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PREFACE
The present volume of ICS is a Gedenkschrift for Friedrich Solmsen (1904-
1989). It comprises twenty-five select contributions commemorating the great
scholar by his friends and colleagues, former students and present admirers.
Three additional articles will appear in ICS XVII (1992)—by W. M. Calder III
(Urbana), D. E. Hahm (Columbus, Ohio), and E. Vogt (Munich).
Solmsen's extraordinary academic career in three countries extends through
sixty years (1929-1989).* It is only natural that during such a span of time the
number of his friends and students has become legion. I have selected a group of
scholars particularly close to Solmsen. In this endeavor I have been kindly
assisted by Lieselotte Solmsen (Chapel Hill), Fritz's wife and assistant since
1932, and by Helen F. North (Swarthmore). My most sincere gratitude to them.
I am also greatly indebted to David Sansone (Urbana) for his self-denying
assistance in the editing and proofreading of the volume, as well as to Fannie
LeMoine (Madison) for her kindness in providing me with the photo of Fritz of
my choice.
The impact of Solmsen's scholarship on Classical studies in the United
States has not yet been explored. On his life and work compare Helen F. North,
Gnomon 61 (1989) 757-59; Eckart Mensching, "Zur Berliner Philologie inder
spaterer Weimarer Zeit—iiber Friedrich Solmsens Berliner Jahre (1922-1933),"
Latein und Griechisch in Berlin 33 (1989) 26-76, as well as Solmsen's own
recollections pubHshed in GRBS 20 (1979) 89-122 and 30 (1989) 117^0.
I have been privileged to know Fritz since 1959. For the past thirty years I
have greatly benefited from his enormous erudition and sound judgment
—
especially while preparing my critical edition of Diogenes Laertius. May this
modest volume be a token of my gratitude and admiration.
Urbana, August 1991
Miroslav Marcovich
^Privatdozent at the University of Berlin (1929-1933); Fellow of Trinity College,
Cambridge (1933-1937); Professor at Olivet College. Michigan (1937-1940); Professor at
Cornell University (1940-1962); Professor at the University of Wisconsin at Madison (1962-
1974); finally, occasional Visiting Professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
(1974-1989).
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The Prosody of the Epic Adonius and its Prehistory
HENRY M. HOENIGSWALD
Summary: 1. True monosyllables in verse-final position are rare
but not exceptional in Homer and Hesiod. 2. Verse-final mono-
syllables beginning with consonant groups are listed. 3. Over-
whelmingly they follow words ending in short vowels. 4. This is not
a property of overall diction or vocabulary as can be shown with a
sample taken from certain earlier locations in the line. An excursus
deals (1) with another phenomenon not limited to line-end, viz. the
alternation between n- and tct-, etc. and that between ev- and evi-; and
(2) with words in -t]^, -it,, -ly^, -oo^, -cov)/ which would (or do) create
overlength even with a following vowel and are often placed at line-
end. 5, In practically all of the 1 14 cadences with verse-final mono-
syllables that begin with single consonants nothing heavier precedes
than a diphthong or long vowel, or a short vowel followed by one
consonant; in addition, there are eight cases with long vowel plus
consonant before a vocalic initial. Thus, overlength at word-boundary,
in the sixth longum is as good as excluded. 6. Word-end after the fifth
longum avoids overlength, exceptions being largely the work of
formula (illustrated from a sample). 7. The line-final "cadences" of the
Rgveda are restricted in strikingly similar ways (though word-end is
not a factor). 8. A sample with instances of problematic overlength in
Homer and Hesiod, concentrated in the latter part of the hexameter but
not tied to word-boundary, is examined with a view to further study.
9. Indo-European sound-structure and poetic technique.
1. TRUE MONOSYLLABLES (i.e. ones which are neither enclitic nor
preceded by a proclitic, whether this is taken orthographically or in some
more sophisticated wayO are infrequent at line end (" I ") in Homer and
Hesiod—only 1% in Homer even by Hartel's count. On the other hand,
they are not the monstrosities of classical Latin (ridiculus mus\) nor are
they mere lapses like, for example, the infractions of Hermann's Bridge after
^ The uncertainty is notorious. De-facto proclitics not sanctioned by diorlholic
practice (e.g. not competing for space with a breathing sign) may in principle be
recognized by their failure to occur at end of line; Ka{ is an example. On fi see
Wackemagel 1955: 619. There is no one clear-cut criterion, however. See note 4, and
Visser 1988: 28 n. 23.
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the fourth trochee. In fact, they can be formulaically well entrenched, as
witness dxvu^evoc; Kf]pl, vEtpeXriYEpexa Zeuql, dKd|j.axov nvpl, (ai kz)
71O01 Ze-ugl, (e^EX,)eTo Ze-uql, eijpeia xGcovl.
2. Some of these monosyllables begin with a consonant group,
including, of course, C„ I,, y (on b[f], ', p, etc. see Section 2 [c]).^ The
group may consist of
(a) sounds other than stop-and-liquid:
v£(pEXTiYepeTa Zexx;! A 511, 517. 560. A 30, E 764, 888, H 280.
454. 38. 469, K 552, A 318, S 293. 312. 341. O 220, U 666. P
198, Y 19, 215, X 182. Q 64. a 63, e 21, i 67, h 313, 384. v 139.
153. CO 477. Th. 558, Op. 53; utixicxa Zevx;! A 175, B 197, 324, Z
198. H 478. e 170. I 377, K 104. A 278. M 279. 292, 377, 599. U
249. Q 314. ^ 243, n 298. v 102. Th. 56. 520. 904. 914. Op. 104;
\ir\zizTa Zet*! A 508; axeponTiYepexa Zz<)q\ U 298; eupvojia Zevql
E 265. 442. I 419, 686, N 732, Z 203. O 724, P 545. Q 296. p 146,
Y 288. 6 173. X 436. ^ 235. p 322, co 544. Th. 514, Op. 229. 239,
281; evpuona Ze\)\ 241; £t)p<)07:a ZtivI 206. E 265. Q 331.
Th. 884; dGdvaxoq xeKexo Zetx;! B 741. H 434. O 2. ft 693; e^eXexo
Ze\)(;I Z 234. T 137; iQcoSvoaxo Zeuql I 292; cbSvoao ZeuI a 62;
i^iXaoL^ Zevql T/i. 820; ai ke tcoGi Ze\)<;I A 128. Z 526, 5 34, ^
215, X 252; dXXd noGi Zeix;! T 273; ovSe tcoxe Zev^I n 644;
avxdp E^iE ZEvql 364, Y 92; ai kev ehoI Zev^I X 256; hz 5'
apa Ztvc,\ M 25, ^ 457; oioiv dpa Zexx;! H 85, n All; 20n oe
jiEpl'* Ze\)(;I dvGpcoTtcov rixGripE x 363-64; EYpexo Se ZEvq! 4;
diE 6e ZEvql 388;
'Apx£ni6i ^vv^l o 410;
ov)K E'XaGf. Tcxco^l P 676;
cxYXi^ S' dpa axdql Q. All; iyyvQi be. oxdql a 120;
AoXiov TcaxEpa o(p6v^l ©411; vnzp^aa{i\q k'vEKa ocpfiql 11 18;
£nion6|a.£voi iievei acpwl ^ 262, p 431, co 183;
^ There is no reason to distinguish between two-consonant and three-consonant groups
like axp-.
^ Underlining of letters calls attention to the possibility of ephelcystic v or metrical
lengthening (see notes 5. 8, 11).
^Non-anastrophic, but presumably not specifically proclitic to Zcvq. Examples recur.
^ See note 8.
^ Here treated as non-enclitic, following orthographic practice.—Enclitic pronominal
forms beginning with a<p- show the following picture: oooe 8' apa ocpecovl v 348;
ouvck' apa o(pecovl Th. 144; ovvek' apa a(f)iac,\ 9 480; evvea 6e o<peaql B 96; ou
6V)vatai o(pil A 116; noXtiioq xixaxo ocpivl P 736; o\)8e Jtoxe a(pivl 562; dfKpl 6'
Spa acpil N 704, P 268; ripxe 6' apa ocpivl n 552, co 9; evtea 8e ocpivl K 471; fivia
8e ocpil n 470; 8(XKpv)a 8e ocpil P 437; e'Txea 8e ocpivl K 152; loxia 8e ocpil i 70;
axvuxo 8e ocpvl E 38; eloaxo 8e o(pil Q 319; ovbei 8e ocpil 4^ 283; one diphthong
(8uvaxai A 116) against 16 short-vowel finals. This belongs in the context of Section 8.
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30aA,X,* apa \iiv <p6fil x 91;
evpeia x0c6vl A 182, 150, A 741, O 387, Th. 458; pePpiGi x9«»vl
n 384; avxap vnb x0«>vl B 465; naaa nepl x9(6vl T 362; ai'naxi
6e xQfi^vl P 316; eiaaxo 6e x^cbvl v 352.
There are, then, 36 different such cadences'^ in Iliad, Odyssey,
Theogony, and Works and Days, ranging from v£(peX,r|YepETa Zevq which
recurs 32 times to 24 cadences occurring once each.
(b) Stop-and-liquid (29 different cadences):
e^EpiTCT] 5p\)q\ H 414; oupeai 5e 6pa)(;l Op. 232;
dv5p6)j.ea Kpeal i 347;
40aX,X« 7toX\) npivl I 250, A 236, N 161, P 167; oi(; zni |iev npivl
Y 408;
ovpavoGi Ttpol r 3; 'IXioGi Tcpol 561, K 12, N 349, 9 581; tiw0i
np6\ A 50. e 469, ^ 36;
al 5' dp* Exi xp£T(;l Y 269;
doPeoxTi KEx^xo (pX,6^l n 123; nat>oaxo 6e <pX6^l NK 228;
expotTtExo (pprivl K 45;
Tiovxov EJii (ppi^l H 63;
5011 XI ^dAxx xpEfi^l 1 197; xov be [idXa xpet^l A 409; ov xi |i.dX,a
XpEcol y 308; xmxE 5£ oe xPemI K 85, a 225; o\>bi xi ^iv xpta)\ 5
707;
ov5£ XI OE XPT|I H 109, I 496, K 479, U 111, T 420. Y 133, ^P 478,*
a 296, p 369, 5 492. k 380, o 393, o 17, x 500; XoxTlod^Evoi; xeo oe
Xpril 5 463; oxxeo oe xp^l' <* 124; ohbi xi ^e xP^l' T 67, x 118;
oxxEo |iE xpil' X 377; 60^^^ ^^ )idXa xpill n 492, X 268; xavxa
5' ana xpnl N 235;
XT|KExo 5£ XP«><;I X 204; ooxEocpi xpw<;l n 145; ndoi 5' dpa xP'^'il
<p 412; xpETiExai Pp6x£0(; XP'^';' Op. 416.
To these we must add
(c) (13 different cadences):
oiS XI ndXa 5t|v [i.e. SpTjv]! A 416, N 573. % 473; ovS' dp' exi
St|vI Z 139, 126, Y 426, "V 690, P 296, 397. p 72;
XT^v 5£ Tipoxi oi [< *5w-]l O 507;
xov 5e Tioxi oi [< *5w-]l (0 347;
' A cadence is here arbitrarily taken as the string of words fUIing the adonius of the fifth
and sixth foot and thus beginning at the bucolic diaeresis or before. The Rgvedic
"cadence" is somewhat differently defined; see Section 7. Both are, however, terminal
stretches.
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joQvyaxipa r\v [< *sw-]\ E 371, Z 192, A 226. N 376. Th. 819;
Guyaxepoq r\(;\ O 504, i 400; Kai Jiatepi 4>l Y 39; xapiC^H^vn
jtooei 0)1 E 71; kuI oGevei |>I 11 542; koi xeKei 4>I ^ 36;^
o'yyq teKeto 'Peal O 187;
oiL)5e Ke ^iv peal M 381; ox> kz |idXa peal Y 101.
3. The remarkable fact is that the word which precedes the terminal
monosyllable in these 78 different^ cadences almost invariably ENDS IN A
SHORT VOWEL. In the first list, (a), the only two exceptions are ai kev
£|j.ol Zet><;l X 256'^ and aXk' apa |a.iv (pGrjl % 91, against 34 turns with
short vowel final. ^^ Even in the (b) list—less telling than the (a) list
because of the possibility of "Attic" correption^^—exceptions number only
^ On the face of it, o\> xi Kpdxei yel H 142 is a case of metrical lengthening (Monro
1891: 83). It would seem, though, that it was at least helped along by the above cadences
(see Meister 1921: 134—35). From the point of view of formula and of placement in the
line it is instructive to look at axti, proceeding from Ifi 6' axei ov naibbc, o 358
through io) axei axo\i.i'^T\ "K 279, iKfjp axei jieyd^o) PePoXTmevoq k 247, rAxpei'Sric;
6' axeii iizydXcc) PePoXrifievoq rixopl I 9 (cp. also lpTi^6fie8a aSevei neyd^o) M 224,
etc.), dxei (p6ivu6o\)oi Ttapeiai! 530 (cp. oiL>5e xi fiiv oBevei pTiyvvoi peovxeql P
751), to eGeXov 8' dxei TtpoxpaneoSai! Z 336 (cp. oGevei pXeneaivcovl 6 337, etc., o
xe Kpdxei 7tpoPePTi)q;il n 54). For dxei this is the complete list. The -i is not
"metrically lengthened" since the syllable may still be seen as simply long by position
everywhere, including before (\i)\i£.yaX(a and before JcpoxpaTteoBai. Similarly, there are,
by a conservative count, five different turns (including n 542) with oGevei CC in all
locations, against the one JKdpxei xe oOeve'i xe P 329; Kpdxei is found only in the two
passages cited, 11 54 and H 142. The final syllable of 'Axi^Xfii shows normal
Wortfugenposition three limes in the third and four times in the fifth arsis (A 283, N 324,
n 575, P 121. Y 376, Q 108, 110) and in this resembles 'AxiA-Xfja, while iScopa 6'
'Axi^Xfii (pepefiev (fi 119 = 147, 176, 196) may be another intriguing indication of the
occasional position-making f)ower of cp- (Korzeniewski 1968: 23; Hoenigswald 1968b:
253; 1972: 939 n. 29). The old true dative in -ei (Hom. 6u(piXoq = Cypr. Ai/reicpiXcq?) is
hardly involved in any of this, not only because its use in Mycenaean does precisely NOT
extend to the a-stems.
' The differences among the cadences vary greatly in importance. Besides, there are
many ways of counting (cp. note 7). If only the "word" (say, oxeponriyepexa, dpa, 6e)
immediately preceding the monosyllable is taken into account the figure drops to 67. The
choice made here has seemed to us to be more in keeping with the workings of the poets'
craft than some of the possible alternatives would have been. The phenomenon under
study is so massive, however, that the decision hardly matters.
^" The adonii aijxdp ejie Zevql © 364, Y 92 and a'l Kev e|ioi Zevql X 256 are
formulaically close.—Before enclitic otpil, 6vvaxai (A 116) is the only instance of
resulting overlength against 14 cases of simple length; see note 6 and Section 8.
^* These include eXaGi, e^eXaa£, PePpiGfc, 'ApxejiiSi. See notes 3, 5, 8.
'^ Allowing us to subsume the three exceptions above under Section 4. A similar
observation applies to ennXeiri v, eji7ipr|aeiv, eyxpijiTttovxc vs. eviTipfiaeiv,
evixpiji<pGevxa (Hoenigswald 1968b: 252; see note 17). For information on Attic
correption in Homer see Chantraine 1942: 108-10, AUen 1987: 100-05. Wathelet 1966
considers that where spellings like TipV, xpV etc. do not simply conceal either a dialect
fonm without the p (npoo- forixor- etc.) or an old VC r = - - (e.g. expanov) Attic correption
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four: E^ep{7iTi Spuql 3 414, olc, etii p.ev jipivl y 408, ox>dk xi |xiv xpeo)l
6 707, and xpeTiexai Ppoxeoq XP«)^I Op. 416, against 25 cases with short
vowel final. *^ Still greater freedom might be expected under (c) where
digamma is subject to various degrees of "neglect" and where gemination,
when it becomes an alternative, is not mandatory. We do have 0t)YaxEpo<;
f|(;l ^ 504 = X 400 (to be compared with the hiatus in ee^^Tiexo ov Kaxa
0t)|i6vl N 8, as if simply eeA^Tiexo pov, not **pf6v [though not merely
**0ov, either, as in 6 6' o\)6' oh 7iai66<; djiiavEii 11 522, corresponding to
la-opiov Tiv apEXT|v 6 535]), and ovSi ke jxiv pEal M 381 (cp. lEvGa ke
pEia [pfia] (pEpoi P 70) but that—two cases against 1 1 short vowel finals
with positional syllable length—is all.
In other words, word-initial consonant groups in this location are in
order where they produce LONG syllables but NOT OVERLONG ones.
4. On the other hand, consider the following sample.
(a) In the second or in the fourth thesis (biceps) and, more rarely, in the
third, too, Zevc, (nom. sg.) may stand after a word ending in a short vowel
(with positional length of the syllable resulting); there are 35 different such
passages (e.g. iTiovxEq a|xa, Ze\)<; 8' rip^E A 495, and including Ze-dc, after
*AxpEi6T|v GfJKE B 482, ek PeA.ecov vnays^ A 163, Pcbaiv Kal a(pi ^
86).
(b) In those same locations Zzvq is, however, also found after a word
ending in a long vowel or in a diphthong: )i\>0£O)j.ai Zevc, (H 76),
ripiaixCSriq oxE 01 (6 216 etc.), ai kev jioi 8cpT| (8 287), Ka^i^ii^ac; Scprj
(Q 529), ava^ Kai xoi (I 98), npiv y' oxe 5t| (M 437), Kal xoxe 6t| (y
13), (o<; ydp nox) (E 120), o\jxco nov (i 262), Sriiowv xw ydp (P 566),
dXkr\Xo\.q in\ ydp (y 152), fi dyaOoq (P 632), d|i(p6xEpoi (Y 155), ©exi
Ktt^EEi (Q. 88), 'lEjiEvoi (y 160), amdp e^ioi (t, 310 etc.), TiEpl Kfipi (p{^Ei
(o 245), 7ixoA,£|io\) El jiT] (? CO 42), ev vooxo) ydp ^loi (co 96), fiaXA^ov
ETiEv (? Th. 428), xcoo^iEvoq (Th. 561), dU' 'dpa ^iv (Th. 899), xw 6' ri
xoi (Op. 333), Ti^^EovEoai Tiopoi (Op. 379), ekxe^eoti (Op. 565), Iti (? Op.
668); that is, about 26 passages with resulting overlength in the arsis that
precedes.
(c) Finally, Zevx; may follow a word-final sequence consisting of a long
vowel or a diphthong and a consonant: alyio^oq Kpovi5ri<; (B 375), xoiSxco
Kpovi6T|q (0 141), EK TiaoEcov Kpovi5'n(; (Z 431), arndp ol Kpovi6ri(; (O
570), 6x1 |ioi KpovvSriq (Q 241), \|/E'u5Eoai Tiaxrip (A 235), ojiTioxEpoiai
TiaxTip (E 33), TpcoEOOi naxrip (P 630), 'ApyEicov (Z 159), laxco v\)v (T
258 etc.), ovxd) vvv (0 465 etc.), vvv t]|iiv Tidvxcov (0 719), uTiEp KpTixTi(;
(^ 300), Ixov^ (p 597), KEpxo^iEcov (Th. 545), 6oXo(ppov£cov (Th. 550).
is limited to the female caesura or to recent, i.e. non-formulaic words; see notes 28, 43. On
possible OVERLENGTH involving stop and liquid see Section 8 (g).
*^ Including 6axe6<pi.
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These 16 passages show what might be called twofold overlength if the
distinction were in any way useful.
There are, then, about 42 cases of overlength (b, c) against 35 cases of
simple length (a). It will not do, therefore, to blame the near lack of word-
seam overlength inside the sixth foot on any gross shortage of suitable turns
in the diction. ^'^
Regardless of location, ^t>v,'5 nxoXtyioq, nxoX-eni^co. nxoXic,,
«ToX(jtop8oq occur only after a short vowel final where of course they
produce positional length.*^ After the heavier word-finals these
ancillary variants are not needed, and overlength is easily avoided even
in locations in which it is otherwise tolerated. TTiis has a mirror image
in the ban on evi-forming compounds with verbs that begin with a
simple consonant (ev-6-uve but not **£v{-5\)ve even though this
sequence is phonologically possible); before a cluster, ev- secondarily
creates overlengths (ev-crxpecpETai E 306 [second foot]).^^
It is tempting to take comfort from the fact that Gcopt]^ (five
different cadences, as well as aioXoGcopri^, XivoBcoprj^ with two
different cadences each), ktj^, tixco^, odA-niy^, (popmy^, (<ppv^ ?)
(these once each) with their fixed final overlengths occur only in verse-
final ancipitia where quantity presumably does not matter at all, while
nr[XT[t, is found in that location in two different cadences, as well as
once in the notoriously lax first foot. However, Kt)KX(OV, in addition
to occurring in three different verse-final cadences and in five different
turns in the first foot (four of them vocatives), is also found positioned
as I - u u Kt)KX(o\t/ V- in three different turns and once as I - u u -
KvkXcoy ^itya.XT[v (i.e. with -(o\|/ in arsi; note the consonantal onset in
Heya^Tiv), ckc6Xti^uu-x I (once) is placed before a vowel, and so is
ipTi^ (two different turns, Ia\)x6q 5* coq x* ipri^ and Iti 5' iptj^ loc,)
when not indeed verse-final (once). It is best to leave aside Ktipu^,
<poivi^, ^oivi^, (cppi^ ?) and their problematic vowel quantities.
^* To insure a minimum of outward comparability, internal passages counted as separate
were given the same length as the terminal adonius (see note 7). It is clear, however, that
this does not uke us very far since spondaic substitution and caesura or word placement
make for different vocabulary choices.
^^ Cp. Section 2 (a) and note 8.
^^ This does not hold for nToX{e6pov (cp. Section 8 [b]), (-)aKe5dvv\)ni, oKCSvrmi
(vs. Ke5-, Ki6-); KxeivcoZ-Kaivco may be a special case.—Short scansion before Ikoi-
Hav6po(; and a few such items with an iambic onset remains an isolated license.
^' Hoenigswald 1968b on e(v)-, evi-, ev, evi; see note 12. The two processes mirror
each other in the sense that in the case of ev-/evi- it is the light variant (evi-) which occurs
only when the other variant is excluded while in the case of 7tx-/n- it is the heavily
consonantal variant (tix-) which plays that role. The ancillary status of evi- is evident
from the fact that while ev6\)ve. eviSuve. eviaxpecpexai were anciently permitted
phoneme sequences, and evoxpecpexai is a plausible innovation, **ev{5\)ve is in fact not
used. On the other hand nx- is ancillary to it- inasmuch as otucpi, Kaxct, eXoi no^iv occur
freely but **eXoi etc. nxoXiv is not found though it is just as conceivable an innovation in
itself as evoxpeq>exai. That ^vv is etymologically prior to auv is another matter.
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5. True monosyllables beginning with a SINGLE consonant, when
found at end of line, are no less consistently preceded by words that end in A
SHORT VOWEL PLUS CXDNSONANT, OR INA LONG VOWEL OR A DIPHTHONG
(there are no instances of -a, -r\, -©). The few monosyllables beginning
with a VOWEL (here included) naturally stand after words ending in a
sequence consisting of long vowel and consonant ^^
T\}Se [LEV ctp Povql (nom. sg.) y ''^30; eiXmoSac; ^ovq\ (ace. pi.)
547. e 60; eaiJio6a<; eXixac; povi;! I 466, a 92, 5 320. i 46; xal
eX,iKa^ ^o\>c,\ I 524. |i 136. co 66; vconfiaai pcovl H 238;
aXk' bnox' av br\\ O 340; bnnoxe kev 6r|l I 115, X 365, P 357; ei
5' eteov 5r|l y 107; autap inr\v br\\ Op. 600, 614;
/Oeiq eyKccpaXov 5ul 85;
fmexepov 5(bl H 363. I 385. 424. a 176. P 262. 5 139; ^)^Exepov
5©l (0 115; mbc, k^bv 5(ol 5 169; iket' e|j.6v 56)1 6 28; epioGeveoc;
TcvKivov 5col T 355; xaXKOpax£(; 5a>l A 426. H 173. O 438. 505, 6
321. V 4; EvpvnvXEq "AiSoq 5cbl 4* 74, X, 571; {)\|/EpE<p£(; 5(ol k 111,
o 424. 432; £(; naxipoq 5(bl X 501; 20«^M'« xe ol 5(ol a 392;
oq KEV ^Ti 6ml Op. 354;
o\)5£ KOKcbv E^l H 472; oq xe Geojv e^I p 518;''
o\)5* dpa n(oq r\\/\ U 60. y 670;
dji<p* ooxEocpiv 61^1 JA 45;
OX) yap Ejifi i^ [p]l A 668; keXexo ^eyocXti ii;l ^ 175; ovSe ol tiv iql
o 3 (also, iql preceded by a de-facto proclitic koi. M 320);^^
EwaXiT] KTi^l o 479;
30iv 6* oXof] Kripl Z 535; ctXX' ejxe ^ev Kripl *? 78;
d^(p* ctSivov KTipl n 481. X 516; eSeXek; x6 6' £^6v icfipl Z 523;
oov Ktti Ejiov KTipl O 52; avxap e^ov Kripl T 319, 5 259. \i 192;
Kd5 Se k' e^ov Kfjpl I 459; K\)5dXi^ov Kripl K 16. M 45. S 33, 9
247; n\)Xai^£V£0(; Xdoiov KTipl B 851; IlaxpoKXfioq X^aiov Kfjpl
n 554; 4(^ 'AxiXXfio(; oXoov Kfjpl Z 139; Eii; 6 ke gov Kfjpl % 58;
EYEXaooE <piXov Kfjpl I 413; evI oxf|0£aoi <piXov Kfjpl a 341, ri
309; £JiiYvdji\|/aoa (piXov Kfipl A 569; eoke <piXov Kfjpl 5 270;
^ll^vE <piXov Kfjpl N 713; Jiapai7CE7ii6ot»aa <piXov Kfjpl H 208; ctov
Se (piXov Kfjpl 7t 274; XExapitojiEvoq xe 91X0V Kfjpl a 310;
5(?<P0ivv9eoke cpiXov KTJpl A 491; <p9ivu0ouoi <piXov Kfjpl k 485;
dxv\)^Evo(; Kfjpl K 67, \i 153, 270; dxvvfXEvov Kfjpl x 188;
dxw^Evco Kfjpl T 57, *? 284, 443; dxv^HEvoi Kfjpl H 428, 431. 4*
*^ See the end of this section on e^l, fivl. Mql, as well as on I'ql and c3<;l. There are no
examples of words ending in two or more consonants preceding terminal
monosyllables.—Inasmuch as elLsio non officii caesurae, ax, in ov>8' o*;! q> 246—the only
example of elision in this location—is to be recognized as a monosyllabic word. See note
25. On Ka{ see note 1.
l^'See note 18.
^°See note 18.
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165, \L 250, CO 420; axvunevii Ktipl Q 773; yriSoavvoq icfipl A 272,
326, I 557; i^inXr\a6nizvoq Ktipl X 504; xwojaevoq icfipl A 44, I
555; ^QX(>i6yi£.vov Ktipl T 37; rixOeto y«P ffipl A 274, 400; ixXXa
5e ol KTipl a 344; Xvaoa 5e o'l icnpl ^ 542; JioXXot 8e o'l Ktipl ti
82, v 85;
navTinepin yXacpupT] vrivql 5 356; epxojievri vrivql ^ 334, x 291;
Tiovxonopoq vTi^^l \i 69, v 95, 161, ^ 339; (hxiiaXoc, vTiuql ji 182, o
473;
aXka bi ^ol vvvl Z 435; /onSe 5e jioi v\»vl O 155; 6v xivd ol
vvvl P 124; ojq Kttl eycb vt»vl e 448; oaoov ey(o vvvl x 169; ei xi
KttKov vvvl A 362 (also, vvvl preceded by Kai,^^ I 105, 111, 259, A
790, H 234, ^ 787, co 186);
d^9iX.\)KTi vv^l H 433; napoixcoKEv 6£ jiXecov v-u^l K 252;
d^PpooiT] vv^l 5 429, 574, ti 283; ovpavoSev vv^l e 294, i 69, \i
315; d|j.<pi 6e jj.iv vu^l T/i. 726;
50eeo7ii5ae(; Jivpl (nom., ace.) M 177, 441, O 597, Y 490, <D 342,
381, 4' 216, 6 418; dKd^iaxov nupl (nom., ace.) E 4, n 122, I 225,
<& 13, 341, ^ 52, -0 123, <p 181; d^ai^dxexov Kupl Th. 319;22
avGo^evov nvp\ U 293; KTiaiievco nvpl tc 2; 5riiov nt»pl I 347,
674, n 301, I 13; f| oXoov nvpl O 605; 5aie 6e ol n\)p\ r\ 7; oloe
5e noi nvp\ x 481; ev 5' e'PaXxav nvpl il 787;
p^o-ux' dp' eyo) oovql Y 205;
dvaaxoi^Tiv oxe ^oi av\ X 375; evGev oBev aoil A 58;
Ti5e ^iyac, cvc} 5 457; koxekcixo \iiya(; o\)q\ x 439; (p0d|iEvo(;
eXaoEv G\)C,\ X 449;
fi KEv Eyo) xovl <I) 226, ^ 565; mq Kai Eyoo xtjvI I 342 (also xai xcpl
I 666, Op. 754; Kal xovl T 96; Kai xfiql A 138; Kai xdl Op. 684;
Kav xcbvl Op. 513);
IooOeoc; (pcoql B 565, T 310, A 212, H 136, I 211, A 428, 472, 644,
559, n 632, 4* 569, 677, a 324, v 124; dUoxpioc; (pcoql E 214, ti
102, a 219; /ooojq oxe xk; (pcoql 11 406;
dn<pl 6e fioi XE^pl H 517;
dGdvaxoc; (oq\ C, 309; aiyEipoq mql A 482; aiyvnioq o)(;l N 531
TiEXioq ©i;l E 185, X 234; tje^iov oSql a 296; KaocixEpoc; mql T/i
862; VTiTcuxiov ©ql Y 200, 431; vrinvxioi toql N 292. Y 244
jjOoitiivibv (iiq\ X 605; 6pvi0Eq oSql T 2; opviBaq coql B 764
XTiXvyExov (oql N 470; ol 6£ Xukoi (ic) A 471, A 72, 11 156
KpTjXEcai OEoq mql T 230; oi OE 0e6v oSql I 302, X 434; wpxo Xioav
wql A 129, Y 164; ejieoev \izXir\ coql N 178; (popEOvxo ^ozc, (oc) A
172;23
'' See note 1.
^^ In violation of Hermann's Bridge.
"See note 18.
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120^^ yap eymv ox;! o 156; aXka. \ix\ o\)5' ©ql <p 246; aveoxT\aev
56 jiiv oiL)5' ©ql ii 756.^'*
If the line-final monosyllable begins with one consonant, a sequence
consisting of a long vowel or diphthong followed by a consonant, or of two
or more consonants at the end of the word which precedes would again create
overlength. This happens only once: napoixcoKev 6e 7tA.ecov vij^l (vv.U.
7tX,eco, kXeov!) K 252 (Doloneia) where the iteration -v#v- could play a
role. As for iq, it occurs in three different cadences after a long vowel, but
also in o{)5e ol tJv v'ql a 3, with "neglected" digamma as we would like to
think; the scansion matches that of oq xe Gecov e^l p 518, o{>5* apa Ticog
Tivl n 60, ai yap eyoiv wql o 156, aXXa |iiv ot)5' togi (p 246,
dveaxrioev 5e |iiv ot)5' w^l Q 756, where p was presumably never
involved. The same as for iq may hold for the postpositive Isic,, "like," (here
included among the orthotones),^ preceded as it most often is by -VC or by
a diphthong or long vowel, but then also by -cov in wp-co ?ie(ov coql A 129
= Y 164, and oicovcov c6(;l X 605. In short, out of 122 instances in this
section, there is only one, and that a slightly doubtful one, in which
overlength results. Altogether, in only two or three of the 200 different
cadences that end in monosyllables do the latter generate overlength. ONLY
LONG, and NOT OVERLONG syllables are permitted at word boundaries inside
the sixth foot.
6. Most of this appears to have gone unnoticed. If questions are asked
at all about Wortfugenposition of the kind -V#CC- they are likely to be
aimed at the circumstances under which it is ALLOWED^^—in arsi and in the
first or the second thesis—than at those under which it is FAVORED or
required because, given certain vocabulary choices, there is no other remedy
against overlength. There are some uncertain hints at the role of overlength
at word-boundary after the longum of the fifth foot: by Hilberg 1879,
Drewitt 1908 (also Piatt 1921), Parry 1928, and Pipping 1937; a more
recent voice is that of West 1970, 1982. Drewitt observed the play between
Kpeicov 'A7a|X£)ivcovl and Kpaxepoq Aio^r|8ri(;l (not **Kpeicov Aio)j.T|5ri(;l!).
Parry discussed it in passing, in perceptive if somewhat ad hoc terms, as a
characteristic of the seam between a hero's epithet and his name. A further
search^^ reveals greater generality, however: in A (= 544 lines) only five
times (including one repeated half-line, 232 ~ 257 [repeated six more times
^ See note 18. On br\\, oi, etc., see Section 2 (c) above.
" For the f see Chantraine 1968-80: 1305. On c*;. ax; see Femandez-Galiano 1986:
248.
^ West (1982: 37) remarks that it occurs only once (Qejiiv xe MvrmoowvTiv xel Th.
135) in the bucolic diaeresis, where all positional length is rare. On spondaic fourth feet
see Meister 1921: 22-27.—Preference is not simply the obverse of exclusion in the sense
that sequences not welcome in certain locations naturally accumulate in the others.
Overlongs are not just dwarfed; they are nearly totally absent in some of the latter.
2'' Hoenigswald 1988.
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elsewhere in the Iliad]) does a word-end generate overlength in that location
(Xp-uoEOK; 5e7ideaail 3 [also y 472], dvaTiXrioTiq Pioxoiol 170 [also
avanXr\oaq kukcl noXXdl 132], cppovecov Jiope Xeipcovl 219,
Aavawv xaxvitcoXcovl 232 ~ 257), when the overall preponderance of
words ending like Ttdpoq, Kp6vo\) over words ending like Aavacov in a
sample, A 73-84, is only 36/11, or 3.27. Nor is this all: along the lines
of famous anomalies like jiEpoTieq dv0pto7toil (= u u x I, after ^.epoTccov
dv0pa)7i(ovl), these overlengths may be credited with formulaic ties to
variants with simple lengths—depending, to be sure, on one's view of what
constitutes formula:
Xpvaioic, Sejcdeaail A 3 ~ y 472: cp. eJiap^djievoi 5e7ideooivl y
340 = 9 272, enap^djievoi; Scjidecaivl r\ 183, enap^doBo)
Sendeaaivl o 418 = <p 263, eyxEiTi Sendeooivl i 10, xp'^oeoioi
ve<peaail N 523;
dvajiXrioriq Pioxoiol A 170 ~ O 132: cp. TioXeoq Pioxoiol P 126,
XiXaiojievoi Pioxoiol ^ 328 ~ co 536, eviTiXeiov Pioxoiol x 580 = <p
78;
<ppovecov Tcope Xeipmvl A 219: cp. <piA,q) nope Xeipwvl 11 143 = T
390 (v.l. xdjxe X.), ppovecov evi G-ojiwI 430, KOKa (ppovecov
evopouCTTil K 486 ~ 11 783, \iiya (ppovecov ePePrjKeil A 296 ~ N 156
~X21;
'
Aavawv xax^tcb^covl A 232 ~ 257: cp. Aavaoi xax'uncoX.oil 6
161, IM\)p|ii56ve(; xax^ncoXoi ^ 6, Aavacov eSvvavxol M 417,
Aavawv vnb xepoivl O 2?^
7. (a) In the SENTENCE—i.e. across word-seams—the incidence of
overlengths is perforce uneven; we have noted the special role of the second
and the fourth foot.^^ For the purpose of the substitution of spondees for
dactyls overlongs are, or would be, longs. Therefore, their distribution,
along with that of plain longs, among the metra of the hexameter and
among their arses and theses cannot be independent of caesura and of the
play of dactyls and spondees.
(b) WORD-INTERNAL overlength is rare IN THE LANGUAGE. This is
connected with the massive, ancient constraints on the phonological
structure of Indo-European and with the ubiquitous sound-laws that tend to
^ Spot checks throughout the poems yield a rich additional harvest; cp. Hoenigswald
1988: 204. The strange reversal in the case of Kpa6{Ti (-Ti!;,
-w, -r]v)—27 times (not
counting repeated Unes) in the Iliad after long vowel, diphthong, or short vowel followed
by a consonant, as against only once, in the second arsis, I - - '6nnr\ oe KpaSiT) N 783,
after a short vowel—^is only a[^arent if r [later > pa] was still the equivalent, in the source
formula, of a short vowel after the manner of dv6poTTiTa Kal liPriv (Wathelet 1966: 160-
72, Hoenigswald 1968a: 20 [with earlier literature], West 1982: 15). This necessitates
adjustments in our view of the relative chronology of certain processes in the prehistory of
Greek.
^' See Section 4.
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reduce new overlengths by shortening long vowels, deleting consonants
from heavy clusters, or giving rise to anaptyctic vowels. The new
overlengths were typically created by vowel contractions (still few in
Homer), "temporal" augments, and many other morphological constructions
like affixation, compounding, and juxtaposition.
In 5 1-150 there are 82 overlengths of BOTH kinds ([a] and [b]) in the
first four feet, against nine in the fifth and sixth. This is no surprise, not
only in view of the behavior of the monosyllables (see Sections 1 to 5) but
simply as a general truth about Greek meters of all kinds, including the
Aeolic meters which are often regarded as specific Indo-European
inheritances. The coda of the line or metrical unit is built more tightly than
is its initial portion.^^ In the Vedic poetry of India this is well known; here
the "cadence" begins at the point in the verse at which syllables are no
longer merely counted but also regulated with regard to quantity. If the
avoidance of overlength is an aspect of line-end in Homer it is a welcome
finding that the Rgveda exhibits something strikingly similar: Rgvedic
cadences not only utilize the two traditional quantities, short and long (or
"light" and "heavy"); they have also been found to be inhospitable, with
certain interesting exceptions, to overlong syllables.^^ It seems that we
have here a precious technical detail of Indo-Etu^opean poetics.
8. It is possible that the observations about the fifth foot are
unnecessarily restricted as offered (in Section 7), inasmuch as WORD
BOUNDARY may not be crucial.^^ n could be that it is overlong quality
AS SUCH that is significantly rare near the end of the line ( . . . - u u - x I,
... X I). Of the passages which would contradict this quite a few are
independently suspect. The comments below cover the fifth and the sixth
foot in five Homeric books, A, A, N, H, and ^, with recourse to other
passages when convenient. They are only intended to call attention to
matters in need of further study.
(a) dv5pa, dv5pwv, etc. Between v- and -p the segment -6- is
automatic. The Rgveda treats the divine name, indra-, in strikingly
analogous fashion.^^
(b) vai6|j.evov TttoXieGpov, etc.: see note 16.
(c) 'Temporal" augment when followed by CC. Aristarchus prefers
unaugmented forms; wpto, riXGe, etc., while familiar, have no particular
authority.^ Is the accentuation of dXxo authentic?
'°See, inter al.. West 1982: 4 on Meillet, Jakobson, Watkins etc.
'^ Hoenigswald 1990.
^^ See note 6 on enclitic o<p-.
"Hoenigswald 1990: 561.
'* Chantraine 1948: 483.—On the mandatory augment of "gnomic" aorists see,
however. Piatt 1891.
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(d) Orthographically marked atticisms:^^ X"M^«Ce. aooov (?, Ven. A
has aooov, anyway). Likewise, probably, ninxe, ninxov, where i is
perhaps attested or suggested for a later period (by accent, though this would
in prose show only in 2 sg. impv. and in pres. part, neuter, by spellings
with El, and by Hdn. 2. 377 [?]^^) but uncertain for Homer, as well as
unetymological.
(e) dv5pcov xe GeSv teI: just possibly a case of vowel shortening by
"Osthoffs Law" but with the orthography normalized; cp. FlpojcowTiaoq <
*npoKcov vfjooq, neA^oTiovvTiooq if < *ne^67icov vfjocx;,^^ ZaowTjooq (cp.
Id[i]oi). The period of these juxtapositions could have been that in which
the formula became fixed.—By the same token oxovaxdq xeI 4 39 etc.,
oXhi^iE^ovc, xel A 83 etc. could exhibit the word-internal treatment of
(-dvo-) > -a\o-k^e, -o\<5-k^e > -aa-xe, -oa-xe with an orthographic
overlay. Word-final overlengths of more straightforward origin are not
numerous. Their very rarity may be significant.^*
(f) Mid. 3 pi. forms.^^ The turn |iaxeoivxo 'Axaiod A 344—the only
serious such optative in or out of cadence—conceals ^axeoiax' 'A.I
(Bentley), without the hiatus. Forms in -uvxai either have t>, Oslhoff or
otherwise, or occur in earlier locations in the verse or both. This leaves
only |j.£^vTivxo ydp aveil P 364,'*^ 0t)pai 6' ejiEKewxo cpaeivad ^ 19,"*^
Tjvx' i%\ Tivpycpl r 153 anywhere in the poems.'*^ (Distractions in
-6covxai/o [= -dovxai/o] naturally do not count.)
(g) Meillet thought that Tixepoevxa 7ipoaT|'66al A 201 etc. with its
glaring correption masks a non-Ionic 7ioxTit)6-.'*^ The same could apply to
stop-and-liquid overlengths"^^ like oaooiievoq jipoaeemel A 105, ^lv
TtpoaeeiTievI A 441, etc.
(h) For g-oacopTiaciJvxav ev a\>kT\\ K 183, dnoaxriocovxai 'Axaioil N
745 the manuscripts have variants of some prominence with -aovxai.—The
proper reading of dyXaiEiaGai etc. (always contracted) may be
" Wackemagel 1955: 1181-82. For other allicisms see below. 8 (0-
3^ Schwyzer 1939: 648.
" Schwyzer 1939: 386.—On cpiXavcop vs. (p{>.av6po<; etc. see Wackemagel 1955: 925.
^^ It may be worth reporting that if we limit ourselves once again to the sixth foot
verse-final monosyllabic enclitics or quasi-enclitics (cp. the xel in Gecov Tel) are almost
never so preceded, 'Axpei8Ti<; 6el Z 64, f| xoi ecpiic; yel X 280, 'AvaPrioiveox; xel 6
113, oc; Kev ejifjc; ye' "^ 27 (also \ir\vc\p xe naxrjp xel 8 224, 550, ev0a Avkcov jievl
n 337, oiL)6e xk; ovv noil ^ 254?) being the only examples throughout. By contrast,
-cov, -OMC, etc. are quite frequent. A comprehensive count covering other metrical locations
as well as all kinds of word-interior position would be needed.
^' Wackemagel 1916: 89-100, Chaniraine 1948: 475-77.
*°Zenodotus' athetesis is not relevant.
*'
"Parfois . . . condamne;" SiipT) 8' eTtexeixo (paeivf)! ?, Chantraine 1948: 476.
—
Wackemagel 1916: 89-100 speaks of an "Atticizing poet."
*^ Wackemagel 1916: 98-99 speaks of "an evident [Attic] neologism."
*' Meillet 1918: 305, Severyns 1946: 40-^1. Wathelet 1966.
** But cp. Section 3.
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ay^aiEoGai etc.'*^—In the Doloneia dxpeKeox; KaxaXE^ovl K 384, d.
KaxaXe^col K 413, 427 (vulgate) compete with the readings d.
dYopevaov, d. dyopevato.'*^
9. In sum, overlength and the escape from it were important factors for
the early epic poets. In express parallel to the Rgveda, and quite in step
with other, better-known fundamentals of Indo-European poetics—the
relative laxity of the first two feet of the hexameter being a familiar
example—incidence diminishes as the verse moves towards its coda.'*^ At
the rightmost word-boundary possible, inside the sixth foot, we have
established near exclusion. As we retrace our steps leftward, observance is
less and less strict. The Rgvedic analog is relevant since the metrically inert
word accent, along with many other traits of the ancestral language structure
that go with quantitative meter—relatively speaking a rarity on the face of
the earth—are better preserved in India and in Greece than anywhere else.
Perhaps the ban on overlength fills its aesthetic role best in the
situation where the poets have the greatest freedom of invention, namely at
word-boundary. If, however, it is really significant that such word-internal
overlengths as have gained and kept a foothold in the language are not more
zealously kept out of the sixth foot at least,"** there is still the possibility
that word-boundary has some prosodic reality in the hexameter and can exert
the same crowding effect which it seems to show here and there in other
genres of versification.'*' Some will find this disquieting since it runs
counter to the otherwise well-founded impression that while it is the essence
of ancient Indo-European metrical prosody to idealize phonological build,
Unes of poetry function much as does the "word" of non-metrical language.
University of Pennsylvania
^^Chantraine 1948: 451.
*^ Whether the apparent rarity of perfect and pluperfect middle forms with overlength is
significant needs to be investigated. Some PARTICULAR fonns like i(pr\nxa\., XiXtinxai,
XeXeiTixo recur precisely in the sixth arsis.
*'' See Section 7.
**
It seems that the type i(px\nxai\ etc. (see note 46) is better entrenched than the types
ejioi Zvoc) (once, see Section 3), **d7a0o\)q ^ovc,\ (no good examples; see Section 5).
*^ West 1982: 9. West also believes (1982: 36-37) that the thesis (biceps) is longer
than the arsis (princeps).
Thanks are due Alan J. Nussbaum, Donald Ringe, Joseph A. Russo, and Laurence D.
Stephens for their advice. Harry Barnes made available to me his extensive collection of
metrical data on Homer.
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Die Reise des Telemach
HARALD PATZER
Der unbefangene Leser der "Odyssee" hat mit der Reise des Telemach seine
Schwierigkeiten, die schon mit deren erster Ankiindigung durch Athene (1.
93 ff.) einsetzen. Die Reise scheint unnotig und fiir die Handlung nichts zu
bewirken. DaB der heimgekehrte Odysseus vor dem Eintritt in sein Haus
mit dem Sohn zusammentrifft, ist zwar geboten, aber dazu wiirde ein kurzer
Auftrag der Gottin Athene an Telemach geniigen, da6 er den Schweinehirten
aufsuchen soUe, um nach dem Rechten zu sehen. Dann ware die Handlung
noch klarer eine "Odyssee," wie das Prooimion und die erste Szene des Epos
sie kennzeichnen, und zwar die Heimkehr des Helden als letzter Abschnitt
einer langen Folge von Irrfahrtenstationen, die schlieBlich an einen toten
Punkt gelangen und eines neuen Anstosses bediirfen.
Auch in Athenes Programm, das die genauere Durchfuhrung des
Gotterbeschlusses, Odysseus heimkehren zu lassen, entwirft, erscheint zuerst
Kalypso, die von Hermes dazu gebracht werden soil, Odysseus in die Heimat
zu entlassen. Dann aber springt Athene unerwartet zu dieser noch weit
entfemten Heimat Ithaka hiniiber und als Hauptperson dort erscheint vollig
unvorbereitet der Sohn des Helden, der im eigenen Haus das selbstherrliche
Gebaren von "Freiem" (um seine Mutter natiirlich), die auch vollig neu
auftreten, erdulden muB. Diesen Sohn will Athene selbst in Ithaka
aufsuchen und durch bestimmte Anweisungen, darunter eine Reise nach
Pylos und Sparta, dazu bringen, sich der Freier zu entledigen, und sie macht
sich sofort auf den Weg. Die damit in Bewegung gesetzte
Telemachhandlung bleibt die vier ersten Bucher der "Odyssee"
ununterbrochen das Thema der Erzahlung. Erst dann geht es an Hermes'
Botengang zu Kalypso, mit dem Odysseus' Heimfahrt beginnt.
Schwierigkeiten machen weiter die Anordnungen der Athene an
Telemach, die sie in ihrem Programm ankundigt (1. 90 ff.). Sie sind zwar
viel ausfiihrlicher gehalten als das, was Hermes fiir Kalypso aufgetragen
werden soil, aber doch noch immer zu knapp, als daB deren Zweck einsichtig
wiirde: Telemach soil erstens den Freiem das Haus verbieten, zweitens zu
Schiff nach Pylos und Sparta fahren, um zu erkunden, was etwa von der
Heimfahrt des Vaters bekannt ist. Das zweite scheint ohne erkennbaren
Zusammenhang mit dem ersten zu sein. Das erste, das Hausverbot an die
Freier durch den knapp zwanzigjahrigen Odysseussohn, wird schwerlich ohne
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Umstande befolgt werden. Die Reise miiBte klaren, ob der Vater noch Icbt
und also heimkehren kann oder tot ist. Lebt er noch und bringt Telemach
diese Kunde zuriick, muBlen die Freier die Rache des Heimkehrers fiirchten.
Das konnte sie veranlassen, eher bereit zu sein, das Haus des Odysseus
fortan unbehelligt zu lassen. Naher liegt freilich, daB sie dies gerade nicht
tun, sondern sich eher auf Odysseus' Kommen vorbereiten, der sie
seinerseits ungewamt antreffen wiirde, was nahelegen wiirde, Telemach als
mOglichen Warner umzubringen. Zudem konnten sie bei bewaffnetem
ZusammenstoB mit dem Heimgekehrten auf ihre weit groBere Uberzahl
vertrauen. Ist aber Odysseus tot, hatten die Freier noch leichteres Spiel;
Penelopes Entscheidung fur einen von ihnen erschiene dann leicht
erzwingbar.
Wenn schlieBlich Athene mit der Erkundungsreise Telemach "herrlichen
Ruhm unter den Menschen" zu verschaffen gedenkt (1. 95), so ist das noch
unverstandlicher, Im Epos ist diese formelhafte Verbindung regelmaBig auf
eine gianzende Waffentat bezogen, als welche diese Reise nicht gelten kann.
Zwar muBte sie unter den damaligen Verhalmissen als beachtliche Leistung
eines eben erwachsenen Angehorigen des Kriegeradels gelten, und man darf
sogar annehmen, daB solche selbstandig geleiteten Fahrten iiber See,
besonders wenn es um Regelung privater oder offentlicher Angelegenheiten
ging, von denen wir im Epos ofter horen, geradezu eine Art Institution
waren, durch die sich ein junger Adliger das Ansehen eines vollgiiltigen
Standesvertreters bei den Mitmenschen erwarb.^ Aber das kann noch nicht
als kXeoc, eoGXov, d.h. genauer: Ruhm einer groBen Bewahrung
kriegerischer Tuchtigkeit (dpexTi), bewertet werden. Wo sonst im Epos von
solchen Reisen die Rede ist, erhalten sie eine so hohe Bewertung weder vom
Erzahler noch den redenden Personen, ausgenommen die Waffentaten des
jungen Nestor (II. 11, 668 ff.). Aber hier sind es eben Kriegstaten, die
geriihmt werden, und es geht auch nicht um eine (Schiffs-)Reise in die
Fremde, sondern um die Teilnahme an einem Kriegszug gegen eine
NachbarstadL
In den Zeiten der bliihenden Homeranalyse lag eine Radikallosung all
dieser Schwierigkeiten durch Annahme verschieden alter Textpartien nahe.
Die vier Odysseebiicher, die ein selbstandiges Stuck einer
Telemachiehandlung durchfiihren, ehe es zu dem bereits in der
Gotterversammlung beschlossenen Botengang des Hermes zu Kalypso
kommt, mit dem Odysseus' Heimkehr eingeleitet wird, dazu etwa auch die
Herabstufung eines KXeo<; eoGXov auf die Leistung einer bloBen Reise,
schienen auf einen "jiingeren Dichter" einer "Telemachie" zu verweisen, die
entweder ein zuerst selbstandiges Einzelgedicht war, das ein Bearbeiter mit
einer alteren Odyssee verband, der die Telemachie noch fehlte, oder der selbst
* S. Renate Zoepffel, "Geschlechtsreife und Legitimation zur Zeugung im alten
Griechenland," in: Ernst Wilhelm Muller (Hrsg.), Geschlechtsreife und Legitimation zur
Zeugung (Freiburg 1985) 326 ff.
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zu jener alteren Odyssee eine Telemachie hinzudichtete.^ Die homerische
Textschichten-Analyse, die noch immer ihre Anhanger hat,^ hat es jedoch
nicht zu iibereinstimmenden und allgemein anerkannten Ergebnissen
gebracht Das Untemehmen stand in der Tat unter der methodischen Gefahr,
den zweiten vor dem ersten Schritt tun zu wollen, d.h. von einem
ungesicherten Textverstandnis auszugehen, das diejenigen Schwierigkeiten
selbst erzeugte, die die Voraussetzung der analytischen Schlusse bildeten.
Der Homertext wird in der Tat von alien Analytikern "unbefangen"
verstanden. Aber es ist die Frage, ob ein unbefangenes Verstehen
homerischer Dichtung einem heutigen Leser oder Interpreten iiberhaupt
mOglich ist, selbst angenommen, der Text sei in rein sprachlicher Hinsicht
einwandfrei verstanden.
Sehr einfache und naheliegende Uberlegungen zwingen zu der Einsicht,
daB dies nicht moglich ist. Die zeitgenossischen Horer, die der Dichter mit
seiner Dichtung allererst ansprechen wollte, verfugten iiber bestimmte,
ihnen durch Uberlieferung vorgegebene Verstehensbedingungen, die ihnen
wie dem Dichter selbstverstandlich und damit als solche gar nicht bewuBt
waren. Als historisch gewordene sind sie notwendig von den ebenso vorab
gegebenen Aufnahmeweisen von Dichtung verschieden, die fur einen
heutigen Leser oder Interpreten aus dem europaischen Kulturkreis
selbstverstandlich und meist unbewuBt gelten. Der "unbefangene" Leser ist
also in Wahrheit der "befangene" und eben deswegen gehindert, einen
urspriinglichen Zugang zu antiker Dichtung zu finden. Hierzu fiihrt kein
^ Eine bequeme Orientierung iiber die Geschichte der Odyssee-Analyse bietet Friednch
Klingner, Ober die vier erslen Biicher der Odyssee, Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen der
Sachsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philologisch-historische Klasse,
96. Band 1944, 1. Heft (Leipzig 1944) = Studien zur griechischen und romischen Literatur
(Ziirich und Stutlgan 1964) 39-79. Kl. macht in seiner Arbeit (freilich nur fiir die vier
ersten Odysseebiicher in ihrem inneren Aufbau) eine Gegenprobe der aus dem iiberlieferten
Text von den Analytikern als vermutlich alter abgegrenzten Textpartien im Hinblick auf
deren dann sich ergebenden Kontext. Durchweg erweist sich die Dichtung so, wie sie uns
iiberliefert ist, als iiberlegen oder sogar allein moglich.
Dasselbe Verfahren erweiterte Erich Seitz in seiner Untersuchung: Die Stellung der
"Telemachie" im Aufbau der Odyssee (Diss. Marburg 1950) (masch.) auf den Bezug der
Telemachiebiicher insgesamt zur "eigentlichen" Odyssee. Es ergab sich die Unlosbarkeit
beider Telle voneinander.
Herbert Eisenberger wird schlieBlich in seinen: Studien zur Odyssee, Palingenesia 7
(Wiesbaden 1973) eine sorgfaltige Gesamtinterpretation der Odyssee verdankt, bei der die
jeweils von Analytikern als von spalerer Hand stammenden Partien einer WeglaBprobe
unterzogen werden. Fast durchweg erweist sich eine Einbu&e an notwendigen
Aufbauelemenien des dichlerischen Logos im Verhallnis zum iiberlieferten Text. E.s
Studien ergeben somit eine—man darf wohl sagen: abschlieBende—Gesamtbilanz der
Odyssee-Analyse, die ihrer Aufhebung gleichkommt. Das bedeutet den Appell, zum
iiberlieferten Text zuriickzukehren und ihn mit groBter Genauigkeit nach MaBstaben
auszulegen, die allein das homerische Epos selbst an die Hand gibt.
^Z.B. Helmut van Thiel, Odysseen (Basel 1988) und Ders., Iliaden und Ilias (Basel
1982); vgl. dazu H. Eisenberger, GGA 234 (1982) 11 ff. und H. Bannert, Gnomon 59
(1987) 97 ff.
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anderer Weg, als zuvor die dem antiken Horer vorgegebenen und unbewuBten
besonderen Verstehensbedingungen zu erschlieUen, was nur mil den Milteln
der Wissenschaft (dcr Philologie) mOglich ist, aber nicht nur zu erkennen,
sondem anzueignen und in Wirkung zu setzen, eine muhevoUe Aufgabe.
Fiir die Dichiung des archaischen und klassischen Griechentums sind
nun die bedeutendsten Verstehensbedingungen dieser Art bestimmte
dichterische Formgesetze, die fiir jede Dichtungsgattung verschieden sind und
sie kennzeichnen. Am homerischen Epos sind solche festen, ihm
eigentumlichen Formen wie etwa die Gleichnisse, die Epitheta, die
wortlichen Reden der handelnden Personen immer aufgefallen und bis zur
Trivialitat allbekannt. Gleichwohl, vielleicht sogar deswegen, gibt es bis
jetzt keine vollstandige Bestandsaufnahme dieser Gattungsgesetze, erst recht
ist nicht versucht worden, sie in eine systematische Ordnung zu bringen,
ihre Bedeutung zu bestimmen und sie folgerecht in die Auslegung
einzusetzen. Denn diese Gesetze und die Formen, die sie vorschreiben, sind
dichterische Zeichen und haben ihre Bedeutung, ebenso wie die Regeln der
Grammatik und des Lexikons der gewohnlichen Sprache. Erst eine auf eine
poetische Grammatik gegriindete Textauslegung—denn Dichtung darf als
Sprache hoherer Ordnung verstanden werden
—
gewahrleistet eine sichere
Wegfiihrung und schutzt vor gar nicht bemerkbaren Irrgangen, die einem
"unbefangenen" Aufnehmen homerischer Dichtung immer drohen.
Der Verfasser dieses Beitrags hat versucht, diese Aufgabe in Angriff zu
nehmen und hofft, die Ergebnisse dieser Forschungen bald veroffentlichen zu
konnen. Die Formgesetze des homerischen Epos wurden erschlossen aus
dichterischen Gestaltungsweisen, die in "Ilias" und "Odyssee" durchgangig
wiederkehren und eine bestimmte dichterische Bedeutung erkennen lassen.
Fiir die Systematik gab ein bestimmter Begriff von "Dichtung" die
Orientiening, der aus Ansatzen der aristotelischen Poetik (bes. cc. 1-3 u. c.
9, 1451a36-bll) entwickelt wurde und fiir den es geniigen soil, wenn er sich
in der Anwendung bewahrt.
Danach laBt sich "Dichtung" definieren als: "Nachgestaltung (^i^T|ai(;)
menschlicher Wirklichkeit im Medium der Sprache, eine Nachgestaltung, die
fiir einen bestimmten Kreis von Aufnehmenden bedeutungsvoU, giiltig und
wahr ist." Daraus ergaben sich drei aufeinander aufbauende Geltungsbereiche
der Formgesetze, und zwar die dichterische 5/?rac/igestaltung, die
Darstellungsweise und die in Sprache dargestellte (nachgestaltete)
menschliche Wirklichkeit.
I
Von diesen Formgesetzen sei nun hier fiir das Verstandnis der Reise des
Telemach in der "Odyssee" Gebrauch gemacht, und zwar indem deren erste
Ankiindigung im Programm der Athene (1. 93 ff.) im Textzusammenhang
gemaB diesen Gesetzen interpretiert wird. Es wird sich daraus ergeben, ob
die vorgeschlagene neue Methode sich insoweit bewahrt, als die friiher
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entwickelten Schwierigkeiten, die die Telemachreise in der Odyssee dem
unbefangenen Leser bietet, durch sie losbar werden. Fiir diesen unseren
Zweck genugt es, sich auf zwei dieser epischen Formgesetze zu beschranken
(genauer je ein Hauptgesetz mit seinen untergeordneten Teilbestimmungen),
die die Gestaltung unseres Textabschnittes vorwiegend bestimmen. Diese
Gesetze betreffen 1) die Exposition des Epos, 2) die Eigenart der im Epos
handelnden Personen.
1) Das fiir die Gestaltung der Exposition geltende Hauptgesetz: Der in
der Erzahlung vorgefiihrten Ereigniskette, die sich hierarchisch in Szenen
und groBere Szenengruppen gliedert und im ganzen eine stetig
vorwartsschreitende Handlung ergibt, gehen knappe Angaben iiber deren
Ausgangslage voraus, die Exposition. Gewohnlich erscheint auch von der
Vorgeschichte der Ausgangslage so viel, wie es diese erklart. Fiir diese
Exposition gilt das Darstellungsgesetz einer moglichst knappen, zuerst
unbestimmten Angabe des Wissensnotwendigen, die sich fortschreitend
durch weitere beilaufig erscheinende fragmentarische Angaben prazisiert (dies
in betontem Gegensatz zu dem Detailreichtum der eigendichen Erzahlung).
Diese unscheinbar auftretenden sich allmahlich erganzenden Angaben konnen
bis in die schon begonnene Erzahlung hineinreichen (der Stil des "in medias
re5"-Gehens). Diese knappe Darstellungsweise setzt bewuBt die
implikatorische Phantasie des Horers in Bewegung. Im Epos ist weiter die
Exposition festgelegt auf die Folge von a) Prooimion (Vorsatzstiick vor der
eigentlichen Erzahlung, der oiVt|) und b) weiterfuhrender Exposition. Schon
hier wirkt also das allgemeine Stilprinzip der fortschreitenden Prazisierung.
a) Fiir das Prooimion gilt ein besonders strenges Aufbauschema,
das sogar noch die syntaktische Gestaltung festlegt. Es fordert die
stichwortartige Angabe der beiden Kemdaten der Exposition: des
Subjektes der Handlung (= der "Hauptperson") und der diesem
zugehorigen Handlung. Beide erscheinen wiederum in einem kurzen
Gebetsanruf an die Muse, der gottlichen Handwerkspatronin des
Sangers, die ihm den Gesang eingeben soil. SchlieBlich muB die
Erzahlwiirdigkeit der zu berichtenden Handlung durch die Vielheit (also
die GroBe) des von ihr ausgegangenen Leidens verdeutlicht werden.
b) Die weiterfiihrende Exposition, die nun der von der Muse
inspirierte Sanger iibernimmt, strebt, noch immer mit knapp
gehaltenen Expositionsdaten, auf die erste Erzahlszene zu, die in sich
noch weitere Prazisierungen in beilaufigen Angaben enthalt.
2) Fur die dichterische Gestaltung (Stilisierung) der handelnden
Personen gilt folgendes Hauptgesetz: Handelnde Personen sind im
homerischen Epos ausschlieBlich Angehorige des Kriegeradels einer Polls.
Ihr Betatigungsfeld ist allein Krieg und Kampf. In ihm wird die hochste
Lebenserfiillung gesucht, die in der unablassigen Bewahrung der
ausgezeichnet von diesem Adel besessenen menschlichen Fahigkeit (seiner
dp£TT|) besteht. Die AngehOrigen des homerischen Kriegeradels
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kennzeichnet es weiter, daB sie einem in der Vorzeit lebenden
vollkommeneren Menschengeschlechl zugehorten, den "Heroen." Damit
sind bei ihnen die am gegenwartig lebenden Kriegeradligen schon
ubergewOhnlichen Tuchtigkeiten bis zum AuBersten des dem Menschen
MOglichen gesteigert. Dies ist mil "Idealisierung" nicht getroffen; gemeint
ist nur eine ErhOhung des dem Menschen Moglichen im ganzen, sei es gut
Oder bOse. Mit Sicherheit gehorte die urspriinglich vom Dichter angezielle
Horerschaft der homerischen Gesange einem zeitgenossischen Kriegeradel an,
der sich in den "Heroen" gespiegelt sah, und zwar in einem
VergroBerungsspiegel, der das, was die Horer selbst waren, starker konturiert
zeigte. Um diesen Wirklichkeitsbezug gegenwartig zu halten, ist hier
vermieden, von "Helden" zu reden, wobei eine Menschenmogliches
uberschreitende mythische Feme mitgedacht sein konnte.
Im festgehaltenen Blick auf diese beiden grundlegenden Formgesetze ist
nun die Eroffnung der "Odyssee" bis zur zweiten Athenerede (1. 1-96)
auszulegen. Die drei genannten Geltungsbereiche dieser Gesetze sind jedoch
nur dem Begriff nach gesondert, im Dichtungstext selber sind sie immer
miteinander wirksam. Es sei auch in dieser Auslegung versucht, sie in
ihrem Zusammenwirken aufzunehmen, wie sicher auch der Urhorer tat.
Ferner ist immer zu bedenken, daB die Formgesetze nur idealtypische
EingrenzungsmaBstabe sind, innerhalb deren eine dem jeweiligen
Anwendungsfall angemessene freie Ausfiillung geradezu mitgefordert ist. In
ihr erst liegt die eigentliche Leistung dichterischer Gestaltungskraft, die als
solche aufzunehmen das Ziel des Interpreten (wie des Urhorers) ist. Die
Formgesetze sind dazu nur Wegweiser, freilich notwendige, ohne die das mit
dem Gedichteten eigentlich Gemeinte nicht sicher erreicht wiirde.
n
In den ersten Versen der "Odyssee," d.h. dem Prooimion, nahm der erste
HOrer sofort das Miteinander von Bindung an ein vorgegebenes
Gattungsschema und Freiheit seiner besonderen Ausfuhrung wahr. Auch
dem heutigen Leser fallt zunachst der sprachlich iibereinstimmende und
zugleich variierende Aufbau im Verhaltnis zum Iliasprooimion ins Ohr:
"den Groll singe, Gottin, des Peliden Achilleus, den unheilvoUen, der den
Achaiem zehntausend Schmerzen brachte und viele usw,": "den Mann teile
mir mit (?), Muse, den vielge-(?), der sehr viel in die Irre fuhr, . . , und der
viele Stadte . . . und viele Schmerzen auf dem Meer usw."
Gewohnlich wird hier ein enger AnschluB an die "Ilias" gesehen, auf die
sich der Dichter zuriickbeziehe und auch den Horer verweise. Es gibt
tatsachlich Stellen in der "Odyssee," da ein solcher Ruckbezug sicher ist.
Aber hier ist eine Ubereinstimmung und auch wieder eine freie Ausfuhrung
so weitgehend, daB auf ein gemeinsames Schema geschlossen werden muB,
eben das Formgesetz der Gattung.
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Zunachst der knappe Anruf an die Muse: "singe" und evvene. Dieses
Odysseewort ist mit "nenne," wie oft ubersetzt wird, ganz unzutreffend
wiedergegeben. Es ist unglaublich, daB die Gottin des Gesanges gebeten
wtirde, den "Mann," also die Hauptperson, nur zu "nennen," zumal sie, wie
der Horer erstaunt feststellen wird, dies viele Verse hindurch gerade nicht tut.
'Evvene IV ist ein dem Horer des Epos sehr bekanntes altertiimliches
poetisches Wort fiir "in alien Einzelheiten berichten." Damit wird der
eigenartige Darstellungsstil des Epos gekennzeichnet, der auch Formgesetz
ist: "erzahlen mit Detailgenauigkeit," wofiir ofter das jungere, sprachlich
durchsichtige Synonym KaxaXiyeiv = "aufzahlen" steht, also gerade das
Gegenteil von "nennen." Die Muse soil dem Sanger also Gelingen geben,
wenn er Geschehen der heldischen Vorzeit, offenbar um dessen
Erzahlwiirdigkeit willen, in alien seinen Einzelheiten vorfiihren wird. Dies
eben ist es, was die Horer "bezaubert," so wie einmal spater Eumaios an den
Erzahlungen seines noch unbekannten Gaslfreundes ruhmen wird, daB er ihn
mit der Fiille des Berichteten "wie ein (epischer) Sanger bezaubert habe" (17.
517). Also eine hochst sinnreiche Variante zum "singe, Gottin" der "Ilias."
Naher zugesehen sind im Odysseeprooimion der Abwandlungen noch
mehr und bedeutendere. Zunachst ist es eine auBerordentliche Kuhnheit, von
"berichte ausfiihrlich" unmittelbar ein personliches Objekt abhangen zu
lassen statt des gewohnlichen sachlichen der "Ilias" beim entsprechenden
"singe." "Den Mann berichte" ist offenbar ein verkiirzter Ausdruck, der die
Handlung, die zu dem "Mann" gehort (nach dem Schema), gerade nur
impliziert und unbestimmt sein laBt, so daB der Mann als er selbst eine
Auszeichnung erhalt. Dann ist weiter erstaunlich, daB als Subjekt der
Handlung des Epos nur ein namenloser "Mann" erscheint, anders als der
sofort genannte "Pelide Achilleus," und daB wir auch so bald seinen Namen
nicht erfahren. Dies ist umso unerhorter, als der Horer als Hauptperson des
Epos keine andere Person erwarten kann als einen dem Kriegeradel der
Vorzeit angehorenden Mann. Hier wird der schon angefuhrte epische
Expositionsstil zunachst unbestimmter und erst im Fortschritt prazisierter
Angaben (und gerade bedeutender Angaben) stark in Wirkung gesetzt, und der
Horer weiB, daB dieser Name bald doch auftauchen wird.
Dieser Horer versteht auch, daB der Sanger mit ReiB den Namen seines
"Helden" noch nicht nennt. Statt seines Namens erhalt der "Mann" (also der
"Held") sogleich Kennzeichnungen, die ihn als Angehorigen des Kriegeradels
von hOchsten Graden erkennen lassen. Auch hier folgt die "Odyssee"
auBerlich dem Prooimionsschema, wie die "Ilias" dies auf schlichte Weise
ebenso tut, erst in Form eines Attributwortes, dann eines ganzen
Attributsatzes: "den Groll,
. . . den unheilvollen, der usw." Dort geschieht
aber Kennzeichnung der Handlung, hier der Hauptperson, des "Mannes," und
dort nur explizierend, hier aber eingrenzend (determinativ) = "denjenigen
Mann, der
. .
.". Die zu erzahlende Handlung kommt damit noch gar nicht
in Sicht.
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Weiter: Das kennzeichnende Attributwort noXxtxponoc, wird seiner
Bildung nach vom Horer soforl erkannt als "stehendes" ("festes") Epilheton,
dessen Verwendung bei Homer eines der bekanntesten Formgesetze ist.
Weniger bekannt ist (war es aber dem zeitgenOssischen Horer sicherlich), daB
diese fest mit einem Heroennamen verbundenen Beiwdrter einen "Adelslitel"
bedeuten, den die Helden untereinander bei formlicher Anrede als geradezu
geschuldetes Ehrenzeichen verwenden. Mit jioX-u-zusammengesetzte
Epitheta bedeuten, wie sich versteht, daB irgendeine adlige Tuchtigkeit "viel"
("reich") von ihrem Trager besessen wird. Das zweite died steht also
immer fur eine solche Adelstiichtigkeit (dpexri), und zwar gibt es Epitheta,
die allgemeine adlige Tuchtigkeit riihmen, wie z.B. "ruhmreich"
(7ioX'6aivo<;), und solche, die einen Helden iiber seine schon hohe
GesamtdpETTi hinaus wegen einer Tuchtigkeit riihmen, die ihm als
besondere iiberragend zueigen ist, wie etwa der "fuBschnelle Achilleus" oder
der "weithin herrschende Agamemnon" usw. Der Horer ist aber auBerst
uberrascht, den "Mann" des Odysseeprooimions, d.h. den Kriegshelden,
gerade mit dem Titel noXvxponoc, ausgezeichnet zu sehen. Ein solches
Epitheton ist im Kanon der stehenden Epitheta des Epos unbekannt (es
erscheint nur noch einmal spater in der Odyssee in offenbarem Anklang an
unser Prooimion, 10. 330). Auch das zweite died des Epitheton, tponoq,
ist als alleinstehendes Wort der epischen Sprache fremd. Es bedeutet die
"Wendung" und ist spater ganz ublich fiir die seelische "Einstellung" eines
Menschen, seinen "Charakter," seine "Seelenhaltung." In der Tat ist die
Fahigkeit, viele "Einstellungen" zu haben, d.h. sich auf jeweils neue Lagen
"einstellen" zu konnen, also "vielwendig" zu sein, wie in der "Odyssee"
genau zu ubersetzen ist, gerade entgegengesetzt der vom epischen
Kriegshelden geforderten Standfestigkeit (die sich sogar im Metron abbildet),
mit der er sich im Kampf durchzusetzen hat. Doch setzt diese offenkundige
und damit bedeutungsvolle Neubildung des Dichters fiir das
SprachbewuBtsein des Horers sicher an dem gelaufigen Epitheton noXv[ir{xi<;
an (= "reich an utixiq, praktischer Klugheit," einer kanonischen Tiichtigkeit
des epischen Kriegeradels), und diesem Adelstitel steht weiter der ebenfalls
gebrauchliche des noXv[ii\xoi\fo<; "an Auswegen reich" nahe. Beide Epitheta
sind in der "Ilias" fast nur mit dem Helden Odysseus verbunden. Der dem
Kriegeradel zugehorige Mann, den das Odysseeprooimion statt seines
Namens mit diesem neuen Adelstitel ehrenvoU kennzeichnet, wird sich also
in der neuen Tuchtigkeit eines "Vielwendigen" (nicht "Vielgewandten," wie
oft iibersetzt wird) bewahren und damit die adlige ^r\xic, um eine neue,
ungewohnte Abwandlung, die Polytropie, erweitem.
Er wird weiter, wie wir sahen, dem Schema entsprechend noch durch ein
Attribut in Satzform gekennzeichnet: "der . . . verschlagen wurde." Hierbei
ist das Neutrum Pluralis ^idXa noXXa als innerer Akkusativ zu verstehen,
also genau: "der sehr viele Verschlagungen erlebte," d.h. der viele
Irrfahrtenstationen durchlief. Nun erkennt man an diesem "viele" sofort das
feste Prooimienelement wieder, mit dem in der Regel die knapp angegebene
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Handlung ausgezeichnet wird (der Groll Achills brachte den Achaiem
"zehntausend Schmerzen"), also wird, wie es dem Schema gemaB scheint,
nun auch die dem "Mann" der "Odyssee" zugehorige Handlung genannt, sein
vielfaches Verschlagenwerden. Aber dies dient doch zugleich immer noch
seiner riihmenden Kennzeichnung als Person, und es bleibt offen, ob eine
solche Handlung wenigstens im ganzen auch erzahlt werden soil.
Sein Verschlagenwerden wird nun aber weiter zeitlich bestimmt:
"nachdem er das heilige Ilion (erobert und) zerstort hatte." Damit
kennzeichnet zunachst den "Mann" ein Schicksal, und zwar ein fiir einen
Mann des Kriegeradels absurdes und deswegen besonders schweres. Einen
Helden, dem ein uberragender Sieg zuteil wurde, traf es hier, statt wie ublich
triumphal mit reicher Kriegsbeute als Siegeszeichen in die Heimat
zuruckzukehren, vielmehr in die Fremde verschlagen zu werden und dort
lange, wohl jahrelang, umherzuirren. Das bedeutet einen tiefen Sturz in das
Elend und die alltagliche Lebensbedrohung, also in die Entehrung, den
Verlust der eben erst glanzend bewahrten dpexTi des zum Kriegeradel
Gehorigen. Nun dient diese Kennzeichnung unseres "Mannes" eben auch
seinem Preis als Mann seines Standes, d.h. soviel wie: Er wurde eben als
solcher durch dieses unerhorte Schicksal herausgefordert zu neuer Bewahrung
seiner dpexTi und bestand sie (denn irgendwie kehrte er am Ende in die
Heimat zuriick), Der Krieg ging fiir ihn also weiter, freilich in der besonders
schweren Form, daB er verschlagen wurde auch aus dem gewohnten
Betatigungsfeld des adligen Kriegers in ein fremdes unbekanntes Milieu, in
dem jedenfalls die sonst fiir den Kriegeradel unangetasteten Wertsetzungen
ungiiltig wurden und er seine dpexTi gleichwohl auch jetzt wieder *zu
bewahren hatte. Es versteht sich nun, daB er nur iiberleben und seine bisher
in seinem Milieu bewahrte dpetri nur behaupten konnte, wenn sie die neue
Form annahm, sich erfinderisch auf neue, unbekannte Lagen einzustellen,
um sich so im ganzen bewahren zu konnen. D.h., er muBte auch
noX-dxpcmoc, werden und sich immer wieder als ein solcher bewahren. Damit
wird offenbar die Grundidee der Odysseehandlung sichtbar und auch
verdeutlicht, daB das Epos "Odyssee" der Gattung voUig treu bleibt, indem
es immer noch die groBe Bewahrung eines uberragenden Kriegers zeigen und
verherrlichen wird, freilich in einer neuen Abwandlung seines
Betatigungsraumes, der ja immer Krieg und Kampf ist, in der Weise, daB
dieser sich um die auBeradlige Welt erweitert, in der sich der adlige Krieger
mit seinen angestammten Tuchtigkeiten und dem Zuwachs der Polytropie
ebenso zu bewahren hat. Jetzt wird auch voU verstandlich, weshalb der
"Mann," d.h. der Kriegeradlige als Held der Irrfahrten, von dem die Muse
erzahlen soil, nicht mit seinem Namen erschien. Denn in der fremden
auBeradligen Welt gilt dieser Name nichts mehr, der in der vertrauten
Gemeinschaft der Standesgenossen, die ja Freund und Feind gemeinsam
umfaBt, zum Kostbarsten der Person gehort, da an ihm der Ruhm der
ausgewiesenen kriegerischen dpetri hangt, mit der die ganze
Adelstuchtigkeit erst voUstandig wird. Der Held der "Odyssee" ist also
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zuriickgeworfen auf seine Polytropie, einem lelzten unverlierbaren Teil
seiner dpexTi, mit dem ihm aufgegeben ist, sie im ganzen
wiederzugewinnen.
Das Irrfahrtenschicksal wird gekennzeichnet diirch eine Vielheit der
Erlebnisse, summarisch: viele Irrfahrtenslationen, dann anlithetisch
unterteill: Zu Lande erlebte er viele (unbekannte) Menschen, zur See erlitt
er viele Schmerzen. Dieses "viele . . . viele" ist dem Schema gemaB
Stichwort fiir die Angabe der Handlung des Epos und zeigt an, worin diese
erzahlwurdig ist. Hier aber geht es nicht um diese selbst, sondem insofem
der Held all dieses erlebte. Damit bleibt es offen, was aus dem Kreis dieser
vielen Abenteuer wirklich erzahlt werden soil. Aber davon muB irgendwie
berichtet werden, wenn von dem "Mann" berichtet werden soli, der durch
diese Erlebnisse gekennzeichnet ist. Wir erfahren also zunachst im
Prooimion nur etwas iiber den Handlungsum/:re/5 desjenigen, von dem dann
wirklich erzahlt wird. Genaueres uber den eigentlichen Gegenstand der
"Odyssee" muB freilich noch erwartet werden.
Aber diese "vielen" Erlebnisse des "Mannes" sind nicht, wie die vielen
Handlungsbegebenheiten des Schemas, durchweg leidvoUe. Wir horen, daB
der Held Wohnstatten (freilich nicht vertraute noXeic,) und Sinnesart
unbekannter Menschen kennenlemte. Solche das Wissen vom Menschen
erweiternde Erfahrung ist ein Gewinn und soweit erfreulich. Freilich
miissen damit die einzelnen Begegnungen nicht durchweg leidlos oder gar
erfreulich gewesen sein. Unverkennbar wird durch sie die neue Tiichtigkeit
des noXvxponoq gefordert, wie sie zugleich Zuwachs erfahrt. Es ging in
jedem neuen Fall um die Frage, die spater in der "Odyssee" in Erinnerung an
die Irrfahrten mehrfach formelhaft wiederkehren wild: "sind hier (in diesem
unbekannten Land, an das es uns verschlagt) Ubeltater und Wilde und nicht
Gerechte oder Gastfreundliche, und ist deren Sinnesart (voo^ wie 1. 3)
gottesfiirchtig?" Wie zur See, wo es neben dem Kampf gegen bose
Naturgewalten immer auch den gegen "Wilde" geben konnte, so war
fallweise auch auf dem Land bei der Beriihrung mit unbekannten Menschen
das eigene Leben und damit zugleich die Kriegerehre zu behaupten. Im
fremden Milieu taucht also immer auch die Grundsituation des adligen
Kriegers auf, die ihm aus dem Lebensbereich der Kampfe mit seinesgleichen
vertraut war, nur sind die Umstande immer wieder neu und unbekannt und
fordern die Polytropie heraus. In diesen Angaben erhalten wir, dem
Expositionsstil des Epos gemaB, beilaufig die weitere Prazisierung, daB der
"Mann" seit seiner Abfahrt von Troja wenigstens zunachst von "Gefahrten"
begleitet wurde, unter denen der Horer sofort das Kriegerkontingent verstand,
mit dem der Held als Herrscher und Befehlshaber nach Troja gezogen war.
Der Horer hat auch die ungefahre Vorstellung einer Flotte von etwa zwGlf
Schiffen mit also etwa sechshundert Kriegem, wie er spater tatsachlich
erfahren wird (9. 159). Wenigstens also dieses Bestandstiick des
altgewohnten Kriegerlebens war dem "Mann," als er verschlagen wurde,
erhalten geblieben. Er hatte freilich auch die Fiirsorgepflicht des
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Kriegsherren fiir seine Leute zu erfiillen und auBer seinem auch das Leben all
dieser zu behaupten, wie er umgekehrt auch deren Hilfe zur Verfiigung hatte.
Freilich horen wir, daB sich diese Gefahrten selbst Leben und Riickkehr
verscherzten durch Freveltaten gegen den Sonnengott. Diese genauere
Einzelheit ist nicht ein VerstoB gegen den Stil der nur knappen Angaben des
Prooimions—sie sind noch immer sehr knapp und verlangen angesichts
ihrer Bedeutung eine spatere Prazisierung
—
, sondem auch sie kennzeichnen
noch immer den "Mann" selbst durch seine Schicksale, indem sie seine Lage
als Irrfahrer noch wesentlich verscharften. Seine Anstrengungen, die
hergebrachte dpexTi auch in der neuen unbekannten Welt zu behaupten,
scheiterten empfindlich, indem er einen wesentlichen Teil dieser dpetT)
verlor, namlich die Herrschaft iiber Untergebene, und dazu war seine
Tuchtigkeit, sie zu fiihren, widerlegt. Er zwar konnte, wie impliziert wird,
sein Leben bis zur Riickkehr in die Heimat retten, aber fiir den Rest seines
Irrfahrtenschicksals muBte er sich, d.h. seine dpexTi, aus tiefster
Emiedrigung wiedergewinnen, ohne "Gefahrten," Schiffe, und auch der in
Troja erkampften Kriegsbeute verlustig gegangen.
Die das Prooimion abschlieBende wiederholte Bitte an die Muse, die
zum Anfang zuriickfiihrt, erstrebt nun endlich die Prazisierung der immer
noch offen gebliebenen zu erzahlenden Handlung. Die Muse selbst soil fiir
das, was sie dem Sanger fur seinen Vortrag eingibt, aus dem gesamten
Umkreis der Geschichten um den Trojasieger, der zugleich Irrfahrer war, den
Anfang auswahlen. Das leitet zur "weiterfuhrenden Exposition" iiber, mit
der der Sanger selbst seinen Vortrag beginnt.
Mit dem zeitlich zu verstehenden "da" setzt die Erzahlung genau*an
jenem Tiefpunkt ein, mit dem das Prooimion "schloB." Die Muse hat nun
so entschieden, daB die eigentlich erzahlte Handlung der "Odyssee" der letzte
Abschnitt der Irrfahrten bis zur Heimkehr sein soil. Damit werden die nach
dem Prooimion vorher durchlaufenen Irrfahrtstationen, die allermeisten also,
zur bloBen Vorgeschichte, die die Ausgangslage der eigentlichen Handlung
erklart. Dies ist nun freilich eine Vorgeschichte, die das Gesamtschicksal
des "Mannes" und damit ihn selbst zu grundlegend bestimmt, als daB auf sie
nicht irgendwann und irgendwie zuriickgekommen werden muBte, was damit
der Horer zu erwarten hat. Jetzt also finden wir den irrfahrenden
Kriegerhelden, wie wir sahen, am tiefsten Punkt seiner Emiedrigung, ja, wie
wir nun genauer horen, auch an einem toten Punkt. Eine gottliche Nymphe
halt ihn zuruck, ihn zum Gatten begehrend, also mit den freundlichen, aber
umso machtigeren Waffen der Verlockung, und zwar der Aussicht auf hohere
Ehren als er je im gewohnten Milieu des Kriegeradels erreichen konnte.
Doch das ist gerade seine Seelenqual, dies leidenschaftlich nicht zu
wiinschen, sondem nichts als Heimkehr und Gattin. Aber dem nun aller
menschlichen Hilfe Beraubten und zumal diesen Machten gegenuber
Wehrlosen fehlt jede Aussicht, das, was ihm allein noch an dpexTj geblieben
ist, dafur einzusetzen, daB er jene geringeren, aber allein ersehnten
menschlichen Ehren und Guter zuruckgewinnt. Hilfe kann nur noch von
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gOttlichen Machten kommen, und zwar so hochgestellten, daB sie den
Willen der Nymphe brechen kOnnlen. In der Tat wurden wunderbarerweise,
wie wir hOren, solche Machle fiir ihn tatig. Nach Jahren leidvollen Wartens
"spannen" ihm "die Gutter" "zu" (d.h. lenkten das ihn betreffende Geschehen
so), daB er nach Hause zuruckkehrte. Der Horer verstand sofort, was es mit
einem solchen gOttlichen Eingreifen im Epos auf sich hat. Wir Modeme,
die wir diese Dichtung nicht einmal horen, sondem nur noch lesen konnen,
mussen uns zuvor umstandlich selber dariiber belehren.
Auch hier waltet ein "Formgesetz" der Gattung, das die Stilisierung der
vom Dichter nachgestalteten Wirklichkeit betrifft. Das oben umschriebene
Gesetz, daB die handelnden Personen ausschlieBlich in ihren Kraften
gesteigerte Angehorige des Kriegeradels sein mussen, die einer groBeren
Vorzeit angehorten, bedarf noch einer wesenllichen Erganzung. Zum
homerischen "Helden" gehort unverbruchlich, daB er die Gunst der "Gotter"
besitzt, genauer: der auf dem Olymp residierenden Gotter, einer bevorzugten
Gruppe unter den gottlichen Machten im ganzen. Ihr Amt ist im Epos
ausschlieBlich, dem Helden bei der Bewahrung seiner dpexTi zu helfen.
Helden und (olympische) Gotter sind also nichts ohne einander. Diese
hochsten Gotter sind selbst hervorragende Krieger, jedoch in ihren Kraften
noch einmal gesteigerte, nun iiber menschliches MaB hinaus bis zu
kosmischem Umfang gesteigerte. Sie leben in einer Art GroBfamilie, die
von Zeus kraft seiner alles iiberragenden Korperstarke regiert wird. Er
herrscht freilich als primus inter pares und wiinscht in der Regel die
Ubereinstimmung mit der ganzen Gruppe, immer um Ausgleich zwischen
den Interessen der einzelnen Gotter bemiiht, die jeweils ihren eigenen
Machtbereich im gesamten Weltregiment haben. Die bevorzugte Gunst
dieser Gotter fiir die heroischen Kriegeradligen beruht auf deren uberragender
menschlicher dpeTTj, die sie den Gottem nahe bringt und die so weit
geschatzt werden kann, daB es zu Liebesverbindungen zwischen Helden und
Gottem kommt, aus denen zwar immer nur sterbliche Helden hervorgehen
konnen, die aber doch das gottlich-heroische Zuneigungs- und
Gunstverhaltnis weiter steigem. Diese Gotter wirken bei den Helden immer
nur helfend und lenkend, greifen also nur ein, wo auch beim Helden das
menschlich Verfugbare aufhOrt, also wo nach menschlichem
Alltagsverstandnis "Zufall" zu walten scheint, also besonders beim letzten
Gelingen menschlichen Tuns, mag auch der Tater in seinem Bereich Meister
sein, auch beim forderlichen Zusammentreffen von Menschen oder dem
Entstehen hilfreicher Gedanken in der Seele (dem "Einfall"). Diese
GOtterhilfe laBt also dem auBersten Einsatz eigener menschlicher Krafte alien
Raum, ja fordert ihn, so daB die Leistung am Ende voU dem Menschen
zugehort. Der homerische Held ist also einer solchen Hilfe, wo er sie notig
hat, sicher, es sei denn, er habe, auch ungewollt, einen Frevel gegen eine
Gottheit begangen. Dieser wird mit dem Entzug der GGtterhilfe vergolten,
der in schweren Fallen bis zum todlichen Scheitem gehen kann.
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Eines Tages, freilich erst nach Jahren, gewahrten also die Cotter auch
dem in die Fremde verschlagenen Trojaeroberer ihre Hilfe, daB er aus der Haft
bei Kalypso frei kam und endlich zu seinem Haus auf Ithaka zuriickkehren
konnte. Der "Mann" erhalt erste personliche Konturen, indem wir seine
Heimat mit Namen erfahren, wieder nur nebenbei. Der Satz, der uns die nun
glucklich eroffnete letzte Wegstrecke der langen Stationenreihe unseres
Helden meldet, bricht jedoch in sich selbst fast zum Erschrecken des Horers
urn. Die Heimkehr nach Ithaka und zum Haus erscheint wieder nur beilaufig
in einem zeitlichen Nebensatz und nur als BeschluB der Cotter, der Hauptsatz
lafit dieses Ziel schon erreicht sein und teilt mit, daB damit das eigentliche
Ziel, die Ruckkehr in das Haus des Helden, nicht nur noch nicht erreicht
wurde, sondem daU er auch dort den "Wettkampfen" noch nicht entronnen
war, nicht einmal der "unter die Seinen" Zuruckgekehrte. Diese
ungeheuerliche Wendung wird freilich in ratselhafter Unbestimmtheit
mitgeteilt, und der Horer erwartet dringend bald genauere Aufklarung. Die
"Wettkampfe" konnen nur von der Art derjenigen sein, die er auf seinen
Irrfahrten zu bestehen hatte und bis jetzt glucklich bestand, also um Tod und
Leben gehende kriegerische Auseinandersetzungen. Unserem "Mann" war
also zu guter Letzt noch das widersinnige Schicksal auferlegt, im eigenen
Haus das Ausgeworfensein aus der Welt des Kriegeradels erleiden und
Herausforderungen ahnlich denen einer unbekannten Fremde mit der
Tuchtigkeit des "gewohnlichen" adligen Kriegers bestehen zu mussen. Das
wird, so knapp es sich hier auch erst andeutet, sogar das Hauptstuck der in
der "Odyssee" zu erzahlenden Handlung sein, und der Held wird, zum zweiten
Mai nach der Befreiung von Kalypso, gottlichen Beistandes bedurfen. Das
ausdriicklich erwahnte Mitleid der Cotter mit dem Irrfahrer, das nun zur Tat
wird, schlieBt eine solche Hilfe erwartungsgemaB ein.
Zunachst freilich erfahren wir, daB aus dem nun Mitleid tatigenden Kreis
der Olympier sich einer ausschloB, der unserem "Mann" "mit Eifer"
grollte—wir horen nicht, warum und mussen bald dariiber Cenaueres
erwarten
—
, namlich Poseidon. Er war es offenbar auch, der die langst von
den ubrigen Olympiem gewunschte Hilfe fiir den Irrfahrer hinauszogerte.
Bei Erwahnung dieses CroUes von hochster Seite fallt beim Erzahler
—
wiederum beilaufig, doch auch wieder horbar herausgehoben durch
Versenjambement—endlich auch der Name dieses "Mannes": Odysseus,
jetzt freilich am rechten Ort. Denn die von den Cottem den Angehorigen des
homerischen Kriegeradels gewohnlich gewahrte Cunst, ebenso wie deren
immer mogliche Verkehrung zum Cottergroll, kann nicht Namenlosen
gelten. Ja Odysseus erhalt hier sogar vom Erzahler auch seinen Adelstitel:
"der gOttergleiche," nicht ohne daB dabei der Widersinn mitklingt, daB ein
solcher Cottergleicher von einem Cott einen ihn schadigenden Croll erleiden
muB. Dem Horer ist es immerhin trostlich, auch zu erfahren, daB dieser
Croll nur dauem wird, bis der Held sein Land erreicht hat, also sich
beschrankt auf Poseidons Herrschaftsbereich, das Meer.
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Die erste Szene der "Odyssee" (1. 21-95), mit der die sich nun voll
entfaltende Erzahlung beginnt, kann hier bis auf die fur unsere
Ausgangsfrage entscheidende Programmrede der Athene (81-95) nicht
genauer durchgegangen werden. Sie fiihrt die Gotterversammlung vor, in der
es zu dem schon mitgeteilten BeschluB der Olympier kommt, die Heimkehr
des Odysseus mit seiner Freigabe durch Kalypso ins Werk zu setzen. Sehr
bald tritt Athene als diejenige hervor, die mit Leidenschaft und Energie die
Initiative fiir ihren besonderen Schutzling Odysseus ergreifL Zeus erklart
sich dafiir (und die iibrigen versammelten Olympier stimmen stillschweigend
zu), da6 die Cotter die Heimkehr des Odysseus planen und in Bewegung
setzen sollen, gegen den Willen des zur Zeit abwesenden Poseidon, dessen
Groll auf Odysseus nun genauer begriindet wird durch den Frevel, den dieser
auf den Irrfahrten begangen hatte, indem er den Polyphem, einen Sohn des
Poseidon, auf seinem einen Auge blendete. Aber es ist vorbestimmt, daB
der Gott nicht bis zur Vemichtung des Schuldigen groUen wird, und dem
Mehrheitswillen der Olympier wird er sich beugen.
Athene kann mit dem Einverstandnis des Zeus und der ubrigen
versammelten Olympier rechnen, wenn sie die Durchfuhrung dieser
Gouerhilfe ubernimmt, und sie wird von jetzt ab in der Odysseehandlung
unablassig als gottliche Helferin wirken, sie, deren ureigener Amtsbereich es
ist, den adligen Kriegem des Epos bei der Bewahrung ihrer Heldentiichtigkeit
(dpexTi) Gelingen zu geben. Sie entwickelt sofort ein Aktionsprogramm.
DemgemaB soil an zwei weit voneinander entfernten Punkten angesetzt
werden, bei Kalypso, wo Odysseus festgehalten wird, und auf Ithaka, im
Haus des abwesenden Helden. Schon in der Exposition wurde, wie wir
sahen, zu verstehen gegeben, daB dem Irrfahrer noch zwei Abschnitte seiner
Heimkehr bevorstehen, die Fahrt von Kalypso bis Ithaka und der
Entscheidungskampf "auch noch unter den Seinen." Fiir beides wiirde es
also der Gotterhilfe bediirfen. Dem entsprechen die beiden unterschiedenen
und aufeinander bezogenen Punkte in Athenes Programm.
Beim ersten Punkt verweilt die Gottin nur kurz: Kalypso soil durch
Hermes der "unfehlbare" RatschluB (der Olympier) uberbracht werden. Er ist
einem Befehl gleich, gegen den von der dem Rang nach weit unterlegenen
G5ttin kein Widerstand zu erwarten ist. Das einzelne bleibt hier offen, etwa
wann Hermes fortgeschickt wird, wie Odysseus die Seefahrt moglich
gemacht wird, wie er sicher bis nach Ithaka gelangt. Das soil offenbar
spater prazisiert werden, und in der Tat wird zu Beginn des fiinften Buches
dieser Teil des Programms mit genaueren Angaben in Angriff genommen.
Der zweite Programmpunkt ist fiir Athene offenbar der weitaus
schwierigere: die letzten entscheidenden Kampfe des Heimgekehrten im
eigenen Haus. Deshalb will Athene die Gotterhilfe hier selbst ubemehmen,
und sie wird sofort nach ihrer Rede ans Werk gehen. Was hier zu tun ist,
gibt sie zwar noch immer sehr knapp an, aber der erste ratselhaft vage
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Hinweis in der Exposition: "Entscheidungskampf auch noch unter den
Seinen" wird hier doch wesentlich genauer ausgefuhrt. Die Lage im Haus
des Odysseus wird wiederum, dem Expositionsstil entsprechend, beilaufig in
einer Handlungsanweisung mitgeteilt, die diese Lage schon verandem soil.
Der zeitgenossische Horer deutete diese ihm gegebenen Stichworte
miihelos. Wenn er von "Freiem" hort, die sich im Haus des abwesenden
Odysseus festgesetzt haben und sich aus dem Viehbesitz des Hausherm
selbst bewirten, so wird ihm folgender Sachverhalt deutlich: Die "Freier,"
eine groBere Zahl von Bewerbem, betrachten die Gattin des abwesenden
Hausherm, den sie fiir verschoUen halten, als Witwe und bewerben sich
formlich um ihre Hand. Die Lage ist jedoch insofem labil, als die Frau
bereit ist, sich wiederzuverheiraten, wie es offenbar dem Brauch entsprach
(die Vielzahl der Bewerber bedeutete iiberdies eine hohe Ehrung), aber noch
unschlussig ist, da es von dem Tod ihres Gatten keine sichere Kunde gibt.
Die Freier machen fur sich nun offenbar Gebrauch von der Sitte, daB ein
Bewerber um eine heiratsfahige Frau als Gastfreund des Hauses gait, in dem
sie lebte, und also zusammen mit anderen Bewerbem bewirtet wurde, bis die
Entscheidung fiir einen von ihnen fiel. Nun gab es fiir den Fall der Penelope
keinen Kvpioq, d.h. obligatorischen mannlichen Rechtsvertreter, der sie
einem Bewerber rechtsgiiltig zu "geben" hatte (die griechische Frau besaB
selbst keine rechtsgultige Geschaftsfahigkeit, konnte also nicht "sich"
verheiraten). Der einzige Sohn hatte zu Beginn der Freite das
Erwachsenenalter noch nicht ganz erreicht. Der Vater der Frau konnte diese
Rolle, die bei einer Verheiratung die iibliche war, solange nicht iibemehnien,
als die Frau nicht in sein Haus zuruckging und sich damit unter seine
Verfiigungsmacht begab. Da aber in der Kegel der Wille der Frau, zumal
einer Witwe, respektiert worden sein diirfte, lag die erste, obwohl rechdich
noch unwirksame, Entscheidung bei Penelope, und die Freier konnten sich
als Gastfreunde ihres Hauses betrachten, die also auf t^gliche Bewirtung
Anspruch hatten. Sie wird anfangs geduldet gewesen, dann aber zu einer Art
Gewohnheitsrecht geworden sein.
Als erstes dringt Athene mit ihren angekiindigten Weisungen an
Telemach auf Beendigung des labilen Zustandes im Hause des Odysseus,
indem sie ihm vorschreiben will, daB er, der inzwischen in das anerkannte
Alter des erwachsenen Mannes eingetreten ist, seine Hausherrenrechte
wahmehmen soil, indem er den Freiem formlich sein Haus und damit den
Verzehr seines oiKO(;-Besitzes (91) verbietet. Dies soil Offentlich in einer
Volksversammlung geschehen, um dem Akt des Hausverbotes, dem niemand
mit Gmnd widersprechen kann, voile Geltung zu geben. Nun ist zu
erwarten, daB die Freier dem sich nicht fugen werden, indem sie sich auf ihr
Recht als Bewerber der Mutter bemfen, das dauere, solange die Mutter die
Entscheidung hinausschiebt (eine Lage, die freilich durch den erklarten
Willen des nun mundig, Hausherr und icupio(; der Mutter gewordenen Sohnes
aufgehoben ist). Mit ihrer Weigemng aber werden die Freier zu Personen,
die das Besitztum eines Adligen widerrechtlich aufzehren. Nach geltender
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Rechtsauffassung ist damit der casus belli gegeben. UnrechtmaBige
Aneignung von Land- oder Viehbesitz gilt als schwere Schadigung und
damit Ehrverletzung eines adligen Hauses, die nur mit Waffengewalt
vergolten werden kann.'*
Ist aber diese Entscheidung durch das formliche Hausverbot des
Telemach an die Freier gefallen, wird es notwendig, daB er klart, ob der Vater
noch zuriickerwartet werden kann oder ob er mit Sicherheit tot ist. Eben das
bezweckt Athene mit ihrer zweiten beabsichtigten Anordnung, der Reise des
Telemach nach Pylos und Sparta zu den dort ansassigen Kriegsgefahrten des
Vaters, die die authentischsten Zeugen fiir die Geschehnisse nach der
Eroberung Trojas sind. Von dem Ergebnis dieser Erkundungsreise hangt
also ab, ob der unausweichliche Entscheidungskampf mit den Freiern von
dem zuriickgekehrten Hausherm selbst oder vom Sohn allein als seinem
Erben ausgefochten werden muB. Im ersten Fall ist die Hilfe des Sohnes bei
diesem Kampf unentbehrlich, als Warner, iiber die Lage Aufklarender und
Planer; femer, da es bei der zahlenmaBigen Ubermacht der Feinde der
Kriegslist bediirfen wird, also eines Trugspiels vor den Freiern im Haus,
wird der Sohn auch als Mitspieler in einem solchen gebraucht werden
mussen, und am Ende und nicht zum wenigsten muB er Kampfgenosse des
Vaters sein. In beiden Fallen gibt es fiir den Sohn des Odysseus kein
Zuriick mehr davon, daB er so oder so mit der Waffe gegen die Freier antreten
muB. Damit wird eine bedeutende Bewahrung kriegerischer dpexri von ihm
gefordert werden, fiir die jedoch am Ende bei dieser entschiedenen Hilfe der
Kriegsgottin Athene ein groBer Sieg zu erwarten ist. In diesem Sinne kann
Athene durch diese Reise fiir Telemach einen "edlen Ruhm" begriindet sehen,
also im ungeminderten Wortsinn der Wertsetzungen des Kriegeradels, den
Ruhm einer groBen Waffentat.
Schon wie Athene den Zweck ihres Ganges nach Ithaka bezeichnet,
macht erkennbar, daB sie damit als Kampfhelferin gegen die Freier tatig
werden will. Sie will "ihm" (d.h. dem Odysseus zuliebe) den Sohn noch
mehr "anfeuem" und ihm ^levoq in sein Gemut legen (88 ff.). Sie redet
damit in Begriffen, die, wie der Horer weiB, ihren festen Ort in epischen
Kampfdarstellungen haben: oxpiSveiv meinl dort regelmaBig das "AnJfeuem"
der Kampfbegierde, und ^evo<; steht fiir "Kampfleidenschaft," das
Besessensein von einem Kampfdrang, der gesteigerte seelische und
kOrperliche Kraft gibt (so meist vor Aristien wie z.B. II. 5. 1 ff., dort auch
das Verleihen von p-evoq durch Athene, um den Kampfer "edlen Ruhm"
gewinnen zu lassen). Zu beachten ist, daB Athene eine solche
Kampfbegierde bei Telemach schon voraussetzt und sie nur noch steigem
will (dies die Weise, wie homerische GGtter helfen). Es hieBe, diese Art zu
reden um ihren Sinn bringen, wollte man darin nur den "Mut" sehen, dessen
es bedarf, um gegen das Unrecht der Freier offentlich zu protestieren oder
zum ersten Mai eine Schiffsreise selbstandig zu untemehmen.
* Vgl. D. 1. 154 ff., 11. 671 ff., Od. 17. 470 ff.
Harald Patzer 33
Auch Athenes Aufbruch vom Olymp nach Ithaka wird nach epischen
Formgesetzen unmiBverstandlich als schon beginnendes Wirken der
Kriegsgottin gekennzeichnet, wenn sie den im Detail beschriebenen
GOtterspeer mitnimmt, "mit dem die Reihen der heroischen Manner
uberwaltigt, denen die vom gewaltigen Vater Stammende zumt." Das ist
eine aus Kampfschilderungen der "Ilias" gelaufige, sicher gemeinepische
"Dingsymbolik," die im Hause des Odysseus auf Ithaka noch weiter wirkt,
wenn Telemach ihr diesen Gotterspeer als vermeintlich dem neu
gekommenen Gastfreund gehorige Waffe abnimmt und ihn in den
Speerstander stellt, "wo auch andere Speere des duldemutigen Odysseus
standen, viele" (Schadewaldt), Dieser Speer wird von Athene bei ihrem
Weggang, der ein wunderbares Verschwinden ist, das Telemach die Gottin
ahnen laBt, zuriickgelassen. Die Dingsymbolik besagt hier, daB gOttliche
Wehrkraft und Kampfleidenschaft (fiEvoc;) in das Haus des Odysseus
eingezogen sind und bald gegen die Feinde des Hauses tatig werden.
IV
Die Kriegsgottin laBt nun zunachst durch ihren hochsteigenen Besuch bei
Telemach programmgemaB ihre gOttliche Gunst, die sie gleichermaBen dem
Sohn wie dem Vater zuwendet, wirksam werden. Nachdem sie in der Gestalt
eines vaterlichen Gastfreundes das Treiben der Freier wahrgenommen und
Naheres dariiber erfahren hat, ruft sie den Odysseussohn in einer langeren
Mahn- und Beratungsrede (einer "Paraenese") dazu auf, die Freier aus d»m
Haus zu vertreiben (1. 269 ff.). Sie gibt ihm dazu Anweisungen, die sie in
derselben Reihenfolge wie in ihrer Programmrede wiederholt, nur freilich
jetzt genauer ausgefiihrt (das Stilprinzip der "fortschreitenden Prazisierung"
setzt sich also iiber den Gedichteingang hinaus fort). Damit bietet diese
Rede geradezu einen Kommentar zu den ersten noch knappen Angaben ihres
Programms. Er bestatigt aufs beste die von uns oben erschlossenen
Implikationen, die der zeitgenossische Horer mitdachte. Dies sei hier noch
kurz angedeutet.
Zuerst sollte den Freiem, die unaufhorlich den Viehbestand des Hauses
aufzehren, dies vor dem versammelten Volk von Ithaka verboten werden.
Das wird Telemach so mitgeteilt: Er solle morgen die Ithakesier zur
Versammlung laden und vor ihnen eine Rede halten, bei der er die Gotter zu
Zeugen anrufen solle. Darin solle er anordnen, daB die Freier sich auf ihre
jeweils eigenen Hauser zerstreuen sollen. Dazu soil die Mutter, wenn sie
geneigt ist, eine Ehe einzugehen, wieder in das Haus des Vaters
zuriickgehen, wo man ihr die Hochzeit ausrichten und die angemessene
Mitgift zueignen werde. Das alles ist zusammenzunehmen und bedeutet:
An die Stelle der bisherigen nicht rechtsgultigen Werbung soil die
ordnungsgemaBe treten (dies wird von Telemach in seiner Rede vor dem
Volk ausdriicklich aufgenommen und erklart, 2. 50 ff.; selbst der Fuhrer der
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Freier Antinoos gibt diese Auslegung der Rechtslage spater vor dem Plenum
der Freier zu, 16. 390 ff.).
Nun wird aber aus Athenes genaueren Anweisungen zu diesem Punkt
offensichtlicher als in ihrer Programmrede (war aber auch dort bereits zu
erschlieBen), dafi die Freier auf dieses Gebot des nun als Hausherr redenden
Telemach nicht eingehen werden. Wenn die Mutter (wie bisher) keine
Neigung hat, sich zu verehelichen, wird sie nicht zum Vater zuriickkehren,
Dann ware es mit dem Wohlleben der Freier auf Kosten des Odysseushauses
zu Ende. Dadurch wird nun noch deutlicher—und erst unter der
Voraussetzung der sicheren Weigerung der Freier— , daB Telemach als
weiteren Schritt die Reise zur Aufklarung iiber den Verbleib des Vaters
untemehmen muB (die, hatten die Freier das Hausverbot befolgt, sich
eriibrigt hatte).
Damit sind wir also beim zweiten Punkt von Athenes Programm.
Zunachst werden jetzt die zu befragenden Personen in Pylos und Sparta
genannt und Menelaos als der besonders fiir die Auskunft Geeignete
gekennzeichnet, weil er der (vor Odysseus) letzte Heimkehrer ist. Nun
werden genauer die Folgen der bei diesen Befragungen gewonnenen
Ergebnisse vorgefiihrt und zwar altemativ, je nachdem sich der Vater als tot
Oder noch lebend herausstellt. Jeweils geht es urn das, was Telemach dann
zu tun haben wiirde. Ist der Vater noch als lebend gemeldet, soil Telemach
noch ein Jahr warten und die Qual des Freiertreibens aushalten. Hiermit
muB gemeint sein, daB in dieser Frist der Vater zuriickerwartet werden kann.
Dafiir kann Telemach mindestens als Zeichen nehmen, daB "Mentes" 1. 194
ff, gehort haben will, Odysseus sei schon zuriickgekehrt und werde wohl nur
unterwegs aufgehalten, aber bei seiner Findigkeit werde er Mittel und Wege
zur Heimkehr wissen. Dieser Fall ist nur knapp erwahnt, eben weil er, wie
der Horer schon weiB, der zutreffende ist. Fiir Telemach bedeutet dies, daB er
sich dann darauf einrichten muB, Odysseus bei seiner Heimkehr gegen die
von den Freiem drohenden Gefahren hilfreich zu sein. Der andere Fall (nach
dem Wissen des Horers der unwirkliche) wird langer ausgefuhrt. Hort
Telemach, der Vater sei tot, soil er als der nun vollgiiltige Erbe und damit
auch Hausherr handeln, d.h. dem Vater die schuldigen Totenehren erweisen
und die Mutter "einem Manne geben" (d.h, in seiner Rolle als Kvpioq der
Mutter), natiirlich einem Gatten, den sie selbst wunscht, und sicherhch nicht
einem der Freier, wie das folgende beweist. Denn die Freier wiirden weiter
im Haus einsitzen und mit ihrer unrechtmaBigen Werbung fortfahren, die
nun langst als Vorwand fiir ihr rauberisches Verzehren des Hausgutes des
Odysseus entlarvt ist. Dann aber ist fiir Telemach der Augenblick
gekommen, da er diese "Freier," sei es mit List, sei es offen, toten muB.
Dieses letzte begriindet der Gastfreund damit, daB Telemach nunmehr das
Alter erreicht habe, da er nicht mehr nur "Kindereien betreiben" diirfe,
sondern—so ist zu erganzen—sich durch eine groBe Waffentat, wie sie
einem erwachsenen Angehorigen des Kriegeradels ziemt, Ruhm unter den
Menschen erwerbe, Darin solle er sich Orest zum Vorbild nehmen, der
HaraldPatzer 35
Aigisth, den MGrder seines groBen Vaters Agamemnon, totete, und damit
Ruhm unter alien Menschen gewann. Denn Telemach sei an seinem groBen
und ansehnlichen Wuchs anzusehen, daB er so kampftuchtig sei, daB auch
noch Spatgeborene lobend von ihm reden werden. Offensichtlich hat damit
Athene den dritten und letzten Punkt ihres Programms wiederaufgenommen,
den "edlen Ruhm," den Telemach mit seiner Reise gewinnen soil, und auch
dieser wird nun genauer kommentiert. Er wird zwar ausdriicklich nur auf den
Fall bezogen, daB der Vater tot ist und Telemach selbst an den Freiem die
am Hausgut des Odysseus begangene Beraubung und Entehrung durch ihren
Tod rachen wird, dazu natiirlich auch, wie das Orestbeispiel zeigt, die
Nebenbuhlerschaft um die Mutter durch die unrechtmaBige Werbung. Es ist
jedoch offenbar fiir den "edlen Ruhm" auch der minder weitgehende Fall
einzubeziehen, der, wie wir sahen nur kurz behandelt wurde, aber dem Horer
als der zutreffende bekannt ist, daB namlich Odysseus lebt und heimkehrend
den Rachekampf gegen die Freier selbst iibemehmen wird. Auch dann wird
Telemach, nun gemeinsam mit dem Vater als sein Waffengefahrte, immer
noch als eine Art zweiter Orest durch eine erste groBe Kampfbewahrung
"Ruhm unter alien Menschen" gewinnen. Das aber bedeutet, daB Telemach
mit seiner Erkundungsreise sich fiir diese groBe Kampfleistung entschieden
hat, ja schon den Weg zu diesem Ziel eingeschlagen hat. Bei Nestor und
Menelaos wird dies seine Sache sein, die er zu vertreten hat, zunachst nur in
der Erkundung, damit aber auch als Vorbereitung fiir die Tat selbst, geschehe
sie nun so oder so. Orest gibt das groBe Vorbild, das ihn ausdrucklich auch
bei seiner Reise leitet. Ahnlich wie Athene-Mentes stellt ihm auch Nestor
dieses Vorbild vor Augen und halt, indem ihn der Erzahler zwei Verse aus
Athenes friiheren Mahnung wOrtlich wiederholen laBt, nach seiner SuBeren
den adligen Krieger verratenden Erscheinung den Odysseussohn einer solchen
OrestroUe fiir fahig (3. 199 f. = 1. 300 f.).
Das Fazit von all diesem ist: Die Reise des Telemach ist notwendiger
Teil des Rachekampfes gegen die Freier, der Odysseus nach seiner Heimkehr
von den Irrfahrten im eigenen Haus noch auferlegt ist, indem der Sohn die
Freier zwingt, sich offen als Feinde des Hausherm zu entlarven, und sich
durch die Reise auf die RoUe als zunachst Heifer, spater ebenbiirtiger
Kampfgefahrte des Vaters vorbereitet und am Ende gemeinsam mit ihm als
Krieger von adliger Art bewahrt.
Frankfurt a.M.

The Case of the Bald-Headed LampHghter
R. D. DAWE
ovK dGeei 66' dvfip '08\)OT|iLov ic, 56^ov Ykei-
eVjiTiq ^oi 6oK£Ei Sa'iScov ciXaq £)j.M-£vai avtov
KctK Ke<paX,fiq, EJiei oiS ol evi xpixeq ot)6' qPaiai.
(Homer, Od. 18. 353-55)
The most singular feature of the case of the bald-headed lamplighter was that
he was not bald-headed at all. The evidence of 18. 355 with its joke about
light reflected on the bald head had to be discarded at an early stage, for it
robs the witticism of its point. ^ Monro made the same criticism in a
curiously phrased note: "The joke about Ulysses as a self-luminous body is
now improved upon by the remark that the light must come from himself,
since he has no hair which could help to produce it." Hair does not produce
light, but Monro correctly saw that the original jibe was not about
Odysseus's baldness but an allusion to the incongruous sight afforded by a
withered beggar as he discharges a role filled by "golden youths" in the
palace of Alcinoos (7. 100) or by girls in Ithaca, fair-cheeked ones among
them. The only other references to Odysseus's alleged baldness come at 13.
399 and 431, passages which describe his hair before he lost it as "fair,"
thus conflicting with 16. 176, which describes it as being of a deep hue.
Whether 6. 230-31 (= 23. 157-58) imply previous baldness is a matter for
sterile debate: the lines say simply that Athene, bom of Zeus, made him
bigger and more solid to look at, and from his head she caused curly hair to
grow like the hyacinth flower. So far as 18. 355 is concerned it remains
only to add that light reflected from a bald head does not travel downwards,
and that an expression like "down from his head" is no more possible in
Greek than in English when coupled with a verb like "be." In a word, v.
355 should not be here at all.
But the question whether Odysseus is actually bald is of no importance
compared with the much bigger question, how and why did he ever put
himself into a position whereby a jibe like that of 353-54 or 355 became
possible? Chapter 18 of the Odyssey is, I suppose, the most
aufschlussreich of all the Chapters in the whole poem, yet this episode of
^ II "nimmt dem Wilze seinen Stachel," as Ameis-Hentze put it.
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Odysseus undertaking the menial role of providing light to the suitors is one
which has received relatively little critical attention, perhaps because it has
been forced to the sidelines by other problems, such as why Penelope
flaunts herself before the suitors and why Odysseus rejoices as she solicits
gifts from them.
Let us set the scene. We have just come to the end of Penelope's
Appearance before the Suitors, the scene instantly and forever associated in
the minds of all of us with Kayser's memorable criticism "ad artes prope
meretricias descendit." The suitors have, with lightning speed, had brought
to them presents which apparently were only awaiting collection. These
they pass on to Penelope, who offers no comment on them; nor do the
suitors say so much as, "Here you are then; I hope you like the colour."
Instead the Queen retires to her bedroom, and it is at this point that the
peculiar episode with which we are concerned supervenes. We are told that
in the hall "they"—and there is nothing yet to indicate that "they" are
anything but the suitors—set three braziers for the purpose of giving light,
ocppa (paeivoiEv (308). Well-dried logs were piled around, Kal 6ai5a<;
|j,eTe)xicryov, which I take to mean, though opinions differ, they (surely now
the maids must be meant, although the change of subject is not made until
the next sentence) dipped portable torches into the main braziers and ferried
them about to act as the ancient equivalent of standard or table lamps: a
tiring exercise, the poet would have us believe, to be done d|ioiPTi6{<;, by
people taking turns. Odysseus's offer to take the whole of this exhausting
work off their hands is phrased as follows:
avxap eyo) xovxoiai <pdoq Ttdvxeaov nape^o).
£x Tiep ydp K* eSeXcoaiv evGpovov 'Ha fi{)iv£iv,
ov Ti ^£ vncrjoovav 7coA,\)xXt||j.cov 5e ^.dX,' £i^i.
(18. 317-19)
His words meet with a curious response. The maids exchange looks and
giggle (320). Melantho, the sauciest of them all, tells Odysseus that he is
out of his mind (327). He ought, she suggests, to go and get some sleep at
the smithy or club, instead of talking so much where he is. He must be
drunk, or else just plain odd, to be talking such nonsense. Possibly his
recent victory over Iros has gone to his head. He should be careful that
some one stronger than Iros may not stand up to him and drive him out of
the house.
Now these are very strange remarks to come from a serving girl,
brought up, we learn here with some incredulity, by Penelope. One might
expect her to jump at any chance of abandoning the tedious chore of tending
fires. Odysseus's offer had not been couched in any long or rambling way,
and we wonder why Melantho criticises it for having characteristics which it
has in fact not got. The violence of her response is, even for this high-
spirited young woman, uncalled for. So too is the violence of Odysseus's
reply to her. He calls her a bitch, and threatens to report her to Telemachos,
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with a view to having him tear her limb from limb on the spot. The
Telemachos he describes is clearly a different person from the Telemachos
we are accustomed to think of, whose footing in the palace is precarious,
and who may be murdered at any moment. We have not, up to now, been
accustomed to think of him as a kindred spirit of King Echetos, mutilator of
all men (85). But now the mere mention of his name is enough to send the
mistress of Eurymachos, if you believe in v. 325,^ flying in terror along
with all the others out of the room (not but what they seep back in again at
19. 60). Odysseus is now left as the sole provider of light. Eurymachos
makes the joke with which we began, and having made it "at the same time"
(356) turns to Odysseus whom the poet now with deliberate care, for he has
not read L'Epithete traditionnelle, describes as the sacker of cities. He
issues a challenge to him, suggesting that he is work-shy. In 362-64 he
states as a matter of ascertained fact that since Odysseus has learnt epya
KttKd, he will not be willing to go about real work, but prefer to slink
among the people until he has the wherewithal to feed his insatiable
stomach.
This response is, in its own way, as strange as Melantho's. To accuse
a man of being of an idle disposition when he has just volunteered to take
upon himself the work of relays of maidservants, if necessary all through
the night, is to expose oneself to an instant and devastating rebuttal.
Odysseus however meets the charge not by appeahng to the evidence of the
offer he has just made but by considering three possible contests between
himself and Eurymachos, two from the life of a peasant, and one from the
life of a noble warrior. Eurymachos is made so angry by this response that
he throws a stool at Odysseus, an act plainly modelled on the similar throw
by Antinoos in Chapter 17.^
We have seen enough to conclude that the theme of Odysseus providing
light is one that the poet hardly knows how to integrate; yet he feels unable
to dispense with it. We come back to our original question. Why did
^ V. 324 is noimally taken to mean. "She had no pity for Penelope in her heart." But the
word in question never elsewhere means "pity," only "sorrow" or "grief." If the line were
preserved by itself we would probably translate it, "Not even so did she check the sorrow
Penelope felt in her heart." If we look at the passage again with that interpretation in
mind, we may wonder if the sense originally intended was, "Although Penelope spent a lot
of time playing with the child, she was not enough to make her forget her sorrow." If that
view is right, v. 325 must be condemned as an addition based on a misunderstanding. It
may be said that the ejection of v. 325, a belated attempt on our part to rescue a small
fragment of Melantho's moral repuution, founders on the rock of 17. 257, the line which
describes Melantheus as Eurymachos's particular friend. But it was long ago noted that
although Melantheus and Melantho were under the same roof they seem to have no
cognisance of each other and are never called brother and sister (I. Bekker, Homerische
Blatter [Bonn 1863-72] I 110).
^ Disputed of course by those who see Steigerungen everywhere. Much good sense in H.
Reynen, "Schmahrede und Schemelwurf im p imd o der Odyssee," Hermes 85 (1957) 128-
46.
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Odysseus ever make the offer in the first place? "It is not stated why he
does it; but it only requires a bit of thought to see that the beggar wants to
make himself useful so that he can remain in the house." So Wilamowitz,
in his first Homer book.'* Many years later he developed his explanation
more fully. "Odysseus now has the task of securing his objective of
remaining in the hall so that he can talk to Penelope later on. And so he
volunteers to undertake the brazier duty by himself; he would do it well. He
says it however in the form of a command, at which the maids may
reasonably be surprised."^ Neither Wilamowitz's first thoughts nor his
second are entirely satisfactory. Making himself useful so that he can stay
in the house may indeed have been part of Odysseus 's motives in other
versions of the story. But in the poem as we now have it the beggar's place
in the palace has already been guaranteed by his victory over Iros (18. 46-
49); while the threat to have him removed from the palace, guarantee or no
guarantee, comes after Odysseus's offer to see to the lights. Wilamowitz's
second thoughts, that the beggar wishes to stay behind in order to facilitate
his meeting with Penelope, again does rather more than justice to the text in
the form that we have it. Penelope has retired to her room, and Odysseus
has sent the maids to her while he sits in the hall surrounded by suitors who
may be there until dawn. The circumstances for a tete-a-tete with Penelope
could hardly be less propitious.
A modem Unitarian, Eisenberger,*^ looks at things from an entirely
different standpoint. He see Odysseus's offer, which he describes as
"excellently motivated" by 346 ff., as a means of liberating the maids so
that they can go to Penelope to cheer her up. But what he describes as "the
attractive trait of caring for his wife"*^ is something that most of us would
put alongside Telemachos's brusque instruction to his mother to go to her
room (1. 356-58 and 21. 350-53): the equivalent of "go somewhere else
and leave me alone." Closest to the truth, I believe, come two scholars
from the past, one the Analyst Seeck, whose belief that Odysseus was a
solar myth does less damage to his work than one might think; the other the
Unitarian Rothe, also not totally devoid of credibility notwithstanding his
comparisons of Homer on one and the same page of his book to Jesus
Christ and Bismarck. These two fearlessly independent thinkers held that
the only reason for getting rid of the maids was to facilitate the removal of
* Homerische Untersuchungen (Berlin 1884) 35: "es ist nicht ausgesprochen, weshalb
er das tut, aber es bedarf nur einiger iiberlegung, urn zu verstehen, dass der bettler sich
niitzlich machen will, damit er im hause bleiben kann." Slightly misquoted by Hennings
in his commentary (p. 493).
' "Odysseus hat nun die Aufgabe, es zu erreichen, dass er in dem Saale bleiben kann, um
nachher Penelope zu sprechen. Daher erbietet er sich, den Dienst an den Feuerstellen allein
zu besorgen; das wiirde er schon leisten. Er sagt es aber in der Form eines Befehles, iiber
den sich die Magde fuglich wundem diirfen" {Die Heimkehr des Odysseus [Berlin 1927] 31).
^Studien zur Odyssee (Wiesbaden 1973) 250.
^
"der schone Zug der Sorge fiir die Gattin."
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the armour (so Rothe) or at any rate to clear the decks for the death of the
suitors (Seeck).*
Before we can assess the merits of this explanation, which as stated is
still wide and unfocused, we must back-track. This apparently isolated
theme of Odysseus as a provider of heat and light may reasonably be taken
as a sequel to a passage occurring in Chapter 15. "I may go to the divine
Odysseus's palace and tell my news to the wise Penelope, and mingle with
the arrogant suitors to see if they will give me dinner, and with all the
countless good things they have got. For I tell you this—and you mark my
words and listen to me: by the grace of Hermes the messenger, who grants
charm and glory to the works of all men, no other mortal can compete with
me in hard work—heaping up a good fire and splitting dried logs, carving,
cooking, and wine-pouring—the kind of thing that lesser men stand by to
perform for the nobility" (313-24). It is line 322 that particularly attracts
our attention. True it does not refer to hght as much as to the provision of
heat, but we are clearly in the same area of domestic service, a lowly one, as
Iros doubtless knew when he insulted Odysseus as "like an old oven
woman" at 18. 27. There are two points to make about this passage in
Chapter 15 by comparison with 18. The first is that the emphasis on hard
physical labour seems more justified. It is a more strenuous business to cut
up logs of wood than it is to stand around holding a lamp. The second
point is that the passage shows all the signs of forcible insertion. The
deadly formula eic ydp xoi epeco, ah 6e a-6v0eo Kai jxev ockovoov, and the
appeal to Hermes, who sheds grace and glory on men's works, even
apparently a woodcutter's, is too portentous when the sequence of thought
should be simply: "I will make myself useful; I am a hard worker." When
one notices the asyndeton of the line before (317) one wonders whether the
insertion may not have begun one line earlier. What does seem clear
however is that we are not far away here from the bald-headed lamplighter,
that theme which lives on without ever being perfectly integrated into its
surroundings.
Having looked backward to Chapter 15 we may now look forward to
Chapter 19. In the highly problematic scene of the removal of the armour
Eurykleia puts a question which it would not have occurred to most of us to
raise: "Who will come along and bring a Ught? You have not let the maids
come forward, who would have Ut your way" (19. 24-25). She receives the
answer: "This stranger here will; I will not tolerate any one idle" (26-27).
The provision of light is again linked, in a way we may find rather peculiar,
with hard work. The armour is duly removed.
"Die Magde, welche die Flammen untertialten, weist Odysseus weg, um fiir den
Freiermord reines Fdd zu gewinnen . . . ," O. Seeck, Die Quellen der Odyssee (Berlin 1887)
210. "Dire Entfemung ist ausserdem notwendig, da sie bei dem Wegschaffen der Waffen
nicht zugegen sein sollen," K. Rothe, Die Odyssee als Dichtung (Padeibom 1914) 141.
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£0<p6peov KopvOdq xe xai ctoitiSaq oncpaXoeooaq
ETXEoi x' o^voEvxa- ndpoiGe 6e FlaA-XoK; 'A6rivT|
Xpvoeov X^xvov Exovoa <pdoq nepiKaXXeq enoiei.
5ti xoxe TriXenaxoq npooe<p(oveev ov jiaxep' ai\j/a- 35
"(6 Jidxep, ri ^liya Qa\)\ia x65' 6(p8aA,|ioioiv opwuai-
e^7iTi(; ^ol xoixoi liEydpojv KaXai xe ji£o65)iai
eiXdxivaixe 5okoi koi kiove^ uyoo' e'xovxei;
fflaivovx' 6<|>8aX)i.oio' (oq ei n-opoq aiBonevoio.
T| ^dX,a xiq Qcbq £v6ov, oi ovpavov evpvv exovoi." 40
xov 6' dnanEiP6^Evo(; 7cpooE<pTi noXvu^xic, 'OSvgoevc,-
"aiya Kal Kaxd oov voov loxavE \ii\b' epeeive*
aiixTi xoi 5(kt| eoxi 6eoc)v, oi "OX,o^7lov exo-uoiv.
dX,Xd ov nEv KaxdXx^ai, Eyco 5* •ujioX^ivo|iai avxov,
6(ppa K* Exi S^coidq Kai urixEpa ar\v epEGi^co." 45
(19. 32^5)
Kirchhoff, in the course of defending this whole section and warning us
of the dangers of assuming interpolation on subjective—I would prefer to
say on poetic
—
grounds, none the less set out the case for the prosecution
with a clarity that should be enough to convince us of the accused's guilt.
It was not a particularly brilliant stroke, he thought, to have Athene, even if
she did have a golden lantern, discharge the function of a maid (the old
Alexandrian criticism), at a time when her proteges were in no immediate
pressing danger; and in spite of Telemachos's answer to Eurykleia's question
it appears that father and son begin their work without light, and then, quite
unexpectedly, find their work illuminated from some mysterious source.
Helpful, no doubt, but not essential; Odysseus could have stood by with the
light while his son moved the armour. Like Bethe,' I believe that Athene
has often been imported into scenes in the Odyssey which were originally
conceived in purely human terms. That certainly seems to be the case here.
But the interpolation has itself been subject to interpolation. The Athene
who stands before us, providing her somewhat theatrical and quite
superfluous piece of diffused lighting, did so with a luminescence which
arose from her own person. A lantern would not have given off the kind of
all-round hghting which Telemachos describes, and Odysseus's answer to
his son, "This is the way of the gods who live on Olympus," makes sense
only as testimony to the aura that surrounds them; he cannot possibly mean
that the Olympians are well known for traipsing around carrying lamps.
But some more Uteral-minded poet has insisted on equipping Athene with a
lamp, and in doing so has spoilt the whole point of his predecessor's
' E. Bethe, Homer. Dichtung and Sage H: Odyssec (Leipzig and Berlin 1914) 336 on the
use of Athene for "nichtigsten Dienstleistungen." Even Eurymachos's original jibe at
Odysseus's baldness was the result of prompting by Athene so that even more pain might
enter the heart of Laertes's son Odysseus (18. 347-48).
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invention, just as the point about the luminosity of Odysseus was spoilt by
the person who insisted on giving him a bald head.^*^
So out goes this lamp, the bane of many an archaeologist's life;^* and
out too, for the sterner breed of critic, goes Athene. But we have still to
ask, why does Eurykleia raise the question of hght in the first place? When
we read a novel in which one of the scenes is set in the evening, we do not
expect a great issue to be made out of who turned on the electric light If
the question is raised at all, it must be for a special reason. Some poet has
evidently been anxious to continue with and strengthen his theme of
Odysseus as a provider of light Rival poets or successors have not wished
to abandon this theme, but they have not fully understood it, and they have
not been able to work it into their own poems without leaving rough edges
at the joins. So here Odysseus and his son carry away the armour while
Athene sheds hght and then—6ti tote (19. 35) the words used often denote
"then, at that late stage," which is hard to reconcile with another word in the
same line, "swiftly"—Telemachos is made to remark on the supernatural
light which seems to suffuse the whole building. Odysseus 's reply to his
son's question is, "Be quiet: keep it to yourself; that is the way with
Olympians; cut along to bed, while I remain here for the purpose of
irritating the servants and your mother still further." The language is
abrupt, the transition inept, the psychology implausible; and it is not easy
to see how servants are going to be further irritated when they are not even
there. As well as all this we have the problem of timing. If Telemachos is
going to comment on the strange light, he must surely do so at its firet
manifestation, when they begin to remove the armour. But Odysseus's
words, "you go off to bed now," imply that the removal of the armour has
been completed. This sudden jump from beginning to end, with no middle,
is a further proof that Athene has no proper place in this episode. We would
very much like to know too where the multiple blazing torches of v. 48
came from as Telemachos strode through the hall. Certainly from the hand
of some one who did not know, ignored, or wished to obliterate Odysseus's
monopoly in that field. Again, the provision of light, and now also heat, is
seen to by the maids at vv. 63-64 without any attempt to make it clear that
this was the resumption of a normal duty recently interrupted by the hero.
The maids' release is not explained, and they have no comment to offer on
their recent incarceration. Their appearance now belongs, we must infer, to
a different way of telling the story.
^° If only we could take Chapter 20 seriously which, as von der Miihll says, "gehoit zum
Minderwertigsten im Homer," we would add that the appearance of Athene "from heaven"
(31) would be unlikely if she had just been in the palace: unless she likes duplicating her
journeys like the eagle later in 19 which goes away for the sole purpose of coming back
(540. 544).
" H. L. Lorimer. Homer and the Monuments (London 1950) 509-10.
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Which raises another question. Why did those maids have to be shut up
in their rooms? If an excuse was ready to meet any question from the
suitors, that excuse would also serve to counter objections that might be put
by the maids. Keeping them in the women's quarters makes sense only if
recognition by Penelope and the killing of the suitors, or at any rate one of
those two things, was meant to follow in short order. Even Homer's most
ardent Unitarian apologist, Combellack, has to confess, "I suspect that no
amount of ingenuity can make the shutting out of the maids plausible for
the characters."'^ But if we do assume that the denouement was to follow
swiftly, removal of the maids makes good sense, and we would direct our
suspicions not at the way they are taken from our sight, but at the way they
are restored to it. They clear things away, which could well have waited
until morning; in fact Chapter 20 does have them at work the following
morning (149-54); and they provide light at the very time when most
people would be thinking of dowsing the lights; and then what? Then
nothing. We are never told that they went away, and yet one is reluctant to
believe that the intimate conversation which is to take place between
Penelope and the beggar is conducted under the gaze of many pairs of
curious eyes. Bathwater may be spilt and basins clang; aged retainers may
be throttled; but no word of comment issues from the lips of any white-
armed serving women. As we shall learn at the very end of Chapter 19,
Penelope does have her own personal attendants with her (601), presumably
two in number as regularly elsewhere. But we surely do not believe in
droves of young women being present throughout. Yet Homer, often
punctilious on informing us of comings and goings, is on this vital
occasion silent, leaving it to Wilamowitz and Franz Stiirmer to tell us that
of course they did actually depart at a fairly early stage. If so, they depart
again, without having come back in the meantime, at 20. 6.
Pausing only for a moment to notice the highly specialised nature of
the threat voiced by Melantho at v. 69, that Odysseus may be driven out of
the house struck by a piece of burning wood, a line which would not have
been amiss in her earlier speech of 18. 327-36, let us just look at one other
little problem, which the recent Italian commentary'^ is baffled by. The
editor at this point, Russo, on reaching v. 183 writes: "It is probable that
Homer chose this name (i.e. Aithon) with some precise idea in his mind,
but is not clear what that could have been." He goes on to talk about the
colour of lions, horses, oxen, eagles, tripods, basins, and iron, before
concluding that here it just means generally "brilliant." But if a special
meaning is to be sought, we might fancifully speculate it is because aithon
l2C5C/\ 6(1974) 16.
" Omero, Odissea (Milan 1981-86) V 235 f.
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fits precisely with what Odysseus has insisted on doing. It is a sort of
tongue-in-cheek joke. My name is Mr. Bums.^'*
Let us push speculation even further. The answer Telemachos is to
return to the suitors if they ask where all the arms have gone is, "I have put
them away from the smoke; they no longer look like the ones which
Odysseus once left behind when he went to Troy, but have suffered harm, in
so far as the breath of the fire has got to them" (19. 7-9). Any reasonably
intelligent suitor would smell a rat at once, unless something had happened
to make such an explanation colourable; and it would be colourable if there
had just recently been an accident involving fire and smoke. Who better to
engineer such an accident than the man who had the provision of fire under
his sole control? To those who would soberly protest that this idea is
wildly far-fetched, I would plead only that as such it does not stand alone in
Homeric criticism. The scholar in whose honour this volume is pubUshed
was no stranger himself to bold hypotheses on the Odyssey}^
Chapter 19 is a peculiar repository of disparate themes. One can strip it
down until there is nothing left. The Removal of the Armour does not take
place either as foreseen earlier or as events will show later. We must
dispense with Melantho, long recognised as being, together with her brother
of the indeterminate spelling, Melanthios/Melantheus, a late intrusion. In
her four-line speech (66-69) she commits three linguistic solecisms. ^^ The
web story is repeated from elsewhere, and poses such chronological
difficulties that many assume it has no rightful place anywhere in our
poem.^^ The fictitious Cretan story should not have been told, since it is at
variance with the story already communicated to Penelope by Eumaios. We
must remove either the footbath, or Penelope's presence at the time, since
her failure to notice all the excitement is explained with the utmost
barefaced ineptitude by saying Athene diverted her mind. We deduct from
the rapidly diminishing total of lines another one hundred and fifty for the
scar and Autolykos story, not merely because Aristotle expressly denied the
story was in the poem, but also because a point of grammar shows us
exactly where it has been slotted in. The self-explanatory eagle is rightly
said by von der Miihll to belong to the most tasteless offerings to be found
anywhere in Greek literature. Nobody has the faintest idea what put into the
Queen's mind the inscrutable burst of didacticism on the subject of dreams
^* The name is known from real life, and seems to reach back to Mycenaean times: see
K. J. McKay, Mnemosyne 12 (1959) 199. I forbear to mention that the name Ithaka was
linked etymologicaUy to ai6a) by L. von Schroder in Kuhns Zeitschrift fiir vergleichende
Sprachforschung 29 (1887-88) 199 f.; and 'OX\>xx£\>c, with the root lux by Wust in RE s.v.
"Odysseus" 1907.
^^ I am thinking of his confident identification of three separate authors in the spurious
end of the poem: Poetry and Poetics from Ancient Greece to the Renaissance: Studies in
Honor of James Button, ComeU Studies in Classical Philology 38 (Ithaca 1975) 13-28.
1^ G. P. Shipp. Studies in the Unguage of Horner^ (Cambridge 1972) 346.
" W. Kullmann. Wiener Studien 15 (1981) 35-38.
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coming through gates of which horns (not hom) and ivory form part, and
the timing of the bow contest is quite wrong. It is unmotivated, and
inconsistent with the way it is introduced as an entirely fresh idea at the start
of Chapter 21.
Such, in the barest outline, is the minefield of Chapter 19 through
which the Analyst incedit super ignes suppositos, conducting controlled
explosions as he goes, while the Unitarian prudently remains on the
sidelines, hoping he will blow himself up. Does the bald-headed
lamplighter help us to thread our way any more safely? Not if we pretend
we can reconstruct some pure original story passing down through
generations, of which our present text is a late debasement. Much damage
has been done to the study of Homer by treating the poems as if they were
transmitted in a vertical plane of time, being modified as they go, but
essentially uniform if only you could arrest their descent at any given
moment. Often we would do better to renounce words like earlier and later,
and think more in terms of synchronous, competing versions. It is, at this
late stage, usually impossible to disentangle whole versions from each
other. But the separateness of component elements can often still be
distinguished, and so can differences in quality. The lamplighter theme is in
all probability not an ancient element of the Odyssey, since it seems linked
with the recent import Melantho, into whose province he intrudes (and
perhaps even with her male counterpart Melantheus; for it is he, none other,
whom the suitors order to light a fire at 21. 176). Our task is made the
more difficult in that some poets have not known what to do with the
lamplighter, and have sought to reduce his importance, by having first
Athene, and then the maids, provide light themselves. But what might the
lamplighter-poet have been aJFter himself? At one point he seems to tell us
in so many words: Odysseus used his newly acquired position to observe
the suitors (18. 344).i8
avtctp 6 nap XanJixfipai (paeivcov ai9onevoioiv
ECXT|Keiv e^ Ttdvxai; opwuevoq- aXXa bi ol Ktip
©pfiaive (ppeoiv rjiovv, a p' ov>k axiXcata yevovTo.
(18. 343^5)
But at best this cannot be more than a minor motive, for Odysseus has had
other opportunities already for becoming acquainted with the suitors'
behaviour.
So we are left only with the two choices with which we began, the
Removal of the Armour and the Interview with Penelope. We do not have
*' This is not absolutely certain: iidvxaq could mean "all the braziers," and opcojievoq
("looking at") could mean "looking after," as opocooa does at 19. 514: "Looking at, i.e.
seeing to, my work and that of my attendants." Similarly Xzvaat at 23. 124. This gives
us a more obvious contrast, no longer between providing light and thinking other
thoughts, but between being ostensibly busy and having a mind running on quite different
matters.
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to accept in full the validity of the Armour scene as it stands, its appearance
in this very place in Chapter 19, together with all the details that conflict
with what is said in Chapters 16 and 22. But the Unk with a Removal of
the Armour scene seems a good one. If you are going to fight one hundred
and eight suitors in a confined space, you have to do all you can to even the
odds first. The armour on the wall has got to go, and that can only be done
in secret. The beggar has got to have a reason for being on the premises
until late—even until dawn if necessary (18. 318). The provision of light is
to be that reason, and the link of light with the actual removal is still
visible in Telemachos's reply to Eurykleia, and in a twisted way is testified
to by the unexpected overlay of Athene in her brief role as The Lady with
the Lamp.
The connection with the Penelope interview is less obvious. Opinions
about whether that interview should or should not lead up to recognition,
itself the precursor to the bow contest and the revenge, are very sharply
divided, and the language can become quite acrimonious. "Of course it was
meant to lead to recognition," said Bethe, before proceeding to a
Wilamowitzian, "Those who do not concede that are not people with whom
one can discuss questions of style and poetry."^' What seems plain is that
no first-class minstrel would ever have arranged matters as we now have
them, either within the interview itself, or with its positioning inside the
poem as a whole. We have already touched on Penelope's failure to notice
the spilt water and the clanging basin, and nothing could be more tasteless
than that Odysseus should wish to re-establish contact with the wife he left
behind twenty years ago by using a housekeeper as intermediary. The whole
pack of cards collapses if we pull one out. We could begin with Melantho
and her three mistakes in four lines. The content of those four lines
matches their language in the problems they pose. The girl has
inexplicably recovered all the confidence she lost at 18. 340, and accuses
Odysseus of spying on women—a wholly implausible charge since he and
his son have both exerted themselves to get the women out of the way. But
if Melantho is eliminated, we lose most of our motive for having Odysseus
ask for some older woman if his feet are to be washed. But in any case the
most obviously available woman to do that washing was not Eurykleia but
Eurynome.^^ With no Eurykleia, we have no scar. With no scar we have
no recognition. In short, we run into the sand. We observe too that what
Penelope had proposed was a bath. There was nothing to say that that bath
would not be of the whole person. And she had proposed it now, with
another bath to follow the next morning. Such an excess of cleanliness is
suspicious, and when Odysseus replies he refers only to the first of the two
*'
"Wer es nicht zugibt, mit dem kann man uber Stilfragen und uber Poesie nicht rechten"
(90).
2° As A. Kohnken points out in his article in A&A 22 (1976) 101-14. It is Eurynome
who bathes Odysseus at 23. 154.
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washings. Suspicious loo is the moralistic tone of the rest of Penelope's
speech, a long section which Odysseus also ignores, a highly tactless thing
to do if Penelope really had been drawing attention to herself as, in her own
words, an intelligent woman and a generous host. As for the timing of this
interview, we notice the curious mess—what more sympathetic spirits call a
Verzogerungstaktik—at the end of Chapter 17. At 508 Penelope asks
Eumaios to summon the beggar to interview. Eumaios's reply tails off into
praise of him as an authoritative raconteur. At 529 she repeats her
command, this time tailing off herself into a routine denuncation of the
suitors. Then thirdly at 544 we have an inconsequential run of
Telemachos's sneezing, the suitors' likely death, and the "another thing"
which Penelope will tell Eumaios and which he is to take to heart, namely
clothing the beggar if he tells the truth; all being left side by side, rather
than reduced to order. Some one is clearly intent on seeing to it that the
expected onward impetus of the story is held up, or perhaps one should say
that no potentially Odyssean piece of poetry is left out of the Authorised
Version. The arrangement finally made is that Penelope is to wait until
sunset in the hall, or in the palace; the word is ambiguous. But when she
does appear, nothing is said to indicate that she is keeping an appointment,
and her arrival (19. 54), which should have been a simple enough matter, is
marked by a textual problem, who "they" are (55) who set Ikmalios's
elaborate chair for her; a problem serious enough for Kirchhoff to posit a
lacuna at this point.
We have departed far from the original theme of this paper, the bald-
headed lamplighter. What we may hope to have done is to show that the
problems in this area of the poem are more complex than they are often
represented as being, and to suggest that if one wishes to probe either further
into the past, or sideways into competing versions, one must do so in a way
which leaves the lampUghter as something more than, in the classic phrase,
a transient and embarrassed phantom.
Trinity College, Cambridge
Proper Behavior in the Odyssey
CHARLES FUQUA
Homeric Greek has an extensive vocabulary of terms that reflect the
characters' compliance with attitudes or behavior considered socially or
personally acceptable by others.^ This essay examines the use of seven of
these terms, one adjective and six nouns, in order to learn what they can
reveal about Homeric ideas of proper behavior. The words selected address
this issue from a series of related but distinct perspectives. Some have been
studied extensively before; others have not. I propose to show that they
illustrate the need for good and proper behavior, "propriety," as viewed by
society and the individuals involved. While propriety as such is never
defined in the Odyssey, it is illustrated from a broad variety of perspectives
by a large number of terms, each of which may reflect the general principle
in varying degrees of intensity. Propriety represents a strong sense that,
while success is always important, how something is done can also be of
great significance. The examples used in this essay are all drawn from the
Odyssey} In the first section of the essay I will examine the basic ideas
that are reflected by the selected terms, and in the second I will deal with
selected aspects of the ways in which these terms are used.
^ Proper behavior and manners are not coextensive, and this essay is not concerned with
the latter. For a study of manners as such see I. M. Hohendahl-Zoetelief, Manners in the
Homeric Epic, Mnemosyne Suppl. 63 (Leiden 1980). Hohendahl-Zoetelief s intention is
to examine the views of A. Dihle, "Antike Hoflichkeit und christliche Demut," SIFC 26
(1952) 169-90, H. Fraenkel, Dichtung und Philosophie des friihen Griechentums^ (Munich
1962) 92 and H. Strassburger, "Der soziologische Aspekt der homerischen Epen,"
Gymnasium 60 (1953) 97-114, that the Homeric heroes knew and abided by fixed social
rules. While manners and proper behavior do overlap, they are also quite distinct from one
another. M. W. Edwards, Homer: The Poet of the Iliad (Baltimore and London 1987) 152-
54, offers some excellent remarks on the role of proper behavior in the Hiad.
All references to the Odyssey will be by the book and line number(s) alone.
^ These terms occur with greater frequency and variety in the Odyssey than the Iliad. I
concur with the view that the Odyssey reflects a "later" or "more advanced" slate of moral
consciousness, a perspective that has been a commonplace in Homeric criticism since
antiquity; see J. S. Qay, The Wrath of Athena (Princeton 1983) 215-16 and W. Kullman,
"Gods and Men in the Iliad and the Odyssey," HSCP 89 (1985) 1-23.
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The first term to be considered is aeikes, which appears 27 times in the
Odyssey. Usage throughout the epic makes it clear this adjective is a very
potent term to describe departures from acceptable behavior. The strongest
use of the word comes not from the Odyssey but the Iliad where the theme
of improper behavior is especially important in the final books and the
phrase aeikea erga is used to describe Achilles' mutilation of Hector's body
(//. 22. 395, 23. 34). The most frequent uses in the Odyssey are with
potmos (e.g. 2. 250, 4. 339-40, 22. 317 = 416) to describe an inappropriate
or unseemly death, with ergon to characterize an act (3. 265, 11. 429, 16.
107), and even to depict Odysseus' ragged wallet (13. 437, 17. 197, 18.
108).^ The range of the other appearances is broad. In 4. 533 it describes
Aegisthus' plots against Agamemnon, in 20. 394 the Suitors' designs, and
in 22. 432 the behavior of the faithless maidservants. In Nestor's
description of Clytaemnestra before Aegisthus' seduction of her (3. 265-66)
there is a strong contrast made between an improper act and good sense; in
this passage proper behavior is depicted as knowing what to do and what not
to do. The range of these appearances of aeikes to characterize acts,
individuals, and situations is considerable, but, even though the adjective
appears in a broad variety of contexts, the term consistently depicts strong
disapproval with an act or how it is performed.
The next two examples I have selected are aidos and nemesis. The basic
ideas conveyed by these terms were well summarized by Gilbert Murray
when he stated: "Aidos is what you feel about an act of your own.
Nemesis is what you feel for an act of another.'"^ The two terms are
complementary. Aidos and the other terms derived from this root imply a
sense of shame and an awareness of the demands of the social system upon
the individual to perform.^ The term appears in a broad range of contexts in
the epic. It is often seen as emblematic of social restraint or good manners
(3. 14; cf. 3. 22-24, 8. 324, 14. 505-06). An interesting play upon the
idea of aidos as social restraint, manners, or even a virtue of the upper
^ The use of the adjective to describe Odysseus' wallet is perhaps the most peculiar. In
all probability it is used to convey both a sense of the wallet's wretched physical
condition and to signal how Odysseus' disguise and squalor are completely out of line with
his proper position.
* G. Murray. The Rise of the Greek Epic* (Oxford 1934) 83. On the two concepts see
also: C. E. F. von Erffa, AIAiiE and venvandte Begrijfe in ihrer Entmcklung von Homer
bis Demokrit, Philologus Suppl. 30. 2 (1937) Chap. I; J. Ferguson, Moral Values in the
Ancient World (New York 1979); J. M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Chicago
and London 1975); M. Scott. "Aidos and Nemesis." AC 23 (1980) 13-35; B. Snell,
Lexikon des fruhgriechischen Epos (Gottingen 1955- ) s.v. a{6coq; W. J. Verdenius,
"AIAfll bei Homer." Mnemosyne 12 (1944) 47-60. These studies bring out the close
relationship of aidos and nemesis. Redfield 115-19 offers an excellent short discussion of
the importance of aidos in Homer. One important quality of aidos is that it is externally
oriented and directed by the individual's response to social situations and the opinions of
others; it is not, in other words, what we might term "conscience."
^ This is nowhere more poignantly illustrated in the epics than in Hector's refusal to
withdraw into the waUs. //. 22. 104-15, which offer a moving echo of 6. 442.
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classes is found when Telemachus tells Odysseus to beg from the Suitors
because "aidos for a man in need is not good" (17. 347; cf. 17, 352). My
final example comes from Odysseus' outburst of 20. 169-71 in which he
forcefully comments on how the Suitors' execrable behavior can be
explained by their lack of aidos. The frequent appearances of this term
illustrate one of the most significant ways in which society's call upon the
individual is expressed.
While there are few appearances of nemesis (1. 350, 2. 136-37, 20.
330, and 22. 40), they are significant in the way that they complement
aidos. Nemesis is directed outward and conveys a sense of how an individual
feels about an act of another.^ In its simplest form nemesis conveys a sense
of moral indignation. It reflects the moral and emotional sensitivity of the
individuals who experience this sensation. The primary sense of nemesis is
one of resentment at someone else's attitude or failure to perform worthily.
The language of nemesis describes one of the ways the dictates of aidos are
carried out. And, while aidos and nemesis also reflect what Adkins has
termed the competitive values, they primarily mirror standards that are
commonly accepted and shared by most men.''
Atasthalia and the parallel verb and adjective, atasthallo and atasthalos,
are much more common. They have often been translated by such
expressions as "presumptuous sin," "to be reckless," "wicked" and so have
been given an undeserved moral stance that is more characteristic of later
eras than that of Homer. Usage in the epics make it clear that the terms
imply not only an attitude of wanton disregard or fixation implied by ate but
also a certain exuberance suggested by thallo.^ Atasthalia is often used to
* As R. Latlimore, Story Patterns in Greek Tragedy (London 1964) 24, observed, ". . .
nemesis means, not an action or activity, or an agency, but a feeling of shock, outrage,
indignation at hybris or any other misbehavior" (see also Scott [above, note 4] 25-27).
There are a number of terms that reflect sentiments parallel to nemesis; see J. P. Holoka,
"Looking Darkly (YllOAPA lAQN): Reflections on Status and Deconim in Homer," TAPA
113 (1983) 1-16. Holoka offers a very detailed examination of how the phrase reflects
someone's (usually a superior's) indignation at being treated indecorously. Holoka shows
how the expression conveys a sense of umbrage at a violation of the rules which govem
the interactions at all levels of society.
^ On the distinction between competitive and cooperative values see A. W. H. Adkins,
Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 1960) Chaps. I-III and "'Honour' and 'Punishment* in
the Homeric Poems," BICS 7 (1960) 23-32. These woiks offer a convenient epitome of
Adkins' position; see also A. A. Long's criticism of Adkins' work, "Morals and Values in
Homer," JHS 90 (1970) 121-39, and the latter's response, "Homeric Values and Homeric
Society," JHS 91 (1971) 1-14. C. J. Rowe, "The Nature of Homeric Morality," in
Approaches to Homer, ed. C. A. Rubino and C. W. Shelmerdine (Austin, TX 1983) 248-75,
provides a thorough discussion of both Adkins' and Long's positions.
* On the concept of ate in Homer see: J. M. Bremer, Hamartia (Amsterdam 1969) 99-
112; E. R. Dodds. The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951) Chap. I;
R. E. Doyle, S.J., "ATH: Its Use and Meaning (New York 1984) 1-22; H. J. Mette.
Lexikon des friihgriechischen Epos (above, note 4) s.v. aato^; W. F. Wyatt, Jr., "Homeric
"ATH," Ay/" 103 (1982) 247-76. See also R. D. Dawe, "Some Reflections on Ate and
Hamartia." HSCP 72 (1967) 89-123.
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describe the folly ot the untoward conduct of the Suitors as individuals and
as a group (e.g. 21. 146-47, 22. 317 [= 416], 23. 67, and 24. 458). Unlike
Odysseus and Telemachus, who have a very keen sense of social order, the
Suitors arrogantly flaunt the "normal" rules and expectations of society in
the belief they can have the world on their own terms. Much the same
attitude is displayed by Odysseus' hetairoi and mirrored in Zeus' complaints
about mankind in general and Aegisthus in particular (1. 33-37). At the
same time these and other passages imply the Suitors' disregard of j)ersonal
responsibiUty as well. This creates in turn a sense of a causal Unk between
ignorance and misconduct that parallels the one found in the uses of aeikes.
By the use of these and other terms the poet makes it clear that, while an
individual may be ignorant of the causes behind certain acts, he is none the
less responsible for them.
The use of hybris in the Odyssey is simple and direct. It refers to
violent physical behavior in a number of different forms. By far the most
frequent uses of hybris are to describe the activities of the Suitors and their
almost total disregard for proper behavior and the rights of Odysseus' house
(e.g. 1. 368, 16. 86, and 410).' In the last two passages the noun is
accentuated by the adjectives hyperbios and atasthalos which intensify and
characterize the action in even more graphic detail. The adjective hybristes
appears three times in the Unes:
And are they violent (hybristes) and wild and not "just" or are they
friendly to strangers and do they have a god-fearing mind? (6. 120-21
= 9. 175-76 = 13. 201-02)
In these lines hybristes is paired with "wild" and opposed to "just,"
"hospitable," and "god-fearing." The lines make it clear that, even though a
Although the derivation has been doubted (e.g. by W. J. Verdenius, A Commentary on
Hesiod Works and Days 1-382, Mnemosyne Suppl. 86 [Leiden 1985] ad 134), usage seems
to suggest that the temis are derived from a combination of ate and thallo. The idea of
extravagant behavior also helps us understand the parallel concept of hybris; see A.
Michelini. ""YBPII and Plants." HSCP 82 (1978) 35-44. The passages in which
atasthalia appear suggest, but do not demonstrate, a connection between atasthalia and
ignorance.
' Many studies have examined the role of hybris in Greek tragedy and the concept has
been extensively scrutinized in histories of Greek religion. My views have been shaped
by the following: E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (previous note) Chap. U; C.
Del Grande. Hybris (Naples 1947); N. R. E. Fisher. "Hybris and Dishonor," G&R Ti
(1976) 14-31 and 26 (1979) 32-49; J. T. Hooker. "The Original Meaning of iSppK;,"
Archiv fiir Begriffgeschichte 19 (1975) 235-37; Lattimore (above, note 6) 23-27; D. M.
MacDowell, "Hybris in Athens," G&R Ti (1976) 14-31; Michelini (previous note);
Murray (above, note 4) 326-29; H. North, Sophrosyne (Ithaca 1966) Chap. I; L. Pearson,
Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece (Stanford 1962) Chap. U; and T. G. Rosenmeyer, "Hubris
and the Greeks" in Hubris, Man and Education (Bellingham. WA 1959) 19-30.
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notion of "just" may not have been well defined, an antithesis of the
concepts of the just and violence may have been significant from an early
date.io
The final two terms, moira and themis, are much more positive in
nature. Moira expresses a broad variety of ideas about order including lot,
portion, procedure, fate (in a very loose sense), and very frequently, in both
epics, death. ^' Adkins underscores an important characteristic of moira
when he describes it as acting in accord with one's social position and status
in society. ^^ Thus, according to Adkins, Homeric man sees a close
relationship between an individual's social position and how he is expected
to behave. In this way moira becomes an embodiment of what is right and
proper and these parameters are determined by an individual's social status.
This idea can be clearly illustrated by the use of the expression kata moiran
in a broad variety of contexts throughout the epic. These include the
depictions of Polyphemus milking his goats (9. 245, 309, 342), the
frequent descriptions of portions at meals as moirai (14. 448, 15. 140, 17.
258, the highly sarcastic remarks of Ktesippos 20. 293-95), and the frequent
references to "correct" speech in a broad variety of social settings and
contexts throughout the epic. The range as well as the variety of contexts
in which the term figures make it clear that while "success" is a very
important goal the manner in which it is achieved is also highly significant.
Therms is even more specific than moira. In Homer themis is a broad
and diverse concept of order with constitutional as well as religious
ramifications. Whereas moira sets limits to an individual in terms of his
strength and position in society, themis is a representation of the social
rules and categories within which the individual works. The appearances of
the term in the Odyssey makes it clear that themis reflects the idea of order
or principles of order. ^^ In the personification of themis in 2. 68-69 there
^° M. Gagarin, Early Greek Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1986) Chap. 11, stresses the
importance of arbitration and the avoidance of violence in early Greek legal procedures.
The question of justice (dike), its nature and role, is too complex to be dealt with in an
essay of this length. From the extensive literature on the subject I found the following to
be especially useful: M. I. Dickie, "Dike as a Moral Term in Homer and Hesiod," CP 73
(1978) 91-101; M. Gagarin (above) and "Dike in Archaic Greek Thought." CP 69 (1974)
186-97; E. A. Havelock. "Dikaiosyne," Phoenix 23 (1969) 49-70; K. Latte, "Der
Rechtsgedanke im archaischen Griechentum," A&A 2 (1946) 63-76; H. Lloyd-Jones, The
Justice of Zeus (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1971); M. Ostwald, "Ancient Greek Ideas of
Law," Dictionary of the History of Ideas (New York 1973) 11 673-85. A convenient short
discussion of the major issues involved is offered by J. E. Rexine, "The Nature and
Meaning of Justice in Homer," CB 54 (1977) 1-6.
" Moira is frequently commented on in conjunction with other concepts noted before
(e.g. Dodds [above, note 8] Chap. I, and Ferguson [above, note 4] Chaps. I-II); see also B.
C. Dietrich, Death, Fate and the Gods (London 1965) and W. C. Greene's classic study,
Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought (Cambridge, MA 1944).
^^ Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (above, note 7) 17-23.
'^ On themis see R. Hirzel, Themis Dike und Verwandtes (Leipzig 1907) and M. Ostwald
(above, note 10).
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can be seen the beginnings of the process of abstraction that were to
culminate in the concept of themis as "law" or "right." Themis is, in some
ways, the mark of civilized society. Stanford argues that themis should be
considered a personification of that part of primitive justice that is concerned
with precedents; it is the established or right way of doing things (e.g. 3.
45, 187).''* In many passages the term is equivalent to "right," "fitting,"
and "proper" procedures (e.g. 10. 73, 11. 451, 14. 56-57, 430). This
emphasis on what are commonly accepted practices in society is even more
apparent when the term appears in the plural. Commenting on the absence
of civihzation among the Cyclopes, Odysseus states (9. 1 12):
For they have no councils where they make plans and no themistes.
Here themistes imply established procedures founded on earlier practices and
judgments. Themis and themistes appear in a variety of contexts. Odysseus
invokes themis, aidos, and Zeus epitimetor in his attempt to obtain guest-
friendship at the close of his first speech to Polyphemus (9. 267-71).'^
Nestor says that he will tell Telemachus "as is themis" (3. 187) what he has
learned about Odysseus since they parted at Troy, and in Agamemnon's
poignant description of Odysseus' return he describes how Telemachus will
embrace his father "as is themis" (11. 451). In the final analysis,
however, the evidence about themis is paradoxical for, while it is clearly an
important term that reflects some of society's and the individual's most
significant concerns, it is not a common term or a primary frame of
reference by which the characters determine their action. In all likelihood
the ambivalent status of themis points to the relative weakness of
communal values when confronted with the demands imposed by the heroic
individual.
The term that comes the closest to offering a definition of propriety is
in the negative and that is aeikes, "unseemly." Aeikes is used in a broad
range of contexts including a variety of departures from accepted behavior,
from actions of Odysseus' faithless slave girls to the appearance of the
ragged wallet he bears. The uses of aeikes suggest that propriety is most
frequently seen as a check to excess rather than a positive inducement to
good behavior. There is a much greater emphasis on what is not proper
than on what is. Proper behavior is most frequently defined and illustrated
from the negative. A substantial number of the most potent terms are in
the negative, imply the negative, or concentrate on violations of accepted
'* See W. B. Stanford. The Odyssey of Homer, 2 vols. (London and New York 1954-55)
on 2. 68 and Gagarin, Early Greek Law (above, note 10) Chap. 11, on the importance of
procedural law in Homer.
*^ The effect of the appeal is intensified by the group of terms implying proper behavior
at the close of the speech and there is no small irony in light of Odysseus' own conduct
earlier when he helped himself to the Cyclops* stores.
Charles Fuqua 55
standards. It is important to recognize that it is the departures from rather
than compliance with social and personal expectations that are the greatest
concern to Homeric man.^^
This does not mean that there are no goads to positive action: aidos and
nemesis are powerful stimuli to proper behavior. Both reflect the demands
of the social system on the individual to perform. Aidos illustrates the
claims that an individual can place upon himself and nemesis how he can
respond to the acts of another. Other terms characterize an act or attitude of
a character in very specific ways. Atasthalia points to the almost mindless
folly of the Suitors and the term brings out the link between their ignorance
and misconduct (e.g. 1. 7-8, 34, 21. 146-47, 23. 67, 24. 458). Terms are
often used in conjunction with one another for greater emphasis and to link
the various ideas in different ways to one another. The implications of
violence in atasthalia are quite explicit in hybris, which is used to describe
the actions of the Suitors, their wanton behavior, and disregard of
appropriate conduct. Descriptions of the Suitors using this term are
important for the way in which they characterize the Suitors and cast doubt
on their abihty to perform in the "normal" heroic way. The final two terms
considered, moira and themis, are much more positive in nature and express
a sense of order in the life of an individual and society. Moira describes a
broad sense of what is right and appropriate in a wide range of contexts.
Themis is more abstract; it describes order, political order, procedure, and, as
noted before, is an important antecedent to justice.
This examination of these terms is only a beginning; much mqre
remains. There are many other terms and examples that should be
considered. Verbs and adverbs as well as nouns and adjectives need careful
scrutiny. A careful study of grammatical constructions and the formulaic
qualities of the lines in which these terms appear needs to be made.
Nevertheless there are some points that can be made on the basis of the
preceding observations. The first is the appearance of "clusters" where three
or more terms are concentrated in a few lines (e.g. 1. 227-29, 3. 205-07).
Although clusters are relatively infrequent, they add an emphatic note. Their
presence appears to be a very deliberate poetic act rather than a chance
'^ In many respects social roles and responsibilities are epitomized by adherence to the
practices of guest-friendship. Since antiquity commentators and critics have noted the
importance of the theme and its close connection with proper behavior. M. I. Finley, The
World of Odysseus^ (London 1977) has shown with particular clarity the importance of this
theme and his work remains the best guide to the subject. Meals are one of the most
important settings for the display of appropriate behavior and it is not accidental that
much of the major action in the Odyssey takes place at meals. As has been often noted, the
conventions of guest-friendship are sometimes manipulated by hosts and guests to their
own advantage and one index of the Suitors' or Polyphemus' depravity is the travesty they
make of the normal rites of guest-friendship. The importance of these practices is also
indicated by the manner in which they are parodied in the epic; see F. Williams, "Odysseus'
Homecoming as a Parody of Homeric Fonnal Welcomes." CW 79 (1986) 395-97.
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collocation of terms. The force of the individual terms may be strong, but
the emphasis created by their juxtaposition is greater than the simple sum of
their parts. The clusters are a very graphic device by which the poet
underscores an element in the narrative. Another interesting phenomenon
concerns the distribution of terms. The Odyssey is in this respect an
"uneven" work; there are often extended gaps between appearances of a term
even though situations occur where its use might seem entirely appropriate.
There is virtually no term with which this phenomenon does not occur. To
consider how many lines on an average separate appearances of a term can be
very misleading. Three striking examples are the absence of aeikes from 4.
694 to 11. 429, oiatasthalos from 8. 166 to 16. 86, and oi atasthalia from
1. 34 to 10. 437. These gaps are striking and there seems to be no simple
rationale that explains this phenomenon. Variety not consistency marks the
language of the epic.
An examination of the repetition of individual terms, phrases, and lines
suggests that the references to propriety had been part of the epic for some
time. The language of propriety forms part of the formulae of the Odyssey.
It is impossible to show that statements about proper behavior belong to
any one stratum or social group of the epic. What, instead, is presented is a
reflection of cultural principles that are important for all levels of society
and the chaos that can result when they are challenged or disregarded. The
characters, save for the Suitors and Polyphemus who interpret them solely
according to their own interest, are aware of the demands of proper behavior
and respond as well as circumstances allow.
Another significant feature of the epic's diction which sheds light on
the concept of propriety concerns who uses the terms, the poet or his
characters. While direct quotation or quotation of one character by another
constitutes approximately two-thirds of the Odyssey, an even higher
percentage of the more significant terms referring to propriety are spoken or
quoted by the characters. ^^ The figures for the seven words examined in this
study are:
^^ I was first made aware of the importance of this distinction by Jasper Griffin in a
paper entitled "Words and Speakers," delivered at the University of Pennsylvania, March
24, 1984. This paper has subsequently been published under the title "Homeric Words and
Speakers," JHS 106 (1986) 36-57. The material Griffin has gathered proves that there is a
sharp difference between the vocabularies used by the poet and his characters and crucial
moral terms are reserved from the narrative to the speakers (40).
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these loosely interwoven conventions to survive. In the Odyssey the
demands of proper behavior are acknowledged and supported on every social
level from the loyal slaves Eumaios and Philoitios to King Alkinoos. The
characters who subvert or pay the least attention to these fragile conventions
pose the most danger. The threat they raise comes not just from their
actions but also the challenge they pose against one of the few things that
bind this society together. In the widest sense the best sign of a character's
worth and merit is to be seen in his understanding of and adherence to his
society's conventions. Achilles in the Iliad transcends the bonds and ties of
his society; only at the end does he approach a fragile reconciliation with
this world. The Odyssey begins with Odysseus set apart and ends with his
full reintegration in society and the restoration of proper order on Ithaca.
The epic is, in many respects, an account of the triumph of propriety.
Williams College
Sappho the "Numinous"
EDWIN L.BROWN
In the opening year of this century Friedrich Solmsen's father Felix accepted
\|/a(pap6(; as providing a valid etymon for "Sappho," and that reading of the
name's significance has since then held the field.^ After nine intervening
decades of progress in philology and linguistics, it may be thought no want
oipietas towards Solmsen pere if this brief contribution to a memorial
volume in honor of Solmsen yi/^ introduces a radically new interpretation of
a name immortalized by the Muses' grace.
In any search for the meaning of "Sappho," one hkely to have appealed
to a prominent family of archaic Lesbos, Oswald Szemerenyi's account of
the lexical cluster including oa(pT|<; seemed upon publication to hold a
valuable clue.^ As Jacobsohn and Leumann had shown, the development of
this adjective started from the adverb adcpa, transformed first to aacpecog,
and reaching the full status of aacpriq by the fifth century .^ But the
existence of oa(pa itself remained unaccounted for until Szemerenyi
proposed to add it to the ever growing number of Greek words traceable to
an Anatolian origin, a number that had already reached half a hundred in
Gunter Neumann's researches on the Weiterleben of Hittite and Luwian in
the Greek lexicon."* Szemerenyi's proposed source is the Hittite adjective
suppi- whose meaning he gives as "pure," "clear" and whose adverbial form
would therefore be suppa from suppaya. The name of the greatest Hittite
ruler, Suppiluliuma, which may be rendered "Clearwell" ("Pure-spring"),
includes suppi- in fact as its initial element. That the Hittite word means
specifically "ritually pure" follows not only from the ritual context of its
^ The etymology, which would suggest that the poet had been remarkable—even in her
infancy—^for rough, dry hair or skin, was first advanced in Rh. Mus. 56 (1901) 502 and n.
1; finally maintained in his postumously published Indogermanische Eigennamen als
Spiegel der Kidturgeschichte, edited by Ernst Fraenkel (Heidelberg 1922) 131.
^O. Szemerenyi, "The Origins of the Greek Lexicon: Ex Oriente Lux" JHS 94 (1974)
154.
' H. Jacobsohn, Philologus 67 (1908) 494; M. Leumann. Homerische Worter (Basel
1950) 112 n. 77.
* G. Neumann, Untersuchungen zum Weiterleben hethitischen and luwischen
Sprachgutes in hellenistischer und romischer Zeit (Wiesbaden 1961).
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regular uses, but from the coexistence of Hittite parku- for "physically
clean."
Whatever hesitations on the semantic side one may feel at passing from
the sacred sphere of suppi- in Hittite to the profane of ad(pa in Greek—and
they need not prove insuperable, especially where language-loans are
involved
—
, at least the case for affiliating Zdjicpco to suppi- would be in no
way weakened by the religious associations of the parent word. For, after
all, the largest single class of Greek personal names is comprised of the
theophoric names—Apollodorus, Hecataeus, Diogenes
—
, to which must be
added all those from common nouns of sacral import—Hagnon,
Hieronymus, Semne. In the specific context of Sappho's naming, one must
not construe the evidence of her devotion to Aphrodite's cult as if she were
demonstrably a priestess or bom into a priestly family.^
At the same time, when Alcaeus addressed to Sappho that remarkable
invocation (which is what his famous pentapody, iotiXok' dyva
|j,eXXix6|iei5£ locTicpoi, amounts to), one might be tempted to wonder
whether he was not perhaps including dyva, "revered," as exegetical
commentary on her name,^ Such play with words, of course, presumes a
control of the relevant linguistic items by the speaker, not necessarily by
his audience. Here it is important to recognize that, as fellow poets on high
archaic Lesbos, Sappho and Alcaeus were heirs of a culture which had
survived the Bronze Age's end possibly intact, like that of another offshore
island, Euboea, whose now revealed prosperity none would have guessed a
generation ago.'' Lazpas, whose identity with Lesbos has been given a
renewed measure of backing by Mellink and Giiterbock, could furnish the
Hittite king a healing cult-image already in the late fourteenth century
B.C.;^ in any case. Homer's references to well-developed Lesbos
(ei))a{^Evo<;) are borne out by the rich finds in Bronze-Age levels there.'
So much for possible Hittite connections of Lesbos and its certain pre-
Classical foundations. But the island had early and long-continuing links
with Iron-Age Lydia as well, so that we should at least note the possibility
^W. Burkert, Greek Religion, transl. by J. Raffan (Cambridge, MA 1985) 187: "It is
Sappho who speaks most naturally of meeting with gods, as if from her own experience;
Aphrodite . . . ".
^ It is satisfying to note that Bruno Gentili, in an article on "La veneranda Saffo,"
QUCC 2 (1966) 37-62, argued
—
quite independently of etymological considerations—for
the archaic connotation of Alcaeus' ayva applied to Sappho. At the same time, one may
recall D. A. Campbell's observation that Alcaeus here "speaks of her in terms fit for a
divinity." Not just any deity, I submit, but Aphrodite, as word-by-word analysis would
bear out.
^ Ufkandi I (London 1979).
* H. Giiterbock and M. Mellink in Troy and the Trojan War: A Symposium Held at Bryn
Mawr College, October 1984. ed. M. Mellink (Bryn Mawr, PA 1986) 41 and 98,
respectively; cf. F. Cornelius, Geschichte der Hethiter (Darmstadt 1973) 218: "Es besteht
kein Grund, dies Land [sc. Lazpa] anderswo als auf der Insel Lesbos zu suchen."
' W. Lamb, Excavations at Thermi in Lesbos (Cambridge 1936).
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that a name ultimately traceable in the Hittite lexicon could have reached
Sappho through her family's commercial or other ties with Lydia,^*' an Iron-
Age state whose language preserved a dialect of Anatolian Indo-European. ^^
On this view we could compare the naming of Sappho with that of the
Kroisos who was commemorated by a late archaic kouros found at Anavysos
in Attica.
Yet, granted that a cultural and linguistic context in which Sappho
could have received a name of eventually Hittite origin was present, will the
derivation of Sappho from suppi- really bear scrutiny, formally and in
detail? Here the signals must be termed mixed. As for the initial phoneme
of "Sappho" at least, the correspondence seems exact; the initial sound in
suppi- is regularly thought to be the sibilant sh, and Gunther Zuntz^^ ^^s
cogently demonstrated that the initial ^ wherever the MSS preserve
instances of Sappho using her own name are due to later misunderstanding
of a letter-form current in several Greek epichoric alphabets. ^^ Sappho would
have intended it to represent the double-sigma sound in GdXaoaa,
napvaaa6(; and those other shibboleths of pre-Greek speech. Zuntz traces
the letter-form to the character in the Linear A and B scripts which is
transliterated se, and he may well be right. What cannot be mistaken is his
point that the metrics of the Sapphic pentapody in which Alcaeus invokes
Sappho by name tells absolutely against a psi-sound as the original initial
in "Sappho." Curiously enough, the MSS of Hephaestion, where alone
Alcaeus' verse is attested, all preserve before IdTicpoi a supposedly extra
sigma, a small mark of her fellow poet's respect for Sappho's own
incomparable aural sensibilities ... or a sign that Alcaeus too pronounced
it "Shappho."
But to turn to the apparent development from a u- to an a-sound
between suppi- and od(pa or "Sappho," Szemerenyi indeed calls this change
characteristic of Luwian, a sister tongue that increasingly affected Hittite
itself. But Sapalulme, which he cited as a Late Luwian form of
Suppiluliuma, is actually attested only in an Assyrian document, while
Szemerenyi's other example of the change (Greek OavvaaaK; versus
Luwian Puna/uwassis) seems to instance a metathesis of the vowels in
Puna- to riavx)-, instead. Moreover, Oettinger has made it highly probable
that the Luwian verb sappa- is not related to our Hittite adjective suppi- at
^° A. J. Podlecki. The Early Greek Poets and their Times (Vancouver 1984) 82.
Meanwhile, lo P. Green, The Shadow of the Parthenon (Berkeley 1972) 170, ihe name of
Sappho's father, Scamandronymus, points to his Asian origin from the Troad.
According to my colleague Craig Melchert, due caution about affiliating Lydian more
closely to Hittite than to Luwian is still in order. His good linguistic counsel must not go
unacknowledged.
^^"On the Etymology of the Name Sappho," Mus.Helv. 8 (1951) 12-35, esp. 21 n.
62.
*' It was a similar misunderstanding of the Middle English thorn, whose shape
approached a y-fonm, that led to the quaint error, "Ye Olde Tea Shoppe."
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all.^" In fact, the Luwian dialects, though closely akin to Hittite, seem
never to use suppi- for the concept "ritually pure," but another word
(kummai-) altogether different.
That raw datum may be fatal to my initial thesis, especially if Calvert
Watkins is right that the language of the Late Bronze Age Trojans and
Lesbians was Luwian. '^ Yet I hope that it will prove possible to build on
the groundwork so far laid down. One may ask whether Zuntz's own
conclusion, reached at mid-century after wide-ranging, meticulous inquiry,
that Sappho is an Asianic name may not rather point the way. He himself
proposed as source the name Sapon designating the holy mountain north of
Ugarit together with its god. Though the Semites, borrowing from their
Asianic predecessors in the land, called this mountain and its indwelling
deity Sapon, it was the same landmark that the Greeks knew as Mt. Kasios.
Awkwardly for Zuntz's thesis, however, the name Sap«i seems to have
entered the roster of Greek myths as Tucpcov.'^
For my own derivation of the name Sappho, therefore, I proffer another
Asianic personal name that appears repeatedly in the Hittite texts, most
often in the form Sapalli-, though variants containing as initial syllables
Za- and Ta- are assumed by Giiterbock to be the same word. All of these
may be confidently linked to the name Ashapala (once Ashupala) held by
half a dozen priests, scribes, and others, and listed in Laroche's great Hittite
prosopography.^"^ Even if the shorter forms should be kept distinct and are
not simply variants more fully assimilated (by cluster-reduction) to Hittite,
the ula variation points to the foreign origin of the name. That origin
should be specifically Hattian, the tongue of that people who exerted the
profoundest influence on the early Hittites in the cultural and particularly in
the religious domain. Now not even Kammenhuber or Schuster professes to
know more than the rudiments of this ancient Anatolian language and
culture, but its word for "god" is well established.^* It is transliterated
(a)shap, shab, or shav- depending on its immediate phonetic environment
Thus Sapalli-/Ashapala with suffix of appurtenance in Hittite (-{a)la-) and
"Luwian" (-alii-) form, respectively, should mean "devoted to the god,"
"belonging to the god," or the like.
If, then, as I am assuming, this name of centuries-long currency and
cross-cultural spread in Asia Minor has issued in our "Sappho," it has done
so by dint of typical Greek shortening into a Kurzname. The spelling -7t(p-,
^* N. Oetlinger, Das Stammbildung des helhitischen Verbums (Nuremberg 1979) 383.
^*
"The Language of the Trojans," in Troy and the Trojan War (above, note 8) 45-62.
'^ See J. de Sauvignac, "Le sens du tenne Sapon," Ugarit-Forschungen 16 (1984) 274
for relevant bibliography.
'"^
E. Laroche, Les noms des hittites (Paris 1966) 44, no. 162.
'*H.-S. Schuster, Die hattisch-hethitischen Bilinguen I (Leiden 1974) 79-81. 1. 1.
11-14, where, too, the presence of A- in the Hitdte personal name Afhapala is charged to
scribes unable to write the consonant cluster sh- initially in cuneiform.
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however, shows not only the usual expressive gemination, as in Zevokko)
with double kappa from EevoKpixoq or Nikotxco with double tau from
Nik6ti)j.o<;, but also the aspirated form of the final labial of the base on
which "Sappho" was built. Thus, while misled by the poet's apparent
spelling of her own name with initial ^, Felix Solmsen was entirely
justified in deriving "Sappho" from a base in final phi (n/a(p-). Schwyzer,
indeed, cites this case along with others including "Pitthon" from niQT]Koc,.^^
It only remains to note that though the orthography of the Hittite scribes
does not always enable us to be certain either of the voicedness or of the
aspiration of their consonants, the alternation of the labial in (a)shab/shap
with a v-sound in certain case forms led Kammenhuber to distinguish it
from a straight unvoiced p and in fact to represent it phonetically as /:
With that detail I hope to have accounted linguistically for the earlier
history of the name in question—which is all, essentially, that an
etymologist aims to accomplish. Of course, he may hope that in the
process he has traced for the relevant name a plausible evolution in terms of
cultural context. That has meant, in the present instance, interpreting
"Sappho" approximately as "Numinous" and tracing it from an early
Hattian-derived personal name for one placed under the aegis of the gods,
through variants among Anatolian Indo-European dialects, down to the late
seventh century. Then it was that the name Sappho, retaining still—
I
submit—something of its original religious aura, caught the fancy of
Aeolian aristocrats wondering what to call a girl-child small, dark, and ever
mysterious.
University ofNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill
^' E. Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik I (Munich 1939) 636-37.
^ A. Kammenhuber, Hethitisch, Palaisch, Luwisch, Hieroglyphenluwisch und Hattisch,
Munchener Sludien zur Sprachwissenschafl, Beiheft4 (Munich 1969) 97, 99.

Who was Corax?
THOMAS COLE
Posed a thousand or so years ago, the question would have seemed easy,
almost insultingly so. Corax—as any Byzantine schoolboy could have told
you—was a Sicilian from Syracuse, Uie inventor of rhetoric (defined by him
as the art of persuasion). He taught his discovery to another Sicilian,
Tisias; and their doctrines (or textbooks) were later taken to Athens, perhaps
through the activity of a fellow countryman, Gorgias of Leontini, during the
course of a famous embassy there on behalf of his native city. The original
discovery was a response to the challenges of democratic politics after the
popular revolution which deposed the last of the Syracusan tyrants, Hieron's
brother Thrasybulus. Corax' s notion of persuasion as an art, capable of
being taught, and the mixture of fact, argumentation and appeals to audience
sensibilities allowed by the different parts in the canonical order of
presentation which he first devised (proem, demonstration [or narrative
followed by demonstration], epilogue), helped make public speaking an
indispensable tool in the process of guiding and controlling popular
deliberative bodies. (Guiding and controlling were Corax's specialities,
since before the revolution he had been a counsellor and close associate of
Hieron's.) The tool, however, like all tools, was subject to misuse—as
Corax found out to his own cost When he brought suit against Tisias for
refusal to pay the prearranged fee for instruction in the new art, the latter
impudently claimed that even if he lost the case he could not be held liable:
Losing the case would mean that he had failed to persuade the jury—hence
had not been taught the art of persuasion as per agreement. Corax responded
by turning the argument around against his opponent: Even an unsuccessful
prosecution would require payment, since it would show that the defendant
had in fact been taught the art, just as per agreement. At this point there
were cries of "Bad crow [corax], bad egg," on the part of jury and/or
bystanders and the case had to be dropped.
The story with minor variations appears in six texts dating from the 5th
century A.D. (Troilus' Prolegomena to the Rhetoric of Hermogenes) to the
13th or 14th (the Prolegomena of Maximus Planudes).^ Since there is no
^ Most fully in the Prolegomena printed as numbers 4 (anonymous) and 17
(Marcellinus?) in H. Rabe's Prolegomenon Sylloge (Leipzig 1931) and in C. Walz,
Rhetores Graeci (Stuttgart and Tubingen 1833-35) VI 4-30 and IV 1-38. The best survey
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strikingly different rival account from those ten centuries we may
conveniently call the one just presented the Byzantine answer to our initial
question about Corax.
Most modem answers reveal in varying degrees the influence of this
Byzantine prototype, but the question itself has come to seem much more
problematic. If one looks for clear traces of the story in the millennium
(roughly) between the time of Corax himself and that of his earliest
biographers, the results^ are disppointingly meagre. Plato (Phdr. 273c) is
the first writer to mention Tisias by name; Aristotle the first to know of
Corax himself (Rhet. 2. 24, 1401al7); and Theophrastus the first to
attribute to him the discovery of a new art (Radermacher 18, A. V. 17).
Dionysius of Halicamassus is the first to connect him, via Tisias, with a
prominent representative of the Athenian rhetorical tradition (Isocrates: cf.
Radermacher 29, B. II. 4). Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. 2. 96) or,
conceivably, Cicero,^ is the earliest source for the lawsuit over Corax's fee.
The only notice, outside the Prolegomena and one late commentary,'* that
identifies Corax and Tisias as master and student, is from the fifth-century
Platonist Hermias (ad Phaed. 273c = p. 251. 8-9 Couvreur, though there it
is Tisias who is the master and Corax the student).^ Ammianus Marcellinus
(30. 4. 3) is the first to attribute a definition of rhetoric ("the artificer of
persuasion") to Corax or Tisias.^ Preoccupation with the politics of
of the tradition is that of S. Wilcox, "Corax and the 'Prolegomena'," AJP 64 (1943) 2 ff.
(cited hereafter by author, as are the editions of Rabe and Walz; P. Hamberger, Die
rednerische Disposition in der alien xexvTi ptixopiKTi = Rhetorische Studien II [Paderbom
1914]; G. Kowalski, De artis rhetoricae originibus [Lwow 1933] and De arte rhetorica
[Lwow 1937]; W. Stegemann. "Teisias," RE W A I [1934] 140-46; D. A. G. Hinks, "Tisias
and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric," CQ 34 (1940) 61-69; and L. Radermacher,
Artium scriplores [Vienna 1951]). For the versions of Troilus and Planudes see,
respectively, Rabe 5 = VI 52-54 Walz and Rabe 7 = V 212-21 Walz. (The six texU referred
to here do not include Rabe 6a = 11 682-83 Walz, or the one from which it is abridged, V 5-
8 Walz, a portion of Sopater's commentary to Hermogenes that contains the Corax-Tisias
story but nothing about the content of Corax's teaching or the nature of his pre- and post-
revolutionary political activities.)
^ Well summarized in Rabe viii-xi.
^ De or. 3. 81 (Coracem . . . patiamur . . . pullos sues excludere in nido, qui evolent
clamalores odiosi el molesti) is generally taken as an allusion to the "Bad crow, bad egg"
phrase, but Cicero did not need to be familiar with the Tisias story to apply the proverb in
this context (cf. Radermacher 29, ad B. 11. 6). Corax's chicks and the bad eggs that hatched
them could be any or all of those speakers who claimed to owe something to the tradition
of formal instruction in rhetoric thought to derive from him.
* That of Sopater (above, note 1) on Hermogenes, usually dated, like Troilus, to the
fifth century A.D.
' Spengel's Ka9TiYnTfi<; Tioio\) for the transmitted iiaBTiTfii; TioCov will "correct" the
text at this point—but need we assume that it was a copyist rather than Hermias himself
who was unfamiliar with the details of the story in its Byzantine version?
^Several Prolegomena (Radermacher 30, B. H. 13) offer the same formulation but
auribute it to oi nepi Tiaiav Kai KopaKa, by which they may be referring in a vague
way to the whole tradition which Corax and Tisias were thought to have founded. "The
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fledgling Syracusan democracy and the proper order of presentation
(dispositio, id^ic,) in an oration only comes in the Prolegomenon of
Troilus and the later works already mentioned.
Piecemeal attestation of the Byzantine tradition in earlier sources need
not mean piecemeal origin over the course of the preceding millennium, but
the possibility must obviously be reckoned with. And jx)ssibility begins to
become probability once two further phenomena are taken into
consideration—the frequency with which certain components of the
traditional account are associated with figures other than Corax, and the
contradiction between parts of the tradition and what is known from other
—
and often better—sources about early writers on rhetoric. The dispute over
payment of a fee—minus, obviously, the concluding dictum on crows and
their eggs—appears first (Apuleius, Flor. 18 = p. 30 K., Aulus Gellius 5.
10) in connection with Protagoras and his student Euathlus^ and may even
have been familiar to Plato in a Protagorean context.* "Artificer of
persuasion" is a definition of rhetoric attributed by Plato {Gorg. 453a) to
Gorgias and considered by many' to be original with Plato himself; and the
quadripartite oratorical divisio (proem, narrative [diegesis], argument
[agones], epilogue) attributed to Corax in three Prolegomena^*^ is associated
alternatively with "Isocrates and his followers" (Radermacher 160, B. XXIV.
29) or his (and Aristotle's) friend Theodectes (Aristotle, fir. 133 Rose).
The last-named bit of rhetorical doctrine is not only credited to figures
other than the "Byzantine" Corax but also—fairly clearly—much more
plausibly credited to them. It is judicial oratory, not the political persuasion
with which Corax is associated in the Byzantine tradition that requires the
Theodectean-Isocratean tetrad. Diegesis, the straightforward presentation of
the speaker's view of what has happened, is, as theoreticians from Aristotle
(Rhet. 3. 12, 1414a36-38) on down are in the habit of pointing out, likely
power of persuasion" appears as Corax's definition in Athanasius' Prolegomenon lo
Hermogenes (p. 171. 19 Rabe = Radermacher 30, B. H. 14).
^ Already known to Aristotle (fr. 67 Rose) as someone involved in a prosecution of
Protogoras; but it need not follow, as Radermacher assumes ("Studien zur Geschichte der
griechischen Rhetorik 1: Timaeus und die Ueberlieferung iiber den Ursprung der Rhetorik,"
Rh. Mas. 52 [1897] 413), that the case involved payment of a fee (see Rabe xi).
* Prougoras' sutement. at the end of the long speech ascribed to him in the Protagoras
(324b-c), that any student who feels the fee charged for his course of instruction to have
been excessive can go to a temple and, upon swearing an oath, pay no more than what he
declares the instruction to have been worth, suggests the possibility that disagreement
over the payment and proper amount of fees was either a subject considered by Protagoras
himself or one that provided the content of stories told about him—as would be natural in
the case of the man who either was, or was thought to be (Diog. Laert. 9. 52), the first
person to teach in return for pay.
' See H. Mutschmann, "I>ie alteste Definition der Rhetorik," Hermes 53 (1918) 440-
43, who cites the parallel Platonic formulations at Charm. 174e (medicine as wyieia^
Stijiioupyoc;) and Symp. 188d (prophecy as cpiX-iaq Gecov Kai avGpomcov 6TmiowpY6(;).
^°Rabe 7. p. 67. 6-7 = V 215. 22-23 Walz; Rabe 9, p. 126. 5-15 = H 119. 10-26
Walz; Rabe 13, p. 189. 16-17 = VH 6. 9-10 Walz.
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to be unnecessary in a political case, where the audience is assumed to be
well aware of the facts of the situation.'^ The one author (Rabe 4, pp. 25.
17-26. 6 = VI 13. 1-11 Walz) who does attribute to Corax a divisio
(proem, argument, epilogue) suited to political oratory writes as if he had
begun with the judicial tetrad and then combined its second and third
members into what counts as a single section dedicated to agones, but whose
purpose is narrative as well: nepl wv E6ei o-uuPcuXeveiv xw by\\Ji<o
Xiyew ox; ev SiTiYnoet -^^
The same incompatibility exists between the Byzantine version of
Corax's activity and Cicero's summary report (Brut. 46-48 = Radermacher
13-14, A. V. 9) of what he claims^^ to have been the account of Corax and
Tisias that appeared in Aristotle's famous compendium—the Synagoge
Technon—of early writings on rhetoric. There the new art is linked in a
totally different way to conditions at Syracuse following the fall of the
tyrants. Is is not the requirements of democratic debate that inspire Corax
and Tisias, but lawsuits over property, once the original owners began to
claim land confiscated by the tyrants and then given or sold by them to
others {cum sublatis . . . tyrannis res privatae longo intervallo iudiciis
repeterentur). This account—whether or not it corresponds to anything in
Syracusan history—certainly accords better than the Byzantine one with the
testimony of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who complain consistently that
writers on public speaking concentrate on dicanic oratory to the total or
nearly total exclusion of pohtical oratory.^'* And the one Byzantine account
of Corax (V 5-8 Walz, from Sopater's Hermogenes commentary) that fails
to assign him any role in politics^ ^ is also the only one that contains a
passage (V 6. 20-24) close enough in phraseology and organization of
material to Brut. 46 to suggest the possibility of derivation from a
common, Aristotelian source:
^^ When narrative is included in the divisio of political orations (see, for example,
Anaximenes (?), Rhet. ad Alex. 30-31 and Syrianus, in Hermogenem 11 170. 14-19 Rabe),
it tends to be conceived as limited in scope (as in Anaximenes' rules for reporting an
embassy) or tendentious in character (the katastasis of imf>erial rhetoricians—see below,
note 43).
^^ That tripartition in this passage derives in some sense from an original quadripartion
is very likely even if, as Wilcox argues (15-16), its author here preserves the Byzantine
tradition in its original form. In replacing the triad with a tetrad or some other scheme
suitable only to judicial oratory, later writers would have been simply spelling out what
was impUcit in their model.
^^ On the general accuracy of the claim, see—against the doubts of Solmsen (Gnomon
26 [1954] 218)—A. E. Douglas. "The AristoteUan Synagoge Technon after Cicero flru/i«
46-48," Utomus 14 (1955) 536-39.
See Hamberger 12-16, with the concurring judgments of Hinks 62-63 and
Stegemann 143-44.
" Corax's political role is also missing from Rabe 6a = 11 682-83 Walz, but that text is
simply an abridgement of Sopater.
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turn primum [after the fall of the
Sicilian tyrants] . . . artem et
pragggpta Siculos Coracem et
Tisiam conscripsisse: nam an -
tea neminem solitum via nee
arte, sed accurate tamen et de
scripto plerosque dicere
^£Ta 5e Ta^)Ta [the age of the
tyrants] Kopg^ Tiprnxov d-
ndvt(ov ovveaxTioaTo 5i -
SpcoKq^igv nepl pTitopiKfi(;.
ol ydp npb a{)-to\) ETcifq-
Sevovxeq ttiv xexvriv ax;
£^rt£lpla Tivl Ktti eni^xeXEia
Xpco)j.Evoi eJiexTiSe-uov, koI
ovxcaq*^ Hev oi. ^i^m M::^fil)
KOI aixiac ovbixi'
—as do the similar lists of fifth- and fourth-century rhetoricians that follow,
both in this account and in Cicero:
isque fuisse et paratas a
Protagora . . . disputationes
qui nunc communes appellantur
loci; quod idem fecisse Gorgias
. . . huic Antiphontem Rha-
nmusium similia quaedam habu-
isse conscripta quo neminem
umquam melius oravisse capitis
causam . . . scripsit Thucydi -
des : nam Lysiam primo pro-
fiteri solitum artem esse dicen-
di, deinde . . . artem remo-
visse; similiter Isocrates . . .
se ad artes componendas trans-
tulisse.
Brutus 47^8
xo-uxov 5e xov K6paKO(;
Tioiac; yeyove ^a9TlXT|(; . ,
.
Kttl ropYia(; 6 Aeovxivo(;
Koxd Tcpeopeiav eXBojv
'A9T|VTiai XT]v XEXvnv g-oy -
ypacpeigav nap' avxov eko-
jiiOEv KOI avxoq EXEpav
7ipoo£9r|K£ Kal (J.EX* av>x6v
'
Avxicprnv 6 'Pa^vo\)ciO(;, 6
6o\)K'oS{5o'o 5i5daKaXo(;
XfiyExai XEXVTiv yp6i\\fai-
)j.£xd xauxa be
'
Igoxpaxric; 6
pTixcop . . .
V 6. 24-7. 14 Walz
(Note that both lists end, as one would expect in Aristotle, with Isocrates
—
not, as in the Prolegomena [Rabe 17, p. 273. 18-22 = IV 15. 17-20 Walz;
Rabe 4, p. 28. 12-16 = VI 15. 19-16. 2 Walz], with the Hellenistic canon
of Attic orators.'*)
ouTcoq (Radermacher) or ovxoi (Gercke) seems a necessary emendation for the
transmitted ovtot;, which would make ot) jiexd xexvTiq a description of Corax's own
method and leave the nature of the contrast with earlier "empirical" rhetoricians
completely unclear.
' The parallel (first pointed out by A. Gercke, "Die alte Texvn prixopiKTi und ihre
Gegner," Hermes 32 [1897] 344-45) would, of course, be more compelling were it
possible to get any sense out of de scripto (often emended, not very satisfactorily, to
descriple) in Cicero's text or from the equally puzzling Kal aixiaq in Sopater. In general,
however, scholars have given it less attention than it deserves.
^* The value of the parallels is not lessened by the illegitimate conclusions which
Bamberger sought to draw from them (below, note 40). It would certainly be less if, as is
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The difficulty of accommodating the "non-Sopatran," political Corax
within either his immediate (textual) or larger (historical) context poses the
problems raised thus far in their acutest form. One has the choice of
radically recasting his role, or largely rejecting the entire Prolegomena
tradition. Scholars in this century have opted, by and large, for the first
alternative. There is widespread agreement on jettisoning everything we are
told about the biography of Corax: both his preoccupation, before and after
the revolution, with political manipulation and persuasion (incompatible
with the divisio he is said to have devised and with fourth-century testimony
about the overwhehningly dicanic orientation of early writing on rhetoric)''
and his lawsuit with Tisias (a floating story of indeterminate origin
eventually attached to Corax because "Bad crow, bad egg" provided such an
effective piece of closure).^^ The relationship between Corax and Tisias
thereby becomes the purely generic one between two collaborators. The
former is to be credited with a discussion of persuasive techniques organized
and presented in the order in which they would appear in a "normal" dicanic
speech of four (or more—see below) parts; the latter with expanding and
improving the collection, or perhaps, in the event Corax 's teaching was
purely oral, with setting it down for the first time in writing. The second
hypothesis has the advantage of explaining a further inconsistency between
the Byzantine Corax and his predecessors. There is no hint, at any point
before Hermias and the Prolegomena, of contrasting characters or separate
generally assumed (cf., for example, Wilcox 9-10), the lines (V 7. 15-18 Walz)
immediately following in Sopater maintained—against Aristotle and all other fourth-
century sources—that the rhetorical works of Corax, Tisias and their immediate successors
were exclusively concerned with political oratory. But what the lines in fact say is that
these works were 6TmaY(0YiKal texvai, devoting no space to stasis theory and
preoccupied with ni9av6TTiTO(; . . . tivoc;, nox; 5ei 6fip.ov vnayayiaQai. Since there
is, so far as I know, no parallel for demagogikos as a synonym for demigorikos or
symbouleutikos, the normal adjectives used in reference to political oratory, it is perfectly
possible that the word means nothing more here than "popular" or "calculated to appeal to
a large audience" {iinayarfnioc, xov 6fmo«, as the phrase immediately following might
suggest) whether in a popular law court or a popular assembly. If so, there is a possible
parallel—^and a further argument for derivation from the Synagoge—to the contrast drawn in
Aristotle's Rhetoric between the author's own conception of the discipline and that of his
predecessors. Aristotelian rhetoric is centered around the study of the enlhymeme; that of
his predecessors is directed at the akroates and framed with his shortcomings (mochthe'ria,
phortikotes,phaulotes) in mind {Rhet. 2. 21, 1395bl-2; 3. 1, 1404a8; 3. 14, 1415b5; 3.
18, 1419al8). What app>ears in Sopater may be nothing more than a "Hermogenized" and
simplified version of this contrast Enthymeme study is Hermogenized into stasis theory
(compare Rhet. 1. 1, 1354al4-15 nepi . . . evBwfiimdTOJv o«5ev XcYovoi with
Sopater's oil6ev nepl otdaecov exowoai Ke(pdX,aiov, both in reference to the same body
of texts); and Aristotle's intellectually limited audience {akroatai phauloi) is presented,
more simply, as a lower-class one {demos).
" G. Kennedy is virtually alone among contemporary writers in his inclination to
make Corax "a political speaker" and attribute to him "a division of speech suitable to
deliberative oratory" {The Art of Persuasion in Ancient Greece [Princeton 1963] 60-61).
^Cf. Kowalski 1937. 47.
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achievements for Corax and Tisias. We are always told what Tisias did (and
taught),^^ or what Corax did,^^ or (beginning with Cicero in the De
oratoreY^ what Tisias and Corax did—never what Corax, unlike Tisias, did,
or the different things which each of them did.^'* The two figures seem to
have been interchangeable—so much so that, as pointed out earlier, they are
in fact interchanged in Hermias' text, the only one (outside the
Prolegomena) which refers to them explicitly as master and student. This
suggests that the ultimate source of all our information was a single report
or a single set of documents in which the contributions of the two men were
not clearly distinguished from each other.
So far the new consensus. A minority of scholars, however, among
them the one to whose memory this collection of essays is dedicated, has
explored, at least tentatively, the first, more radical alternative suggested
above. In 1934 Friedrich Solmsen drew attention^^ to a "wichtiges, nicht
genug ausgewertetes Zeugnis" of Aristotle concerning the character of "the
art [of rhetoric] before Theodorus." According to Rhet. 2. 24, 1400bl5-16,
a certain type of argument from probability constituted "the entirety" of this
art inaocL y\ npotepov xot) 6Eo5cbpov xe/vTi). Since Theodorus was the
second after Tisias in the canonical succession of early writers on rhetoric,
the statement, if true, makes it highly unlikely that Corax or Tisias dealt
with anything but the proofs section of the four-part oration. Any kind of
argumentation from probability {eikos) is largely excluded from the narrative
21 Plato. Phdr. 261a, 273c, AristoUe. Soph. El. 32, 183b29. Theophrastus {ap.
Radermacher 18. A. V. 17).
22 Aristotle. Rhet. 2. 24. 1402al7. "Aristotle" in the anonymous preface to the
spurious Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Cicero. De inv. 2. 2. 6.
23
1. 91; cf. Brut. 46.
2* Teioiaq (lexa xovq np(ic>xo\)<; heads Aristotle's list of contributors to the
development of rhetoric at Soph. El. 32. 183b29 ff.. and Corax is sometimes assumed
(e.g.. by Hinks 65-66) to be included among, or identified with, the npcotowq. If so.
Aristotle may be implying some sort of contrast between Corax's achievements and the
more solid or clearly identifiable ones of his successor. But it is much more likely that the
npokoi are Empedocles (called the inventor of the discipline in Aristotle's Sophist [fr. 65
Rose = Rademiacher 28. B. I. 1] and/or the divine patrons or mythical masters of effective
speech—Henmes, Nestor, Odysseus—with whom the Prolegomena regularly begin and who
probably played some role even in fourth-century accounts (Wilcox 8. with note 10) of the
pre-history of the discipline: cf. Crat. 407e (Hermes), 398d (Greek iipcoe(; so called
because they were pr|topeq tivei; Kal ipanr\z\.Koi, Phdr. 261b (Nestor, Odysseus.
Palamedes). and for what may be a distant echo of one of Aristotle's own formulations,
Quintilian 3. 1. 8: primus post eos quos poetae tradiderunt movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen
dicitur Empedocles. G. Kennedy ("The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer," AJP 78
[1957] 23 ff.) regards the last passage quoted as Quintilian's own attempt to strike a
compromise between those who categorically affirmed, and those who categorically
denied, the existence of rhetoric in the age of the heroes; but this sort of compromise is
typically Aristotelian. If primitive maxims and proverbs can count as philosophy (fr. 13
Rose = De philos. fr. 8 Ross), one would expect primitive eloquence and figures of speech
to count as rhetoric.
25
"Theodorus." RE \ A2 (1934) 1842^4; cf. Hinks 68-69.
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of a speech, and rarely if ever forms part of a proem or epilogue.^^ This,
combined with Tisias' general addiction, well attested in Plato (Phdr. 267a,
272e, 273c-d) to Eikostechnik, and Theodorus' equally well attested {Phdr.
266d; Arist. Rhet. 3. 13, 1414bl3-15) obsession with subdividing
oratorical structures into their component parts (narrative, preparatory
narrative, supplementary narrative, proof, supplementary proof,
supplementary refutation, etc.) naturally points to the strong possibility that
the entire topic of oratorical divisio was Theodorus' innovation.^^
Solmsen's general doubts about the modem consensus—though not his
views on Theodorus—were seconded several years later by Kroll,^* and they
have been carried a step further in two works completed in 1990—E.
Schiappa's "The Beginnings of Greek Rhetorical Theory"^^ and my own The
Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece?^ The starting point for both
investigations is the contention—advanced as a surmise by me,^^ proved in
so far as such things can ever be proved by Schiappa^-^—that the word
"rhetoric" (first attested in the Gorgias) is Plato's own term, coined
sometime in the 380s, for a set of techniques not thitherto seen as
constituting a separate, definable discipline. Schiappa argues the
unlikelihood of Tisias' having come up with anything like the systematic
presentation of rhetorical techniques or theories which the notion of a
definite art of rhetorike suggests, and is inclined to doubt the tradition which
^^ Solmsen's own conclusion is more cautious, allowing for the possibility that there
were pre-Theodoran discussions of other parts of the speech but that Aristotle chose to
ignore them here because he is using lechne to mean "der eigentUche Inhalt der Texvtiq"
—
i.e., enthymeme or Argumenlationstechnik. But he cites no parallel for this use of techne'
when what is meant is merely to evxejcvov vt\<^ xexvTi^.
^^ Solmsen's conclusion follows for Corax and Tisias even if, as I think rather more
likely, x\ npotepov tov 6eo6copo\) Texvri is a reference, not to "the art of rhetoric before
Theodorus," but to "the earlier art of Theodorus," i.e., an earlier work of Theodorus written
before the interest in divisio for which he was famous became apparent (cf. the variant
reading npoxepa, which would, of course, require that the phrase be so translated). This
interpretation, unlike Solmsen's, does not eliminate the possibility that divisio was
already a concern of Thrasymachus, Tisias' immediate follower in the sequence of early
writers on rhetoric; but whatever the situation was with him, such concern is excluded for
Corax by Aristotle's further observation {Rhet. 2. 24, 1402a 17) a propos of another type
of argument from probability, that it was "what the art of Corax is composed of
{synkeimene).
2* In "Rhetorik," RE Suppl. 7 (1940) 1046. The general difficulty of reconciling
Corax's Eikostechnik and his supposed preoccupation with dispositio was first pointed
out, to my knowledge, by W. Siiss, Ethos: Studien zur dlteren griechischen Rhetorik
(LeiDzig and Berlin 1910) 74.
^^To appear in D. Zarefsky (ed.). Rhetorical Movement: Essays in Honor of LelandM.
Griffin (Evanston 1992).
^" Baltimore 1991. See, especially. Chapter 5, with the works of the earlier scholars
(Gercke, Radenmacher, Lesky, Barwick, Koch, Havelock) cited in nn. 11-12. To that list
(on pp. 168-69), add Kowalski 1933. 37-38 and 44; Kowalski 1937, 85; and Solmsen's
review of Radermacher (above, note 13) 214-15.
^1 Origins (previous note) 2 and 98-99.
^2
"Did Plato Coin Rhe'torikel" AJP 120 (1989) 460-73.
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credits him with a written rhetorical handbook. My own reconstruction
accepts the existence of the handbook but posits a collection of model
pieces, analogous to those found in the Tetralogies of Antiphon and based
on the principle of eikos: pleadings pro and con (or, more likely,
compressed summary versions of such pleadings) on topics likely to come
up in court cases—not an analytic set of precepts. The famous pair of
arguments (associated with Tisias at Phaedrus 273b3-c4 and Corax at Arist.
Rhet. 2. 24, 1402al8-21), in which a defendant's superior strength is
adduced to establish first the likelihood and then the unlikelihood of his
being guilty of having assaulted the plaintiff as charged, will have come
from this collection—and perhaps the debate over non-payment of a
teacher's fee as well.^^ Though not based on probability, the latter
illustrates a similar process of turning an argument around against its
original propounder.
My own reconstruction is less radical than Schiappa's and, unlike
Schiappa or the Byzantine tradition or the modified version of it which
constitutes the modem "consensus," it is compatible with all the fifth- and
fourth-century evidence.^ But neither reconstruction addresses itself to the
problem of how and why the Byzantine tradition came into being in the first
place. A partial explanation has been suggested by some of the architects of
the modem consensus, but their arguments must be carried further if the de-
Byzantinization process under way here is really to work.
It is generally agreed that the transfer of the activity of Corax from the
dicanic to the political sphere is a post-Aristotelian development in tjie
tradition, and it is fairly easy to see why the transfer took place. Political
rhetoric, in the view of Isocrates (Antid. 46, Paneg. 4), followed here by
Aristotle (Rhet. 1. 1, 1354bl7 ff.), is a higher, more significant form than
dicanic; that it should replace dicanic rhetoric in the discipline's foundation
myth was almost inevitable once the view of Isocrates became authoritative,
and once rhetoric itself had ceased to be, as it often was for Plato and
Aristotle, a suspect discipline whose claims were to be disputed or curtailed,
and had become, along with philosophy, the central ingredient in higher
education. Its finest achievements were expected, quite naturally, to be
^^ Poterat in arte sua . . . Tisias . . . ingenii ostendandi causa jieXexaq componere in
quibus talia perlustrarent unde ad ipsum auctorem fabula translata videatur (L. Spengel,
Artium scriptores [Stuttgart 1828] 33-34). Cf. Kowalski 1933, 43.
^* For those portions of the evidence that are usually uken (erroneously, I believe) to
point to the existence of organized collections of rhetorical precepts before the handbook
of Theodectes and the earliest version of Aristotle's Rhetoric, see Origins (above, note 30)
130-33. One possible testimony not discussed there is POxy 410 (= Radermacher 231-
32, D) an analysis, in Doric, of stylistic megaloprepeia, which its first editor believed to
be "considerably influenced by Tisias* xexvTi" or even taken from a summary of the
"productions of Tisias and his school" (cf. W. Rhys Roberts, "The New Rhetorical
Fragment in Relation to the Sicilian Rhetoric of Corax and Tisias," CR 18 [1904] 18-21).
But with the exception of Drerup (cf. Stegemann 142), Roberts' view has found no
followers.
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present, at least in nucleo, in the work of its protos heuretes', and it is even
possible that Corax's role in controlling and directing the passions of the
Syracusan populace has arisen, ultimately, through a transfer into a
particular historical situation of the civilizing, organizing role in the pre-
history of the human race which certain laudatory texts assign either to
eloquence (Isocrates 3. 6-9) or the first person to master it (Cicero, De inv.
\.1.2,Deor. 1. 30 ff.).
A similar tendency to attribute everything that was basic in the
discipline to its founder will explain why Corax came to be credited with
the—ultimately—canonical Gorgianic or Platonic definition of rhetoric as
the power or artificer of persuasion. Having invented for the benefit of his
contemporaries the art of rhetoric, it was inevitable that Corax should have
told them in briefest possible compass what it was.
It is impossible to pinpoint the period(s) or author(s) in which Corax
began undergoing this metamorphosis, though Timaeus of Tauromenium
—
our earliest authority (cf. D. H. De Lys. 1, p. 11.3 Us.-Rad.) for Gorgias'
embassy to Athens—has often been suggested as its ultimate source.^^ The
shifts involved, whether of scope (from minor achievement to major), venue
(from courtroom to popular assembly) or narrative mode (from history to
fiction) certainly point to the work of someone who, like Timaeus, was
simultaneously Sicilian patriot, Sicilian "democrat"^^ and, if Polybius is to
be believed, congenital liar.
On the other hand, neither patriotism nor republicanism nor general
mendacity will explain Timaeus' concern with the technicalities of divisio,
and he does not in fact figure in the modem consensus in this connection.
The assumption is, rather, that one at least of the various divisiones (four in
all) attributed to the Byzantine Corax must be an isolated remnant of the real
Corax, faithfully recorded in Aristotle Synagoge, but later transferred
inappropriately from its original dicanic context into a political one.
There is little justification, however, for the separation thus posited
between one aspect of Corax's traditional role 2is a protos heuretes and all the
others. Like all the others, this aspect is missing from the one Byzantine
text (above, pp. 68-69) which shows a close verbal parallel to Cicero's
summary of the Synagoge. More important, the tetradic divisio encountered
in three Prolegomena (above, pp. 67-68) is so canonical a feature of ancient
rhetoric as a whole that it can, when linked to a listing of the presumed
'^ Radennacher (above, note 7) 412-19. followed by Hamberger 12-18 and Wilcox 20-
23. Rabe ix and Schiappa (above, note 29) n. 51 remain unconvinced, perhaps with good
reason: see text. p. 70.
^^ I.e.. anti-monarchist, as may be inferred from his hatred of Agathocles. Wilcox (21-
22) draws attention to the close parallels between Rabe 4. p. 25. 3-8 = VI 12. 6-10 Walz
(the vowing of a cult in honor of Zeus eleulherios to be instituted once the dynasty of
Hieron is expelled from Syracuse) and Diodorus' account, in a passage often thought to
derive from Timaeus. of the actual institution of the cult after the expulsion had taken place
(11. 72-73).
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tasks (erga) or purposes of each of its four parts, function as a kind of
alternative or supplementary definition. Rhetoric is the artificer of
persuasion and, more particularly, the art of "proemizing" for good will and
attentiveness, narrating for clarity and believability, arguing for proof and
refutation, and "epilogizing" for summary and reminder (or perorating for
pathos). To say that Corax invented rhetoric was tantamount to saying that
he invented this four-fold way of conceiving his task and implementing its
operation. The ease with which definition can become foundation myth is
particularly clear in Rabe 9, pp. 125. 22-126. 18 = II 119. 18-29 Walz,
which first describes how Corax produced his rhetorical inventions:
. . . <paaiv evpexTiv npcoxov yeveoGai tov Kopaxa . . . tov
Sfjuov . . . a\iyKExv\iivov ehpovxa Kai iva iiev to GopvPovv
jiavoTi Ktti ireioTi Ttpoaexc^v [1] "^ohq tojv npooi^icov xonovc,
ejiivoT|cavxa- iva 5e Kai nepi xov jtpdYnaxo(; aa(pg>(; 5i5d^Ti xai
niQavoic, [2] ... xfiv 6ir|Yriaiv eniKaxavoTiavTa- iva 6e Kai
. . . JLLULU KOI d7roxpe\|/Ti [3] xoiq dycboi xpilod^i£vov • iva 6e
. . .
dva^vrjOTi nXr\p(0OT\ 5e Kai xov noQovc, [4] ... Kai xovq
e7tiX6YO\)(; KaxaoxTiod|ievov,
and then goes on to add
xiveq Se paoiv epya xf[C, prixopiKTiq eivai x6 7ipooi|iidoao0ai
npoc, Evvoiav fi Tcpogoxtiv r\ £\>)j.d6£iav [1], x6 5iTiYf|aaa6ai
npbc, aa<pf|VEiav [2], x6 npbq nioxiv dYcovioaoGai [3], x6 npbc,
dvdfiVTioiv ETciXoYioaoGai [4],
which is practically identical with the same author's formulation (Rabe 4, p.
32. 6-9 = VI 19. 5-8 Walz) of the Theodectean (above, p. 67) tetrad:
Jlpool^ldoa0Gal npbq Evvoiav [1], 5niYiloaaGai npbc, TtiGavo-
XTixa [2], dYwvioaoGai npbq dn65Ei^iv [3], dvaKE<paXai(6oaoGai
npbc; dvd^-VTiaiv [4].'^^
It is just conceivable that the reverse process has occurred, and the definition
has been generated from a genuine tradition about Corax's divisio. But this
is highly improbable, given the fact that, though the divisio is basic to the
organization of the third book of his Rhetoric, Aristotle never suggests that
it is the work of any one writer from an earlier generation.
'''r: Aristotle, fr. 133 Rose. Cf. the alternative formulation in Rabe 13, p. 216. 1-4 =
Vn 33. 5-7 Walz: npooijiidaaoGai npoq evvoiav [1], 8iTiYr|aaa9ai npoq
niSavoTTiTa [2], nioToooaoOai npoq nei6a> [3], eniXoYioaaBai npoq 6pYT\v r\ 'iXtow
[4]. The same definitional tetrad may be used equally well to produce an anti -foundation
myth—cf. Cicero's contention (ascribed to the Academic Chamiadas at De or. 1. 90) that it
is ridiculous to posit a protos heuretes for rhetoric, since it was perfectly within the
capacity erf anyone of us, as normal human beings, to blandire [\]et rem gestam exponere
[2] et id quod intenderemus confirmare et quod contra diceretur refellere [3], ad exlremum
deprecari et conqueri [4], quibus in rebus omnis oratorum versaretur facultas. Quintilian
makes the same point more briefly at 2. 17. 6.
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What applies to the "historicization" of the Theodectean tetrad will also
apply to the triadic divisio attributed to Corax in one of the Prolegomena.
The latter, as was pointed out (above, p. 68), seems to have arisen through
the minimal change necessary to accommodate the tetrad to a political
context. The same cannot be said, however, for the pentadic and heptadic
divisiones found in two of the Prolegomena: proem, narrative, agones,
parekbasis (digression)^* and epilogue (Rabe 17 [Marcellinus?], pp. 270.
22-271. 20 = IV 12. 17-13. 19 Walz), or the same, with narrative called
katastasis instead of diegesis, and with the insertion of proparaskeue
(preliminary presentation) and prokatastasis (preliminary narrative) between
it and the proem (Rabe 5 [Troilus], p. 52. 8-20 = VI 49. 1-20 Walz). It is
clear that both Troilus' heptad and Marcellinus' pentad result from insertions
into a tradition that elsewhere derives from the same source as do the
Prolegomena with a briefer divisio. The extra parts required to produce them
are simply named and defined, with no effort, as there is for the four parts
shared with the other divisio, to indicate the purpose which they serve in the
process of political persuasion (digression and proparaskeue are assigned a
purely dicanic function [see below], and prokatastasis has the merely formal
one of preparing the way for the katastasis itselQ. But what is to guarantee
that this different source is a later source? The tetradic divisio itself may be
an insertion into a tradition that originally contained the triadic adaptation of
it found in one text (above, p. 68, with note 12); only its widespread use
elsewhere and the existence of independent testimony linking it to
Theodectes prevents us from seriously entertaining the possibility that its
ultimate source is Corax himself. Since the pentad and heptad are so rarely
encountered,^' the most economical explanation for their presence in the
Prolegomena is that one or the other of them derives from a genuine report
or memory of the actual content of Corax 's text.''^
^* The reading in all but one of the passages where this section is mentioned and
presumably to be read there (p. 52. 14-15 Rabe = VI 49. 8 Walz) in place of the transmitted
parekthesin.
'' The heptad only in Troilus and the set of confuse annexae . . . definitiones,
divisiones, interprelationes (Rabe Ixiii) adjoined in one set of manuscripts (cf. p. 212.
17-19 Rabe = VII 25. 8-10 Walz) to what now appears as Rabe 13. For the pentad, see
text. p. 79.
*° The seven parts of Troilus, in particular, "are to a certain degree recommended by
their singularity," whereas "the four canonical . . . partes orationis we suspect just
because we should expect to find them referred back to the inventor of the Art" (Hinks 68).
Hinks, like several others, seems imable either to accept, or find decisive considerations
against, the authenticity (argued at length in Hamburger, 31-38) of Troilus' heptad. Cf.
Radermacher 34, ad B. U. 23 {ea . . .fortasse ex Aristolele provenit memoria,scimus
autem in terrmnis technicis inveniendis primes auctores quasi delirasse) and Stegemann
146. Hamberger has, however, found no followers (cf. Hinks 68) in his attempt (7-8 and
31 ff.) to establish an Aristotelian origin for the context within which the hepud appears.
(The argument rests on supposed parallels with the remarks on the beginnings of rhetoric
in Sopater's scholia to Hermogenes [V 5-8 ff. Walz], the only late rhetorical text which
has been thought [see text, pp. 68-69] to contain close echoes of the Synagcge Technm.)
Thomas Cole 77
Though the possibility can obviously not be excluded, it seems to me
to be, on balance, a fairly unlikely one. There is no reason to disbelieve
Cicero when he says (De inv. 2. 2. 6) that Aristotle's Synagoge drove all
the works it summarized out of circulation. Authentic notice of a five- or
seven-part system of Corax would have had to be taken directly from some
Aristotelian Mittelquelle, and then reinserted by Troilus and Marcellinus
into an account derived indirectly—^via Timaeus or whoever—from the same
Aristotelian source. And it is hard to see any reason either for the original
division of the two transmissions—direct and indirect—or their later
reunification.
There are, moreover, clear difficulties in both the pentadic and heptadic
divisiones which make it unlikely that either could ever have been intended
as the basic organizing system for a course of practical instruction in public
speaking. Digression (parekbasis) as defined by both Troilus and
Marcellinus is an excursus on the prior life of the accused (dtTioSei^vv
. .
.
xo\> Kpivop,evov p{o\) [Troilus] ~ ttjv Tipotepav xox> ivayo\iivo\}
Siaycoyriv [Marcellinus]) designed to ensure conviction even if the case
immediately at hand fails to do so. As such it is relevant to only half the
judicial cases—those for the prosecution—with which the student is likely
to be confronted. As if to correct this fault the longer divisio of Troilus
balances parekbasis with an exact counterpart the proparaskeue, dedicated to
removing a (presumably) preexisting charge that is doing the speaker harm
(ahiav Xx>Tio\>(5a\ avxov). The result, however, is a model oration plan
which by virtue of including both proparaskeue and parekbasis presupposes
a speech that is simultaneously for the prosecution and for the defense. We
seem to be dealing with a tradition that is Byzantine in more ways than
one."*^
Comparable difficulties attend the katastasis and prokatastasis in the
heptadic divisio. Both terms are well attested in the imperial rhetoricians,
but Troilus* definition of the former (\|/iXtiv twv 7cpax9evtcov ekGeow)
makes it exactly what the imperial katastasis is not. Bare narrative is
regularly diegesis, katastasis being the term used when some sort of
slanting, or coloring, or skewing is called for.''^ Troilus' point of departure
may have been the tradition, attested in a single source (Syrianus in
Hermogenem 2, p. 127. 4 Rabe = Radermacher 35, B. II. 24) that katastasis
*^ A section, toward the beginning of a speech for the defense, countering aitiai of the
sort Troilus refers to is frequent enough, both in fourth-centuiy oratory and fourth-century
rhetoric: cf. the suggestions for dealing with diabolai in Arist. Rhet. 3. 15 and
Anaximenes (?), Rhet. ad Alex. 29, pp. 61. 11-64. 23 Fuhrmann. But Hamberger's
attempt (105 ff.) to detect its presence in the three earliest surviving pieces of fifth-century
oratory (Antiphon 1, 5 and 6) seems to me to involve an artificial Gliederung which
isolates from their surroundings sections that in two cases are better taken with the
introduction, and in the third with the narrative.
*^See D. A. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge 1983) 88, with n. 6, and Kowalski
1933. 45-50.
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was Corax's word for "proem." He reconciles this with the usage with
which he was more familiar by assuming that Corax must have recognized
two subspecies: a "proemic" or "pro-"katastasis (cf. his definition:
eioPoXriv Kal apxT|v Kal npooC^iov . . . ercl tt^v Kaxdaxaoiv) and a
"diegetic" katastasis, which he inaccurately identifies with what went by that
name among his own contemporaries. Whether the tradition about Corax
that inspired this subdivision was correct or not, Troilus' use of it tells us
nothing about the original organization of Corax's text.'*^
Even granting, however, that the divisiones including prokatastasis,
parekbasis and proparaskeue are unlikely to be much older than the texts in
which they are attested, one may still wonder what impelled their authors to
seek out a five- or seven-part system in the first place. A possibility worth
considering is that Troilus and Marcellinus were influenced here by another
multi-partite classification which they share, and which appears nowhere
else in the Prolegomena. Both authors present their account of Corax's
invention of rhetoric as an illustration of the way any act of creation can be
described and accounted for in terms of the particular "determining
circumstances" (peristatika) that accompany it. These are five in number:
the where, when, who, why and how of its coming into being. In the case
of rhetoric the "where" is Sicily, the "when" the period following the fall of
the tyrants, the "who" Corax, Uie "why" the desire to control the process of
popular decision-making, the "how" the five or seven parts of an oration. It
is conceivable, therefore, that the number of subdivisions in the "how" was
regulated at some point in the development of the tradition in such a way as
to make it equal to the number oi peristatika. The suggestion is supported
by the fact that Troilus actually mentions—though he does not accept—
a
variant list of seven peristatika (pp. 51. 26-52. 2 Rabe = VI 48. 22-25
Walz) which would match his own heptadic divisio, and refrains—as if
*^ If katastasis was in fact the word Corax used for the first part of a speech, it may have
been used, along with agones (the only other piece of terminology in the passages on
divisio under examination here that has a fifth-century ring about it), to refer to the
essential recurring components of the sort of collection of model pieces which, it was
suggested in the text (p. 73), Corax produced. Arguments pro and con (agones) would have
to be preceded in every instance by a "setting up" (katastasis) of the basic facts of the
situation which the arguments presupposed (cf., in the most famous collection of model
rhetorical pieces surviving from antiquity, the two- or three-line settings of the stage
which introduce individual items in the Controversiae of Seneca, and—for the fifth-century
texts which support this meaning of katastasis—Origins [above, note 30] 83, with n. 14).
Later usage may derive from the meaning suggested here, normally identifying katastasis
(as what precedes the argumenu section of a speech) with the die'gesis, but occasionally (as
what begins a speech) with the proem (cf. Rhet. ad Alex. 29, pp. 64. 24 and 65. 9
Fuhrmann). Like Troilus. the author of Rabe 15, p. 247. 21-22 = VH 43. 1-2 Walz (td
. . . npoo{^ia KataoTaTiKot xow dycivoq XxxjiPdvonev) may be attempting to reconcile
the two senses, but through elimination of the die'gesis rather than addition of a proemic
katastasis.
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seeking to avoid a clash with the five peristatika he does accept—from ever
explicitly mentioning the number of parts in that divisio.^
The longer list oi peristatika is derived from the shorter (by including,
illogically , raw material [hyle] and product [pragma] among the peristatika
that attend the conversion of the one into the other); and the same may hold
true, as was suggested earlier, for the longer list of speech parts:
Proparaskeue is a parekbasis for the defense, and prokatastasis is produced by
mating the katastasis attributed to Corax with its imperial counterpart. As
for the shorter list, parekbasis would have been a natural candidate for
inclusion once the original decision to convert the standard tetradic divisio
into a pentad had been made. It is the extra ingredient—a digressio
comprising an orationem a causa atque iudicationem remotam introduced
between argument and conclusion''^—in the five-part system best known to
Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic writers, that of Hermagoras (F 22a-d
Matthes); and it might have been considered a speech part with which Corax
had a special affinity. Small wonder—so the reasoning would have gone
—
if the creator of a tradition stigmatized by Aristotle for dwelling on ta exo
tou pragmatos*^ decided, once he had devised the four-part system, that there
was still need for a special spot in each speech set aside exclusively for such
irrelevancies.'*^
Other reconstructions are obviously possible, but their possibility does
not in itself justify tracing the five- and seven-part oratorical models found
in the Prolegomena to anything but some sort of later variant on the four-
part form that characterizes most of the tradition. The modem consensus
that strips Corax of all but the authorship of a handbook defining rhetoric
and analyzing the form of the juridicial oration on the one hand and, on the
other, some sort of preoccupation with arguments based on probability
** Contrast the concluding reference to the "how" in Marcellinus (tci \i.ipr\ nevxe xox>
Xoyov, echoing nevte 6e eioi tiva TiepiCTraxiKa five lines earlier [p. 271. 21-26 Rabe =
rV 13. 19-25 Walz]) with its counterpart in Troilus (5ia xcijv eTtivoriGevxojv aiixciv
fiepcbv xo\i Xoyou taking up the earlier 6ia xoiv nevxe JtepiaxaxiKoiv [p. 52. 20-27 Rabe
= VI 49. 15-20 Walz]). Note also that Troilus does not mention the six-part "how" known
to Syrianus {ad Hermogenem 2, p. 39. 17-19 Rabe)
—
perhaps because it has no parallel in
either of the divisiones found in the branch of the Prolegomena tradition to which he and
Marcellinus belong.
*^ Cic. De inv. 1. 51. 97; cf. Radermacher (above, note 7) 414 n. 2.
*^Rhet. 1. 1. 1354al2 and b23. Cf. in MarceUinus (p. 271. 2-3 Rabe = IV 13. 1-2
Walz) the unintelligible phrase Kai x6 xoi 7tpdYjiaxo<; Sitiyeixai (a definition of what the
parekbasis does). Here the simplest emendation is an inserted Ttpo (Rabe) or (more in line
with the meaning of parekbasis) e^co or eicxoq. Either of the latter would result in a
duplication (xa (e^to) xow npayfiaxcq) or approximation of Aristotle's own phrase.
*^ That either Hermagoras or Marcellinus took his pentad from the Rhet. ad Alex.—or
earlier texts drawn on by iu author—is unlikely, given the different terminology used
there for the five parts (proem, diegesis, bebaiosis, la pros tous anlidikous, and palillogia)
and the fundamenully different character of the section corresponding to parekbasis: an
anticipation of one's opponent's arguments, not a digression into ad hominem
irrelevance.
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should be revised in favor of one which leaves him with nothing but the
latter. And Timaeus' role should be similarly reduced—to that of (at most)
replacing Aristotle's dicanic context for Corax's invention of rhetoric with a
political one: the situation following the fall of the Syracusan tyrants when
ETiETioXa^e , . . br\\iay(iiyG)v 7iA,f|9o(; . . . Kal Xoyo-u 6eiv6TTi(; vnb
xwv veoneptov TioKeixo (Diodorus 11. 87. 5). Diodorus may well derive
at this point from a Timaean account in which Corax was named as one of
the plethos or, more likely, as the first teacher of logon deinotes to the
young; but his political preeminence, before and after the revolution, and his
role as discoverer and definer of rhetoric and its basic parts, make far more
sense as inseparable components of a coherent foundation myth than either
does as the invention of a Sicilian historian.'**
As for Corax himself, or what is left of him, it is natural to wonder
whether continued existence in histories of ancient rhetoric is desirable at
all, stripped as he has been of most of the choregia—offices, political
status, pupils, progeny intellectual and literary—without which living, or at
any rate living well, is impossible. Antiquity records, to my knowledge,
only one other Corax from the historical period: the man who killed the
poet Archilochus in a battle fought on the island of Naxos at some point
toward the middle of the seventh century."*^ Plutarch, along with Aelian (fr.
80 Hercher) and, later, the Suda {s.v. 'Apxi^oxoq), says that Corax was an
epithet: The man's real name seems (eoikev) to have been Calandes.^^ One
naturally wonders how Plutarch came to be informed so exactly on such a
matter
—
probably not through independent research into the prosopography
of seventh-century Naxos. Name as well as epithet may have been preserved
on some document kept in the Archilocheum on Paros and available for
consulation there. It is just as likely, however—since the real name merely
"seems" to have been Calandes—that Plutarch (or his source) found earlier
accounts in disagreement on this point^' and simply assumed on the basis of
^* Those inclined to go along with V. Farenga's deconstructionist reading of the myth
("Periphrasis on the Origin of Rhetoric." Modern Language Notes 94 [1979] 1033-53)
will have even less reason to attribute any of it to Sicilian invention. Essential to
Farenga's interpretation is the story
—
present in two Prolegomena (Rabe 4, pp. 24. 16-
25. 3 and 17, pp. 269. 25-270. 3 = VI 11. 12-12. 5 and IV 11. 18-24 Walz)—of how
Hieron's suppression of free speech forced his subjects to communicate through gestures
and dance steps; and this is surely too preposterous, even for Timaeus.
*' Aristotle, fr. 611. 25 Rose = fr. viii (FHG n 214) in the collection of excerpts from
Aristotle's PoUteiai erroneously transmitted under the name Heraclides Ponticus. The
phrase mentioning Corax is missing in some manuscripts, and Rose prints it in his
apparatus, evidently assuming that it has been added from elsewhere to fill a lacuna in the
text of "Heraclides" himself. Cf. Miiller ad loc.
^^De sera num. vind. 17. 325d-e.
'^ Eusebius (Praep. Ev. 5. 93. 9) gives a third variant. Archias (usually assumed to be a
corruption of Kalandas). In other passages mentioning the poet's death (listed in
Lasserre's edition, cvii-cviii) no name is given at all.
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his own experience that Corax had to be the nickname: Greek parents were
not in the habit of calling their children crows.
This rule may have admitted of exceptions in the Sicilian context with
which we are concerned, but assuming an exception in the present case
requires an additional, equally questionable assumption. Would any Greek
named Crow—especially if he were a Siceliot (acuta ilia gens et controversa
naturay^—be ill-advised enough to try to make a living by teaching the art
of public speaking? Even if it did not occur to his compatriots themselves
to identify lessons in eloquence from the Crow with lessons in cawing and
squawking they had only to recollect Pindar's famous lines, from a poem
premiered at Agrigentum in 476 B.C., when Corax was a boy or young
man, in which an unidentified group of lesson-takers—cacophonous rivals
(or, perhaps, inept imitators and explicators) of the poet—are compared to a
pair of crows who chatter fruitlessly against or about the eagle of Zeus
(liaGovxeq . . . KopttKeg co<; aKpavxa yap-uexov Aibq npbc, opvixa, 01.
2. 86-88).
That Pindar's simile is not irrelevant to the tradition about Corax was
surmised over a century ago by Verrall.^^ Verrall's own version of the
connection—that the two crows are literally the "two" Coraxes, Corax and
his pupil Tisias—has the disadvantage of being incompatible, both with the
Pindaric context of the passage^'* and the tradition, at least as old as
Aristotle, which places Corax 's activity as a teacher after the fall of Hieron
and his dynasty (466/5). What the passage does show is how natural it
would have been, in fifth-century Sicily, to associate loud and frequent, or
inept and unwelcome, discourse with the chatter of crows; and so, as a
consequence, how unlikely it is that Corax was anything but a name
bestowed after—not before—its bearer had started to teach people how to
speak.
The epithet may have been totally derisive and contemptuous, or
derisive and affectionate at the same time. The question cannot be answered.
But if one asks what Corax was called before he got his new name, the
answer is almost inevitable: Tisias. Much that is puzzling in the earlier
stages of the tradition is thereby explained—the inability on the part of any
sources earlier than Sextus to distinguish the one figure from the other, the
frequency with which the name Corax carries overtones of uncertainty or
contempt (Coracem istum veterem [Cic. De or. 3. 81], usque a Corace
nescioquo [ibid. 1. 91], ttiv tov Tiaiov texvt|v ... to 6\)OK6paKo<; epyov
'^ Cicero's own explanation {Brut. 46) for why rhetoric should have arisen in Sicily
rather than somewhere else.
^^
"Korax and Tisias." Journal of Philology 9 (1880) 197 ff., developing a suggestion
offered (p. 130) in an earlier article, "TOnOI. TOFIH (?). and TOnAil." published in the
same issue.
^* Whatever the exact point being made, it is clear that the crows in some sense want
their cawing to be attended to along with, or instead of, the eagle's light; and it is hard to
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[Lucian, Pseudolog. 30],^^ xi Gavjiaaxov ei KopaKoq etpe-upovToq rnv
pTiTopiKTiv ol an' EKEivou KopttKcq eloiv;^'^) and—most tellingly per-
haps—the peculiar language in the earliest surviving reference to either man:
5eiva)<; y' eoikev d7iOKeKpi)^in£VTiv texvtiv evpeiv 6 Teioiac; §.
aXXocj POT k; Sr\ nox ' & v t\)yx"^ c*- ^g"'- onoSev y ai pet
ovo^g^o^evo; (Plato, Phdr. 273a).
In the light of the Byzantine tradition and its immediate forerunners,
Socrates' reference at this point to "Tisias or someone else, whoever he is
and whatever he likes to be called" is usually taken, following Hermias,^'' as
a way of indicating that credit for the "art" of Tisias was disputed between
him and another older, more obscure figure. But if the later tradition did not
exist—and there is no independent evidence to suggest that it did exist in
Plato's day—the most natural way of taking the passage would be as a
reference to uncertainty about the identity of Tisias himself, not his
collaborator: "Tisias or whoever else he [the man sometimes known as
Tisias] happens to be and whatever the source of the name he prefers to go
by." One would not necessarily suspect a further, malicious reference to the
fact that anyone in his right mind would prefer not to have got a nickname
in the way Tisias did; but if the nickname was Corax and Plato knew it, the
reference is almost certain to be there. Onomastic precision is surely the
last thing Socrates is aiming at in this passage.^*
That "How to Speak as Taught by Tisias" (r\ xov Tioiov Xoycov xexyTj)
should become so widely known by the alternative title, "How to Speak as
Taught by the Crow" (i] xov KopaKoc; Xoycov xexvTi), as to lead to
ignorance of the author's real name and, later, to positing the existence of
two authors would not be surprising, even today, in certain parts of the
Mediterranean world. And what applies there now applies a fortiori to that
world in antiquity:
see any comparable relationship between Pindaric song and the teachings of Corax and
Tisias.
'^ Lucian's apparent equation of the "art" of Tisias with the activity (ergon) of the
"damnable Crow" is even more suggestive of the view of Corax proposed here, as is
Corax 's appearance as an emblematic corvus atop a standard carried by Tisias at Martianus
Capella 5. 433-34, p. 150 Willis. Both passages, however, are too vaguely allusive to
allow any firm conclusions as to the form in which the story was familiar to their
respective authors.
'^Isocrates' supposed reply (Apophthegmata 8' 1, p. 278 Blass-Benseler) upon being
asked why the populace is in the habit of being robbed and cheated by its rhetors.
" Ad loc., p. 251. 8-9 Couvreur.
** Knowledge of the epithet may also have been one of the things that suggested to
Plato the prominent and contrasting role assigned in the Phaedrus to another famous Tisias
with an alias. Tisias the Chorus-Master—i.e. Stesichorus (cf. the Suda, s.v.)—is as surely
a patron saint of "good" rhetoric in the first part of the dialogue as Tisias the Crow is of
"tad" rtietoric in the second.
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Anyone familiar with the village life of central and southern Italy
knows how difficult it is to identify a person by his name but how easy
it is to locate him through the nickname known to the people of the
area in which he lives
—
from which the author^' rightly concludes, inferring ancient practice from
modem, that the appearance in archaic Greek poetry of what are obviously
redende Namen need not mean that the persons who bear them are fictitious.
Alessandro Manzoni had presumably made the same observation about
village life in the 1820s; and he, too, drew inferences about an earlier period,
when he came to write his famous novel of seventeenth-century Lombardy:
Fate a mio modo [Agnese is launching Renzo on his ill-fated attempt to
seek out the services of a lawyer/rhetdr to counter the designs of Don
Rodrigo] . . . andate a Lecco . . . cercate del dottor Azzecca-
garbugli,^ raccontategli. Ma non lo chiamate cosi, per amor del cielo:
e im soprannome. Bisogna dire il signer dottor— Come si chiama,
ora? Oh to'! non lo so il nome vero: lo chiaman tutti a quel modo.
Basta, cercate di quel dottore alto, asciutto, pelato, col naso rosso, e
una voglia di lampone suUa guancia. . . . quello e una cima d'uomo!
Ho visto io piu d'uno ch'era piii impicciato che un pulcino nella
stoppa, e non sap>eva dove batter la testa, e, dopo essere stato un'ora a
quattr'occhi col dottor Azzecca-garbugli (badate bene di non chiamarlo
cosi!) I'ho visto, dico, ridersene . . . ^'
A certain "tio Buscabeatas, aunque no era este su verdadero nombre ..." is
the protagonist of a story of village life near Cadiz by a Spanish
contemporary of Manzoni*^^—and the examples could doubtless be
multiplied. Tisias was probably as poweriess as Doctor Azzecca-garbugli to
suppress the name to which local reaction to the infancy of rehearsed
courtroom eloquence was condemning him and his fledglings. Only the
published version of his model pieces, informing readers, at least down to
Aristotle's day, of the author's identity, and preserving some true memory
of onoGev xaipei ovo^a^o^ievo^, ultimately saved him from the fate of his
Manzonian counterpart—though at the price of condemning historians of
ancient rhetoric to a bimillenary case of seeing double.
Many of those historians will doubtless continue to prefer the double
vision. But even if they do, they may well find that this "antonomastic"
accounting for Corax is at least ben trovato. What more appropriate fate for
the putative founder of the entire rhetorical tradition, with the centuries-long
^'B. Gentili, Poetry and its Public in Ancient Greece (Engl, transl. Baltimore 1988)
294-95.
^° Dr. Shystermeister (lit., "Spy out the ploy") is surely—oTtoGev x"ipei
p.eTa<ppa^6nevo(;—a spiritual as well as onomaslic analogue lo Corax.
^* / promessi sposi, cap. 2.
*^ Pedro AntcKiio de Alarcon, El libro talonario.
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study of figural speech it incorporates, than to be finally revealed as nothing
more—or nothing less—than a figure of speech himself?
Yale University
The Creatures and the Blood
BARBARA HUGHES FOWLER
One cannot read the Oresteia without being haunted by the theme of
perpetually shed blood or without being struck by the prevalence in it of
animal imagery.^ One cannot read that trilogy either without a sense not
only of an archaic style but of an atmosphere that is more than archaic, that
is in the Choephoroe primitive, in the Eumenides almost primeval.
The primordial atmosphere of the Oresteia is created in large part by the
style, for a characteristic of the archaic style is the technique of
juxtaposition. 2 Just as Aeschylus uses one or two nouns or even a
compound of two nouns to modify another noun and so multiplies the value
of each element,^ just as he uses compound nouns with both active and
passive meanings and so creates deliberate ambiguities,"* so he also
juxtaposes words, themes, and images so that his audience in a
subconscious but stereoscopic perception acquires an uncanny sense of some
primeval significance in the Oresteia. The significance of the animal
imagery lies in its constant juxtaposition to the factual or metaphorical
mention of blood. If this juxtaposition were limited to scenes of sacrifice,^
it would be neither surprising nor perhaps of particular import. Since,
however, it is not so limited but occurs throughout in both the thought and
the underthought of the trilogy,^ it is extremely important: It is in fact the
' On the theme of ever-flowing blood see A. Lebeck, The Oresteia (Cambridge, MA
1971) 80-91. On animal imagery in the trilogy see R. Lattimore, The Oresteia (Chicago
1953) 16-17 and B. H. Fowler. "Aeschylus' Imagery." C&M 28 (1969) 23-74.
^ B. A. van Groningen. La Composition litteraire archa'ique grecque (Amsterdam 1958)
29-33; R. A. Prier. Archaic Logic (The Hague 1976) 11.
^ E.g.. Agam. 403-04: aaniotopaq / kXovoxx; Xoxionowi; te Kal vavPataq
onXionouq.
* For a detailing of this technique see K. A. Kelley. Aeschylus' Use of Compound
Adjectives (Diss. University of Wisconsin-Madison 1975).
^ On the imagery of sacrifice see especially F. Zeitlin. "The Motif of the Corrupted
Sacrifice in Aeschylus' Oresteia" TAPA % (1965) 463-508 and "Postscript to Sacrificial
Imagery in the Oresteia {Agam. 1235-37)." TAPA 97 (1966) 645-53. On the interfacing
of animal and sacrificial imagery see P. Vidal-Naquet. "Chasse et sacrifice dans VOrestie
d'Eschyle." PP 24 (1969) 401-25.
^ I take the expression from Gerard Manley Hopkins, who on January 14. 1883, wrote
to Alexander William Baillie. "My thought is that in any lyric passage of the tragic poets
(perhaps not so much in Euripides as the others) there are—usually; I will not say always.
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clue to the most profound meaning of the Oresteia. That meaning lies in
the presence, from the very beginning, of the Erinyes.
The Erinyes developed from the winged spirits or "bacilli" that caused
old age, death, and disease.^ Originally they were the Keres-Erinyes, "death-
spirits angered," and their anger usually arose from the fact that they
belonged to persons who had been murdered. They were in fact the outraged
souls of the murdered dead. By the time of Homer, however, they were no
longer the souls themselves but rather the avengers of souls. In the Iliad (9.
571) Althaea calls upon the Erinys to avenge the death of her brothers.
Since the Erinys is female and single, she is clearly not the ghosts or souls
of both or either of the brothers. Elsewhere in Homer the Erinyes are
avengers of crimes against blood relatives on either the mother's or the
father's side (//. 19. 454; 21. 412), and at last, in the case of Achilles'
horses (//. 19. 418), they have become the agents of the fates or even the
fates of death itself.^ In Aeschylus' Oresteia we have Erinyes who are at one
level avengers in the Homeric sense but who in many respects revert to the
more primitive pre-Homeric concept of them as the outraged souls of the
dead.
In the first chorus of the Agamemnon Agamemnon and Menelaus are
described as shrieking (kXcx^ovtec;) Ares, like eagles that wheel high over
the nest because they have lost the tendance of their nestlings. Some god,
Apollo, Pan, or Zeus, hears their shrill bird cry (olcovoGpoov yoov 64\)P6av)
and sends a late-avenging Erinys (uoTeponoivov . . . 'EpiviSv) against the
transgressors (48-59). The image refers most immediately to Helen, but the
it is not likely—^two strains of thought running together and like counterpointed; the
overlhought that which everybody, editors, see (when one does see anything—which in
the great corruption of the text and original obscurity of the diction is not everywhere) and
which might for insunce be abridged or paraphrased in square marginal blocks as in some
books carefuUy written; the other, the underthought, conveyed chiefly in the choice of
metaphors etc used and often only half realised by the poet himself, not necessarily having
any connection with the subject in hand but usually having a connection and suggested by
some circumstance of the scene or of the story. I cannot prove that this is really so except
by a large induction of examples and perhaps not irrefragably even then nor without
examples can I even make my meaning plain. I will give only one, the chorus with which
Aeschylus' Suppliants begins. The underthought which plays through this is that the
Danaids flying from their cousins are like their own ancestress lo teazed by the gadfly and
caressed by Zeus and the rest of that foolery. E.g. 6iav 6e XiTtovoai / x^ova cruTxopxov
£\>p{a <pe\)7op.ev: the suggestion is of a herd of cows feeding next a herd of bulls. . . .
Then comes 8e^ai9' Ikcttiv / tov GTiXwyevf) axoXov aiSoio) / nvcujiati x^P^'- ^^^^
alludes to the eninvoia by which Epaphus was conceived—dpoevo7t>,Ti9fi 8" / eajiov
vPpioxfiv AiTVJixoyevii etc: this suggests the gadfly. Perhaps what I ought to say is that
the underthought is commonly an echo or shadow of the overthought, something like
canons and repetitions in music, treated in a different manner, but that sometimes it may be
independent of it." (Further Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. C. C. Abbott [Oxford
1956] 252-53).
' J. Harrison. Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (Cambridge 1903) 165-75.
* Harrison (previous note) 213-17.
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fact that the nestlings are plural (TtaiScov) and that the Erinys is late-
avenging makes the figure refer to the children of Thyestes as well. The
Atreidae in their expedition for Helen are fulfilling Thyestes' curse upon the
house of Atreus. The concept of a nestling child also suggests Iphigenia
whose loss, another result of the curse, will in time be avenged.' The verb
KXd^to is frequently used for the shrieking of birds (e.g. Horn. //. 10. 276;
17. 756; Soph. Ant. 112) and, in the Odyssey, of the baying of hounds (14.
30). The Erinyes as developments of the winged Keres were akin to the
Sirens and Harpies, bird-women.*^ The priestess at Eumenides 50-51
describes the Erinyes as Harpies without wings (Oivecoq YeYpa|i)ieva(; /
5e'i7cvov (pepovcsac,- aTtxepoi . .
.
), and Orestes at Choephoroe 1054 calls
them his mother's wrathful hounds (eyKoxoi Kijveq).
Calchas interprets the omen of the eagles devouring the hare together
with her young before their birth {Agam. 119-20) as the taking in time of
Troy. That may be its immediate meaning, but his very next words suggest
other, more ominous meanings. May no malice from the gods, he prays,
darken the mighty bit forged for Troy by the army, "for holy Artemis is
angry at the winged hounds of her father for sacrificing a wretched,
trembling creature together with her young before their final course; she
loathes the eagles' feast" {Agam. 131-37). *' The alternate translation of
at)x6xoKov npo Xo^ov, "his own child on behalf of the army," makes the
omen predict the sacrifice of Iphigenia,*^ who, sacrificed as a virgin, will be
deprived of children. That the fetuses are plural makes the portent also recall
the feast of Thestes, which is the cause of all the action that follows.*^
' B. M. W. Knox, "The Lion in the House." CP 47 (1952) 18; R. J. Rabel. "The Lost
Children of the Oresteia" Eranos 82 (1984) 21 1-13.
'° Harrison (above, note 7) 176-79; 197-206.
*^ Among the many interpretations of this omen see W. Whallon, "Why is Artemis
Angiy?" AJP 82 (1961) 78-88; H. Lloyd-Jones. "The Guilt of Agamemnon." CQ 56 (1962)
187-99; J. J. Peradotto. "The Omen of the Eagles and the He01 of Agamemnon."
Phoenix 23 (1969) 237-63; A. H. Sommerstein. "Aesch. Agam. 126-30." CR 21 (1971)
1-3; A. WooUey. "Aesch. Agam. 126-30." CR 24 (1974) 1-2; S. E. Lawrence. "Artemis
in \hc Agamemnon" AJP 97 (1976) 97-110; A. H. Sommerstein. "Artemis in Agam.: A
Postscript," AJP 101 (1980) 165-69; H. Neitzel. "Artemis und Agamemnon in der Parodos
des Aischyleischen Agamemnon" Hermes 107 (1979) 10-32; L. Bergson. "Nochmals
Artemis und Agamemnon," Hermes 110 (1982) 137-45; H. Lloyd-Jones. "Artemis and
Iphigenia," JHS 103 (1983) 87-102; E. Belfiore, "The Eagles' Feast and the Trojan Horse:
Corrupted Fertility in the Agamemnon" Maia 35 (1983) 3-12; W. D. Furley, "Motivation
in the Parodos of Aeschylus' Agamemnon" CP 81 (1986) 109-21.
^2 W. B. Stanford. Ambiguity in Greek Uterature (Oxford 1939) 143^4.
*' Lebeck (above, note 1) 34.
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Artemis in the following lines is the goddess who is tender toward the
dewy whelps of ravening hons and kindly to the nursling young of all wild
beasts: xooov nep evcppcov a KaXa / SpoooK; denTOK; iiaXepcov Xeovxtov
/ TidvTtov x' dypovo^itov (piXo^daxoic, I Griptov oPpiKaXoiai xepTtvd 140-
43. She is Potnia Theron.
The Potnia Theron, originally a winged Earth-Mother goddess of the
Near East, represented in the iconography as flanked by wild beasts, travelled
early to Greece, for she appears in Minoan and Mycenaean art. By the
archaic period she had become, in part at least, identified with Artemis, for
Homer at Iliad 21. 470-71 calls her Ttoxvia Giipcov, "Apte^iq dypoxEpTi,*'*
and on black-figure vases Artemis is winged and carries or is accompanied
by animals. The Potnia Theron on the Francois Vase is, for instance,
assumed to be Artemis. A proto-Attic vase shows the Potnia Theron as a
Gorgon, and Chryssanthos Christou in his study Potnia Theron
demonstrates that the gorgon on the temple at Corfu and elsewhere is the
nether aspect of the Earth-Goddess become Artemis-Hecate.^^ As such, she
is, like the Harpies, the Sirens, and the Sphinx, akin to the Erinyes, for all
are derived from the winged Keres or death-spirits.^^ Both Orestes in the
Choephoroe (1049) and the priestess in the Eumenides (48) describe the
Erinyes as "like gorgons." In the Oresteia then Artemis as Potnia Theron
has a dark as well as a tender side. As an avenging Erinys she demands the
sacrifice of Iphigenia as payment not only for the eating of the pregnant hare
but as vengeance for the children of Thyestes.^'' By forcing Agamemnon to
pollute himself with the slaughter of his own child she is causing him to
fulfill the curse upon the house of Atreus.
Calchas prays to Apollo that Artemis not send contrary winds to delay
the ships and so force another sacrifice, uncustomary, uneaten (Guoiav
Exepav dvo^iov xiv' d5aixov Agam. 150), for there remains in the house a
treacherous fear, ready to rise again (naXivopxoq 154), a mindful child-
avenging (xeKvoTtoivoq 155) wrath. Such was the warning that Calchas
shrieked out {aniKXa-fijEy 156). He too has become a bird (or a hound),
an Erinys, a means to the fulfillment of the curse upon the house.
The word dSaixov, "uneaten," means that the sacrifice of Iphigenia was
a a(pdYiov, an offering to the chthonic deities, and that she was first
butchered, then burned in a holocaust. Such sacrifices were made before
going into battle.'* "Avop.ov, "uncustomary," means that she was a human
rather than an animal sacrifice. When later the chorus says that it cannot
mention what happened next, they are undoubtedly referring to the
** W. Burkert, Greek Religion, transl. J. Raffan (Cambridge. MA 1985) 149.
*5 C. Christou. Potnia Theron (Thessaloniki 1968) 136-42; 170-210.
l<* Harrison (above, note 7) 176-79; 197-212.
^"^ Cf. Harrison 72: "It is probable, though not certain, that behind the figure of the
Olympian Artemis, of the goddess who was kindly to lions' cubs and 'suckling whelps.'
there lay the cult of some vindictive ghost or heroine who cried for human blood."
** Harrison (above, note 7) 65; Burkert (above, note 14) 60.
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butchering of Iphigenia.^' The acpdyiov was also an offering made to the
souls of the dead to make them avengers, and that is the hidden meaning
here.^^ Iphigenia's blood is poured to the outraged souls of Thyestes'
children to make them Erinyes. Her sacrifice is a part of the fulfillment of
Thyestes' curse.
There are hints even in the Hymn to Zeus of the presence of the
Erinyes. The chorus tells of Uranus being overthrown by Cronus. The
Erinyes in the Hesiodic tradition were sprung from Earth impregnated by the
drops of Uranus' blood when he was castrated by Cronus.^^ The man who
"shrieks" (KXa^tov 174) for Zeus' victory usurps the bird- (or hound-) cry
of the Erinyes. He celebrates the triumph of the Indo-European, Olympian,
male god over the probably pre-Greek, chthonic, female goddesses.^ In the
following strophe the grief of memory that drips (axdCei 179) in sleep
against the heart recalls the drops of blood from which the Erinyes sprang.
It also anticipates the blood that will drip, especially from the Erinyes
themselves, throughout the trilogy. The 7t6vo<; that is }i,viiai7iTi|itov (180)
again suggests the memory of Thyestes' children.
At line 201 Calchas shrieks out (eKXay^ev) another remedy, more
grievous than the bitter storm, proffering Artemis as its cause. Once more
he, like Artemis, acts as an Erinys. He has become her agent, and as a bird-
or animal-man.
In the lines describing the events at Aulis, blood and animal imagery
are, not surprisingly, intermingled. The first mention of blood is factual.
How, Agamemnon asks, can he stain the altar with virgin-slaughtered
streams (napGevoacpdyoiaiv peiGpoic; 209-10)? At 215 he speaks of a
'' R. Lattimore, Story Patterns in Greek Tragedy (Ann Arbor 1964) 40-41, makes the
point that Iphigenia's rescue "was acknowledged in both the Homeric and Hesiodic lines of
epic, by Sophocles and Euripides, by Polyidos, and probably by Aeschylus himself in his
lost fphigeneia," and that only Pindar {Pylh. 11. 22-23), probably in 474 B.C. said that
she was slaughtered. He contends therefore that Aeschylus' audience would assume that she
was rescued. Pindar, however, who uses the word a(faxQclaa, is powerful evidence for
Aeschylus, for both work in the archaic, as opposed to either the epic or the classical,
tradition, and I see no hint at all in the Agamemnon that she was rescued. In an
unpublished 1977 paper, "The Eating of Iphigenia," Laura Ward contended that the use of
words like Ovoia and Pcofioi; would have put the audience in mind of a sacrifice to the
Olympians and so have hinted at the possibility that she was actually eaten. On Gwoia as
opposed to aqxxYiov see Harrison (above, note 7) 63.
Harrison (above, note 7) 64-65.
^^ Hesiod, Theogony 178-85.
^^ This may well be an oversimplification. Recent scholarship has challenged so set a
pattern. See, for instance, Buikert (above, note 14) 18-19: "Global dualisms which
exaggerate the distinction between Indo-European and non-Indo-European assert
themselves all too easUy: male and female, patriarchy and matriarchy, heaven and earth,
Olympian and chthonic . . . The myth of the generations of the gods comes from the
ancient Near East, as does the idea of the opposition between the sky gods and the earth
gods. It is the chthonic choai which are related to Indo-European, whereas the Olympian
sacrifice has connections with Semitic tradition." Nevertheless, the traditional antitheses
do seem to hold good for the Oresteia.
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virgin's blood (nap9£v{o\) 9' ai^iaioc,) in a sacrifice to stop the winds
(nax>oa\/i\iov . . . Qvoiac, 214). The winds are also ghosts, the souls of the
dead, and the Harpies, kin to the Erinyes, were winds .^^ Here they double as
avenging Furies for Artemis, who used them to force the sacrifice. They
help to fulfill the curse upon the house of Atreus.
Iphigenia was held above the altar like a goat, face downward. This
again indicates a a^dyvov, a sacrifice to the chthonic powers.^"* Her
garments fell round about her (232-34). She shed her saffron-dipped robes
to the ground (vpoKov Pa<pd^ 6' e<; 7ie6ov xeovoa 239). Here, juxtaposed
to the animal image, is an instance of underlhought. The words denote
garments falling to the ground, connote blood shed to the ground.^^ At
Agamemnon 1121-22 KpOKoPacpriq axaycov will refer to blood,^^ and will
twice more in this play suggest dippings into blood. A few lines later
Iphigenia is described as axavpanoc, (245) and as one who was present at
the pouring of the third libation (xpuoaTiovSov 246) at her father's table.
Here is an animal image immediately juxtaposed to a word suggesting the
pouring of blood.^^ 'Axa-upcoToq, "unmounted," therefore "virgin,"
suggests Artemis Tauropolos whose rite at Halae Araphenides included the
drawing of blood from a man's throat.^* KpoKoi), referring to Iphigenia's
saffron-dipped robes, suggests and may actually refer to the cult of Artemis
at Brauron, where little girls in yellow dresses performed a bear dance and
where a goat was sacrificed.^ In the aetiological legend a man had angered
Artemis by killing a bear. She, in turn, sent a plague upon his people. To
placate her the offender sacrificed a goat dressed in his daughter's clothes.
Clearly the goat is a substitution for a virgin child. In later legend a bear
(or deer) was substituted for Iphigenia upon the altar, and in time Iphigenia
at Brauron became a goddess.^ The description in Aeschylus of the sacrifice
clearly owes something to the ritual of the darker Artemis, the chthonic
aspect of the Potnia Theron, at Brauron and at Halae Araphenides.
^ Harrison (above, note 7) 179-83.
^ Harrison (above, note 7) 63.
^ Lebeck (above, note 1) 81-86. For other recent interpretations of these lines see N.
B. Booth, "Two Passages in Aeschylus' Agamemnon," Eranos 77 (1979) 85-95; M. L.
Cunningham, "Aesch. Agam. 23l-il" BICS 31 (1984) 9-12; D. Armstrong and E. A.
Ratchford, "Iphigenia's Veil: Aeschylus, Agamemnon 228^8," BICS 32 (1985) 1-12.
^ Cf. W. G. Thalmann, "Aeschylus' Physiology of the Emotions," AJP 107 (1986)
503. R. B. Onians, Origins of European Thought (Cambridge 1954) 84, thinks that
KpoKoPacpfjt; ataycov refers to bile. E. Fraenkel, Aeschylus. Agamemnon U (Oxford
1950) 507-08, on Agam. 1122, thought it referred to blood. (Cf. Choeph. 183-84, where
bile is near the heart.)
^ Cf. P. Burian, "Zeus Soler Tritos and Some Triads in Aeschylus* Oresteia" AJP 107
(1986) 332-42.
^ Burkert (above, note 14) 59, 152.
29 H. Uoyd-Jones, "Artemis and Iphigenia," ///5 103 (1983) 87-102.
^ Burkert (above, note 14) 151-52.
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There is another juxtaposition of blood and animal in underthought and
in open metaphor at lines 392-94. The chorus says that the evil of the man
who spurns the altar of Justice is not hidden but like base bronze when put
to the touchstone is proved "black-clotted" (neXa|iTcaYri(;), since he is like
a child that chases after the flying bird (noxavov opviv). Words formed
from nriyvvm will occur throughout the trilogy to denote or connote the
clotting of blood. 3^ Here the image refers to Paris who will bring bloodshed
to his people and looks forward to the parable of the lion cub that will soak
the house in gore.
The figure of the dog occurs in underthought in a number of minor,
perhaps faded, expressions throughout the Oresteia. Certainly they recall
Clytemnestra who claimed to be a watchdog to the house, her master's
faithful hound (Agam. 607). Perhaps they also anticipate her actual role as
an avenging hound-Erinys. Later in the same chorus the elders mingle
creatures and blood in underthought. People mourn the man who fell nobly
in the gore (tov 6' ev cpovaiq KaA,a><; neaovt' 447) for the sake of another
man's wife. One meaning of (povT| is "blood shed by slaying" (LSJ s.v.),
and the participle neaovx', though it modifies the man rather than the blood,
reinforces that particular sense here. Next they say that some "bark"
(Pau^ei 449) in secret and resentful grief "creeps" (epnei 450-51) against
the Atreidae. Here are the figures of the dog and the viper. Both are
associated with the Erinyes.
There is another juxtaposition of animal and blood imagery in lines
595-614. Men, Clytemnestra sarcastically says, in woman's wise, were
"barking" (eXaoKov 596) the celebratory song throughout the town.
AdoKco, like K^d^co, is a word used of screaming birds (//. 22. 141; Hes.
Op. 207) and of the howling of dogs (Od. 12. 85). It is not in the Oresteia
a faded metaphor. At 607 Clytemnestra calls herself the dog (icvva) her
husband left at home. A few lines later she declares that she knows no more
of another man than she does of dipping (pa(pd(; 612) bronze. It is not, she
(or the herald) then states, shameful for a noble wife to "bark" (Axxkeiv 614)
such a boast. Bacpd^, after the lines above describing the sacrifice of
Iphigenia, certainly suggests, indeed predicts, Clytemnestra's dipping a
bronze sword in Agamemnon's blood. Her description of herself as a dog is
meant to suggest to the chorus a watchdog, but it also predicts the
metaphorical pack of hounds that are to appear as avenging Furies. AaKeiv
makes Clytemnestra the animal she is to become, an Erinys.
In the strophe (a) that begins at 681 we also see juxtaposed in
metaphor animals and blood. Many men, bearing spears, hunting with
packs of hounds (icuvayoi 694) down the vanished oars' trail have beached
their ships on Simois' eternally leafing shores because of a bloody
(al^axoeoaav 698) Strife. The Greek host itself has taken on the role of
the Erinyes.
'* Agam. 1198. 1509; Choeph. 67, 83; Eum. 191.
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In the following strophe and antistrophe (P) we have in the parable of
the lion cub an obvious intermingling of blood and animal imagery that
refers primarily to Helen, who is described in strophe y as the thought of a
windless calm entering Ilium, and also perhaps to Paris, described in the
preceding antistrophe (a) as fatally wedded (aivoXetcrpov 712). Because of
him Priam's city endured wretched blood (jieXeov aiji.' 716). The lines that
contain the parable itself (717-36) abound in language that recalls and
anticipates other characters and actions of the drama which also combine
blood and animal imagery. ^^ For instance, npoxeXeioiq at 720 echoes
npoTeXeia at 227, where it is used of Agamemnon's preliminary offerings,
that is, the sacrifice of his daughter, for the sailing of the ships.^^ The word
usually means the sacrifices made to Artemis before a marriage for
protection against the dangers of childbirth.^ Iphigenia, in the Cypria, was
brought to Aulis, as she thought, for her marriage to Achilles,^^ and in the
Oresteia the sacrifice of the virgin who shed her saffron-dyed robes to the
ground is a travesty of a marriage. lawtov (725-26) recalls the watchdog
(607) that Clytemnestra declared herself to be and anticipates the hateful dog
(kuvck; ^laTjTTiq 1229-30) that Cassandra will later call her.^^ C)iX6^aoxov
(719) recalls Artemis as the Potnia Theron or Erinys who was lovely and
kind to the whelps of ravening lions and tender to the breast-loving
(<piXx))idaToi^ 142) young of all wild beasts.^^ The house that was soaked
with blood (aiVaxi 5' oxkoc, ecpvpOri 732) refers most immediately to the
house of Priam but suggests very vividly the house of Atreus that will at
1533-34 be shaken by a bloody beat of rain that does not come in drops
(o)j.Ppo\) KTUTiov 6o^oa<paXti / xov ai|iaTT|p6v • vi/aKaq 6e Xtjyei) and that
Cassandra describes as breathing blood-dripping slaughter ((povov , . .
al^axooxayTi 1309). The priest of Ruin (lepetx; xiq "Axaq 735-36) that
had been reared in the house recalls Agamemnon, the priest who was the
butcher at Aulis. Finally, the lion cub itself predicts all those other human
beings who will become lions: Aegisthus, the strengthless lion that rolled
in the master's bed (1224); Clytemnestra, the lioness that slept with the
wolf while the noble lion was away (1258-59); Orestes and Electra, the
double lion that came to Agamemnon's house {Choeph. 938).^* More
immediately it foreshadows Agamemnon as the Argive beast (6dKo^),
nestling of the horse (inno\> vEoaa6<;), the raw-meat-eating lion (tb^T|ox'n(;
Xetov) that leapt the wall and licked its fill of royal blood (aSriv eXei^ev
^^ Knox (above, note 9) 17-25 for a detailed treatment of the parable.
^^ Knox (previous note); Lebeck (above, note 1) 18, 70-73.
'^ Burkert (above, note 14) 151.
'^ Such was the tradition, though Aeschylus makes no mention of it. Cf. Cypria apud
Proclus Crestomathy I and Euripides, Iphigenia at Aulis.
'^ Gilbert Murray's text (Oxford 1955) temptingly reads Xei^aaa KoiKxeivaaa
<l>ai5p6v ovq 6{kiiv, which makes the figure of the dog even more vivid.
3' Cf. Knox (above, note 9) 20.
^' Knox (above, note 9) 22-23 and Lebeck (above, note 1) 50-51.
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a\\iaxoq xvpavviKov) at Troy (824-28). Agamemnon's licking of the
royal blood makes him too an avenging Fury, for one of the most
significant facts about the Erinyes is that they drink, suck, lick, and vomit
blood. They are, in effect, vampires. When at line 1188 Cassandra declares
that the inharmonious chorus that does not leave the roof of the house has
drunk human blood to embolden itself the more (TtencoKax; y\ (nc,
BpocavveaGai nXiov, I ppoxeiov aVa), she does not speak metaphorically.
The Erinyes, who are the outraged souls of the murdered dead, must enliven
themselves with human blood to wreak vengeance. At Choephoroe 577
Orestes says that the Erinys, not stinted of gore, will drink her third draught
of blood unmixed ((p6vo\) 6' 'Epiv\)(; ovx ^)7ieonavia^evTj / aKpaxov aijia
Tiiexai Tp{tT|v Ttooiv). This too is more than metaphor. At Eumenides
183-84 Apollo says to the Erinyes, "You disgorge in agony the black foam
from men, vomiting clots of gore you sucked" (ocvtik; -on' aXyovx; ^ie^v*
ocTt' dvGpcoTicov dcppov, / efxovoa GpojiPoxx; o\j(; d(peiXK\)aa(; (povov). At
264-65 the Erinyes themselves threaten to suck the ruddy clot of gore from
Orestes' living limbs (dno ^wvtoq po(peiv / epvGpov ek jxeXecov
TtE^avov). Here there is no question at all of metaphor.
Clytemnestra also becomes her own avenging Fury. At 958-60 she
says, "There is the sea—^Who will drain it dry?—fostering ooze (loiKiSa),
costly as silver, ever refreshed, of plenteous purple dyes for our robes
{noXkr\c, 7iop(pvpa(;
. , . Ei^dxtov Pa(pd<;)." The ooze of purple, actually the
color of congealed blood,^' in itself foretells blood. El^dxcov Pa(pd<;, close
in sound to al^idxcov Pacpdi;,'*^ recalls the shedding of Iphigenia's robes
(KpoKov Pa(pd<; 239) and of her blood and Clytemnestra's own remark that
she knows no more of another man than she does of dipping (pa(pd<; 612)
bronze. Once more she foretells the murder she is about to commit because
of Iphigenia.
After Clytemnestra has murdered Agamemnon, she exults in being
spattered by her husband's blood (1388-92):
ovx© xov a-bxov Gviiov opuaivei Tteomv
KoiKpvoiwv o^Eiav aiVaxoq ocpayriv
pdXXei |x* ep£^v•^l yaKoiSi <poiviaq Spoooi), 1390
Xaipovoav ovSev t|ooov r\ 5ioo56x(oi
ydvei o7copT|x6(; vaX-UKoq ev XoxEvjxaoiv.
The image is primarily sexual, but the word ocpayriv makes Agamemnon
another sacrifice to the underworld,'*^ and Clytemnestra, "spattered with dark
drops of bloody gore," has "drunk" his blood and so become the avenging
Erinys of Iphigenia, while Agamemnon has drunk to the dregs in his house
the mixing bowl that he himself had filled with accursed evils (1397-98):
» Pliny, NH 9. 135.
**> Stanford (above, note 12) 156.
** Cf. Lebeck (above, note 1) 60-63.
94 IlUnois Classical Studies, XVI
Toaci)v5e Kpaxfip* ev 56|ioiq KOKoiv oSe
nXi\aac, dpaicov avxbc, CKTiivei jioXtov.
He was his own Erinys. He punished himself for his own wrongdoing.
There is no word for blood in the particular passage, but lines 970-71, in
which Clytemnestra says that when Zeus makes wine from the unripe grape
(an 6\i^>aKOC, niicpaq / oivov), then there is straightway a chill in the house
(ev So^iok;) when its rightful master roams its halls (Soon'), are often taken
to refer to Iphigenia. They estabUsh an association of blood, wine, and the
house which echoes here.
The chorus, horrified at Clytemnestra's deed, asks her what potion
(tcotov 1407) drawn from the sea has caused her to make this sacrifice (Qvoq
1409). In murdering Agamemnon, she has poured his blood to the avenging
spirit of Iphigenia. The expression pvxa^ e^ aXoc, (1408) in recalling the
earlier passage in which purple ooze was drawn from the sea makes tiotov in
1407 suggest that Clytemnestra here drinks blood and so becomes an Erinys
herself.
At 1427 the chorus says, "You barked overweeningly" (7iepi9pova
EA.aKe(;). AdoKto is not here and not elsewhere a faded metaphor.
Clytemnestra as an Erinys does "bark" like a dog or "shriek" like a bird.
"Even as your mind," the elders say, "is maddened by this blood-dripping
((povoXipei 1428) act, so a drop of blood (ki^oq , , . di^axoc, 1429) is plain
upon your face" ("eyes": 6|i)xdxcov 1429), This is to be t^en literally.'*^
Clytemnestra, the dog-Erinys, has drunk blood. Her face is smeared with it.
So the Pythia says of the Erinyes: ek 5 ' oiijidxcov XeCpo-uai 5\)a(piXii Xi^a
(Eum. 54). She herself then says that she slaughtered (eacpa^*)
Agamemnon to Justice exacted for her child, to Ate, and to the Erinys
(1433).
A similar combination of blood and animal imagery continues to define
Clytemnestra as an avenging Fury. At 1460, speaking of Helen, the chorus
says that she has crowned herself with long remembrance because of blood
that cannot be washed away (aV' dviTixov). Clytemnestra tells the chorus
not to turn their wrath against Helen as though she alone were the slayer of
many Danaan men, the worker of woe past all cure (d^uaxaxov 1467). The
word is used of milk that will not curdle and suggests here blood that will
not clot.'*^ The ancients apparently thought of clotting, curdling, and
*^ Fraenkel (above, note 26) EI 672-73. on 1428. takes it to refer to her maddened
bloodshot eyes.
*^ Aret. CD 1. 13. Jennifer Smith, in a paper read on April 5. 1990 at a meeting of the
Classical Association of the Midwest and South, "Miasma and Medicine in the Oresteia,"
suggests that the expression a^wotaTOv aXyoq means a wound that will not heal because
its edges will not come together. "This problem." she says, "was typical of the chronic
ulcer (to cXko^ neTtaicofievov) and was sometimes solved by incising the wound so that
the shape was more elongated {Ulc. 2)."
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freezing as similar processes, for they used the same word, titiyvv^i, for all
three phenomena.''^
At 1468 the chorus addresses the demon that has fallen upon the house
and the twin descendants of Tantalus, wielding a sway that bites to the heart
(Kap5i65TiKTov 1471) and matches the temper of women. Here is the figure
of the viper or perhaps the dog. Clytemnestra, the elders then say, stands
like a crow (SiKav KopaKoq 1472-73) over her husband's corpse. She is
not only the raven that feeds on carrion but a bird-woman, another aspect of
the Erinys.
Clytemnestra next tells the chorus that they have correctly named the
thrice-gorged demon of the house, for the lust for licking blood (epco<;
al)iaToXoix6<; 1478) is nourished in the maw. Before the old agony leaves
off, fresh blood (veoq ixcbp 1480) spills. Here again is the vampire Erinys,
the curse of the house, in its most recent epiphany Clytemnestra herself.
At 1492 the chorus addresses the dying Agamemnon. "You lie," they
say, "a spider (apdxvT|<;) in this web." He is the victim of the spider that
murders in its mating. At 1501 Clytemnestra, the spider-woman, tells the
elders that the ancient harsh avenger (dXdaxtop) of Atreus, that grim
banqueter, taking the form of the corpse's wife, has repaid him, sacrificing
(iniQ-daac, 1504) a full-grown man for the babes. Clytemnestra and the
avenging Fury have become one. She is avenging the death of Thyestes'
children as well as that of Iphigenia. She is the demon that fulfills the curse
upon the house. The chorus does not quite believe her, but grants that the
avenger might well be from the father (naxpoOev 1507), for black Ares
with streams of kindred blood (ojioonopoK; / enippoaiaiv ai)idtcov 1509-
10) forces his way forward to where he will offer justice for the clotted blood
of children served for meat (Tidxvai Ko^)pop6pcoi 1512). This is a clear
reference to Thyestes' children. In the following stanza the chorus repeats
its address to Agamemnon as the spider dying in the web (1516). Thyestes
who ate the roasted flesh and "drank" the clotted blood of his own children
became, in Aeschylus, the first of the Erinyes in the Tantalid house. At the
end of the Agamemnon Aegisthus describes that banquet. Like the Furies
themselves, who vomit clots of blood, Thyestes as his own Erinys vomits
back the slaughtered flesh (dnb G(payr\v ip&v 1599).
In the first chorus of the Choephoroe we have a now familiar
intermingling of blood and animal imagery. The women with their nails
cut bloody furrows in their cheeks (npenei napr[\.q (poiviaa' d^\)Y)xoi(; /
ov\)xo<; dXoKi veoTo^Koi 24-25). In the following antistrophe the dream-
interpreter "barked" or "shrieked" (eXaKe) for terror from the innermost
chamber, and the dream-interpreters "shrieked" (eXxxKov) that those beneath
the earth (xoxx; 7a(; vepGev) were exceedingly angry at their slayers (35-41).
The dream-interpreters who are under pledge to the gods (GeoGev . . .
hniyyyioi 39) abet the Erinyes, the gods below, who, since they are plural,
** Cf. Lebeck (above, note 1) 99.
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are not just Agamemnon but also Iphigenia and the children of Thyestes.
The dream-interpreters partake now of the cycle of vengeance.
In the next strophe the women say that Clytemnestra has sent them
forth to perform an dnoTpoTiov KaKcov (44). She is attempting a riddance
ceremony, offerings to placate the ghosts of the dead. But what redemption
is there, the chorus asks, for blood once it has fallen to the ground (xi yap
X-uxpov neoovxoq ai[iaioc, 7ie6oi 48)? So in the Agamemnon the elders
had asked, "Who could with charms call up again the black blood of a man
once it has fallen in death to the earth?" (1019-21):
TO 5' eni Yav nzabv ana^ 9avdol^ov
nponap dv5p6(; neXav ai|ia tiq av
TidXiv dyKaXioaix' £JiaEi5(0v;
The expression is not entirely metaphorical, for the answer is, no one: The
Erinyes have drunk it to enliven themselves for revenge. The blood of the
victim nourishes those who have been murdered before him in this chain of
violence. So in the next strophe (7) the women say that because of blood
drunk to her fill by nourishing earth the vengeful gore clots and does not
drain through (66-67):
5i' di'nax' EKTioGevG' vnb xOovoq xpocpov
x(xa(; 96vo(; ninr\yev o-u 8iappv5av.
There is more blood now than even the Erinyes can drink.
The next two lines are corrupt but seem to say that the guilty man
suffers calamity and "teems with sickness" (yoaov ppveiv 69). This may
refer to the Erinyes in their most primitive guise: when they still were
disease-causing Keres.
The chorus goes on to say that for him who has violated a bridal
chamber there is no cure, and all streams though they flow in one course
rush on in vain to cleanse the hand that is polluted widi gore (xepo[ivor\
(povov 73). The passage refers to Thyestes, who had seduced Atreus' wife,
and so makes clear that the Erinyes in this play are not just Agamemnon's
avenging spirits but those of the victims who preceded him. Finally, in a
fine example of underthought the chorus says that it is itself chilled, i.e.
"clotted" (na'xyov\iha 83) with hidden grief.
In the scene that follows this choral passage Electra is occupied in the
actual performance of the riddance ceremony, and there are a number of
instances of the forms of the verb xeto (87, 92, 95, 109, 129) and the noun
Xoaq (149). At 155 the chorus specifically calls the "pouring" an
dnoxpoTiov, and at 164 Electra calls the libations (xodq) earth-drunk
(yanoxovc). This is not just a metaphor. The spirits of the murdered dead
beneath the earth have drunk them.
The interchange between Electra and Orestes which occurs later in the
same scene contains a number of animal images, preceded by Electra's
saying that thirsty drops (axayove^ 186) fall from her eyes (e^
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o^i^dTcav . . . ninxo-oGi 185) at the sight of Orestes' lock. The many
occurrences throughout the trilogy of the word TiiTttoD to denote or connote
the shedding of blood to the ground make these lines also suggest blood, and
in their anticipation of the Erinyes, who will at the end of the play "drip
hateful blood from their eyes" (koc^ 6^p,dT(Dv axd^cuoiv aip.a 6\)0(piXi(;
1058), make Electra another, albeit paler, avenger, a weaker Erinys. At
lines 40(M)3 the chorus will say that it is the law that drops of murder-
blood ((poviaq oxaTovaq) poured upon the ground will demand other blood
(aXXo . . . ai|ia).
Not many lines later Electra declares that she fawns (aaivofxai 193) on
hope. Orestes calls himself and Electra the bereaved brood of the eagle-
father (aiEToO 247) who died in the woven nets and spires of the dread viper
(5eivfi(; £xv5vT|(; 249). Orphaned and pressed by hunger, they are not full
grown to bring to the nest their father's quarry (Gripav 251). "If you
destroy," he prays to Zeus, "these nestlings (vzoaaoxx; 256) of a father who
made sacrifices and held you in high honor, from what like hand will you
receive the homage of fine feasts?" Once more he calls his sister and
himself aiexou yivzQX' (258). The chorus' caution to the two to be
discreet lest someone repeat their words to their master ends in the wish that
they may see Clytemnestra and Aegisthus dead in the pitchy ooze of flame
(Gavovxaq ev ktiki5i niaoTipEi cpXcyyoq 268). Ktiki5i suggests here, as it
did before (Agam. 960), indeed predicts, blood. At 275 Orestes speaks of
himself as "made bull" (xavpoviiEvov) by the loss of his possessions. This
too is an expansion of the animal imagery—of birds, dogs, snakes—that
defines the characters of the drama as avenging Erinyes.
At 420-23 Electra says of Clytemnestra that she may fawn (aaiveiv),
but the miseries that she and Orestes have endured from her will not be
soothed, for the temper they have from their mother is like a savage wolf
(Xt>Ko<; . . . (b^ocppcov) and implacable (aoavxoq). At 446 Electra declares
that she has been kennelled like a vicious dog (7toX\)oivot)(; kmvoc, SiKav)
and that she pours forth tears (Xi^y\ xeovoa 447-48). This again anticipates
the real Erinyes who will distil from their eyes 5A)a(piXfi Xi^a (Eum. 54).
At lines 525 ff. Orestes does unequivocally become an Erinys.
Clytemnestra, the chorus says, explaining the riddance ceremony that she is
having Electra perform, dreamed that she gave birth to a snake (xekew
5pdKovx' e5o^ev 527). It drew clotted blood with her milk (ev ydXaKxi
Gpo^iPov d([iaxoq ondoai 533). Then she, an Erinys herself, shrieked
(K£K?ia77£v 535) from out her sleep. Orestes interprets the dream so that
it fits (clots?, oMyKoXXoic, 542) at every point. If it mixed clotted blood
with her own milk (0p6|j.p(oi x' eVei^ev ai|iaxo<; (piXov yahx 546), then
he, turned serpent (EK5paKovx(o0E(<; 549), will kill her as the dream
declares. He has drunk blood, become an avenger. He could not more
clearly be an Erinys, a vampire-snake.
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Aegisthus, referring to the reported death of Orestes, says that this
would be a burden dripping fear (t6eip.aToaTa7E<;t 842)'*^ to lay upon a
house already wounded and bitten (6e6TiYnevoi(; 843) with former gore
((p6v(oi 842). Here in underthought is a fine mixture of blood and animal
imagery. The Erinyes lurk behind this as behind so many other passages.
Orestes the avenger is already at hand.
At 924 Clytemnestra warns Orestes, who is about to kill her, "Beware a
mother's wrathful hounds" (^iTixpoq eykotoxx; Kvvaq). It is not clear that
she is speaking metaphorically, for when Orestes does see the Erinyes, he
calls them exactly that (iiTixpoq eykotoi kovec, 1054).^*^ A few Unes later
she calls him the snake that she suckled (091V eGpEvi/dnTiv 928). At 938 the
chorus, referring presumably to Orestes and Electra, say that a double lion
(SiTtXotx; Xecov) has come to Agamemnon's house. The lion is not
associated with the Erinyes, but it was a common attribute of the original
Potnia Theron, and it is one of the creatures that Artemis as Pomia Theron
cherishes.'*'' At 994-95 Orestes calls Clytemnestra a sea-serpent and a viper
whose very touch without her bite would rot (iitipaivd y' ei'x' £xi6v' Ecp-o /
a-f\neiv Giyova' ctv dXX,ov ox> 5E5T|7)i.£vot)). At 1047 the chorus tells
Orestes that he has freed all the city of the Argives by lopping off the heads
of the two snakes (6^0^ dpaKovtoiv). Immediately afterward he sees the
Erinyes, like Gorgons, black-robed and braided about with swarming snakes
(6pdKo\)oiv 1050). Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, avenging the wrongs done
them, become serpent-Erinyes. Orestes, bom a snake, takes vengeance, as
Agamemnon's Erinys, upon them. Now he is pursued by his mother's
snake-women avengers, the wrathful hounds (eykotoi ycdveq 1054) whose
eyes drip blood (axd^ovaiv aVa 1058); here in a culmination of the blood
and animal imagery are the Erinyes made manifest.
At the opening of the Eumenides the priestess sees Orestes, now an
Erinys himself, sitting, a suppliant at her shrine with blood-dripping hands
(a'lVaxi / oxd^ovxa XEipac; 41-42). There follows soon after her
description of the Erinyes as like Gorgons (48-49) or Harpies (50),
loathsome, black, snorting women whose eyes ooze disgusting drops (ek 6'
o^p-dxcov Xei^orooi 6\)0(piXfi Xi^a 54).
When the ghost of Clytemnestra appears, she says to the Erinyes that
they have often licked {eXzi^axe 106) the wineless libations (/odq 107)
that she has poured to them. These were not literally of blood, for she goes
on to describe them as ^EiXiy\iaxa, offerings presumably of milk, water,
and honey, but the words she uses by the associations they have
accumulated throughout the two previous plays certainly suggest blood.
Only a few lines later, in the image of the hunt that is in this play to be
*^ Page's daggers. "Vix tolerabile," he says. M has -azdy' ic,.
*^ On what Orestes actually does see, cf. A. L Brown, "The Erinyes in the Oresteia: Real
Life, the Supernatural, and the Stage," 7/75 103 (1983) 13-34.
^^ Christou (above, note 15) 138.
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sustained, she says that Orestes, like a fawn (veppou 5{Kav 1 1 1) has leapt
from their nets and got away.
At 128 Clytemnestra clearly states that she is herself an Erinys. She
refers to herself as the wrath of the dread snake (6eivfj(; 5paKa{vri(; , . .
HEvo<;). The earlier snake and viper imagery comes now to fulfillment in
this appearance of the avenging ghost of Clytemnestra. She was in life and
is now in death an animal-woman, a vindictive Fury,
Apollo, when he addresses the Erinyes, in instances of underthought as
well as in the plain statements he makes, creates that primeval atmosphere
that is so peculiar to the Eumenides. He threatens to shoot them with a
winged, glistening snake (o<piv 181) to make them vomit the clotted gore
(0p6p.po\)<; (povou 184) that they have sucked from men. They belong, he
tells them, where there are sentences of beheading, the gouging out of eyes,
slitting of throats, mutilations, stonings, and where men are impaled
incLyhxzc, 190) beneath their spines, nayevxeq here means "stiffened" in
a sense other than "frozen" or "clotted," but the association with blood is
there. The Erinyes belong, Apollo then says, in the den of a blood-gulping
lion (XeovToq dvxpov a'i|iaTopp6(po\) 193). This too harks back to the
Agamemnon, where Agamemnon, himself a lion, lapped the royal blood at
Troy and so became an Erinys.
At 245 ff. the Furies declare that they like a hound pursue the fawn and
track him down by drops of blood {a\.\x.a. . . . oxa^aynov 247). The smell
of human blood makes them laugh with joy (oofiT] ppoxeicov aiiidxcDv |ie
npoayeA^ai 253). The dog that was in the earher plays Clytemnestra has
now become the bloodthirsty hound of her avenging spirit. Once more the
imagery has come to fulfillment in the actual appearance of the Erinyes.
At 478-79 Athene does not speak metaphorically when she says that if
the Erinyes lose their suit, venom (ioc;) from their hearts falling upon the
ground (ne6oi Tieotov) will bring perpetual pestilence (aiavTi(; voooq) to the
land. She predicts their own threat. The venom which will "fall to the
ground" suggests and probably meant blood which will quite literally
devastate the land. At 782-83 the Erinyes call the venom a drop from the
heart (iov iov . . . KapSiou; OTaXayfiov) that will blight both leaf and child.
These creatures, bom of drops of blood, curse of a house that drips blood,
themselves threaten to drip blood to destroy the land, its creatures, and its
crops. In the end, however, they pray that the dust not drink the black blood
of its citizens (niovaa kovk; ^eXav oX\x.ql 980) and consent to don robes,
reddened not with blood but "dipped" in a "crimson dye" ((poiviKopdTtxoiq
1028),ofcelebrauon.
The power of the juxtaposition of the creatures and the blood
throughout the Oresteia lies in the fact that it is not completely
metaphorical. The human beings who drink blood do, almost literally,
become their own Erinyes. Just as the Erinyes, snake-women, are not
entirely human, so the characters of the trilogy are in part animal. It is only
when Uiey, like the Furies of the Eumenides, have abandoned the concept of
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5iicT| as Vengeance for the concept of Sikt] as Justice that they will take
their proper and human place in the order to be established by the
anthropomorphic Olympian deities.'^
University of Wisconsin, Madison
'" p. VeUacotl. "Has Good Prevailed? A Further Study of the Oresleia," HSCP 81 (1977)
113-22, challenges this traditional interpretation of the Oresleia. Cf. D. Cohen, "The
Theodicy of Aeschylus: Justice and Tyranny in the Oresleia" G&R 33 (1986) 129^1. I
concede that Orestes "gets away with murder" but think that Aeschylus for dramatic
purposes intended his trilogy to end in a resolution which he calls 5{)cn.
8Order and Disorder in Sophocles' Antigone
GORDON M. KIRKWOOD
In the kommos at the end of the play, Creon, in his last utterance, laments
in dochmiacs, "Everything in my hands is aslant {navxa yap / Xexpia
xdv xepo^v) and a fate that is hard to bear has leaped upon my head" (1344-
46). The final words resemble the question asked by the chorus of Oedipus
in Oedipus Tyrannus, when he enters from the palace: "What daimon has
made so great a leap upon your unhappy fate?" (1300-02). These words too
are in dochmiacs, and while I do not want to press the analogy unduly (the
verbal similarities are not extensive), the parallels and contrasts between the
passages are rather striking. Oedipus is an object of horror and pity
combined (w Seivov i6e'iv noQoq 1297) as a result of what has happened to
him and what he has done to himself; Uie chorus's reproach of Creon is for
what he has done to others and is unmixed with pity (whatever the audience
may feel). But it is to the preceding phrase, Tidvxa . . . Xexpia xdv
Xepoiv, that I wish to call attention. Aexpioq, "aslant," "leaning sideways,"
is a striking word in this context, though it is not in itself remarkable. Its
one other use in extant Sophocles is in Oedipus at Colonus, describing
Oedipus 's uncomfortable sideways shift in obedience to the demand of the
chorus that he remove himself from the forbidden area of the shrine of the
Eumenides (195). Usually it merely suggests a "leaning" position and is
fairly colorless. In Euripides, however, where it occurs twice, both
occasions are sinister. One is the ominous moment, in Medea, when the
young princess, as she walks daintily, enjoying her new finery and admiring
herself, suddenly begins to feel the effects of Medea's poison and tilts
sideways and staggers back (Xexpia jtdXiv / xwpei 1 168-69). The other is
in Hecuba (1026), in a metaphor of falling overboard; the text of the passage
is not entirely certain (though the word Aixpioq is), but there is no doubt
that it, like the Medea passage, depicts a situation out of control.
At Antigone 1344^5, it is reasonable to think that as Creon utters
these words he is holding the corpse of Haemon in his arms. As he enters,
at line 1257, the words of the chorus can be taken to indicate that he has
Haemon in his arms (^vii^' ETiiarmov 6id x^^-poc, tx(ii\ 1258). It is
doubtful whether the actor would continue to hold this load for the nearly
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one hundred following lines,^ but there is nothing to prevent our supposing
that at both 1285 and 1345 the body is in Creon's arms, whatever may have
been its placement in between. So far as visual impact is concerned, it is
unquestionably more effective for Creon to have the body in his arms as he
enters. It is uncertain that the phrase 6ia xeipoq, especially in the singular,
can confidently be taken to mean "in his arms," and 6ia xepwv at 916 has a
different force.^ But if we accept the tableau of the father with his son's dead
body aslant in his arms, the position of Haemon's body is strikingly like
that of the son in the traditional pietd of Christian art. The grouping, with
the dead body aslant, occurs also in ancient Greek art, in the vase-painting
by Douris that depicts Eos holding her dead son Tithonus.^ The scene at the
end of Antigone gains in pathos by its simultaneous evocation and implicit
parody of the maternal protectiveness portrayed by the pietd and the vase
painting. Even without our assuming the physical enactment, the phrase
alone suggests this irony.
From this last picture of Creon let us move back to his first
appearance. The gods have set the city upright, he declares, after shaking it
with a great shaking. The metaphor in noXk&i aaXan ceiaay/xzc, (163) is
either of an earthquake or, more probably, in view of other Sophoclean
usage (especially the metaphor later in this speech, at 190), of a ship in
heavy seas. The language of regained stability continues: The city was
formerly set upright by Oedipus (oipGov 167). Creon goes on to say that
the chorus gave their support to him, as they later did to the sons of
Oedipus "with steadfast thoughts" (e|I7ie5oi<; (ppovrmaaiv 169). This theme
of stability appears in this speech once again (182-83), when Creon
enunciates his belief that citizens must put the safety of the state before
personal friendships, because "we make our friends when we are sailing in
an upright . .
.
," where we can supply either "ship" or "city" to complete
the picture in xavtriq 6pQf[c, (189-90). Political stability is a precondition
of friendship, and Creon will make the city flourish by laws that accord with
^ Most critics, including Jebb (Sophocles. The Plays and Fragments EI: The Antigone,
3rd ed. [Cambridge 1900] 223), take 1258 to mean that as Creon enters his attendants are
carrying the body on a bier. Kamerbeek, however, in his note ad loc. (The Plays of
Sophocles ni: The Antigone [Leiden 1978] 201), holds that Creon is carrying the corpse,
which he then sets down, to be carried by attendants at the end of the play. Rather
confusingly, his note to 1345-47 mentions "the corpse in his arms." G. Muller simply
says that Creon enters "mit der Leiche seines Sohnes auf den Armen" (Sophokles.
Antigone [Heidelberg 1967] 264) and makes no further mention of the matter, thus
presumably supposing that Creon continues to hold the corpse. D. Scale (Vision and
Stagecraft in Sophocles [Chicago 1982] 105) is ambivalent, first stating that Creon enters
"actually bearing the 'body' of his own son in his hands," but adding at once that "the
other possibility" is that the body is on a bier.
^The very ambiguity of the phrase has an ironic effect. At 916 it clearly means "under
his control"; at 1258 the same meaning can well apply, whether or not the literal meaning
is assumed. The dead son is no longer in rebellion against his father.
'Paris, Louvre. Gl 15.
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this principle (toioio6e v6p,oiai 191). It is on these practical grounds of
civic safety and stability, he goes on to explain, that he has decreed
honorable burial for Eteocles and the dishonoring of the body of Polyneices,
who threatened the city and its gods with fiery, bloody ruin.
Creon has thus established himself as the very embodiment of order in
the state, at least in his own eyes. But the ominous tone of the prologue
must surely affect our reception of Creon, even though the parodos, with the
choral song of rejoicing in the surcease from confusion and terror that the
morning has brought, suggests restored order. The prologue puts before us
both the audacious proposal of Antigone and Ismene's response, which
expresses the very soul of orderly female behavior (58-64): "Now that we
two are left alone you must see that we shall bring utter ruin on ourselves if
in spite of nomo s we transgress the vote of rulers or their power.
Moreover, we must remember, first, that by our very nature we are women,
not meant to fight against men, and, secondly, that because we are ruled by
those who are stronger we must give ear to these commands and worse.'"*
Following Creon's opening speech the chorus, with what I suppose
may be called EV"E6a (ppovrmaxa, declare (211-14), in effect, "AnyUiing
you say, Creon; you can make any law you like, about the dead or about us
who are still alive." The chorus are stolidly for authority, no matter what;
they will obey any law Creon imposes. Their subservience is
understandable. The attack of the Seven is still a terrifying presence in their
minds, as the parodos has shown, and Creon's address is formidable.^ Yet
there is in their immediately following words, when they misunderstand
Creon's order and demur at standing guard over the body (216), and perhaps
also in the emphatic ooi (21 1), a suggestion of reserve, if not dissent.
Order apparently reigns, then, for everything and everybody, except, of
course, Antigone. Though she has for now disappeared from the action, she
is as a result of the prologue very much a presence. Her reference to the ills
of foes coming upon friends (10) is especially relevant to my topic,
introducing as it does a specific note of "disorder." But so far as Creon and
the chorus are concerned, the air of stability is first threatened by the arrival
of the guard, with his shuffling, irresolute, sub-comic manner and his
disturbing report. The fagade of orderliness totters a little under the impact
of the guard's behavior, so strongly in contrast with Creon's authoritarian
manner, and the initial response of the chorus, who wonder if the reported
burial of Polyneices might not have been "divinely impelled" (0£T|XaTov
278), brings further disturbance. ©eriXaxov is a strong word and it shakes
Creon, who has assumed and continues to assume, in his angry reply to the
* While Ismene here accepts Creon's kerugma as nomas, Antigone never so refers to it
except in scorn (452, 847).
^ The mood of the chonis and the motivation of its subservience are well described by E.
Viketos, "A Study of AEINOI (Sophocles, Antigone 332-333) in its Dramatic Context,"
PLATON 40 il9iS)^9-S\.
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elders, that he is the protector of the gods as well as of the citizens of
Thebes. He is the bulwark of Thebes against the danger of fire to the
"pillared shrines" of the gods, and against the "scattering" of the laws of
Thebes that Polyneices and his allies threatened (280-88). Later in the same
speech Creon makes it clear, by his reference to dissenters within the city,
that the order he has established is after all not very firm, even in his mind.
Also, the fact that the guard, for all his shuffling manner, bests Creon in
their verbal exchanges undermines the impression of firm decisiveness that
Creon sought to project.
In the great scene of confrontation between Creon and Antigone, in the
next episode, the contrast between Creon's nomoi and the agrapta nomima
that command Antigone's loyalty finds its most decisive statement, and it is
this scene above all, I believe, that has created the long-prevalent but
difficult belief that these two positions represent two interpretations, both
partially valid and both inadequate, of what is right in the apparent dilemma
which the play presents. These are the two "fragile goodnesses" that Martha
Nussbaum describes in her examination of the play in her study of Greek
morality in the drama and philosophy of the fifth and fourth centuries.^ She
regards the play as constituting a prime example of fifth-century discussions
of human conduct, with both die principal characters seeking in vain to find
moral safety in inadequate concepts of right conduct. Both are fragile
goodnesses because both antagonists are intransigent, unable to bend to the
exigencies of a complex situation. I shall return to Nussbaum's analysis
later, because I think that the persistent theme of order in the play suggests
that this view does not adequately describe the behavior of Creon.
A brief exchange the interpretation of which is important for my
argument occurs later in this episode. Antigone asserts (504-07) that "these
men" (by which she can only mean the chorus) would agree that what she
has done is properly a cause for kleos, not punishment, if they were not
afraid to say what they think. Not so, Creon answers: o\> Tov)to lioiavn
TwvSe KaS^eitov 6pai<; (508). I take this to mean, "You alone have this
view, differing from these Thebans present." Creon cannot mean all the
Thebans; the word xwv6e indicates "those present," and since we are told, in
the first episode, that the meeting of Creon and the chorus is private (ek
THxvxwv 6ixa 164) we are not to suppose that those present represent the
general populace of Thebes. They are a group distinguished by their loyalty
to the dynasty (165-74). Antigone's rejoinder (509) is: "These men too
have this view, but they keep their mouths shut for you." Whereupon
Creon answers, in what I think can be taken as genuine astonishment, "Are
you not ashamed to judge differently from them?" The question is not a
repetition of what he has said, namely that only Antigone, of those present,
judges it glorious to have buried Polyneices. Creon is here concerned not
^ M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy (Cambridge 1986).
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about the morality of burial but about obedience. Antigone's defiance con-
travenes the peitfuirchia Creon has earlier stressed and anticipates the empha-
sis on kosmos that is a feauire of the encounter between Creon and Haemon.
Creon is characterizing not the act of burial but Antigone's disobedience; it
is in this that he finds a lack of aidos. This part of the episode ends with
Creon 's angry declaration that "No woman shall rule as long as I am alive"
(525), a resolve that is a part of Creon's fear of disorder. Antigone's
unfeminine audacity, in such strong contrast with Ismene's proper outlook,
provokes Creon's anger because it is an offense against his sense of order.
The first overt questioning of Creon's order, apart from Antigone's
disobedience, comes in the next episode, the confrontation with Haemon.
The pattern of the incident is like that involving Creon, the chorus, and the
guard, in Episode One. In Episode Three, Haemon's opening words (635-
38) create, on the surface, an initial presumption of wisdom on Creon's
part, obedience on Haemon's. Haemon tells Creon, at) \io\. yvcb^ou; e'xcov /
XpTioTctg dnop0oi(;. These words mean, literally, "having good counsels
you set them out straight before me," or, possibly, "you set me straight."
The verb (XTtopGoco, "set straight," is rare. Its infrequent other uses show
that it can mean to "set" either "straight up" or "straight on." There are no
examples elsewhere in which the meaning is to set a person straight, and it
seems more probable, therefore, that the implied object here is Yvcb^aq
rather than ^le. "Straight up" is the commoner meaning, as it is with
6p96co, and the noun d7i6p0co|xa, in its one appearance, in an inscription,''
refers to setting something up in a temple.* Nevertheless, "straight on"
seems to be the meaning here, in view of the following words, ai^
E(pevo^ai.' In either case, Haemon is declaring that his father's gnomai are
"straight," and that is doubtless what Creon wants to hear. A note of doubt
is introduced by Haemon's closing phrase in this opening speech, aou
KaXox; Tiyou^ievou (638). Jebb, among others, refuses to see this hint,
insisting that Haemon's "deference is unqualified," ^° but the suggestion is
there, whether or not Haemon intends it, since we have some grounds for
doubting the absoluteness of Creon's wisdom, not only from Antigone's
contrary view but also from the uneasiness expressed by the chorus.
But Creon is satisfied with his son's answer and proceeds to lecture him
on the merits of obedience. His emphasis is on the need of order within the
family, on the grounds that "If I nurture disorder within the genos, I shall
certainly nurture it in those outside the genos" (659-60). From the family
Creon's lecture proceeds to the city, and his authoritarianism becomes ever
more dominant, one might even say more obsessive: "Whomever the city
'/G 9(1). 691. 2. a third century B.C. Corcyrcan inscription.
'Cf. e^opBow (83) and x<yffi\ 6p8ot (1158).
' In general, however, the concept of "straightness" in the language of the play is
"straight up," as in the ship in Episode One (162-63) and the ship that appears later in the
present episode (715-17).
*° Jebb (above, note 1) note ad loc.
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may appoint, he must be obeyed in all matters, be they small and just or the
opposite" (666-67). Whether Creon is justified in calling himself appointed
by the city may be doubted, in view of his statement (173-74) that he holds
all power by virtue of his relationship to the dead brothers. (There is no
suggestion in this passage of appointment other than by himself.) Creon
continues his lecture (675 ff.), inveighing against the destructiveness of
anarchy and extolling the virtues of peitharchia, to which most of those who
enjoy stable lives (x&v opGov^ievwv) owe their safety.^ ^ One more word of
Creon's speech is relevant to my topic; Creon draws the following
conclusion: We must defend xa Koonou^eva, i.e. the orderliness of
obedience to Creon. And, finally, says Creon, we must keep women in
their place. This is an integral part of Creon's KoojioiS^eva.
There is irony in the grave reply of the chorus, though they perhaps do
not intend it, when they declare that Creon seems to them to have spoken
(ppovovvTox;, "unless we are being deceived by our old age." We may recall
that their first effort in judgment, when they suggest that the burial may
have been 9eT|XaTov, is greeted by Creon's enraged taunt that their words
are showing them to be foolish as well as old.
Haemon's response begins mildly, as he takes up his father's theme of
uprightness, averring that he can in no way find that Creon has not spoken
6p0w<;; but the agreement does not last long. After declaring that the city as
a whole supports Antigone, Haemon lectures his father: Do not keep
within you one ethos alone, namely that what you say, and nothing else,
6p0©<; e'xei. The illustrative images that he proceeds to introduce, the
unbending tree and the ship with sail unslackened, emphasize the danger of
loss of stability: The tree is destroyed root and branch (avTorcpe^va), and
the ship's captain ends his voyage capsized (712-17).
But Creon has not yet changed his sense of what is orderly. His reply
to Haemon's urging that he examine not his age but his erga, i.e. his action
in defending Antigone as he has just done, is the rhetorical question (730),
"Is it an ergon to revere those who are disorderly {xovq aKoo\io\)vxac,
oePeiv)?" In other words, in Creon's eyes Haemon is now guilty of
supporting disorder, the very fault that in his preceding lecture to his son he
said that he was determined not to nourish: tot eyyevfi aKoa|ia Gpen^ai
(659-60). Creon has, after all, nourished disorder within the family.
The exchange between father and son leads next into the related imagery
of disease, and the two images, of health and order, continue to be linked in
Creon's scene with Teiresias. To the stem warning of Teiresias that Creon
had better listen to him, Creon dutifully answers that he has not in the past
rejected the seer's wisdom. The answer of Teiresias to this is in terms of
the stable ship (994): "It is thus that you have steered the city on a straight
'* Jebb (ad loc.) translates xaiv opGownevojv by "whose course is fair." But the meta-
phor more probably suggests staying "upright" rather than "straight on," and in Haemon's
rejoinder to this lesson in politics the opposite case is stated in the same language.
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course (5i' opGfjq)," with its echo of Haemon's metaphor of the capsized
vessel.
After the initial exchange, Teiresias gives his report of the ill-omened
behavior of the birds (999-101 1) and the failure of his burnt offerings. He
begins his interpretation of these signs with the declaration (1015-22), "The
city is sick, because of your way of thought (phren 1015)." He goes on to
describe how the altars and hearths of the city are filled with carrion, from
the rotting corpse of Polyneices; the gods refuse sacrifices, no bird gives a
clear call. All is in confusion; the whole of nature, it seems, is out of
order. In short, Teiresias makes it inescapably clear that the law imposed by
Creon, who thought that he was acting on behalf of the gods of Thebes by
bringing just vengeance on one who meant to scatter (6iaaK£56)v 287)
their laws, is an offense against the gods of Thebes.
After an angry exchange, in which Creon rejects the advice of Teiresias
to bury the body, Teiresias utters what he has just described as xaKwriTa
5ia (ppevwv (1060), "what is in my mind and ought not to be stirred," i.e.,
what ought not to have to be said and would not have been said were Creon
less intransigent. Some parts of Teiresias' s speech beginning at 1064
present incidental problems of interpretation,^^ ^^ ^^ general meaning is
clear. Creon has got matters out of order. He has cast down below what
belongs above, by housing Antigone in a tomb, and has kept in this world
a corpse that belongs to the nether gods. This is a matter, Teiresias
continues, in which neither Creon nor the upper gods have any place; by his
action (tade) Creon has violated them. Creon, the would-be man of law and
order, has turned basic natural order upside down. Almost as devastating, for
one who wants to bring order to his city, is what Teiresias goes on to say
(1080-83), that all the cities around are hostile, because animals or birds
have carried the unholy stench of carrion to their city hearths. There could
be no more complete rejection of Creon's sense of order.
Most of these problems have no specific relevance here, but the following points
should be noted. Dawe's text at the end of 1070 has his conjecture QvSnv for the MSS*
SeJbv. His arguments for this reading {Studies in the Text of Sophocles EH [Leiden 1978]
113-14) are, first, that "it is impossible that a^oipov can stand for xacpfjq cifioipov,"
and, secondly, that 1068 and 1070 "were clearly designed to be" parallel; 6ecbv, of course,
interferes with the parallel. But a^olpov does not create any real problem; the context is
enough to suggest that the corpse is without a share of what is proper for the dead. The
parallel would be appropriate, but Dawe's way of achieving it is not. Qioc, and the verb
Guoj are appropriate for sacrificial offerings to a god or, possibly, to a hero, but not for an
ordinary mortal. The evidence presented in J. Casabona's comprehensive Recherches sur
le vocabulaire des sacrifices en grec (Aix 1966) 85, 110-11, 116-17, appears to rule out
the use of Qvoq in this context. (I am indebted to Professor Kevin Clinton for advice on
this point.) A. Brown, Sophocles. Antigone (Warminster 1987) proposes axeQSiv, but
while this has the merit of providing a parallel to ^aXcov in 1068, the combination exei
.
. . oxeGtov is too unattractive to attribute to Sophocles.
Dawe's athetesis of 1072-73 is not necessary. The meaning of these lines seems clear-
ly enough to be that oi KattoGev are properly assigned to the nether gods and are not the
business of Creon or the gods above; the subject of Pid^ovxai is easily supplied from a>v.
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The note of disorder continues. When Creon, cowed at last by
Teiresias's ominous words, turns to the chorus for advice they tell him to
go and release the girl and build a tomb for Polyneices, and the episode ends
as Creon charges off, fearing that he would have done better to preserve the
established laws (xovq KaQeoxGnaq vo^ou^ 1113-14) throughout his life.
But he proceeds to put matters in reverse order, building the tomb for
Polyneices first and then moving to Antigone's place of entombment.
Many critics defend this "order" of events, on the grounds that it is the non-
burial of Polyneices that angers the gods. But in fact Teiresias's words
concerning the disorder that Creon has created condemn both sides of the
disorder, and it is therefore not thematically insignificant that Creon
proceeds to do the reverse of what the chorus advise. ^^
By the end of the play, the disorder of Creon's intended order is revealed
in all its disastrous consequences. The picture that emerges is of course
only one thread in the rich and complex web of this play's imagery, but it is
a continuing presence, and the final picture of Creon with everything aslant
in his hands is an appropriate seal for this theme.
I have mentioned Martha Nussbaum's analysis of the play in her book
entitled The Fragility of Goodness. At the heart of her thesis about the play
is the idea that both Creon and Antigone cling to too narrow a concept of
what is right, and while both have a degree of rightness both are unwilling
to compromise and hence both are shown to be wanting in practical
morality. Their goodness is fragile. Nussbaum recognizes that Creon's
stand is more open to criticism than Antigone's, but she allows him, as do
most critics, a measure of genuine patriotism that commands respect. And
there no doubt was, in Sophocles' audience, some tendency to regard
Creon's decree as politically acceptable. There seems little doubt that non-
burial as a punishment for certain heinous crimes was not unusual in fifth-
century Athens, as Martin Ostwald has recendy argued.^'* We can readily
agree with Robert Garland that "the degree of enlightenment shown by
Sophocles was not necessarily shared by his contemporaries."^^ Yet the
^' While it is true, as critics have observed, that it is dramaturgically essential for the
discovery of Antigone to come after the burial, this fact does not negate the significance of
the order of these events. In a play in which the theme of order is prominent, it is hard to
suppose that this instance of order is without meaning. The playwright was not obliged to
have the chorus give the advice they do. At the same time, it would be wrong to think that
if Creon had followed the advice of the chorus all would have been well. Teiresias's
prophecy could not go unfulfilled. Kamerbeek (above, note 1) has good comments on this
passage.
^* From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law (Berkeley 1986).
15 R. Garland, The Greek Way of Death (Ithaca 1985) 103. Nevertheless, I cannot agree
with the view of D. Hester on this point, in "Sophocles the Unphilosophical,"
Mnemosyne 24 (1971) 11-59, an extensive and generally valuable analysis of the play
and its criticism. Hester insists that Sophocles cannot have been so out of step with
contemporary attitudes as to regard Creon's decree as unacceptable. The evidence of the
play is overwhelmingly against this point of view.
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severity of the punishment first proposed by Creon and the decision to leave
all the enemy dead unburied seem excessive, even for a time of crisis. The
assertion of Albin Lesky, that "Creon 's decision is arrogant and evil," is
perhaps too severe, but he is surely correct in stating that the laws for which
Antigone fights are laws with which "the polls ought never to be in
conflict."^^ Lesky's statement is brief and somewhat over-simplified.
Antigone's motives are complex, and Creon is no doubt patriotic within his
limited understanding. But his patriotism consists of a determination to
maintain order in the city by a rigid requirement of obedience to himself.
This is a matter not so much of goodness or evil as of comprehension. An
ill-conceived decision is maintained stubbornly in the face of mounting
proof that it is disastrous for all concerned. Creon 's order proves to be
disorder, not because Antigone challenges it but because it was only an
illusion of civic order, imposed by Creon alone, acceded to in private by the
elders, objectionable to the city at large, who approve of Antigone's action,
and finally exposed by Teiresias as a prime example of disorder.
Throughout the play the theme of order and disorder is repeatedly
expressed in metaphors having to do with spatial positions and forms. The
prominence of this language suggests that napeipcov (368) may have more
probability than it has usually been granted. The chorus, after singing the
praises and the dangers of human ingenuity, declare that v6|j.o\)(; 7iape{p(ov
x6ov6(; / 0EWV x' EvopKov 6iKav / x>\f\,nQX\.c,. Most recent editors change
the striking word napeipcov to yepavpwv, conjectured long ago by Reiske.
The verb eipco means "string" or "weave" together; Pindar uses it for
creating a wreath of song (A^. 7, 77). Flapeipco is rare; Xenophon uses it
meaning "insert" (Symp. 6. 2), and it occurs in an Aeschylean fragment (fr.
281 Radt), where the meaning appears to be similar. FepaCpcDv certainly
simplifies matters, but it does so by reducing the passage to a tameness that
is no credit to Sophocles and by falsely stressing the doubleness of the
obligation. 1'' It is precisely the failure of Creon to see that the two
obligations the chorus speak of here are not in conflict but must be woven
together as a single tissue. The laws of the city and the justice of the gods
are not divisible.^*
Cornell University
^^ Greek Tragedy, trans, by H. A. Frankfort (London 1965) 108. B. Vickers. Towards
Greek Tragedy (London 1973) 526 ff. expresses the same view.
^^ Ilapeiptov is retained in the new OCT of Sophocles by H. Lloyd-Jones and N. G.
Wilson (Oxford 1990). and is defended by them in Sophoclea (Oxford 1990) 124.
'* I am indebted to several University of Toronto classicists for helpful criticism offered
when I gave an earlier version of this paper at a seminar of the University of Toronto
Graduate Department of Classics. I am grateful also to Professor Phillip Mitsis and to
Patricia Kirkwood for their careful reading and their efforts (not entirely in vain, I hope) to
correct flaws in my arguments and their presentation.

Pericles Among the Intellectuals
i
PHILIP A. STADTER
4)iXx)ao(po\)^£v avE\) ^laXaKiaq. These words, put into Pericles' mouth by
Thucydides, suggest Pericles' interest in oo(pia. Unfortunately the historian
gives no other indications of Pericles' involvement with the dynamic
intellectual currents of his day.^ Many modem scholars have attempted to
fill this lack. The sophists, according to G. B. Kerferd, "owed much to
individual patronage, and above all to the patronage of one man, Pericles.
This is something which has not been recognized as fully as it should in
accounts of the sophistic movement. Lack of evidence makes it difficult for
us to form any clear and reliable judgment about the personality of Pericles.
But his intellectualism is not to be doubted."^ Such an assertion invites
reexamination of our admittedly thin evidence, for in fact Pericles'
intellectualism was frequently doubted in his own time and subsequently.
What exactly was his relation with the intellectual and artistic movements
of his time, especially with the sophists? Who were the intellectuais
closest to him, and what was his relation to them?
In what follows I will examine Pericles' associations, recorded or
imagined, with a number of intellectuals—Protagoras, Parmenides and
Zeno, Pythoclides, Damon, Anaxagoras, Sophocles, Phidias, and Aspasia.
In so doing, I will pay especial attention to the temporal and literary context
in which our notices appear. I believe that it is seriously mistaken to make
Pericles the central figure of intellectual life at Athens. That view is
founded upon an incautious and unskeptical reading of Plutarch's Pericles
' It is a pleasure to explore again in a volume dedicated to his memory a topic that I
discussed several years ago with Fritz Solmsen. Conversations with him always revealed
new aspects of old problems.
^ The speeches Thucydides attributes to Pericles catmot be taken as a direct statement of
Pericles. They indicate Thucydides' respect for his intelligence, but give no indication of
his training or intellectual milieu. The sophistic figures occasionally employed (as at 2.
40. 1) belong to Thucydides' own style.
' G. B. Kerferd. The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge 1981) 18. Cf. also F. Schacher-
meyr, Perikles (Stuttgart 1969) 142-49 on Pericles* Kulturprogram, D. Kagan, Pericles of
Athens and the Birth of Democracy (New York 1991) 171 and 185 on "the intellectualism
and rationalism" of Pericles.
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and other late sources, and docs not sufficiently attend to the tradition of the
fifth and fourth centuries. Like Plutarch, I will give particular importance
to the statements of contemporaries, despite the obvious bias and even
hostility they often show. This reexamination will reveal a Pericles rather
different from some standard presentations. Stripped free of the anecdotal
rhetoric of later centuries, Pericles emerges as a powerful orator and dynamic
politician, but not a participant in the sophistic revolution. Let us start
with the evidence for Pericles' contact with the most famous of the
sophists.
"Close personal relations existed at least with Protagoras," Victor
Ehrenberg writes.'* The chief evidence comes from an anecdote in Plutarch's
Pericles. Pericles is said to have spent the whole day with Protagoras,
trying to establish who should be held responsible for the accidental death of
a participant in the games—the javelin which killed him, the thrower of the
javelin, or those managing the games (Per. 36. 4-5). The source and value
of the story are problematic. It is often considered as contemporary,
deriving from Stesimbrotus. Yet Plutarch does not attribute the passage on
Pericles' dispute with Protagoras to Stesimbrotus, as he does the
immediately following story of Pericles' seduction of Xanthippus' wife.^ In
fact, the story does not fit Stesimbrotus' purposes, as far as we can establish
them. Stesimbrotus, a Homeric rhapsode and explicator, tried to show, in
his book deriding the politicians Themistocles, Thucydides, and Pericles, the
weaknesses in the education and training of these leaders. It would not have
been to his advantage to show Pericles debating on an equal footing with
Protagoras, the wisest of the sophists. If anything, he would have wished
to show Pericles demolished by the brilliance of the expert.^
Plato in his dialogue Protagoras, written almost five centuries earlier
than the Pericles, has an illuminating passage which serves as a
counterbalance to Plutarch, and warns us not to overinterpret his anecdote.
Xanthippus and Paralus, the two sons of Pericles, are discovered by Socrates
at the house of Callias, following Protagoras about as he holds forth. But
* V. Ehrenberg, Sophocles and Pericles (Oxford 1954) 96.
^ This is the apparent interpretation of Plutarch's discrete and shocked reference to this
story at Per. 13. 16 and 36. 6.
^Note how, in Plato Prot. 339a-e, Protagoras' statements on Simonides are meant to
leave Socrates reeling and unable to reply. In such a case, one would imagine that
Stesimbrotus presented a satirical picture of Xanthippus' report of Pericles' encounter with
Protagoras. The source of the account of Xanthippus' quarrel may well be comedy. On
Stesimbrotus' pamphlet, see F. Schachermeyr, "Stesimbrotos und seine Schrift iiber die
Staatsmanner," SAWW 247, 5 (1965), K. Meister, "Stesimbrotos' Schrift uber die
athenischen Staatsmanner und ihre historische Bedeutung (FGrHist 107 F 1-11)," Historia
27 (1978) 274-94, and H. Strasburger, "Aus den Anfangen der griechischen
Memoirenkunst," in Forma et Subtilitas: Festschrift fiir Wolfgang Schone zum 75.
Geburtstag (Berlin 1986) 1-11.
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they have not been sent there by Pericles.^ As Socrates notes, Pericles has
neither trained them himself in political wisdom, nor entrusted them to
others, but rather "left them to graze for themselves, like free-ranging sheep"
(319e-20a). Now they are listening to Protagoras, but soon—the
implication is—they will move on. Moreover, Socrates observes, Pericles
has also refused to entrust his ward Cleinias to Protagoras: after a brief
period in the care of his uncle Ariphron, Pericles has once more put Cleinias
in the rather dubious care of his brother Alcibiades (320a-b).*
It is clearly Plato's view that Pericles had no special faith in
Protagoras' teaching, or that of other sophists, but expected that his sons
and wards would grow up naturally, with no special training, in the
companionship of their older relatives and fellow citizens. How different
Pericles is from Callias, who spent a fortune on the sophists! Far from
spending money on sophists, Pericles, as Plato reports elsewhere, put his
ward Alcibiades in the care of a paedagogue, a certain Zopyrus, a Thracian
slave in his household, who had grown too old for other duties (Ale. I
122a).' Plato's scorn for Pericles' attitude toward education is palpable.
If we are to believe Plato, then, Pericles did not think that Protagoras
was a good or necessary educator for the young people in his charge. What
then of Plutarch's report that Pericles spent a whole day discussing with
Protagoras the case of the contestant in the pentathlon? The story, if true,
would be indicative of Pericles' interest in considering legal problems at
length, though not necessarily of his enthusiasm for sophistic disputations.
But there is little reason to consider it authentic: A similar case in
Antiphon, Tetralogies 2, concerns a boy killed by a javelin thrown in a
gymnasium. The problem, while undoubtedly the subject of discussion in
the fifth century, was also a standard rhetorical challenge concerning
responsibility, into which teachers could introduce real names to enhance
vividness. By Plutarch's day, it must have been a common topos, like the
story of the slave of Pericles, who fell from the roof of the Propylaea while
sleep-walking.^'^ The story probably belongs to the pedagogical tradition of
the rhetorical or philosophical schools, as do several others in the Pericles}^
'Pace Schachermeyr (above, note 3) 148.
* Cf. also Meno 94d: Pericles has trained them in |io\)aiKT|, ayojvia, and xaXka . . .
ooa xexvtiq exexai, but not in virtue.
' 2^pyrus—if it is the same one—apparently became an example in Socratic circles:
Phaedo wrote a dialogue named after him, and he was said to have been interested in
physiognomy (Diog. Laert. 2. 105; cf. also Cic. Tusc. 4. 37. 80; De fato 5. 10).
i°Cf. Plut. Per. 13; Pliny. NH 11. 44; Diog. Laert. 9. 82; Hieronymus fr. 19 Wehrli.
^* Cf., e.g., the story of Pericles and the eclipse {fer. 35. 2). ascribed to the
philosophical schools. For Antiphon as a predecessor of the later rhetoricians* treatment
of sUsis theory, cf. D. A. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge 1983) 17 and 40; for
Pericles as an example in declamations, 121. Even if the story goes back to Stesimbrotus,
its veracity would hardly be assured, since Stesimbrotus' anti-Periclean brief led him to
report or invent even the story of Pericles' lust for his daughter-in-law. Jacoby, FGrHist
1 14 Illinois Classical Studies, XVI
A second ground for connecting Protagoras and Pericles is that
Heraclides Ponticus reports that Protagoras went as lawgiver to Thurii.*^
The notice itself is unreliable, since Diodorus speaks at great length of
Charondas as the lawgiver who revised the ancient laws of Zaleucus for use
at Thurii (12. 11-21). Moreover, we are by no means certain that Pericles
played a determining role in the foundation of Thurii and in the appointment
of tfie lawgiver. Of all the sources referring to the founding of the new city,
only Plutarch presents Thurii as a Periclean project. The context in
Plutarch's Pericles does not encourage belief: our notice appears in a list of
Athenian initiatives of all sorts (Per. 11. 4-6), which Plutarch has
assembled to glorify Pericles. The list includes projects which are clearly
non-Periclean, such as Tolmides' cleruchy to Naxos.^^ Thurii thus offers no
support for a tie between Pericles and Protagoras. Quite simply, we do not
know Pericles' role in the foundation of the city, nor in the choice of
Protagoras as lawgiver, if indeed he was chosen, nor the motivations
Pericles might have had in urging the appointment if he did so.
In sum, Plato assures us that Pericles conspicuously avoided the one
service which he might reasonably have entrusted to Protagoras, the training
of his own legitimate children, Xanthippus and Paralus. Anecdotes
connecting the two men are highly dubious. The silence of the fifth and
fourth century sources points to the conclusion that Pericles' circle never
included Protagoras.
Nor is this surprising. Although an excellent orator, Pericles had little
in common with the sophists. Exactly because of his gifts as a speaker, he
did not need to go to them for rhetorical training. By the time the first
sophists became active in the 440s, Pericles had been a leading figure in
Athenian politics for two decades. In addition, he presented himself to the
Athenians as a champion of religious orthodoxy. We cannot pass over
casually the fact that he instituted an extraordinarily ambitious and
expensive program of sacred buildings, whose manifest purpose was to
107 F 11 prints the whole passage, but marks with large print 36. 6 as the section actually
ascribed by Plutarch to Stesimbrotus. An unauthentic work found in the Plutarchan corpus,
the Consolalio ad Apollonium, reports that Protagoras praised Pericles* self-control at the
funerals of his sons {Cons, ad Apol. 118e = FVS 80 B 9. cf. also Val. Max. 5. 10. ext. 1,
Aelian VH 9. 6). Even if the anecdote were genuine, it would tell nothing of Protagoras*
personal contact with Pericles.
^^ Quoted by Diog. LaerL 9. 50.
^' The seer Lampon, a mantis whom PluUrch elsewhere considered a friend and agent of
Pericles {Praec. ger. rep. 812d), was the chair of the Athenian commission sent to
establish the city. But a cross-examination of Lampon by Pericles in a trial for asebeia is
recorded by Aristotle {Rhet. 3, 1419a), which indicates that Lampon at that time was not a
friend of Pericles. Plutarch*s description of Lampon as Pericles' agent is most probably a
deduction from his presence on the Thurii commission. See for a full account of the
evidence for the foundation of Thurii D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War
athaca, NY 1969) 154-69, 382-84.
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honor the gods of the city. We may find it easier to consider the Parthenon
or Propylaea as aesthetic monuments, but the Athenian people, led by
Pericles, saw them first of all as dedications to their patron goddess.
Moreover, Pericles was willing to make a casus belli of the religious
sanctions against the Megarians for working land sacred to the Eleusinian
goddesses. Protagoras' view of the gods was that "concerning the gods I
cannot know either that they exist or do not exist, nor what sort they are in
appearance: many things hinder knowing, the obscurity [of the subject] and
the brevity of human life."^'* Pericles' public life utterly contradicted that
opinion. On the contrary, Pericles devoted a substantial part of his energy
and political capital to seeing that Athens honored the gods as they had
never been honored before, with buildings, festivals, and processions.
The tenuous evidence for Pericles' contact with Protagoras depends on
traditions elaborated after the fourth century. A similar late elaboration also
lies behind Plutarch's statement that Pericles heard Parmenides and Zeno
when they were at Athens (Per. 4. 5). A meeting of the two Eleatics with
Pericles would indeed have been chronologically possible, but no other
writer suggests any such contact. In this case the argument from silence is
especially important Plato has Socrates refute the notion that Pericles has
any real knowledge by showing that he has taught no one. In the course of
the argument he notes particularly two men whom he knows to have
profited from contact with Zeno. Socrates pointedly omits listing Pericles
as a student, although he is the subject of the argument at this point (Ale. I
1 19a). ^^ Plutarch or his source has misremembered Plato, and made Pericles
one of Zeno's students. ^^ There is no other evidence for Pericles' contact
with these men. *
In fact, neither fifth-century writers nor Plato, our chief source for the
sophists and their friends, ever suggests that Pericles had contact with any
philosopher except Anaxagoras, or with any sophist at all, unless Damon is
included in that category. The comic poets, so hostile to his other friends,
say nothing about sophists. ^^ This silence is echoed by the other Socratic
writers and by Aristotle. Our conclusion must be that Pericles had no
interest in the sophists, and gave them no support. The sole exception
—
and he is in fact not an exception—is Damon, son of Damonides.
1* H. EHels and W. Kranz. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker^ H (Berlin 1959) 265 (80 B
4).
^
^' Grote's reference to this passage as evidence for Zeno's teaching of Pericles is
mistaken {History of Greece Vm [London 1869] 145, c. LXVII).
*^ There is no reason to assume another source: such casual errors are not infrequent,
even in material Plutarch knows well; cf. e.g. the conflation of the campaigns of Epidaurus
and Potidaea at Per. 35.
^^ Note that Aristophanes does not mention Pericles in the Clouds, except for a political
action unrelated to sophistry {Nub. 859).
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Damon, an undoubted associate of Pericles, is often considered a
sophist, but he is a unique representative of the species. First, he was an
Athenian, and one prominent enough in political life to be ostracized.
Second, there is no record that he received payment for teaching others. He
is first mentioned in our Hterary sources by the comic poet Plato, quoted by
Plutarch in the Pericles. This poet, writing after Pericles' death, has a
character address Damon with these words: "You, as they say, were a Chiron
in bringing up Pericles."^ ^ Clearly the poet suggests that Damon taught or
influenced Pericles in some way, as Chiron was said to have done for
Achilles and other heroes. Unfortunately the nature of the activity is not
specified. Several references from the fourth century supplement this
intriguing notice. Plato informs us that Damon was especially expert in
music (Rep. 3, 400a; 4, 424c), and had been influenced by Prodicus (Lack.
197d). According to Plato Damon had an effect on Pericles (Ale. I 118c,
where he is coupled with Pythoclides and Anaxagoras) and on Nicias (Lack.
197d). Isocrates, in the 350s, considers him a teacher of Pericles, along
with Anaxagoras, and most sensible ((ppoviixcbxaxo^) of the Athenians
(Antid. 235). Finally, the Athenaion Politeia tells us that Damonides, the
father of Damon, was a political adviser to Pericles, especially in suggesting
public payment for jury duty (27. 4), and was ostracized by an annoyed
demos. An ostracon apparently dating from the 440s, "Damon
Damonidou," indicates that Aristotle or the papyrus text is mistaken, and
that not Damonides but his son Damon was ostracized, although the
ostracon which survives was not necessarily cast on the occasion of his
ostracism. 1' Then, sometime in the late fourth century, as Wallace has
argued, Heraclides Ponticus or another writer composed a philosophical
dialogue containing Damon as a character, in which the educative value of
^* Per. 4. 4 = fr. 191 K.: <s\> yap / oSc; <paoi Xeipojv e^e6pev|/a<; IlepiKXea. Although
Plutarch refers to "comic poets," he probably knew only this one citation. On this
fragment, cf. J. Schwarze, Die Beurteilung des Perikles durch die attische Komodie und ihre
historische und historiographische Bedeutung, Zetemata 51 (Munich 1971) 160-64.
Schwarze' s attempt to fix a date, however, cannot be accepted.
' The ostracon might have been cast when another person received the "winning" vote.
An alternate interpretation of Ath. Pol. 27. 4 corrects the Ath. Pol.'s Damonides to
Damon, and argues that Damon was older than Pericles, being bom about 500, adviser to
Pericles in the 450s, and ostracized ca. 430: see K. Meister, "Damon, der politische Berater
des Perikles," Rivista storica dell' anlichita 3 (1973) 29-45, P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary
on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford 1981) ad loc., and R. W. Wallace, "Damone
di Oa ed i suoi successori: un'anaUsi deUe fonli," in Harmonia Mundi, ed. R. W. Wallace
and B. MacLachlan, Quaderni Urbinati, Suppl. 4 (forthcoming) 30-53, at p. 50. This does
not seem to uke account of the testimony in Plato, Ale. I 118c, that Pericles associated
particularly with Damon as an old man, and that Damon figures in a play of Plato Comicus,
who first began producing plays in the 420s. As Wallace notes (p. 52), the earlier dating
would make Damon one of the earliest sophists, if he can be called such, well before
ProUgoras. This seems highly improbable.
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music was discussed.^^^ Later notices are not useful in establishing Damon's
role as associate of Pericles. Even the rather detailed comments of Plutarch,
Pericles 4. 1^ and 9. 2, are derived entirely from the notices in Plato,
Aristotle, and Plato the comic poet. The apparent additions, where Plutarch
speaks of Damon as a top-notch sophist (aKpo(; ocxpioTTiq) who used the lyre
as a shield, are a reworking and elaboration of Plato's description, through
the mouth of Protagoras, of how sophists had protected themselves from
hostility, and provide no new information.^^
What then is Damon's position with regard to Pericles? He was
considered extremely smart, and was an adviser to Pericles, as his father had
been before him. It is quite likely, given the fact that he was ostracized,
that he was politically active and belonged to a well-to-do family, with the
wealth if not the lineage of other leading figures in mid-fifth-century
politics. His Athenian birth and apparently continuous residence in Athens
set him off from other sophists, who came from minor cities, traveled
through the Greek world to earn money and build their reputation, and
considered a profitable stay at Athens a high point of their activity. Damon,
according to Plato and later writers, was especially interested in music, in
particular the different harmonies and their effects on the psychology or
behavior of listeners or performers.^^ If we were to relate his musical
interests with any political initiatives of Pericles, we might expect them to
be the increase in the number of festivals (Plut. Per. 11. 4), the
reestablishment of the musical agon in the Panathenaia shortly before 446
(Per. 13. 11), and especially the construction of the Odeon (Per. 13. 9-
10).^^ Such an emphasis on music as a proper activity of government
would well fit Damon's interests, and not be different in kind from hfs
father's recommendations regarding jury duty: both initiatives won influence
for Pericles by distributing public money to the citizens. It would also
explain why Damon might be seen by Pericles' opponents as a dangerous
element, worthy of ostracism: his advice would be directly related to
Pericles' power in Athens, and to the use of the phoros from the Delian
league, which was also the basis for the objections against the Periclean
^Wallace (previous note) 32^2.
^^ Plato, Prot. 339a-€. Wallace (above, note 19) 50, cites also Olympiodorus, In Ale.
ed. Westerink, 137. 20-38. 11, as furnishing infonmation that Damon taught Pericles the
songs "which harmoniited the city," but this is simply Olympiodorus* interpretation of the
passage in Ale. I 1 1 8c, filled out with the discussion of Damon in the Republic. I disagree
with Wallace's assertion (51) that as scientific researcher on human subjects and as
political adviser, "Damone fu un sofista tipico." His interests were similar to those of
some sophists, but the defining quality of the sophist is not scientific research but
teaching to those who will pay.
^ On Damon as music theorist see W. D. Anderson, Ethos and Education in Greek Music
(Cambridge, MA 1966) 74-81, WaUace (above, note 19) 44-53.
^ Cf. F. Schachermeyr, "Damon," in Beitrdge zur alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben:
Festschrift fOr F. Altheim I (Berlin 1969) 192-204, at 199-200.
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building program, Damon, then, should be seen as an intellectual Athenian,
who had given thought to music and its effects, as well as to political
actions which would strengthen Pericles' position, not least to those
favoring the celebration of musical events in the city.^'^ There is no
evidence in our sources that he ever taught for money as a professional
sophist.
According to Plato, Ale. I 118c, Damon was preceded as teacher of
Pericles by Pythoclides of Ceos, whom the scholiast to the passage
identifies as a teacher of the semnos style of music and a Pythagorean. Our
only other information is Protagoras' assertion in Plato, Prot. 316e, that he
"hid his sophistry" under the cloak of music. ^^ Pericles, like every
Athenian gentleman, studied music as a youth; his teacher, it would seem,
was Pythoclides, someone better known than the ordinary music teacher, as
befitted Xanthippus' wealth and social status.
Pericles' contact with Damon raises the question of his personal
contacts with other Athenians who might be considered intellectual leaders.
Two acquaintances stand out, Sophocles and Phidias. Sophocles and
Pericles shared the generalship in 441/40, at the time of the Samian War
(Androtion, FGrHist 'ilA F 38; cf. Plut. Per. 8. 8). They undoubtedly
spoke to each other on this occasion, as on others when the limited social
and political world of Athens brought them together.^^ However, we have
no way of knowing whether the two men found each other's company
congenial, or whether Sophocles ever chose to discuss his poetry or the
views expressed in his tragedies, rather than, say, the nature of the Persian
threat, the problems of imperial administration (Sophocles had been a
hellenotamias), or the competitors in the upcoming Olympic games. On
the contrary, their contemporary. Ion of Chios, suggests just the opposite.
Ion, who reports with delight a dinner conversation with his fellow tragic
poet Sophocles, found Pericles' company boorish and arrogant. One
suspects that Ion avoided Pericles when he could, and tolerated his presence
when he had to (FGrHist 392 F 6, F 15). Sophocles may have done the
same. Plutarch records an anecdote in which Pericles prudishly tells the
poet to keep his eyes to himself, and not on pretty boys (Per. 8. 2).^^ The
^ Although in this discussion it has been presumed that Damonides and Damon were
both advisers to Pericles, the force of the present argument does not depend on that
assumption. It would be possible for Damon to have advised Pericles both on jury pay and
later on musical festivals and building the Odeon, before being ostracized.
^ Plutarch's ciution of Aristotle for Pythoclides at Per. 4. 1 apparently represents a
confusion with the passage from the Protagoras, which is paraphrased immediately after.
^ Note that Sophocles was active in governmental roles: hellenotamias in 443/2,
perhaps general in the 430s (Vita Soph. 9). For the questions concerning Sophocles' civic
career, see P. Karavites, "Tradition, Scepticism, and Sophocles' Political Career," Klio 58
(1976) 359-65. with earlier bibliography.
^ Again, this seems a standard story which was ascribed to Pericles and Sophocles for
vividness; cf. the other versions in Arist. 24. 7 and [Plut.] Vitae dec. or. 839a.
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story is of dubious value, but does suggest that Sophocles, who at a dinner
party chuckled over his successful "generalship" in winning a kiss from a
pretty wine-pourer (Ion 392 F 6), would hardly have sought out Pericles'
company and subjected himself to such puritanical observations. The
feeling was no doubt mutual. Plutarch reports that Pericles, unlike earlier
politicians, avoided dinner parties, and concentrated on state business.^*
A third Athenian with whom Pericles is associated in our literary record
is Phidias, sculptor of the Athena Parthenos as well as of earlier statues, the
Lemnian Athena and the Athena Promachos. Phidias was undoubtedly
known to Pericles. However, when we compare the early notices with the
later tradition, it is apparent that these ties have been expanded far beyond
what was actually known. In particular, there is no evidence that Phidias
ever "managed and oversaw the whole building program," as stated by
Plutarch.29 Nor can we assert that Pericles' involvement with Phidias' trial
for embezzlement extended beyond the political realm to personal friendship
and a shared artistic vision.
Our first report of Pericles' ties to Phidias comes from certain unnamed
comic poets cited by Plutarch: Phidias, according to these anonymous
mockers, was furnishing a rendezvous on the AcropoUs for Pericles to meet
freeborn women,^'^ The comic scene exploits the sacrilegious contrast:
Phidias working on the statue of the virgin goddess, under whose aegis
Pericles is seducing the wives of citizens. In simple terms, Pericles is
accused of using the building program for his own (in this case, lecherous)
ends. The only other fifth-century notice is in Aristophanes, who has
Hermes affirm that Pericles was frightened by the accusations against
Phidias, and therefore, to distract his enemies, began the Peloponnesian War
{Peace 605-11). This reference to Phidias' troubles is confirmed by the
decree of Glaucon cited by Plutarch {Per. 31.5) and in the fourth century by
Philochorus {FGrHist 328 F 121) and perhaps by Ephorus, since it appears
in Diodorus.^* Philochorus has Pericles involved not as a friend but as
epistates, a public commissioner responsible for the statue. Diodorus
mentions Pericles' position as commissioner also, and adds that the
prosecution was led by Pericles' enemies, who charged both Phidias and
Pericles.
The story of Pericles' friendship with Phidias develops much later,
partially as an expansion of Aristophanes' explanation for the war, Plato
and the orators are silent on the relationship of the two men. Subsequent
^ Per. 1. 5; cf. W. R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth Century Athens (Princeton
1971) 121-28.
»/>«r. 13.6.
^ Per. 13. 15. As in the case of Damon, Plutarch uses the plural, but may well be
generalizing from a single notice that came to his attention.
'* Presuming that Diod. 12. 39. 1-2 accurately reflects Ephorus. Diodorus* word for
Pericles* position is in\.)izXx\Ti\c,.
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tradition on the trial of Phidias employs no new evidence, and is no more
reliable than the stories that Phidias had carved his and Pericles' portraits on
Athena's shield, or had died in an Athenian prison.^^ Plutarch's notion that
Phidias was overseer of the building program is contrary to all we know of
Athenian building practice.^^ Phidias, like Ictinus, Metagenes, and
Callicrates, was simply a prominent artist in the execution of the building
program. He became especially tied to Pericles because of the fame of his
statue and of the trial for embezzlement which threatened Pericles' political
position.^ When a faction attacked a leading artist in the building program,
they also threatened Pericles, the chief proponent of the program. Pericles
acted to preserve his position, and would have done the same whether
Phidias was a friend or an enemy. Politically, it would have been
absolutely necessary to take steps to defend himself in this dangerous
chmate.
Two foreign intellectuals remain to be considered, who in their diverse
ways were said by writers of the fifth and fourth centuries to have influenced
Pericles. The less well documented relationship was that with Anaxagoras
of Clazomenae, the physical philosopher and exponent of mind as an
underlying principle in the universe. Our information on Pericles' relation
to Anaxagoras begins with Plato and Isocrates.^^ No fifth-century author
thought it worth noting. Isocrates in his Antidosis (235) mentions
Anaxagoras along with Damon as a teacher of Pericles. His information
may well derive from Plato, who in the Phaedrus (269e-70a), and again in
Alcibiades I (118c), says that Pericles learned from Anaxagoras. The
Phaedrus passage is worth quoting for the ironic tone in which it comments
both on Pericles' success as an orator and on Anaxagoras' philosophy.
Socrates speaks to Phaedrus (269e^70a):
Pericles was probably the most complete orator in regard lo rhetoric.
—
What then? [Phaedrus asks]—All the major arts (xexvai) require
'^ I do not wish to discuss here the host of problems connected with Phidias' trial, or
that of Anaxagoras, but merely review the early evidence for Pericles' involvement. For
recent work on the two trials, see P. A. Stadter, A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles
(Chapel Hill. NC and London 1989) 284-305. on Per. 31. 2-32. 6.
^' Cf. Stadter (previous note) 166-67, on Per. 13. 6. and W. Ameling. "Plutarch,
Perikles 12-14." Historia 34 (1985) 47-63. at p. 57.
^ Diodorus says that Pericles, as epistates of the Parthenos statue, also was accused of
sharing in Phidias' crime. This may be true.
'* For accounts of Anaxagoras' life and thought, see G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M.
Schofield. The Presocratic Philosphers^ (Cambridge 1983) 352-84; M. Schofield. An
Essay on Anaxagoras (Cambridge 1980); J. Mansfeld. "The Chronology of Anaxagoras'
Athenian Period." Mnemosyne, ser. 4. 32 (1979) 36-69. 33 (1980) 17-95; D. Sider. The
Fragments of Anaxagoras (Meisenheim 1981); and L. Woodbury, "Anaxagoras and
Athens," Phoenix 35 (1981) 295-315. For the later traditions on Anaxagoras, see D. E.
Gershenson and D. A. Greenberg, Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics (New York 1964);
for his use by Plutarch. J. Hershbell, "Plutarch and Anaxagoras." ICS 7 (1982) 141-58.
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prattling and abstract talk (otSoXeoX^ctQ 'fctl ^eT£a)poXoYla(;) about
nature. From this seem to come highmindedness and effectiveness.
Pericles had this quality, in addition to his talent. I think it was because
he had fallen in with (npooneowv) Anaxagoras, who was like that. So
Pericles was filled with talk about the heavens and arrived at the nature
of sense and nonsense, of which Anaxagoras spoke a great deal. From
this Pericles drew what was profitable for him for the art of speaking.
Plato here does not speak of serious studies of astronomy or physics,
but rather of a certain high-sounding and powerful style, full of inflated
words, which Pericles picked up after meeting Anaxagoras.^^ Contact with
someone like Anaxagoras who concerned himself with abstract matters gave
Pericles a loftiness which was most effective in persuading the demos.
Plato alludes to a feature of Pericles' style which reminded him of
Anaxagoras' thinking. He explains this style by contact of some sort, but
suggests neither that Pericles was an intimate of Anaxagoras nor that he
seriously considered the philosophical or physical questions examined by
Anaxagoras. But it is this passage from the Phaedrus which Plutarch
exploits to paint his vivid picture of Anaxagoras' influence on Pericles,
reflected not only in the statesman's political restraint, but even in his gait
and posture.^^ Neither Plutarch nor the other authors who enhance and
expand Plato's notice in the later tradition add to our knowledge of Pericles'
relationship with the philosopher.^*
A second strand involving Anaxagoras is represented by the stories of
Pericles' defense of the philosopher at his trial, or his rescue from prison
before or after trial. These may begin as early as Ephorus (cf. Diodorus 12.
39. 2), but become prevalent in the Hellenistic period: Diogenes Laertius 2.
12-14 gives four different versions of Anaxagoras' trial, as reported by four
authors. The trial tradition is not helpful in establishing Pericles' relation
^^ Cf. C. J. Rowe, Plato. Phaedrus (Warminster 1986) 204-05. We perhaps have an
example of this style in a conceit from one of his speeches, reported by Plutarch {Per. 8. 9
= Stesimbrotus 107 F 9). "Those who have died for their country," Pericles said, "are like
the gods. We cannot see them, but we consider that they do not suffer death on the basis of
the honors they receive and the benefits they bestow."
^'^ Per. 4. 6-6. 3. 8. 1.
3* E.g. [Dem.] 61 {Erol.) 45. 3. Plut. Them. 2. 5. Dio Chrysostom, Or. 1. 32. 6.
Libanius, Or. 1.1, Themist. 26, 329c, Olympiodorus, In Ale. I, p. 135. The reference in
the Pericles to Anaxagoras' disinterest in money (16. 7) derives from Plato, Hipp. Mai.
283a. The scene of Pericles with the starving Anaxagoras (16. 8-9) seems to be an
anecdote developed in the philosophical schools, again on the basis of the contact of the
two recorded by Plato. Compare the similar story of Pericles offering to maintain the
shoemaker-philosopher Simon, only to be rejected by the freedom -loving sage (Diog.
Laert. 2. 123). The anecdote describing the diverse interpretations of the ram prodigy {Per.
6) is almost certainly a late invention; among other things, the account of the dissection
is impossible. Theophrastus' story of the amulet, found in Per. 38. 2, does not seem to
indicate any special philosophical influence, merely the intelligence Pericles was noted
for.
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to Anaxagoras. First, as Dover has noted, the very variety of tales indicates
that there was no accurate information about the trial.^' It is quite possible
that the whole trial is an invention of philosophical biography. The second
Platonic epistle (311a) noted that the relation of Pericles and Anaxagoras
could be assimilated to the standard topos of the statesman and his
philosophical adviser, connecting such men as Periander and Thales,
Croesus and Solon, and Hiero or Pausanias and Simonides.''^ The numerous
versions of the trial story concentrate on how Anaxagoras was protected by
his powerful student, not on the learning of the student or the political
context. The story would be useful to any philosopher dependent on a
powerful patron.'*^ Only Plutarch supplements this edifying story with new
evidence, Diopeithes' decree against atheism {Per. 32. 2), but the connection
of the fifth-century decree with an attack on Pericles probably is Plutarch's
own inference.'*^ Second, even if we accept the existence of the trial and
Pericles' role in it, the precise jx)litical and juridical situation remains
unclear. Pericles might, for instance, have protected Anaxagoras as part of
his general policy of encouraging metics in Athens,"*^ or for political
reasons, rather than as a friend. Pericles' defence of Anaxagoras would
confirm his acquaintance with the philosopher, but does not reveal his
intellectual views or debt to him.
In brief: On the basis of Plato and Isocrates we can argue that in the
fourth century Pericles was thought to have had some intellectual contact
with Anaxagoras, probably in the area of high-sounding cosmological
theories. There is no indication of the period at which this contact took
place. Plato's brief and ironic ascription of Pericles' eloquence to
Anaxagoras' influence grew into a tradition exemplifying the relation
between sage and statesman, the major feature of which became Pericles'
role in protecting Anaxagoras from an accusation of atheism.
The other non-Athenian associate of Pericles was the Milesian
courtesan, Aspasia, Attic comedy often mocked Pericles' liaison with
Aspasia as lustful, uxorious, or a cause of war, but one comic writer of the
fifth century, Callias, in his Pedetai {The Men in Fetters) apparently
^ K. J. Dover. "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society," Talanta 7 (1975) 24-
54. at 27-32.
^ Cf. also Plut. Max. cum prin. 777a. Plutarch's reference in the same work to Socrates'
meeting with Pericles at the house of Simon the shoemaker (776b) also reflects the topos.
*' Cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 12-14. Plut. Nic. 23. 4. Lucian. Tim. 10. 11. Olymp. In Meteor.
17, Anth. Pal. 7. 95. Note also the anecdote encouraging the support of the philosopher at
Per. 16. 8-9. If the story of a trial developed later, then the notice in Diodorus would not
be from Ephorus, but later tradition.
*^ Even Plutarch implies in the same passage {Per. 32. 5) that Anaxagoras never came to
trial.
*' Cf. his encouragement of Cei:rfialus to emigrate to Athens, [Plut.] Vitae dec. or. 835c.
He may have been Anaxagoras' prostates (as he apparently was of Aspasia) and thus
required to speak on his behalf.
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presented their relationship as intellectual. Callias stated that Aspasia was
the teacher of Pericles, as Socrates had been of Euripides.'*^ This tack was
continued by Plato and other Socratic writers, who attributed Pericles' skill
at oratory to the coaching of this disreputable female intellectual. In the
Menexenus, Socrates is able to deliver a funeral oration because he has just
had the advantage of the tutoring which previously Aspasia had given to
Pericles {Men. 235e). Both Aeschines and Antisdienes wrote dialogues
featuring Aspasia's relation to Pericles. The former seems to have seen her
as a good influence, a teacher of political arete, whom Pericles defended
when she was put on trial, while the latter apparently took the line of the
comic poets, that their relation was lustful, and that Pericles was merely
yielding to pleasure. Xenophon has Aspasia teaching Socrates the art of
matchmaking {Mem. 2. 6. 36, Oec. 3. 14), but does not bring in Pericles.'*^
Aspasia's liaison with Pericles is of those we have examined by far the
most fully reported in the fifth and fourth centuries. She was associated
with Pericles from contemporary writers on; she was admitted to be the
mother of Pericles' son and namesake. Comic writers presumed that she
influenced Pericles' foreign pohcy, and in the fifth and fourth centuries she
is presented as a powerful intellectual force as well. It is only her sex and
her profession which have kept her from being recognized as a major
intellectual and cultural influence on Pericles. Or rather, we immediately
recognize as comic exaggeration or Platonic irony the notion that a woman
might have influenced Pericles, but do not see the same elements at work in
the case of Anaxagoras or Damon. Do we have any right to argue that her
ideas on persuasion, on art, on foreign policy, or internal politics were any
less important to Pericles' than those of Anaxagoras and Damon? Can we
rely more on Plato's words in the Phaedrus than those in the Menexenusl
Aspasia did not write a book, like Anaxagoras: but Antisthenes said that
Pericles kissed her every day, coming and going.'*^ If she was as intelligent
as the Socratics suggest, she may have had a major influence on Pericles'
thinking with regard to rhetoric, aesthetics, and politics. As Xenophon
noted, she would have known a lot about human psychology, which might
have been of more practical use to Pericles than all Anaxagoras' talk.
**Cf. Schwarze (above, note 18) 91-93.
* For the fragments of Aeschines, see H. Dittmar, Aeschines von Sphettos,
Philologische Untersuchungen 12 (Berlin 1912), and on the Aspasia, B. Ehlers, Eine
vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: Der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers
Aischines, Zetemata 41 (Munich 1966). For Antisthenes see F. Caizzi, Antisthenis
Fragmenta (Milan 1966) and G. Giannantoni, Socraticorum Reliquiae U (Rome and
Florence 1983). The role of Aspasia in Plato's Menexenus is at least partially playful, as
Plutarch saw {Per. 24. 7), but no full explanation has been offered: see W. K. C. Guthrie, A
History of Greek Philosophy IV (Cambridge 1975) 312-23 and the observations of N.
Loraux, The Invention of Athens (Cambridge, MA and London 1986) 323.
^PluL Per. 24. 8, Athen. 13. 589e.
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In conclusion, let me review briefly the ancient evidence for Pericles'
non-political interests. His contemporaries do not speak of his
enlightenment. On the contrary, the poet and bellelrist Ion of Chios found
him an arrogant boor. The comic poets of the thirties presented him as a
lecher, desecrating the Acropolis by his assignations with the wives of
prominent Athenians. They mocked his political power and his haison with
Aspasia under a number of mythological guises: Zeus with Hera, Heracles
with Omphale or Deianeira, and Paris with Helen. Aspasia's pernicious
influence, according to the comedians, led to two wars, against Samos and
Sparta. Stesimbrotus reports Pericles' seduction of his daughter-in-law, the
wife of Xanthippus. The writers of the last quarter of the fifth century are
slightly more favorable. They continue to play on his relationship to
Aspasia, but they mention also Phidias and Damon. His extraordinary
oratorical power is noted by both comic poets and Thucydides, but only the
latter praises as well his judicious control of passion, his honesty, and his
foresight. Thucydides, however, is silent on the training which might have
prepared him for this role. Rather, the implication of the encomium of
Themistocles at 1. 138 seems to be that Pericles, like Themistocles, relied
on natural genius.
In the fourth century, Plato associates him with Aspasia, Anaxagoras,
Pythoclides, and Damon, but notes that as a speaker he antedated the technai
which prescribed rules for rhetoric {Phdr. 269a). Isocrates repeats the names
of Damon and Anaxagoras; Aeschines and Antisthenes think rather of
Aspasia. Ephorus appears to have mentioned Phidias and Anaxagoras.
Down through the fourth century, therefore, Pericles is considered a
compelling orator and a powerful political leader, but not a man particularly
intellectual or given to philosophy. He is not associated with the "new
intellectuals" of his day, Euripides and the sophists, nor with Socrates. The
intellectual influences on him are three: Damon, the political adviser and
theorist of the psychological effects of music; Anaxagoras, the physical
philosopher who gave loftiness to his oratory; and Aspasia, who taught him
the art of persuasion. Later stories seem to grow from this base, especially
from the notices in the comic poets and in Plato. Pericles was not at the
center of intellectual life at Athens in the 440s and 430s, and certainly not
the patron of the sophists.
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Strepsiades as a Comic Ixion
KENNETH J. RECKFORD
Many readers of Aristophanes' Clouds have regarded Strepsiades as a
disappointing as well as disappointed hero. Unlike Dicaeopolis, Trygaeus,
Peisthetaerus, and Lysistrata, who sweep away all obstacles to their
Pgreathearted schemes, Strepsiades goes from helpless to humiliated: from
family and money problems, through academic failure, to the final indignity
of being beaten and out-argued by his own son. Even his revenge against
Socrates has seemed more bitter than triumphant, an inadequate reply to so
many failures. In Whitman's influential view, Strepsiades' jiovripia was
flawed, his ambitions too petty to warrant success. He was just not up to
the requirements of a comic hero.^
My arguments for raising Strepsiades' grade (and with it, that of the
play itselO require time and space not presently available. To read the
Clouds is not always to see it; and I would suggest that performance brings
out Strepsiades' comic strengths—among them, his engaging simple-
mindedness, his openness to experience, his resilience, and what we might
call his sheer survivability—in ways the unadorned text does not. I would
also suggest that Strepsiades, more than most protagonists, exemplifies
comedy's gift of enduring frustration, surviving humiliation, persevering
through failure to try and try again. "I may have fallen, but I won't just lie
there," is his watchword. He is descended not from Achilles or Ajax, who
cannot endure indignity, but from Odysseus, who can. He exemplifies, not
the self-assertion of the tragic hero transposed to comedy's metaphysical
universe, but the even greater strength of not needing to be a tragic hero in
the first place.
The point may seem obvious, but its application to Strepsiades has
mostly been ignored. That is, in part, because his style and fortunes have
no obvious tragic counterpart. Dicaeopolis, in the Acharnians, is played
^ C. H. Whitman. Aristophanes and the Comic Hero (Cambridge, MA 1964) 119-20.
Cf. the recent condemnation of Strepsiades by T. K. Hubbard, "Old Men in the Youthful
Plays of Aristophanes," in Old Age in Greek and Latin Literature, edd. T. M. Falkner and J.
deLuce (Albany 1989) 103: "Whereas the old men of Aristophanes' other plays in this
period are all essentially sympathetic characters, despite their flaws and obsessions,
Strepsiades is a malign parody of the usual comic hero—stupid rather than clever, socially
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against the "miserable Telcphus," whose persona he borrows from
Euripides' rag-and-mask shop, but whose tragic rhetoric and pathos he
ultimately throws off, in Odyssean fashion, to resume his own comic way.^
Trygaeus, in the Peace, takes a loathsome dung-beetle for his paratragic
steed, rides to Olympus, and recovers the lovely goddess Peace—as against
Euripides' Bellerophon, who tried to ride Pegasus to Olympus and was
struck down by Zeus' thunderbolt for his presumption. There is no
comparable role-model for Strepsiades. I do have one, less obvious, in
mind; but let me prepare the way with two blatantly paratragic passages
from the Clouds. The first is Strepsiades' lament at 717-22:
ZT. Kal nSx;', ote p.o\)
(ppot)5a xcc xp'rma^a, (ppovSri xpoid,
(ppcoSri \|A)xr|, (ppouSri 6' e^Pou;-
Kai npbq to-utok; exi toiai KaKOic;
(ppovpac; a5cov
oXiyoxt (ppovSoq yEyevTiiiai.
The anaphora, the anapaestic rhythm, the pathetic evocations of <ppo\)5o<; are
probably derived from Euripides. Rau compares Hecuba's lament at Hec.
159-61 (her aged husband is gone, her children are gone—more than she yet
realizes), and also Peleus' lament dXAndr. 1070 [actually, 1078]—his voice
is gone, his limbs are gone—as he collapses on learning of his grandson's
assassination at Delphi.^ The two passages have much in common, and
Aristophanes may be conflating them intentionally. He enjoys the
Euripidean term (ppo\)6o(;, savors it, and by the heavy-handed play on
(ppov6o(;/(ppot)pa(;, builds it into a brief comic aria whose force might be
conveyed by a modem parody to the tune of "Old Man River" (from Jerome
Kern's "Showboat"):
Lost my money,
I've lost my color,
I've lost my spirit,
I've lost my sneakers . . .
The tragic possibilities are real enough, for Aristophanes as well as for
Euripides. Strepsiades has ventured into the (hterally and figuratively) mist-
enshrouded world of the Phrontisterion, where Socrates guides, or
misguides, souls. It is a tricky atmosphere, one in which values and
possessions tend to disappear. The absurd juxtapositions, the culmination
of the lament's first section in euPdq, bypass high tragic pain. Strepsiades
worries more about losing his money and shoes than about losing his soul.
destructive rather than constructive, and totally unsuccessful in achieving any transcendent
vision."
^Cf. K. J. Reckford, Aristophanes' Old-and-New Comedy (Chapel Hill 1987) 172-86.
194-96.
' P. Rau, Paratragodia, Zetemata 45 (Munich 1967) 190.
Kenneth J. Reckford 127
and rightly so; he is too earthbound to suffer the alienating enchantment of
the philosopher's Siren song, to "vanish" into the invisible worid of
Socratic abstraction. His problem for now is bedbugs. He is not a tragic
hero(ine)—is not Hecuba or even old Peleus, nor meant to be. And that is,
despite his discomfort and humiliation, wonderfully reassuring.
Strepsiades' self-laudatory triumph song at Clouds 1154-66 is another,
more ambitious pastiche of tragic tags and motifs. The opening Unes come
from a lost Peleus of (the scholia say) Euripides; Rau argues persuasively
that they come from one of those Sophoclean hyporchemes that raise high,
delusive hopes just before the catastrophe.'* But lines 1 165-66,
IT. 'il TEKvov, ci) Tiai, e^eXS' oTkcov,
cxi£ oo\) naipoq,
are certainly taken (as the scholiasts observe) from Euripides' Hecuba, as
that mater dolorosa calls forth her daughter Polyxena to tell her of her fate
(171-73):
(0 TEKVOV, (b Jiai
5vcxavoxaTa^
—
e^eXO' e^eXS'
oiKCOV—aiE liaxEpoq avSdv.
The verbal and musical echoes of tragedy carry, at least implicitly,
evocations of pain and loss. Like the brave hopes of Sophocles'
hyporchemes, Strepsiades' enjoyment of triumph proves short-lived (even
though the catastrophe is deferred until after the two outrageous scenes with
the creditors). There may be a further hint that his loss of a son to the new
education is comparable, in its way, to Hecuba's demoralizing loss of.her
daughter (and later, of her son). The themes of demoralization, loss of
innocence, and the disappearance of traditional values are prominent and
disturbing in Hecuba, and they supply a partial backdrop to the Clouds,
along with the unmediated social and historical changes to which Euripides
and Aristophanes (and Thucydides) were alike responding. We should, I
think, admire Aristophanes' courage in taking on so much tragedy—the pain
of the aging Hecuba or Peleus as they lose their human props and supports,
and the underlying pain of an Athens that has been losing its moral and
spiritual bearings under pressure of war, suffering, and change. But, still
more, we should enjoy die sureness with which Aristophanes transmutes
tragic pity and terror into comic laughter and comic reassurance. For
Strepsiades never yields to misfortune. He always bounces back. He
survives, that is, in ways that Peleus, Hecuba, and the others never can.
Two of the most important things, then, that we can say about
Strepsiades are: (1) that he is not a tragic hero(ine) out of Euripides, and (2)
that he comes perilously close to being one. Words and phrases, songs and
* Rau (previous note) 148-50. Scholia are cited from D. Holwerda and W. J. W. Koster
(edd.). Scholia in Aristophanem I. 3. 1-2, in Nubes (Groningen 1977).
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scenes, enforce this point throughout the Clouds, much as they will do
throughout the Wasps, where Philocleon is like and yet unlike a tragic
heroine consumed by unrequited love or a defeated tragic hero who must fall
upon his sword. But what we miss in the Clouds, as in the Wasps, is a
certifiable tragic foil for our paratragic or "trygic" hero. The suggestion that
Strepsiades plays a comic Ixion cannot (because no Ixion-tragedy is extant)
fill the gap; but it may help. By reminding us, once more, of what
Strepsiades is not, it may add somewhat to our appreciation of what, in vital
and comic terms, he is.
The Ixion legend, of uncertain origins,^ is best known from Pindar's
Second Pythian Ode. (1) This version presupposes, but barely alludes to,
Ixion's treacherous murder of his father-in-law and his subsequent
purification by Zeus himself. (2) As Pindar tells it, Ixion proved ungrateful
(much like Tantalus in Olympian 1); he conceived a mad passion for Hera,
whom he tried to assault. "His hybris roused him to arrogance, blind
infatuation and ruin." (3) His sins bore fruit. He lay with a cloud in Hera's
shape; their offspring was Kentauros, who sired the hybristic race of
centaurs on Magnesian mares. (4) And now Ixion is bound to the four-
spoked wheel, on which he forever turns.
Aristophanes may well have known and used Pythian 2 (I shall return
to the parallels). He may also have been influenced by an Aeschylean
trilogy, including Perrhaebides and Ixion, and perhaps involving the tragic
sequence of murder, alienation, forgiveness, new crime, and new
punishment. Whether Aeschylus included Zeus' (earlier) seduction of
Ixion's wife Dia, who bore Perithous to him, we do not know. Euripides'
Ixion, as Plutarch reports, was a "vile and impious" man: The audience was
scandalized, "but I didn't remove him from the stage," said Euripides,
"before nailing him to the wheel. "*^ The story sounds apocryphal, but the
scandal was likely enough, to judge from other plays and other reports. In
two surviving fragments, Ixion apparently rejects counsels of moderation,
asserting his drive for power and fulfillment.^ Did he justify his criminal
behavior later, in familiar rationalizations? "I can't help my nature," he
might have said; or else, "that is how Zeus behaved—and how can I, a
mortal, be stronger than Zeus?" The Oedipal wishes, thinly disguised, the
fear of punishment, and the modem, sophistic arguments by which moral
inhibitions are waived: All this would be very Euripidean, and very
powerful. I am tempted to claim Euripides' Ixion as a forerunner of
^ For the development of the Ixion legend and its representations in literature and art,
see J. L. Boyce, Ixion. Origins and Meanings of a Myth (University of N.C. dissertation:
Chapel Hill 1974). Ciutions by courtesy of the author.
^Plut. De aud. poetis 19e.
^ Euripides, frr. 425, 426 in Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, ed. A. Nauck, suppl. by
B. Snell (Hildesheim 1964): first a plea against greed (and perhaps tyranny), then a defense
of risk-taking for "great results" (including tyranny). The parallel with Eteocles in Phoen.
is striking.
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Pheidippides, who comes very close (in comic terms) to parricide and incest;
but unfortunately, there is no evidence either that the play was produced
before 423 or that Aristophanes referred to it. We must therefore return to
Pindar's cloud-centaur combination, as it evokes the inner nature of Ixion's
sin, and as, very differently, it heralds Strepsiades' comic enterprise and fall.
For what Pindar emphasizes, what he so emphatically rejects in telling
Ixion's story, is vanity. The delusion inflicted on Ixion, of lying with a
cloud, at once reflects his crime, punishes it, and bodies forth the sinner's
spiritual and psychological state, much as the punishments in Dante's
Inferno, from drifting on the winds (Paolo and Francesca) to being changed
into serpents (the thieves), mirror that loss of human freedom and integrity
which, for Dante, results from the increasing compulsions of sin. Ixion's
intercourse with a cloud, an image, marks the degrading and unreal essence
of axTi, blind infatuation and delusion. It focuses our attention on the
negative, the sheer emptiness of Ixion's wish and act. Here Pindar draws on
many sources in folklore and legend. Gods often deceive mortals with
images, in dream or waking vision, on the battlefield or in the bedchamber.
Sexual impulses are strangely disguised, and strangely frustrated, from
Menelaus' dream-image of Helen in the sad Agamemnon ode (414-26) to
the nightmare figures of incubus and succubus surviving into modem Greek
folklore. As for the monstrous Kevtavpoc;, Pindar may aheady have known
his derivation in popular etymology from kevteiv + avpav, to "stab the
air."^ He is the very embodiment of lying with a cloud.
Pindar draws a threefold moral in Pythian 2. One should show gratitude
to benefactors, realize that the gods bring hopes to accomplishment, and
avoid vain thoughts. (The latter are characterized as deceptions, dndtai,
and also as empty, Keved. Pindar suggestively links Keveoq with
KEvtavpoq, offspring of vanity.)' Scholars have debated the ode's more
particular applicability to Pindar or Hieron. It may be that, as Finley
suggests, Pindar is himself the chief recipient of his own warning to avoid
vain thinking, to remain grateful, not resentful.^^ (Was he passed over in
' P. Von der Muhll. "Weitere pindarische Notizie." MH 25 (1968) 226-29. argues that
the Volksetymologie xivxaMpoc, < Kevteiv aupav probably formed a bridge between
Ixion and the centaurs, influencing the legend's development in the direction inherited by
Pindar. Although this smacks of later Hellenistic rationalizing, it suits Pindar's fondness
for significant word-play (e.g., Kevxavpov 44 / Kcved 61) and Aristophanes' (cf. below,
notes 14, 19, 20). Cf. also Sophocles' poetic association of Kevxa\)po<;, vecpeXii (here =
"net, trap"), and Kevtpa in Track. 831-33, 839-40. Later, Euripides will make Pentheus
"stab the air" at Bacch. 629-32 as he attacks the false image of Bacchus. (There are sexual
overtones, here as elsewhere.)
' Cf. the companion-poem, Pythian 3, where Coronis fjpaTO xtbv dneovToav (20), as
many do "who hunt windswept aims, whose hopes are unfulfilled"; she fell into great
disaster (29), yet her child Asclepius was preserved and given to the good centaur Chiron to
rear.
^°John H. Finley. Jr., Pindar and Aeschylus (Cambridge, MA 1955) 92-98. For a
somewhat different reading, cf. R. E. Grimm, "Pindar and the Beast," CP 57 (1962) 1-9.
130 Illinois Classical Studies, XVI
favor of Bacchylides?) Yet the lesson remains general. We are all called to
show gratitude and accept mortal limits (the two go together). Success
requires restraint, requires acceptance of reality. All genuine achievement,
from statecraft to chariot-racing to poetry, must depend on the gods' gifts
and the sense and skill with which we embrace those gifts. Anything else is
folly.
I return to Strepsiades, who in true comic fashion refuses to accept
life's ordinary restraints and limits, such as the payment of debts incurred
through his son's horse- and chariot-racing. His first scheme failing, he
ventures himself into the Phrontisterion, beholds its wonders, and is
initiated shortly by Socrates into the mysterious and delusive realm of
celestial matters (xa ^execopa), scientific ideas, and novel deities such as
the Clouds (250-59):
lii. PovXei xa 0eia JtpaYnax* eiSevai aa9W(;
atT* eaxiv 6p0coq;
XT. Nt) AC, EiJiep eoxi ye.
Zi2. Kai ^vyyeveaGai zalq Neq>£Xaiaiv ei(; Xoyovq,
xaiq nuExepavai 5ai|j.oaiv;
ZT. MdXioxd ye.
IQ. Kd9i^e xoivuv in\ xov lepov aKt^7io6a.
ZT. 'l8oi) KotGrinai.
ZQ. TovTovi xo{v\)v XaPe
xov oxecpavov.
ZT. 'Ejii xi oxe<pavov; Oijioi, ZcoKpaxeq,
atanep fie xov 'AGdnavG' oncoc; ^T^ Gvoexe.
Zfl. OuK, dXXd xavxa Tidvxa xovq xeXovjievovi;
r\\itic, noo\)\iev.
ZT. Eixa 5-n xi Kep6avcb;
ZQ. Aeyeiv yevTjoei xpi|ifia, KpoxaXov, nainahf].
Socrates' double entendre at 252 was unintentional. Being much concerned
with sex, as with food, Strepsiades joyfully accepts the invitation to "have
intercourse" with the Clouds—which may have prompted Socrates to add the
qualifying ei^ Xoyotx; ("verbal intercourse, I mean") after a pause.^^ The
audience will enjoy his naive, sensual reaction. Soon afterwards, they will
be amused by his literal-minded fear of being sacrificed "like Athamas." The
allusion, as Dover observes, is on target, for Phryxus and Helle were
Athamas' children by his consort Nephele, or Cloud. ^^ Strepsiades has his
moments. His characteristically associative thinking here lights, most
appropriately, on that hero who slept with Cloud and got himself and his
family into all kinds of trouble.
After summoning the Clouds, Socrates explains to the puzzled
Strepsiades why they look like women (345-55):
" Translators usually miss the joke; William Arrowsmith is a happy exception.
^^Aristophanes. Clouds, ed. K. J. Dover (Oxford 1968) 132, 257.
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£Q. 'AnoKpivai vvv ctxx' av eptojiai.
IT. Aeye v-uv taxecaq o xi PovXei.
ZQ. "H5ii JTOx' (xvapX£ya(; eiSeq vecpeXriv Kevxavpo) ojioiav,
•q reapSdXei -q JI-oko) q xavpcp;
ZT. Nti AC eyfoy*- Eixa x{ xovxo;
lii. riyvovxaiTidvB'oTipo'oXovxai Kax'Tiv jiev iSwai Ko^Tix1^v
aypiov xiva xmv Xaaioov xovxwv, oiovnep xov Hevo9dvxo'u,
OKWTCxovcaixfiv |j,av{av aiixov KevxavpoK; fiKaoav a{)xd(;.
IT. Ti ydp, T^v apTcaya x©v 6Ti}i.oo{cov Kax{5(oai Ii^cova, xi
5p©oiv;
lii. 'Ajio^aivovoaix-qv (pvoiv avxov Xvkoi e^aicpvin; eyevovxo.
IT. Ta\)x' apa xavxa KXecovufiov a-uxai xov pi\|/aa7iiv x^^^
iSovaai,
6x1 SeiXoxaxov xovxov ecopcov, £Xa<poi 6id xovx* eyevovxo.
IQ. Kal vvv y' oxi KX^iaOevq ei5ov, opaq, 5id xovx' eyevovxo
yuvaiKeq.
The passage works on several levels. First, as a metatheatrical joke, for
the representation of comic choruses requires theatrical convenience even
more than symbolic appropriateness. It is difficult for choreutai to represent
clouds "floating in the blue." It is easier to represent clouds who, for their
own purposes, present themselves as seductive women—with, most likely,
touches of "cloud" about their drapery and headdresses. (Strepsiades' protest
earlier that "these have noses," whereas real clouds resemble "spread-out
wool," plays on slang terms for the penis and for sexual intercourse, hence
reminds us that the real-life choreutai were male. The joke focuses our
minds, if not Strepsiades', on disguise and the multiple interpretation of
disguise.)*^ •
Second, Aristophanes scores extra points by indulging in some old-
fashioned EiKaa^oq, a primitive form of satire. Its riddling guise invites
the audience to play along. Why do the Clouds appear as centaurs? To
ridicule some pederast, like Xenophantus' son.^"* Why as wolves (we would
say, sharks)? Some embezzler of public funds: Simon, maybe. Why deer?
Some coward: Cleonymus, of course. And now Strepsiades, catching on,
completes the argument himself (he is quick enough when it comes to
personal insults): So why women? The Clouds must have noticed
—
Cleisthenes.
^3 The argument of C. Brown. "Noses at Aristophanes' Clouds 344?" QUCC 14 (1983)
87-90, is not really refuted by G. Mastromarco, "D Naso Delle Nuvole (Aristofane, Nuvole
344)," QUCC 23 (1986) 121-23; for although the Qouds present themselves basically as
human (Mastromarco), Aristophanes cannot resist confusing levels of make-believe
further by alluding to the masculinity of the actual choreutai (Brown). On noses and
penises, cf. also M. Davies, "The Tickle and Sneeze of Lx)ve," A/A 86 (1982) 117 and nn.
15. 16.
^* Dover cites a scholion to Aeschines 1. 52 but fails to follow up the joke, whose
point lies in an obscene pun: The compulsive pederast is a KevToppo(;, or "butt-fucker":
cf. Von der Muhll (above, note 8) 228, with refs., including Nub. 350.
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And third: Socrates' account suggests an aspect of the Clouds' ever-
shifting nature that goes well beyond Socrates' own limited and limiting
comprehension.*^ For as they assume various shapes in order to expose,
through satiric "likenings," the personality traits and obsessions of
particular men, the Clouds resemble nothing so much as—the poets, actors,
and choruses of Old Comedy. Like Aristophanes himself, they are experts
at indecent exposure. Through taking on disguises, they reveal the shameful
truth beneath ordinary appearances. But they are also (again, like the comic
poet and his troupe) free agents, mischievous self-willed players. If they
assume the likeness of seductive women, they may do so, not just because
of the effeminate Cleisthenes, but because of the would-be cheater
Strepsiades, whom they visit, in time-honored fashion, with delusion—or
for that matter, because of that other cheater, Socrates, who also wrongly
believes that he can control the Clouds' comic mimicry, fun, and
delusiveness in the service of his own inferior and limited purposes.
Many years ago, venturing a descriptive account of "Aristophanes'
Ever-Flowing Clouds," I said that they were (among other things) natural
symbols of confusion and deception. ^^ Instances of the latter included
Hera's seduction of Zeus in Iliad 14, where their divine lovemaking is
concealed, together with Hera's purposes, in a golden cloud, and Ixion's
infatuate intercourse, in Pythian 2, with die cloud-image in Hera's shape.
Strepsiades misbehaved, or was mistreated, "like a comic Ixion." But his
disaster was more a comic djidTTj than a tragic dxTj—more like the comic
deception of Zeus than like the tragic infatuation of Pindar's Ixion.
The Strepsiades-Ixion comparison is mentioned in Dover's commentary
(we came to it independently), and it is developed by Kohnken in his careful
1980 article on the CloudsP Dover uses Ixion and the phantom Helen
(especially in Euripides' Helen) to illustrate the mythic and poetic linkage of
clouds with deception; and Kohnken argues at length for Aristophanes'
conscious evocation of Pythian 2: The collocation of clouds, women and
centaurs, mockery and madness, is strikingly similar. I am not altogether
convinced that Aristophanes is alluding to Pindar's version, which we have,
rather than to the lost Ixion-tragedies or to the legend generally. I shall,
however, argue that the case for Strepsiades as a comic Ixion can be
strengthened, by the "intercourse with clouds" joke that I discussed earlier,
^^ On the function and meaning of the cloud chorus, see H.-J. Newiger, Metapher und
Allegoric (Munich 1957) 50-74; P. Pucci. "Saggio Sulle Nuvole," Maia 12 (I960) 31^2;
P. Handel, Formen und Darstellungsweisen in der aristophanischen Komodie (Heidelberg
1963) 234-38; K. J. Reckford, "Aristophanes' Ever-Flowing Clouds," Emory Univ.
Quarterly 22 (1967) 222-35; C. P. Segal, "Aristophanes' Cloud-Chorus," Arelhusa 2
(1969) 143-61; A. Kohnken, "Der Wolken-Chor des Aristophanes," Hermes 108 (1980)
154-69; D. Ambrosino, "Nuages et sens. Autour des Nuees d'Aristophane," Quaderni di
Storia 18 (1983) 3-60.
^^ Reckford (previous note) 231-34.
^^ Dover (above, note 12) kviii; Kohnken (above, note 15) 162-63 and, on the
likelihood of a conscious Pindaric reminiscence, n. 27.
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and also by a concatenation of words and images that are especially
prominent in the latter part of the Clouds: twisting and turning (oxpecpeiv
and related terms), chariot and wheels, the horse-goad (Kevtpov), sexual
passion (epav, ipa(5xr\c^, and lifting someone "up in the air," literally or
figuratively (eTcaipeiv). The combination is striking. It evokes Ixion's
punishment, while reminding us, again, that Strepsiades is not Ixion.
In Hellenistic and Roman times, Ixion's wheel became one of the great
Sehenswiirdigkeiten of the underworld, along with Tantalus' feast (or
impending rock), Sisyphus' boulder, and Tityus' vulture. Earlier, though,
Ixion was depicted as revolving in mid-air.^* Euripides' Heracles laments
that, for his sins, he will be banished from earth and sea, and "will imitate
the wheel-driven Ixion in his bonds" {HF 1295-98). On a fourth-century
Campanian neck-amphora, two winged figures set Ixion's wheel in motion.
Are Uiey Aurai, or perhaps Nephelai? In everyday Greek life, the bodies of
slaves or criminals undergoing torture were attached to wheel rims {in\
xpoxot) oxpepXo\)a0ai), lashed with whips or prodded with goads (Kevxpa).
Aristophanes often mentions these tortures.'' But the juxtaposition on the
vase of lovely female figures and the mid-air wheel brings us back more
particularly to Strepsiades, the "son of Twist."
His name, as many have observed, suits his nature.^^ It also suits the
near-Euripidean reversal plot on which he revolves. At the play's beginning
we find him twisting and turning in bed, anxious about his debts. His goal
is to twist out of debts and lawsuits somehow, like a successful wrestler, or
like Odysseus 7ioXt)xpo7to<;, the "man of many turns." Socrates and the
Clouds encourage his day-dreams of becoming a super-successful lawyer and
scoundrel—a KEvtpcov and otpocpK;, among other things.^' He fails, of
course. He cannot, any more than others, harness the intellectual and
cultural revolution (Aivoq) to his private purposes. The reversal plot makes
him a victim, whether of bedbugs on the "mystic cot" (twisting and turning
again beneath the bedclothes, in comic counterpoint to the gracefully
*' Berlin F 3023, listed in A. D. Trendall, The Red-Figured Vases ofLucania, Campania
and Sicily (Oxford 1967) 338, no. 787. On this point, and for the following references to
Ixion in myth and art, see Boyce (above, note 5) 33-40, 92-99 and notes.
^' Cf. Pax 452, Lys. 845-46 (and J. Henderson's commentary [Oxford 1987] ad loc),
Ra. 620. PL 875.
^Cf., among others, B. Marzullo, "Strepsiade," Maia 6 (1953) 99-124; Pucci (above,
note 15) 15-18. Although the name Strepsiades is not introduced until line 134, I take
Aristophanes* uses of axpif^di and related terms at 36, 434, 776, 792 and 1455 as strongly
thematic, together, probably, with forms of Tpenco (40, 88, 813, 1263) and tpecpo) (927,
1158. 1206. 1208).
^^ Although we might expect an active meaning for KevTpcov here ( = KevTpoxvTioq,
"one that strikes with the goad"; cf. the scholia), Kevrpcov normaUy denotes a low, vicious
person: "one that bears the marks of the Kevtpov, a rogue that has been put to the torture"
(LSJ). The term otpocpi^, "a slippery fellow, or twister." is more clearly suited to
Strepsiades. Its fuller implications are wonderfully suggested by the French roue which
Ambrosino (above, note 15) 12 uses of Strepsiades in another connection, at line 260.
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dancing chorus), or of his all too sophistically educated, father-beating son.
He is more twisted about than twisting. And yet (this is a chief difference
to tragedy), Strepsiades retains the clown's basic resiliency, the ability to
bounce back from defeat. "I may have fallen [been thrown], but I won't just
lie there."
I give, for language, imagery, and tone, the end of the second creditor
scene and the beginning of the chorus's little teasing song that precedes the
catastrophe (1296-1306):
ZT. OuK dno5ico^ei aauxov dno ir\q oiKiaq;
Oepe jioi TO KEvxpov.
AA. Tarn* iyto napxvpojiai.
ST. 'TTiaye. Ti ^.eXXeiq; Ouk eTmc,, (o aaja.<p6pa;
AA. ToLVx' ovx ^Ppi? 5fix' eoxiv;
LT. "A^eiq; 'EcpiaX©
Kevxoav {tnb xov TipwKXov oe xov oeipacpopov.
OevyeK;; "E^£X,X6v o' apa Kivr|oeiv eyw
a\)xoiq xpoxoiq zoic, ooici xai ^uvcopioiv.
XO. Oiov x6 Ttpayp-dxcov epdv (pXxxvpcov • 6 ydp
yepcov o5* tpaaQciq
drtooxepfioai povXexai
xd XP'HHO'Q' dSavelaaxo.
The association of goad (Kevxpov), wheels, and passionate love is telling,
Strepsiades got into trouble, of course, through Pheidippides' horse- and
chariot-racing. He owed twelve mnae to Pasias for a horse, three to
Ameinias for a little chariot and wheels (xpoxoiv 31). Now the second
creditor has come, a natural enemy and oppressor, masquerading pathetically
as a figure out of Euripidean tragedy, smashed up in a racing accident.
Strepsiades sees through the act and the false pathos (much as Dicaeopolis
rejected the "desolated" farmer in Acharnians 1018-36) and, with splendid
appropriateness, he converts his creditor into a racehorse to be driven
—
away. The comic business with the Kevxpov is sexual aggression too, the
dramatic equivalent of a simple "Fuck you!"^^ It also links up with the
Kevxa\)pO(; motif earlier and with the chorus' teasing remarks about this
"great lover," which are more than a warning, in colloquial terms, not to
"like trouble." Strepsiades is a lover at heart, a senex amator. Infatuation
comes naturally to him, as to Pindar's Ixion, or to Ixion's sister Coronis,
who "was in love with the impossible" (ripaxo xcov amovxaiv , Pyth. 3.
20). Should a comic hero desire anything less?
The turning of Strepsiades' wheel of fortune is marked most
emphatically at 1452-64:
^ For Kevxpov = phallus, cf. J. Henderson. The Maculate Muse (New Haven 1975) 122;
for the phallic "sting" of the wasp-chorus, K. J. Reckford, "Catharsis and Dream-
Interpreution in Aristophanes* Wasps," TAPA 107 (1977) 305-07 and n. 22.
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IT. Tavxi 6i* v\iaq, at Ne<peXai, rtenovG' eyco,
v)^iv ctvaGelc anavxa xd|ia npdy^axa.
XO. At)x6(; ^ev ovv aavx^ o\) xovxcav aixioc;,
oxpeyaq oea-uxov eii; novripd npdy|j.axa.
ZT. Ti Sfjxa xaux* ov noi x6x' riyopevexe,
dXX' av5p* aypoiKOv xal yepovx* enfipExe;
XO. 'H^eiq noov^ev xavG' EKdoxoO', oxav xivd
yvoi^ev Jiovrip&v ovx* epaaxriv Jipay^-dxcov,
t(oq av av)x6v e^iPdXxo^iev ei^ kukov,
O7i(oq dv el5fi xovq Oeovq SeSoiKevai.
ST. "iijxoi TiovTipd y', (i) Ne<peX«i, SiKaia 5e-
oii ydp |j.' exP'Hv xd xP'HM-otQ' d5avevad|iTiv
drtooxepeiv.
It was, the Clouds insist, Strepsiades' own silly fault. He "twisted" himself
into bad trouble. The collocation of words, aTpev|/a(;-eKfipeTe-epaGTTi(;,
balancing the Clouds' earlier warning, once more might recall Ixion as the
lustful man caught up in delusion and punished on the airborne wheel. For
Strepsiades' "airborne" adventures in the realm of ideas, clouds, and xa
^etecopa have belied his passionate hopes, bringing him to reversal,
recognition, and punishment, as on the wheel of time. He comes perilously
near to becoming an Ixion, a tragic hero, perhaps a Euripidean one.
Perilously near: But there are differences, and they are crucial.
For Strepsiades, though humiliated, is not finally hurt. His repentance
is comic repentance, in the manner of Verdi's Falstaff: He may speak
ruefully, may admit (as beasts often do in Aesop's fables) that "it served me
right"; but that is quite enough, and he will move quickly to new resolution
and new action: the burning of the Phrontisterion. As for the Clouds'
judgment on him, Strepsiades (by now) recognizes teasing, recognizes
comic moralizing when he hears it. He insists, quite rightly, that the
Clouds' alleged justice was as "naughty" in its way as his own attempt to
evade paying his debts. Not only, that is, are the Clouds not representatives
of the old morahty and religion: They are irresponsible spirits, independent
comic agents in their own right, who serve only their own wilful sense of
play. (I have compared them elsewhere to Shakespeare's fairies in A
Midsummer Night's Dream.)^ Although their trickery towards Strepsiades
was evoked in part by their observation and comic mimesis of Strepsiades'
own tricky nature, and in part by their patronage of Socrates and related
intellectual frauds (who may, however, become victims in their turn), still
this little dndtTi is only one manifestation of their immortal, illusionary,
ever-changing playfulness.
Strepsiades, then, is like Ixion—and unlike. The cumulative
similarities of word and act, the clouds, centaurs, and turning wheels, lead us
finally to appreciate the comic hero's strength in not being, precisely, a
^Reckford (above, note 15) 222.
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tragic hero. The Clouds has painful moments. It flirts with tragedy, even
as it parodies it (the second creditor). There are paratragic laments, very
close to Euripides. The reversal plot itself is very Euripidean, very close to
Hecuba and Andromache. The audience may have felt the closeness, may
have been disturbed by it—and by other serious implications of the Clouds.
And yet, it is not a tragedy, as Strepsiades is not Ixion. He survives
humiliation. He refuses to accept defeat. He is resilient, as clowns and
Athenians should be. In the end, he may claim rightful (or wrongful)
descent from Odysseus, "man of many turns," and from Pindar's victors in
the chariot race and the wrestling match. Is it a coincidence, after all, that
the champion of Isthmian 7 (the pankration) is named Strepsiades?^
University ofNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill
^ This essay is submitted in grateful memory of Friedrich Solmsen, who read Pindar
with me in 1978-79 and provided much scholarly counsel over the years. He approved the
present thesis in embruo, referring me to Von der Miihll, and led me on with sherry,
cookies, and encouragement. But I must admit, despite Aristophanic temptations to the
contrary, that the responsibility for any subsequent faults is my own.
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Herodotus and Athens
MARTIN OSTWALD
"Because of the greatness of our city there is an influx of all things from the
entire world, with the result that the enjoyment of goods produced at home
is no more familiar to us than the produce of other men" (Thuc. 2. 38. 2).
Pericles' words, as recorded in the Funeral Oration Thucydides attributes to
him, are often taken as characterizing the age over which he presided. There
are good reasons in abundance for doing so. But they can be faulted for an
egregious omission: The influx of the material goods and the prosperity
they signal also brought to Athens an influx of foreign artists and
intellectuals. The Funeral Oration makes only passing reference, if any, to
them in Pericles' boasts that Athens is hospitable to foreigners (2. 39. 1)
and that the entire city is "an education for Greece" (xr[<; 'E'kXabo(;
7iai6e\)aiv 2. 41. 1). Like Pericles, we tend to be so blinded by Athenian
achievements in tragedy, comedy, and historiography in the fifth century
that we lose sight of the large number of foreigners who contributed to
Athenian culture at this time. Pericles was himself closely associated with
at least two of them, Aspasia and Anaxagoras. In his lifetime, too,
Protagoras, the first of the foreign sophists, came to Athens from his native
Abdera, and Hippodamus was invited from Miletus to design a new plan for
the bustling and expanding Piraeus. Prominent foreign artists were active in
Athens about this time: Polygnotus of Thasos, Agatharchus of Samos,
Zeuxis of Heraclea, Agoracritus of Paros, and others; tragedies were
performed of Aristarchus of Tegea, Archaeus of Eretria, and Ion of Chios;
most of the dithyrambic poetry the Athenians heard was composed by
foreigners (Melanippides of Melos, Phrynis of Mytilene, Timotheus of
Miletus, etc.), and among prose writers we find Stesimbrotus of Thasos and
Hellanicus of Lesbos.
Foremost among the prose writers attracted to Athens in the fifth
century was one of the foremost writers of Greek prose of any period,
Herodotus of Halicamassus. What attracted him to Athens can only be
conjectured: It may have been merely part of his passion for travel, it may
have been the intellectual climate of the Periclean Age, or it may have been
a desire to visit the focus of resistance against the Persians in the previous
generation. In view of the prominence given to Athens in his narrative, it
is surprising how little about his relation to Athens has been preserved in
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the ancient traditions about his life. The most detailed account, that in the
Suda (s.v. 'Hp65oTo<;), mentions his birth in HaUcamassus—presumably in
the mid-480s— , his exile in Samos, his return to his home to help
overthrow the tyrant Lygdamis, and his participation in the Athenian
settlement of Thurii, where he is said to have spent the rest of his life. It
says nothing about his travels and nothing about his stay in Athens. For
the latter we depend on a few scraps of information which tell us that in
445/4 B.C. "he was honoured by the Athenian Council for having read his
books to them" (Eus. Chron., Olymp. 83.4); we are told, further, that "on
the motion of Anytus, he received from Athens a gift of ten talents"
(Diyllus, FGrH 73 F 3); and elsewhere we learn that Thucydides was reduced
to tears by one of his lectures (Marcellin. 54). ^ That Thucydides attended
lectures by Herodotus in Athens is chronologically improbable: He will
have been no more than ten to fifteen years old in the 440s, and after his
stay in Athens Herodotus settled in Thurii. But when we combine this
story with the dated tradition that Herodotus was honoured for his reading, it
remains credible that Herodotus visited Athens and delivered lectures in the
mid-440s; the fact that he was publicly honoured is corroborated by the
tradition, whose general accuracy is guaranteed by the name of Anytus
associated with it, that he received a gift from the state. However, the sum
of ten talents is somewhat high to deserve credence, considering that a
similar gift by the Athenians to Pindar is said to have amounted to only one
talent and two thirds (10,000 drachmas).^ Perhaps we may assume, without
support from any ancient source, that in addition to his readings Herodotus
had j)erformed other meritorious services for the city.
We are even in a position to form a reasonably accurate idea of the kind
of readings he gave in Athens. The "books" from which he read at that time
cannot have been his work in the shape in which it has come down to us.
At least negatively we can be fairly sure that they cannot have included the
narrative of the Persian Wars now to be found in Books 6-9, because these
books contain references to events which did not take place until the late
430s: The expulsion of the Aeginetans from their homes, referred to at 6.
91. 1, did not occur until 431 B.C.; incidents of the Peloponnesian War,
which broke out in 432/1 B.C., are mentioned at 7. 137. 1 and 9. 73. 3; and
the Theban attack on Plataea, which started that war, was known to him
when he wrote 7. 233. 2.
But there are also positive pointers and they suggest that he lectured on
his travels and on the people and places he had encountered. I am thinking
of four instances in which he adduces Athenian parallels to explain foreign
^ On Herodotus and Athens, see F. Jacoby, "Herodotos." RE Suppl. H (1913) 226-^2;
H. Kleinknecht, "Herodot und Alhen." Hermes 75 (1940) 241-62; H. Strasburger. "Herodot
und das perikleische Athen." Historia 9 (1955) 1-25; C. W. Fomara. Herodotus: An
Interpretative Essay (Oxford 1971) 37-58.
^Isoc. 15. 166; cf. [Aesch.] Ep. 4. 3.
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phenomena: In discussing the outer circuit wall of Ecbatana, he compares
its size with the circumference of the walls of Athens (1. 98. 5); when he
refers to the Persian cubic measure artabe (1. 192. 3), he gives its equivalent
in Attic medimnoi and choinikes; to give an idea of the distance of
Heliopolis from the sea, he relates it to the distance of the altar of the
Twelve Gods in Athens from Pisa and the Temple of Zeus at Olympia (2. 7.
1); and when he speaks of the shape of the Tauric peninsula (the Crimea) he
compares it with the peninsula on the point of which Sunium is located (4.
99. 5). These analogies, it seems to me, make sense only to an audience as
intimately familiar with Athens and Attica as only the Athenians are likely
to have been; they therefore permit the inference that they formed part of
Herodotus' Athenian lectures. Some corroboration of this is the comparison
of the Tauric peninsula with features of the region between Brindisi and
Taranto in Southern Italy, which immediately follows the analogy with the
Sunium peninsula. The guess is not unreasonable that this addition was
made in a later revision of this part of his work, in order to adapt his
example to the experiences of an audience he was addressing in Magna
Graecia. Although this does not constitute irrefutable proof of anything, it
makes it extremely likely that he introduced local comparisons to make his
presentation of foreign peoples and places more graphic to whatever audience
he was addressing. If this argument is sound, we may conclude that he
lectured in Athens on sites he had visited in Persia, Egypt, and Scythia—^all
places which, as we know from other evidence, he had visited before he
came to Athens.
Was Herodotus already interested in "history" in the sense in which ^ye,
following in his footsteps, understand the term, when he lectured in Athens?
Certainly, the fact that traces of only geographical and ethnographical
lectures have survived does not mean that he had nothing to say on the
history of the places he had visited. On the contrary, it is unthinkable that
his accounts of Persia, Egypt, and Scythia should not have included what he
had seen and heard about important events which these places had
experienced in the past and which we find embedded in his narrative. But it
is questionable whether the conception of the work as a whole, integrating
as it does the Persian Wars with the events in different parts of the world
that led up to it, which constitutes Herodotus' claim to the title of "father of
history,"^ was already present in his mind when he visited Athens. In the
absence of any evidence, it is at least plausible that this conception was
stimulated by his stay in the city, which had roused itself from the rubble in
which the Persians had left it to become an imperial and cultural centre
second to none in the Greek world.
' On this point, see especially Jacoby (above, note 1) 467-86. The arguments of D.
Fehling, Die Quellenangaben bei Herodot (Berlin and New York 1971; English tr. by J. G.
Howie [Leeds 1989]), contrived to deny that claim, are unconvincing, despite their
occasional insights; see the review by J. Cobet in Gnomon 46 (1974) 737-46.
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Herodotus is even more reticent about himself and his life than is
Thucydides, and this reticence extends also to the names of his informants.
The crucial role played by the Athenians in the battles of Marathon,
Artemisium, Salamis, and Mycale makes it a priori likely that a large
number of his informants were Athenians, who would supply him with
tales of the glorious exploits of their ancestors in these engagements, but
also with accounts of earlier events in Athenian history, such as the
Cylonian revolt (5. 71), the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons, its
overthrow, and the establishment of the Cleisthenean democracy (1. 59-64,
5. 55-97). The Athenians are more frequently mentioned as a source of
information than any other Greek people and are exceeded only by the
Egyptians.'* To identify individual informants is impossible even in those
cases where individual experiences are related, such as Dicaeus' vision on the
Thriasian plain (8. 65) or the exploits of Sophanes of Deceleia (6. 92. 2, 9.
73_74). However, there is so much detailed and often intimate information
on a number of noble families that the inference is inevitable that Herodotus
had free access to members of the upper classes and enjoyed their confidence.
The complexity of the relationship of Peisistratus to the Philaidae, the
family of which Miltiades and Cimon were members, is such that one is
tempted to assume that Herodotus learned of it from a family member, who
also showed him the tomb of Miltiades' father Cimon (6. 34-41, 103. 2-4,
136. 3). He is so well informed about the history of the Alcmeonids (6.
125-31) and so anxious to clear them of responsibility for the traitorous
shield-signal given to the Persians at the time of Marathon (6. 121-24) that
close personal connections between him and one or more of their number
have been inferred. A similarly cordial relation to the Kerykes, one of the
families in charge of the sanctuary of Demeter at Eleusis and its mystery
cult, can be inferred from the details he knows of their ancestor Callias under
the tyrants (6. 121-22). He knows what the Gephyraei believe about their
own provenance and what other Athenians believe about it (5. 57. 1),
indicating acquaintance with living Gephyraei as well as with their
opponents. Further, the numerous anecdotes told to denigrate the moral
qualities of Themistocles (8. 4. 2, 57-58, 112. 1, 124. 1-2) are likely to
come from descendants of Athenians prominent at the time of Salamis who
opposed the policies of the man who made Athens a naval power. Yet
hostile and complimentary strands are so tightly interwoven with one
another that we must assume that Herodotus integrated the family traditions
he had learned with more general popular traditions current about the past.^
* See the list in Jacoby (above, note 1) 398-99.
^ See the excellent discussions of R. Thomas. Oral Tradition and Written Record in
Classical Athens (Cambridge 1989). esp. 171-73 on the Philaidae; 247-51 and 264-81
on the Alcmeonids; 109 and 252 with n. 34 on the Gephyraei; and 206 n. 37 and 224 on
Themistocles.
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Modern scholars have often interpreted Herodotus' work as an
encomium on Athens, on democracy, on the Alcmeonids, and on their most
illustrious scion, Pericles,^ Of Herodotus' respect and admiration for all of
these there can be no doubt, but his admiration was neither blind nor
confined to Athens, and above all it did not make Herodotus an apologist for
Athens tout courtJ Herodotus recognized that the deployment of sea power
was the single most decisive factor in the victory of the Greeks over the
Persians, to whom they were inferior in manpower and in materiel. It is for
realizing this fact, for acquiescing in the abandonment of their city to be
ravaged by the Persians (8. 40-41) and for relinquishing the command of the
allied navy to the Spartans lest divisiveness undermine Greek survival (8. 3)
that Athens is praised as the "saviour of Greece" (7. 139). But note the
preface to this praise: "At this point, I am constrained by hard facts to state
publicly a judgment which will be invidious to the majority of mankind;
none the less, I shall not hold back what seems to me to be true" (7. 139.
1). This statement shows that he is writing not a panegyric nor a defence of
Athenian policy at the time of writing, but a fact about the past which
contemporaries did not like to hear. Moreover, Herodotus' admiration for
Athens did not make him blind to the fact that the Spartan contribution to
the victory was no less decisive than the Athenian. Even though their stand
at Thermopylae was doomed to failure, the fact that it was made under the
command of their king Leonidas gave an example to the rest of the Greeks
which evoked Herodotus' unbounded admiration (7. 204 and 220). Further,
it is at Plataea, not at Salamis, that the Greeks won what Herodotus calls
"the noblest victory of any that we know," a victory credited to the
leadership of the Spartan Pausanias (9. 64. 1).
Similarly, Herodotus' praise of the Athenian democracy is no simple
encomium on a particular form of government or on a particular state. In
fact, he never praises democracy as "democracy," but applauds it where he
does under names which suggest his admiration of a particular aspect of it.
In the Constitutional Debate which he places in Persia after the overthrow
of a usurper, he praises popular rule as "government by the people which
has the fairest name of all, political equality (ioovop.{T|)" (3. 80. 6); and he
extols its Athenian variety as "right of free speech (laTiyopiri)," which the
Athenians acquired after they had expelled the tyrants. But that does not
mean that he is blind to its shortcomings. Some of these are summed up in
Megabyzus' statement in the Constitutional Debate that "there is nothing
more devoid of insight or more prone to arrogance (hybris) than a useless
mob" (3. 81. 1); another in Herodotus' comment on Aristagoras' success in
Athens after his failure at Sparta to enlist support for the Ionian Revolt, that
"it seems easier to hoodwink many than one, since he was unable to
^E.g.. F. D. Harvey, "The Political Sympathies of Herodotus," Historia 15 (1966) 254-
55.
^ Strasburger and Fomara (above, note 1 ).
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hoodwink one man, the Lacedaemonian Cleomenes, but managed to do so in
the case of thirty thousand Athenians" (5. 97. 2); and yet another in how the
clever Athenians were duped to accept Peisistratus as tyrant (1. 60. 3-4),
However, Herodotus does not praise laTiyopiTi for its own sake but as having
given Athens the freedom (eXevGepiri) which she had not enjoyed under the
tyranny and through which a great city became even greater (5. 78; cf. 66.
1), The winning of this freedom for themselves enabled them later "to
choose that Greece should survive free" and thus "to arouse the entire rest of
the Greek world which did not medize and to repel the King of Persia with
the help of the gods" (7. 139. 5).
There is no need here to demonstrate that for HerodoUis the issue in the
Persian Wars was the affirmation of freedom against the threat of slavery.
But it must be pointed out that, whatever Herodotus' own attitude toward
democracy may have been, he praised iaTiyopiri only for having given
Athens that liberty which enabled her to lead the Greeks in the fight for their
freedom, even if initially the Spartans regarded the newly won Athenian
freedom as a challenge to their own supremacy in Greece (5. 91. 1).
Nevertheless, the Athenians had no monopoly on freedom. The most
rousing treatment of this theme is put into a Spartan context, when the
exiled Spartan king Demaratus explains to an incredulous Xerxes at the
crossing of the Hellespont that the Spartans, "though free are not free in
every respect: law (nomas) is master over them, and they fear it far more
than your subjects fear you" (7. 104. 4). What this means is strikingly
illustrated by the behaviour of the Spartans Sperthias and Boulis who had
volunteered to be sent as hostages to Persia (7. 134-36, esp. 135. 3). After
explaining at the Persian court that the Spartans will never surrender to
Persia, because they have tasted a freedom alien to the Persian slave
mentality, they refuse to do obeisance to the Persian king on the ground that
their customs (nomoi) enjoin them from bowing down before a human
being. Evidently, love of freedom is Herodotus' primary concern; whether it
was exemplified in lariYopiii or in obedience to the law was of secondary
importance to him.
There can be no doubt that Herodotus was aware of the prominent role
the Alcmeonids had played and were still playing in the history of Athens.
The fact that the birth of the most prominent Alcmeonid of his own time,
Pericles, was prefigured by his mother's dream of giving birth to a lion is
neither ominous nor complimentary, but simply indicates that Pericles was
a man to be reckoned with (6. 125-31). Herodotus' defence of the family
against the charge of treason at the time of Marathon (6. 121-24) is often
taken as a sign of partiality for them. But since there is little other evidence
for such partiality, Herodotus may simply have found it difficult to beheve
that a family which had rendered such outstanding service to the state in the
past could have been responsible for the shield-signal which, he knows for
sure, was given to the Persians. It is commonly thought that this defence is
evidence for an Alcmeonid source for Herodotus. That is plausible and
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perhaps even probable, but it does not rest on firm foundations: Herodotus
may well have learned of the charge from sources hostile to the Alcmeonids
and may have rejected it on the basis of his own judgment of what this
prominent family would or would not be capable of doing.
Our difficulty in this regard is due to Herodotus' failure to mention even
a single Athenian informant by name. But we know from other sources the
name of one prominent Athenian with whom he must have established a
close personal relationship, and that is the tragedian Sophocles. The
external evidence for this relationship consists in the opening of an epigram
quoted by Plutarch (Mor. 785b): "Sophocles at the age of fifty-five
composed a song for Herodotus" (q)5tiv 'HpoSoxo) xexi^ev locpoKX-fiq
Execov wv / Tievt' etiI TievxriKOvta, Page, Epigrammata Graeca 466-67),
which was evidently written as a dedication to accompany the song. Since
Sophocles was bom in 497/6 B.C., the date of this occasion will be ca.
442/1 B.C., about the time when the evidence of Eusebius' Chronicle
attests Herodotus' presence in Athens. This is also the time in which
Sophocles wrote his Antigone. It has long been seen that the passage in
that play in which Antigone explains her preference for her brother by
arguing that, once one's parents are dead, he ^one is irreplaceable, whereas a
husband or child is not (904-24), depends on Herodotus' story about the
wife of Intaphemes (3. 1 19. 3-6), who, when given the choice by Darius to
have one member of her family exempted from execution, opted for her
brother: "O King, I could get another husband, God willing, and other
children, if I were to lose these; but since my father and mother are no
longer living, there is no way in which I could get another brother." The
parallels between Antigone's arguments and those of the wife of Intaphemes
are so close that they have been taken to corroborate the personal contact
between tragedian and historian which is suggested by the fragmentary
epigram.* A close relationship between tragedian and historian is further
suggested by two other Sophoclean passages. Clytaemnestra's ominous
dream in the Electra (417-27), in which Agamemnon's ancient scepter
sprouted into a tree which overshadowed the whole of Mycene, presages the
return of Orestes in a way similar to that in which the dream Herodotus (1.
108. 1-2) attributes to the Median king Astyages forewarns of the birth of
Cyrus. Here a vine covering the whole of Asia sprang forth from the
genitals of his daughter Mandane. Again, Oedipus' comparison of his sons
to Egyptian males in the Oedipus at Colonus (337-41), who sit at home
weaving while their wives go out to provide the necessities of life may well
be indebted to Herodotus' account (2. 35. 2-^) of Egyptian men weaving at
home, while their women buy and sell in the market-place. True, both
these plays were probably written some time after' Herodotus' death
* Jacoby (above, note 1) 232-37.
' C. W. Fomara. "Evidence for the Date of Herodotus' Publication." JHS 91 (1971) 25-
34, argued for as late a date as 414 B.C.; this view was attacked by J. Cobet, "Wann wurde
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(performed ca. 420 and 401 B.C., respectively); but it is worth remembering
that tales from Persia and Egypt were part of Herodotus' lectures in Athens.
These two incidents may well have become engraved in Sophocles' mind at
the time of Herodotus' visit to be recalled in these later plays. Moreover,
on a superficial level, a similarity between the two authors can be seen in
the importance of dreams, oracles, prophecies, and warnings that influence
the lives of legendary heroes in Sophocles and those of historical figures of
an ascertainable past in Herodotus; it is further manifested in the prominence
given by both authors to concepts such as hybris (offensive pride), tisis
(vengeance), dike (justice), phthonos (jealousy, envy), and ate (moral
indifference leading to ruin) as motivations for human conducL^^
To go beyond these similarities to assert that Herodotus' view of the
historical process owes something to Sophocles is a plausible conjecture
incapable of proof. But it is a point worth pursuing, for, it seems to me,
both authors share a perception of human life that is not shared by any other
two authors in the whole of Greek hterature. To demonstrate this similarity
in detail would take me beyond the scope of my present task. But I must
indicate a little more clearly what I have in mind.
The tragic aspect of Herodotus' work has been described so beautifully
by David Asheri in his recent edition of the first book of Herodotus^ ^ that
his observations are worth quoting. Asheri remarks how the mechanism of
historical development operates in Herodotus, as it does in tragedy, through
an unconscious cooperation of gods and men. "In Herodotus," he writes,
"history repeats itself in this sense: Behind the multifariousness and
variability of particular events, which never repeat themselves, there exist
archetyp^ models which remain and recur and which can be detected by way
of analogy: 'I know,' says Artabanus to Xerxes (7. 18. 2-3), 'how bad it is
to desire many things; for I remember how Cyrus fared in his expedition
against the Massagetae, I also remember Cambyses' expedition against the
Ethiopians, and I participated in Darius' campaign against the Scythians.
Knowing all that, I have reached the conclusion that you, Xerxes, can be the
happiest man in the eyes of all humanity, if you do not move <against the
Greeks>.' Artabanus, that is, Herodotus, shows that behind specific Persian
expeditions—different in detail, conducted by different kings against different
peoples—there looms a recurrent 'model' of expansionism failed. If a
particular event catches our interest as a curiosity, it gains historical
significance as a symptomatic and paradigmatic phenomenon. That does not
mean that Herodotus falsifies particulars so as to adapt them to the model;
Herodots Darstellung der Perserkriege publiziert?" Hermes 105 (1977) 2-27. Fomara
responded with more convincing arguments in "Herodotus' Knowledge of the Archidamian
"^ar," Hermes 109 (1981) 149-56.
1° Schmid-Stahlin 1.2 (1933) 569-72.
" D. Asheri (ed. and comm.), Erodoto. Le storie I (Milan 1988) xliv-xlv.
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but a paradigmatic history necessarily implies a selection of human actions.
In this respect, Herodotus is more of a philosopher than a historian, if
philosophy, in the Ionian sense of the word, is primarily the search for
being in becoming. Moreover, he is more of a poet than a historian, even
though he wrote prose, because he is interested more in what might happen
than in what really happened, less in 'what Alcibiades did and suffered' than
in the paradigm."
I believe that it is possible to go beyond this to point out that
Herodotus shares this paradigm more closely with Sophocles than either
with Aeschylus or Euripides. Chronological considerations apart, which
make such an influence unlikely, Euripides' tragic vision tends to consist in
frail, vulnerable humans buffeted about by hostile powers in a world not of
their own making. There is Utile of that in Herodotus. Nor does Herodotus
share with Aeschylus the view of a moral universe in which superhuman
forces control a human destiny which leaves to human agents little more
than a choice that makes them links in a chain of events already
predetermined in the mysterious ways of heredity. Just as Sophoclean drama
is shaped by great individuals—^an Oedipus, an Ajax, an Antigone—who, in
acting reasonably according to their lights, fall victim to forces over which
they have no control, so Herodotus sees the mainspring of historical
developments in individuals placed in situations in which their decisions
lead not only them but also the people whose destiny is tied up with theirs
to an end which they did not foresee.
Sophoclean characters find themselves in conditions in which, however
reasonably they act, their actions will inevitably have consequences which
recoil against them and against those close to them in kinship, friendship,
or citizenship: Oedipus, in performing his royal duty in trying to rid
Thebes of a plague, discovers the identity which fate had hidden from him
and falls, a blind exile, from his high station; Creon, in trying to restore
balance to a state wrecked by fraternal war, stumbles against the religious
obligations incumbent upon members of the family; Deianeira, in
attempting to regain the love of her husband, destroys him. However good
their intentions, however logical their aims, Sophoclean characters discover
the limits of their humanity as set by inscrutable and inexorable forces. An
Oedipus or a Creon may be warned of what is to come by a Teiresias, but
no warning can avert what is in store for them.
A remarkably similar view of the human condition is taken by
Herodotus both in working out the theme of his work as a whole and in
innumerable details in his narrative which serve as building blocks for his
structure. ^^ History is enacted by persons whom character, family, and
social and political mores and traditions have placed into situations with
which they cope as reasonably as they can according to their lights, but
^^ J. Cobet, Herodots Exkurse und die Frage der Einheit seines Werkes, Historia
Einzelschriften 17 (Wiesbaden 1971).
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cannot control the outcome of their actions. A decision once made is
subject to the inexorable laws of an external necessity, a force which,
though divine, can be communicated to men by gods, especially by Apollo
and his oracle, but is apparently not determined by them. In Herodotus, the
fate of a great individual is usually identical with the fate of his people; his
doom is their doom. This is the thread that holds together the large issue
central to the work, the wars between Greeks and barbarians from the first
major encroachment of non-Greeks upon Greek territories to the re-
establishment of a natural boundary—the Hellespont—between them.
Beginning and end of his narrative are tied together by a statement of
the external features of his paradigm: The theme that states which were
formerly great have become small and those now great were small in the
past is placed near the opening of Book 1 (5. 4) and echoed toward the end in
Book 9 (27. 4). As in Sophoclean tragedy, history is enacted by great
individuals: Rejecting mythical accounts, he starts out by naming Croesus
as "the individual whom I know to have been the first to perpetrate acts of
injustice against the Greeks" (1. 5. 3-6. 1), and the fate of Croesus is the
fate of Lydia, just as the fate of Media and subsequent rise of Persia is the
fate of Cyrus, and just as the fate of Persia becomes identical with the fate
of Xerxes. Although a tragic setting is not sustained with equal intensity
throughout the work, it is hinted at in the discovery on the part of all the
major figures involved in the conflict between east and west that certain
limits are set to human existence and that good fortune is never constant.
Croesus, though warned by Solon that wealth and power do not constitute
happiness, learns his lesson the hard way when he attacks Persia; Cyrus is
taught by his attack on the Massagetae that he was misguided in "his belief
in his more-than-human birth and good fortune in war" (1. 204. 2), despite
Croesus' attempt to make his captor profit from his experience; Cambyses'
mad lust for expansion is checked by the Ethiopians, Darius' by the
Scythians, and Xerxes' by the Greeks.
The inevitability of the pattern inherent in the paradigm is driven home
by innumerable vignettes whose structures exhibit a distinctly Sophoclean
irony. There is, in the first place, the story of Candaules, whose excessive
infatuation with his wife boded a bad end (1. 8. 2: xp^iv yap Kav5auX,T]
yeveoGai KaK&q), which came to pass through the duress his actions
eventually imposed on Gyges; we find it in the story of Arion and the
dolphin, which shows that those who believe that they can enrich
themselves with impunity through murder on the high sea cannot get away
with their crime; we find it in the story of Polycrates who, though willingly
accepting the advice to give up his most treasured possession, retrieved it in
spite of himself and met a horrible end. And we find it in a most striking
way when a dream makes Xerxes realize that he cannot back out of his
decision to march against Greece, however much he desires to do so. In the
detailed narration of events as well as on the larger canvas of his history,
Herodotus shows human agents placed in situations in which they are
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constrained to act in ways which are bound to lead to failure, because they
do not recognize until it is too late the limits which their humanity has set
for them.
The similarities between the tragic view Herodotus takes of historical
events in their large movement as well as in subsidiary details and
Sophocles' treatment of the human condition is so striking that we are
entitled to wonder whether they resulted from discussions between these two
men. We have no way of telling either whether Herodotus had developed it
sufficiently by the time he arrived in Athens in the 440s to transmit it to
Sophocles or whether his friendship with Sophocles made him see the
information he had gathered on his travels in a new way, which became the
organizing principle of the work as a whole when, a decade or so later, he
prepared the work as a whole for publication in Thurii. If we could be
certain that the subject of his lectures in Athens was nothing but his travels,
we could feel more confident than we can feel on the basis of the meager
evidence we have that Sophocles' tragic vision had a greater impact on him
than his stories had on Sophocles. In any event, it is unlikely that two
such similar conceptions of human life should have developed in complete
isolation one from the other. A further argument which would favour
Sophocles' influence on Herodotus is that he was working in a tradition of
tragedy which had been well established in Athens at least since the days of
Aeschylus. We know of no similar tradition to which Herodotus could have
been exposed before his arrival in Athens. That he did leave a mark on
Athens is amply attested by Aristophanes' AcharmansP
The tragic view does not divide men into saints and sinners, but
presents them objectively as frail creatures placed into situations in which
their decision will subject them to transcendent laws that will reveal the
limits of their humanity and lead to failure or even ruin. For Herodotus,
cities, states, and peoples operate under the same kind of constraint, and
this, as we have seen, is one of the reasons why his admiration for Athens
or for Sparta cannot be unconditional. He tells us at the opening and toward
the end of his work that he will deal with cities both great and small, since
"cities which were formerly great have for the most part become small, and
those which were great in my own time were formerly small," and this leads
him to the knowledge that "human happiness never remains constant" (1. 5.
4). It is inconceivable that a man holding these views was unaware of or
indifferent to the events going on in his own contemporary world,
dominated as it was by the imperial policy of a city which the sequel of the
Persian Wars had catapulted from comparative insignificance at the time she
first enters Herodotus' narrative to a greatness that set her on a collision
course with Sparta.^'* Whether Herodotus approved or disapproved of
" Cf. Ar. Ach. 523-29 and Hdt. 1. 1^. Further paraUels are cited by Jacoby (above,
note 1) 232.
^* Fomara (above, note 1) 59-91.
148 Illinois Classical Studies, XVI
Athens' imperial policy we do not know. But he is likely to have
recognized it as an inevitable consequence of the role Athens had played in
the Persian Wars, and his knowledge of human affairs made him foresee the
conflagration to which it was leading.
Herodotus' migration from Athens to Thurii, where he seems to have
spent the rest of his life, used to be seen as prompted by his support of
Periclean policy. More recently it has been suggested that he was motivated
by disenchantment with Pericles for hiding imperial designs under the
pretext of the panhellenic policy advocated in the guise of the Congress
Decree, and that he sought fulfillment of his panhellenic ideal in the new
colony.'^ However, it is more likely that he left Athens and did not return
to his native Halicarnassus because he knew that both places would be
embroiled in the conflict that was sure to come. Thurii was far removed
from the scene where the action would take place and it would give him the
intellectual and social ambience in which he could live out his days as a
keen observer of human life.
Swarthmore College and University ofPennsylvania
^^ Strasburger (above, note 1) 23-25.
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The Closure of Herodotus' Histories
JOHN HERINGTON
1. Introduction
The questiion whether the Histories, as we have it, ends at the point where
Herodotus intended it to end has been debated for more than a century, and
even now there seems to be no firm consensus as to the answer. Although
over the past few decades the majority of students seem to have inclined to
the affirmative for various reasons, a respected authority on Herodotus could
still conclude, in 1985, that "there is in fact no proper ending to the work,
and though I have accepted the capture of Sestos as a logically reasonable
endpoint, other material could well have followed and some kind of 'epic'
conclusion might well have been expected."^ The present article reconsiders
the question in the hope that, at least, a greater measure of certainty is
attainable than that.
On one factor in the problem only there seems to be general agreement,
and this may be discussed fairly briefly: As a historical narrative of the wars
between the Greeks and Persians, the Histories is clearly unfinished. Many
scholars, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, observed
(perfectly correctly) that as a matter of history those wars did not end with
the capture of Sestos; and from this they concluded that Herodotus did not
live, or perhaps did not care, to complete his project.^ The conclusion
seemed to be reinforced by Uie observation of Lipsius that the last sentence
in Herodotus' actual narrative of die war (9. 121), "and during this year
* K. H. Waters, Herodotus the Historian (Norman 1985) 114. The continuing
uncertainty on the subject may be illustrated by two quite recent opinions. David Asheri in
his general introduction to Erodoto: le Storie I (MUan 1988) xx-xxi, holds that at 9. 122,
Herodotus' work "termina o, meglio, si interrompe. Manca almeno un epilogo"; John
Gould, Herodotus (New York 1989) 18, remarks that Herodotus' "choice of an ending has
surprised and disconcerted some modem readers, and the assumption that he meant to
continue has provided a convenient explanation. But the sense of incongruity is more
likely due to our lack of sensitivity to Herodotus' own criteria for determining the proper
shape of a narrative."
^ The most influential proponent of this view was no doubt Felix Jacoby, in his justly
famed article "Herodotus" {RE Suppl.2, Stuttgart 1913). esp. cols. 372-79; the same
passage contains a survey of the earlier literature on the question.
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nothing happened any more beyond these things,"^ belongs to a group of
transition-iormulae, that occur fairly frequently within the Histories; could
there be clearer proof that Herodotus had somehow been prevented from
completing his intended narrative? Only in 1924 was confidence in this
conclusion weakened by the observation of H. Frankel'* that this ending of
the Histories conformed to the widespread archaic literary practice
(exemplified above all in the Homeric and Hesiodic epics) of leaving the
narrative open-ended, for a continuator to pick up on at some future time.
In that case the last words in 9. 121 are no proof that the work is
unfinished; rather they may be a deliberate invitation to someone else (a
someone who in the event turned out to be Thucydides) to carry on the story
from that point. But Frankel's observation of course leaves untouched the
simple fact that, for whatever reason, Herodotus' work does not complete
the narrative of the Persian wars.
On the other hand, during the past five or six decades a number of
observations have accumulated to suggest that the ending of the Histories
presents a paradox: While the book is open-ended as a strictly historical
narrative, as a work ofarchaic art it is perfectly and unambiguously closed.
Sections 2 and 3 of this article will review the final chapters of the Histories
(9. 108-22) in the light of those observations,^ adding one or two more that
seem to tend toward the same conclusion. In brief, we shall find that these
chapters are carefully—some might even be tempted to say, artificially
—
designed to recall the entire course and tendency of Herodotus' great story,
with special emphasis on its opening movements, and on the beginning of
its climax, Xerxes' expedition of 480/79. The method used is, in a word,
repetition: repetition of themes, situations, characters and even turns of
phrase, in such a way that the hearer is reminded, by parallel or contrast, of
those significant moments earlier in the work. What rhetorical term we
apply to this method, once identified, is perhaps in the last resort a matter of
indifference. For convenience, and for want of a more precise word, it will
hereafter be referred to as ring-composition. Not all will agree with this
extended definition of that term,^ but no more applicable one seems to exist,
and a certain degree ofjustification for it may be found in earlier usage.
' J. H. Lipsius, "Der Schluss des Herodoteischen Werkes," Leipziger Sludien zur
classischen Philologie 20 (1902) 195-202.
* Hermann Frankel, "Eine Stileigenheit der friihgriechischen Literatur," first published
in 1924, reprinted in his Wege und Formen friihgriechischen Denkens, ed. 2 (Munich
1960) 40-96; the remark referred to is found on p. 85.
^ The individual contributions of the various scholars concerned will be acknowledged,
so far as is practicable, as the discussion reaches the relevant passages in Herodotus. Here,
however, a special acknowledgement is due to the concise but richly suggestive
discussions of the closure of the Histories by Henry R. Immerwahr, Form and Thought in
Herodotus (Cleveland 1966) 8-9. 43 and 144-47.
^ Immerwahr (previous note) 54, n. 3, would confine the term primarily to verbal
repetitions, and would distinguish it sharply from "circular" or (after John L. Myres,
Herodotus, the Father of History [Oxford 1953]) "pedimental" composition. But there is
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W. A. van Otterlo thus defines ring-composition: "The theme set up at
the beginning of a given section is followed by a longer or shorter
discussion relating to it; and is then repeated at the end, in such a way that
the entire section is framed by statements of like content and more or less
similar wording. Thus it is closed off as a unified structure, clearly marked
off from the context."'' Van Otterlo, though not the first scholar to observe
the phenomenon,* was the first to treat it in depth and also, it seems, to
bring the term "ring-composition" into general currency. But his studies, so
far as they related to Herodotus, were concerned with ring-composition as a
device for defining units within the work, from the paragraph, through the
longer digressions, to the logoi. He does not seem to have entertained the
possibility that it might be employed to define the beginning and end of a
poem or narrative—to mark off the entire work, as it were, from its context
in life. That possibility was, indeed, acknowledged by Beck in her careful
dissertation on ring-composition in Herodotus, but in one passage only;' for
the topic (unfortunately for the rest of us) did not fall within the intended
scope of her book.
Finally, in section 4, it will very briefly be suggested that the closure
of the Histories is by no means unique in Greek literature. Other archaic
large-scale compositions, notably the Iliad, seem to present a similar
paradox: an open-ended narrative, an unmistakable artistic closure by means
of ring-composition in the wider sense here adopted.
2. The Closure of the Histories as a Whole
Most readers approaching the Histories for the first time must experience a
growing bewilderment once they have passed from its magnificent opening
sentence into the surreal world of the Mythological Proem. They may
momentarily recover their faith in the enterprise as they contemplate the
vast historical perspectives opened up in 1. 5. 3-7. 4; but the part-bawdy,
part-tragic tale of Gyges and Kandaules immediately follows that solemn
some precedent, as will shortly be seen, for the use of "ring-composition" to denote
thematic as well as verbal repetition; and neither "circular" nor "pedimental," at least as
Immerwahr uses these terms, seems to apply quite so aptly to the phenomena discussed in
this article.
^ W. A. van Otterlo, "Untersuchungen iiber Begriff, Anwendung und Entstehung der
griechischen Ringkomposition," Mededelingen der Nederlandse Akademie van
Wetenscfiappen, Afd. Letteikunde, N. R. 7 no. 3 (1944) 131-76; the passage here quoted
occurs on pp. 131-32.
* See his article (previous note) 131-32 for earlier writers on the subject; they include
H. Frankel (above, note 4), and Max Pohlenz, in his Herodot: der erste
Geschichtsschreiber des Abendlandes (Leipzig 1937).
' Ingrid Beck, Die Ringkomposition bei Herodot und ihre Bedeutung fiir die
Beweistechnik (Hildesheim 1971) 84, where she speaks of "die grossen gedanklichen
Ringkompositionen, die das iibergreifende Einheit des Werks umspannen," and adduces,
after Lesky, the episode of the Wisdom of Cyras (9. 122).
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moment. And so their perplexity continues, perhaps even as far as the
opening of the Persian logos in 1. 95.
Similar surprises, and similar modulations in tone and theme, await
those readers who persevere to the end of Herodotus' narrative. Those
chapters (9. 108-22) that succeed the account of the Mykale battle and its
aftermath contain three striking, and at first sight rather bizarre, episodes
that have this in common: Each recalls a crucial passage, and with it a
crucial theme, from the three major opening movements of the Histories.
These episodes are the sexual infatuation of Xerxes, the crucifixion of
Artayktes, and the advice of Cyrus the Great to the Persians.
The Xerxes episode (9. 108-13) is clearly designed as a pendant to, and
a reminder of, the episode that opens the Lydian logos: Gyges and
Kandaules (1. 8-13). The correspondences in location, characterization and,
not least, phraseology seem unmistakable. Herodotus takes care to point
out that Xerxes' infatuation began at Sardis, that is at the scene of the
Gyges-Kandaules episode and indeed of most of the Lydian logos; this
initial focus on Sardis is all the more striking since the major developments
in the story actually occur after the court has moved on to Sousa (9. 108,
end).^^ Both episodes concern the immoderate sexual conduct of an Eastern
monarch and its fearsome consequences; and both are narrated with a certain
ironic humor. Finally, as if Herodotus wished to make the parallelism clear
beyond any doubt, they have in common a number of verbal similarities, for
instance:
(1) The opening of each episode: 1. 8. 1 omoq 6fi wv 6 KavSa-uXtiq
TipdoOri XTyq ecovtot) yuvaiKOi;: compare 9. 108. 1 tote 6ti ev xfiGi
Idp5iai £0)v Tipa tfiq MaoiotEco yuvaiKoq.
(2) 1. 8. 2 xpfiv ydp KavSauXri yEVEoGai KaKcbq: compare 9. 109.
2, of Artaynte, tti Se, KaKox; ydp E6EE navoiKiT] ye\ioQai k. t. X.
(3) 1. 8. 3, Gyges to Kandaules, 6£G7ioTa, twa Xiyei<; Xoyov o-uk
hyiia, keA^vcov |j,e 6£aK0ivav t-qv e^tiv 0ETioao0ai yu^ivTiv;: compare
9. HI. 3, Masistes to Xerxes, w 6£a7ioTa, tiva p,oi Xoyov Xiyeic,
d%pT|aTov, keXevcov jxe yuvaiKa . . . ^lexevTa GvyaTEpa tt^v or[v
yfiiiai;
(4) 1. 10. 2, of the injured wife of Kandaules, [laQovaa dk x6 tioitiGev
EK io\> dvSpoq, K. X. X.: compare 9. 110. 1, of the angry wife of Xerxes,
[laQduoa Se x6 tioieuhevov, k. x. X.
(5) 1. 11. 3 6 Se r-uyn*; xeok; ^iev d7i£0a)p.a^£ xd XEyo^iEva k. x. X.:
compare 9. 111. 3 6 Se Maaioxriq dTioGcofidaaq xd XEy6\izva k. x. X.
^° It has actually been questioned whether Xerxes was in Sardis at the time of the battle
of Mykale, and not rather in upper Asia, coping with the Babylonian revolt; see R. W.
Macan, Herodotus: the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Books (London 1908), note on 9. 108.
Professional ancient historians will be better able than the present writer to judge this
matter, if Macan is by any chance right, the implications for Herodotus' methods are both
interesting and disturbing.
John Herington 153
(these happen to be the only two instances in Herodotus of the collocation
dnoGcona^Eiv tot A-eyoiieva).^^
The second episode that concerns us, the crucifixion of Artayktes (9.
116-20), carries us back to the Mythological Prologue of 1. 1. 1-5. 2, and
specifically to Herodotus' account of the Trojan War and of the eternal
division between Europe and Asia.^^ When Uie Athenians arrive before
Sestos, one of the Persians occupying the city is Artayktes, a man
notorious for his wickedness. Herodotus describes at some length how he
had seized, despoiled and defiled the shrine of the hero Protesilaos at nearby
Elaious, and the deception by which he had earlier persuaded Xerxes into
granting him possession of that shrine. "Sire," he had said (9. 1 16. 3), "at
that place is the house of a Greek who made an armed expedition
(strateusamenos) against your country and was slain, thus receiving his just
deserts. Grant me this man's house, that every man may learn not to make
an armed expedition against your country." Artayktes well knew that with
these words he would obtain his request from the unsuspecting Xerxes; for
he had chosen them (says Herodotus) in the knowledge that "the Persians
hold all of Asia to be the property of themselves and of their reigning king."
In the sequel, the Athenians occupy Sestos and capture the fleeing
Artayktes. While one of his guards is cooking some dried fish, a prodigy
occurs: The fish begin to wriggle about as if not dried, but newly caught.
Artayktes interprets this as a token of Protesilaos' divinely granted power,
even in death, to punish the wrongdoer, and offers to make lavish
reparations to the hero and to the Athenians. The Athenian general
Xanthippos, however, will have none of it. The Athenians take Artayktes
"to the headland to which Xerxes had joined the bridge by which he crossed,
or, some say, to the hill above the city of Madytos" (9. 120. 4), and there
nail him to a plank and stone his son before his eyes. They then sail for
home (9. 121), carrying their plunder with them, most notably the cables of
Xerxes' bridge, which they have found stored up in Sestos, and which they
will dedicate in the sanctuaries of the gods. The episode—and Herodotus'
entire narrative—ends with the famous sentence quoted earlier "And during
this year nothing happened any more beyond these things."
This episode at Sestos effectively closes both a greater and a lesser
circle. The lesser, which embraces the story of Xerxes' expedition into
Europe in Books 7-9, will be discussed shortly; for the present we shall
concentrate on the greater, which spans the entire Histories. The anecdote of
^^ E. Wolff. "Das Weib des Masisles." Hermes 92 (1964) 51-58 (reprinted in W. Marg.
Herodot, ed. 2 [Darmstadt 1965] 668-78), has provided a comprehensive study of the
resemblances between the two episodes in situation, content, lone and wording. On p. 56
he enumerates a number of verbal correspondences, including the second example in the
above list.
^^ This has been observed by more students of Herodotus than can be conveniently
enumerated; examples are Pohlenz (above, note 8) 163-64, and Immerwahr (above, note 5)
146.
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Artayktes and Prolesilaos recalls, verbally as well as thematically, the
passage in 1.4. 1-5. 1 in which Herodotus speaks of the Trojan War and of
its consequences for the future relations between Europe and Asia
—
consequences with which, in some sense, the world still has to live. By
undertaking that war, say the Persians, the Greeks put themselves mightily
in the wrong, "for they began making an armed expedition (strateuesthai)
against Asia before they, the Persians, did so against Europe . . . From this
point on, they say, they have ever thought the Greek nation to be their foe.
For the Persians claim Asia and the non-Greek nations that reside within it
for their own, while they consider Europe and the Greek nation to be things
apart. That is how the Persians say it happened; they find that the
beginning (arcH^ of their enmity against the Greeks came about through the
taking of Troy."
The Artayktes episode not merely recalls this entire passage, and the
momentous issues that it evokes; it also brings us back to the very first
hostile act of the Trojan War, when a Greek warrior first set foot on Asian
earth. Herodotus had no need to remind his contemporaries who Protesilaos
was, and not all modern commentators have thought fit to supply
Herodotus' omission. This hero, of course, was known to the Greek artists
of the fifth century, as he had been known to Homer, for one circumstance
above all: he was the earliest casualty in the Trojan War, having been slain
by a Dardanian "as he jumped from his ship, by far the first of the
Achaeans"(///arf2.702).i3
The Xerxes episode and the crucifixion of Artayktes recall respectively
the Lydian logos and the Mythological Prologue, both of which, though
their thematic importance is incalculable, are still only distantly connected
with the overriding theme of the Histories: the rise and disgrace of the
Persian power. The last of our three episodes, the Wisdom of Cyrus (9.
122), brings us back to the opening of that great story.^'^ At 1. 95. 1,
having formally taken leave of his Lydian logos, Herodotus announces:
"And from here our logos goes on to enquire who this Cyrus was who
destroyed the realm of Croesus, and in what way the Persians gained the
hegemony {hegesanto) of Asia"—a promise which he methodically fulfills in
the remaining chapters of what we now know as Book One. 9. 122 in fact
recalls what manner of man Cyrus was—the wise leader, the founder and
upholder of Persian freedom—and reveals him at the height of his success,
*' Most of the conunentaries on Herodotus since that of Heinrich Stein (first ed., Berlin
1856) have of course duly quoted the Iliad passage in their notes on 9. 116. But the
implications, in the Herodotean context, of the fact that Protesilaos was the first Greek to
attack Trojan soil are not always explored in the secondary literature as they seem to
deserve. Pohlenz, for example, does not consider them at all, Immerwahr only briefly (p.
146).
'* For this view compare Myres (above, note 6) 299; Immerwahr (above, note 5) 146;
and N. Ayo, "Prolog and Epilog. Mythological History in Herodotus," Ramus 13 (1984)
39-42.
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when he has become the ruler of Asia. The anecdote is hooked on to the
Artayktes episode in a characteristically Herodotean way. It was an ancestor
of this very Artayktes (says Herodotus), one Artembares, who was struck by
a brilliant idea, which the Persians communicated to Cyrus in these words:
"Since Zeus grants hegemony {hegemonien) to the Persians and, among
individuals, to you, Cyrus, after your conquest of Astyages [cf. 1. 127-
30]—come, seeing that we possess a land that is little, and rugged at that,
let us leave it and obtain another that is better . . . For just when, we ask
you, will there be a finer opportunity than at a time when we rule many
men and all of Asia?"
The prime function of 9. 122 thus seems to be to echo the opening of
the Persian logos, and to recall the splendor of the Persian empire in its
early years. At the same time, however, it recapitulates two major themes
that pervade the Histories from beginning to end. To continue with
Herodotus' account: When Cyrus had listened to Artembares' scheme, he
firmly rejected it. If the Persians really must migrate, he said, they had
better make up their minds to become the ruled instead of the rulers, for soft
lands were apt to give birth to soft men. On this the Persians acknowledged
the wisdom of Cyrus and retired from his presence. "They chose to rule
while occupying a barren land rather than, while sowing Uie plain, to be
others' slaves." That sentence, the last in the Histories, is here translated as
literally as possible (even at the cost of a certain inelegance in the English
style), in order to bring out the studied chiasmus, rule, barren land: plain,
slaves, and as a reminder that Herodotus' final word is douleuein "to be
slaves." In that way, with quite extraordinary emphasis, the close of the
Cyrus episode recalls the antithesis between freedom and slavery that is a
leitmotiv of the entire Histories}^ Simultaneously it re-states the
association of freedom and valor with hard living in a rugged landscape, a
theme that is found early in the Histories (see Sandanis' advice to Croesus
in 1. 71), but reaches its fullest significance in the course of Xerxes'
expedition; above all in Demaratos' remarks to the King on the poverty and
are/gof Greece (7. \2\)}^
At this point we may pause briefly to consider the combined effect of
the three episodes in 9. 108-22 that we have been discussing. Even from
what has been said so far, it may appear that they constitute a kind of triple
ring-composition, recalling as they do three momentous passages from the
outset of the entire Histories. By archaic compositional conventions,
Herodotus could hardly have sent a clearer signal that the work had now
^' The theme enters with the Lydian logos: Before the rule of Croesus all the Greeks
were free (1. 6. 3), but Croesus enslaved them (1. 27. 4). Probably the most emphatic
presentation of the antithesis occurs precisely in the opening chapter of the Persian logos
(1. 95. 2): The Medes, "having gone into battle for freedom against the Assyrians, acted
like brave men and, repelling slavery, became free."
^^ Compare Macan (above, note 10), note on 9. 122; Pohlenz (above, note 8) 163-64;
Gould (above, note 1) 59-60.
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reached its designed end. And one further point is worth stressing in this
context: Of the three elements in that ring-compositional closure, two are
overtly and inseparably linked to the capture of Sestos. Artayktes' crime,
and his execution, took place in the neighborhood of Sestos, and it is
Artayktes' forefather Artembares who provides the transition to the final
ring-compositional element, the Wisdom of Cyrus. In other words, the
artistic closure of the Histories, and the choice of stopping-point for the
historical narrative of the Graeco-Persian wars, are mutually dependent It
seems scarcely possible, in the light of that, to argue that Herodotus
intended to pursue the narrative to the capture of Byzantium,*'' or the
foundation of the naval league,** or even far beyond, but for some reason
broke off at the capture of Sestos. If he did so intend, why is the historical
event at Sestos so crucial to the literary closural technique that he has
adopted?
3. The Closure of Histories 7-9
Many scholars have noticed how certain elements in the closing chapters of
the Histories recall the opening of the story of Xerxes' expedition, as it is
told in Books 7-9. The Artayktes episode offers the clearest instances; by
several overt allusions this is linked to the passage in 7. 33-34 which
occurs at the point in the narrative where Xerxes has reached Sardis with his
land force, and is preparing to march to Abydos. Meanwhile, Herodotus
says, his emissaries "were working to bridge the Hellespont from Asia into
Europe. Now in the Hellespontine Chersonese between Sestos and
Madytos, there is a rugged promontory that juts into the sea opposite
Abydos. It was here that, not long after this, when Xanthippos son of
Ariphron was general of the Athenians, they captured a Persian, Artayktes,
governor of Sestos, and nailed him alive to a plank; this man used to bring
women to Protesilaos' shrine at Elaious, and there perform wicked actions.
Now it was to this promontory that those whose charge it was built the
bridge, starting from Abydos." It will be noted how this preliminary
information about Artayktes is neatly dovetailed (of course by ring-
composition, the framing element being the promontory opposite Abydos)
into the account of the building of the bridge. In 9. 116-20 that
information is repeated, with considerable expansions (the relevant passages
have already been quoted in Section 2). Thus the story of Artayktes closes,
as it opened, at or near the point where the fateful bridge touched European
soil.*' The cycle of Xerxes' expedition, like the greater cycle of the ancient
" So. tenutively, Pohlenz (above, note 8) 176.
*' So. "fast zweifellos." Jacoby (above, note 2) col. 376 (after Wilamowitz and others,
there cited).
*' This point has most recently been made by Gould (above, note 1) 58-59. On p. 59 he
adds the interesting suggestion that Artayktes' execution at the point where Xerxes' bridge
touched Europe may echo a theme announced in the Gyges-Kandaules episode (1. 11. 5),
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enmity between Asia and Europe originating in the Trojan War, is closed by
this execution. And it is surely no accident that the very last incident in
Herodotus' historical narrative, immediately following that execution, is the
removal of the bridge-cables to Greece.^"
Likewise, but less overtly, the Xerxes episode of 9. 108-13 seems also
to recapitulate the story of the expedition of 480/79. That story opened
with Xerxes at the height of his power and splendor: His speech in the
Persian council (7, 8), the march of his army out of Sardis (7. 40-^1), and
his crossing of the Hellespontine bridge (7. 54-56) are among the most
spectacular visions of royal pomp in all Herodotus. But having vanished
from the stage after his retreat from Salamis, Xerxes is suddenly propelled
back into the spotlight in 9. 108-13 in the role of a shabby, stupid and
cruel sexual intriguer. The contrast between the Xerxes revealed at the
beginning of the expedition and the Xerxes revealed at its end may well
remind us of the contrast between the opening chorus of Aeschylus'
Persians (65-92), where the magnificent and all-powerful king drives his
chariot irresistibly toward Greece, and the epilogue (908-1077), where that
same king appears before our eyes defeated and in rags. In both the tragedy
and the history the entire story of personal and national humiliation is thus
summed up and concluded.
It is possible also to discern an echo of the opening of Xerxes'
expedition in the episode of the Wisdom of Cyrus. Lesky has seen a direct
link between 7. 8 a 1 (Xerxes' speech proposing the expedition) and 9. 122.
2, noting that in both passages the word /z^e/wme (which Lesky takes to be
a "Stichwort") occurs fairly prominently.^^
At this point we may conclude our survey of the ring-compositional
elements in the closing chapters of the Histories. In sum, it seems fairly
clear that this elaborate system of echoes and repetitions must be designed to
close simultaneously the greater story contained in the Histories as a whole,
and the lesser, but culminating, narrative of Books 7-9. Even if there
existed no parallel for such a closure of an entire large-scale composition,
this conclusion would seem likely in itself, and it might seem to gain
further support from the practice, widespread throughout archaic hterature, of
closing off units (sometimes very extensive ones) within a work by means
where the Queen tells Gyges: "Your attack [on Kandaules] shall be from the same place
from which he showed me naked."
^ Compare, among others, Myres (above, note 6) 299; Immerwahr (above, note 5) 43
and 146.
^^ Albin Lesky, Geschichte der griechischen Literalur, ed. 3 (Bern and Munich 1971)
348; ed. 2 (Bern 1963) 296; for an elaboration of his view, cf. Beck (above, note 9) 84.
The present writer, for his part, hesitates to lay too much stress on the suggestion. The
two Herodotean passages concerned do not seem to be very closely related; and the
instances of tiYeiaGai, iiyejiovCii in Herodotus with reference to the rule of Persia are by
no means confined to those passages (see J. Enoch Powell, A Lexicon to Herodotus
[Cambridge 1938] s. vv.).
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of ring-composition. But there do in fact exist archaic parallels to the
ending of the Histories; they will be sketched in the following section.
4. The Closure of the Iliad
xr\ 6e 6i)(o5£KdTTi noXejiC^o^ev, ei rcep dvayKii: Iliad 24. 667 (Priam's
last words to Achilles).
Kttl Kaxd to EToq Tot)TO ovSev Exi tiXeov XOUTCOV EyEVETO:
Histories 9. 121 (the final words in the narrative of the Persian Wars).
As Frankel observed, the narratives both of the Iliad and of the Histories
are open-ended in the sense that a continuator might (and in fact did) pick up
the stories of the Trojan and the Persian wars respectively where each had
left off. The above quotations, in which the incompleteness of the accounts
of the respective wars is not merely acknowledged but almost (one might
say) advertised, should be enough to illustrate the point. As Frankel also
indicated, this feature is actually shared by most of the other archaic
hexameter poems of which we have any knowledge.^
Yet the surprising, and perhaps too little noticed, fact is that some of
these archaic poems are also closed, artistically, by some form of ring-
composition. The Theogony and the Odyssey, at least in the states in
which we have them (and in which Herodotus probably had them also), are
closed after a fashion by verbal repetitions of thematically loaded lines:
Theogony 1022 Mot>oai 'OX-u^inidSEq, Kovpai Aibq aiyioxoio (= 966, 52,
25); Odyssey 24. 548 MEvxopi £i5o|j.£VTi rmEv 5£|j.a<; ti6£ Kal at)5Tiv (=
24. 503, 22. 206, 2. 401).23 But neither of these ring-compositional
closures can compare with that of the Iliad either in scale or in
sophistication. In his edition of Iliad 24, C. W. MacLeod has put together
the evidence that supports this statement, with admirable care and insight^
Since his book is readily accessible, it seems unnecessary to repeat all his
discussion in detail, but here—with a couple of additions and a minor
correction—are his chief results. Book 24 recalls the opening of the Iliad
(Book 1 and the first incident of Book 2), and the Embassy of Book 9, both
in situations and in phraseology. The main resemblances between it and the
opening of the Iliad are as follows.
^^ For Frankers observation compare above, note 4; compare also B. A. van
Groningen, La Composition litteraire archaique grecque: Procedes et Realisations
(Amsterdam 1958) 70-72.
^ It will be noted that the ring-compositional closure of the Odyssey, in particular,
resembles those of the Histories and of the Iliad in that it recalls both the opening
movement of the narrative and a supreme crisis in it. Od. 24. 503 and 548 (themselves
constituting a ring-compositional frame for Athena's final epiphany) recall the goddess's
guiding role in the Telemachy and in the Slaying of the Suitors.
^ C. W. Macleod, Homer, Iliad XXIV (Cambridge 1982), Introduction, esp. 32-35. An
earlier discussion of the question, not (as it happens) referred to in MacLeod, seems to
deserve mention: C. H. Whitman, Homer and the Homeric Tradition (repr. New York
1965). esp. 259-60.
John Herington 159
The episode of the old man who enters the Greek camp to supplicate
Agamemnon for the ransom of his daughter, and is rudely refused, is
balanced and contrasted with the episode of Priam's supplication to Achilles
for the ransom of his son's body, and Achilles' acceptance of his prayer.
The divine colloquies at the end of Book 1 and the beginning of Book 24,
and especially the roles of Thetis and Hera in them, are similarly balanced
and contrasted; as are (as has long been noticed) the time-lapses of nine and
eleven days that occur in each book.^^ And as Agamemnon is lured to
destruction by a deceitful dream from Zeus at the beginning of Book 2, so
Priam is sent safely on his way by a true messenger from Zeus in 24.
Furthermore, the parallelisms in situation between Books 1 and 24 are
emphasized by the repetitions of certain lines and phrases that occur only in
those two books: for example r\[ioq 6' ripiYeveia (pdvn poSoSdcKX'uA.oq
Tiax; (1. 477 = 24. 788); and (oc, ecpax', e6eioev 6' 6 yepcov Kal ekeiGeto
Hv0a)(1.33=24. 571).26
The parallels between Iliad 24 and 9, as described by MacLeod, are less
striking, but still substantial. In both books Achilles is surprised in his
lodging by a night visitor or visitors, begging him to relent from his anger;
and he entertains them with a meal. Near the end of each episode Achilles
offers a bed to an old man or old men (Phoenix; Priam and Idaios). And in
each Achilles, at our final glimpse of him, is peacefully asleep with his
concubine (9. 663-65 and 24. 675-76; the first lines of each passage are
identical); in 24, as MacLeod observes, "the concubine is Briseis, whose
loss caused all the trouble."
By those means the last book of the Iliad lays to rest the poem's great
theme of Achilles' wrath and, simultaneously, calls to mind its first
beginning and a crucial moment in its progress. The end is bonded into the
beginning, the circle is complete. In the Histories too, and through similar
repetitions of situation and of phrase, the closing chapters contrive at once
both to finish the tale and to recall its beginning and a major episode. In
each case it is difficult to escape the inference that the ending we have is the
ending designed. One may here add that the "some kind of 'epic'
conclusion" to the Histories that was desiderated by Waters^ seems, in fact,
to be hterally there in place—even if it is not the precise kind of conclusion
that any reader later than the late fifth century might reasonably have
expected, whether to an epic or to any other narrative.
^ MacLeod (above, note 24), 32.
^ MacLeod (above, note 24) gives five other pairs of responding passages from 1 and
24. In each of these examples, as in the second of those just quoted, the wording in the
context of 24 pointedly emphasizes the parallels and contrasts between Priam's
supplication of Achilles and Qiryses' supplication of Agamemnon. As has been seen in
Section 2 of this article, Herodotus' Xerxes episode (9. 108-13) similarly reinforces the
situational parallel with the Gyges-Kandaules episode by means of verbal echoes.
^ Above, note 1.
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Finally, we may add two further apparent points of resemblance
between the two great works. Neither of them properly falls even within
the extended definition of ring-composition that has been adopted in the
present article, but they are perhaps striking enough to be worth
consideration in this context. Near or at the ends of both the Iliad and the
Histories some major characters from the defeated side are brought back for a
last-moment appearance, as if, once more, to remind us in person of the
course and the issues of the entire work. We have already seen how Xerxes,
the moving spirit of 7-9, and Cyrus, the hero of the Persian logos, are thus
recalled to the stage in Herodotus. Similarly the last episode of the Iliad,
the mourning and funeral for Hector, lines up not merely Priam but also
Andromache, Hecuba and Helen, to make, as it were, their final bows, and at
the same time vividly to recall some of the most moving scenes in the epic,
from Book 3 to Book 22.
The inclusion of Helen as the last of the three women-mourners serves
not only to recall the course of the ?pic but also to recall one of the
antecedents to the narrative contained in it; this is the woman whose folly
sparked the entire war. And here we come to a second possible point of
resemblance to the Herodotean closure. Helen's reappearance is not, in fact,
the only passage in 24 that carries us back to the remote beginnings of the
Trojan saga. There are two others, both alluding to events not mentioned
elsewhere in the Iliad: lines 28-30, on the Judgment of Paris, and lines 62-
63, on the feast at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis—that fatal union of
mortal and immortal from which Achilles sprang. Would it be too fanciful
to compare these evocations to Herodotus' evocation, in the Artayktes
episode, of the first combat in the Trojan War, the war which to the Persian
sages was the ultimate cause of the events described in the body of the
Histories'} If that comparison is allowed, then in both the Homeric and the
Herodotean finales we may discern a bold extension of the ring-
compositional technique that has been discussed in this article: a closure
emphasized not just by a return to the opening of the narrative, but by a
return to the archeoi the entire chain of events that led up to that narrative.
M. S. optimi viri Friderici Solmsen
Yale University
13
Iphigeneia Changes Her Mind
DAVID SANSONE
Already in antiquity readers of Euripides' lA found Iphigeneia's change of
mind problematic.^ Notoriously, Aristotle (Poet. 1454a26-33) cited
Euripides' heroine as the example of a tragic character who displays the
defect of inconsistency. And since that time readers have debated Aristotle's
judgment, some agreeing with the philosopher that Iphigeneia is indeed
inconsistently portrayed,^ others seeking to show in various ways that Iphi-
geneia's change of mind is properly motivated in dramatic terms. Gudrun
Mellert-Hoffmann, for example, in a detailed study tried to show that the
Panhellenic ideal that is voiced by Agamemnon and echoed by his daughter
is not a pretense, as Funke had argued, but a motif that runs through the
play and provides the genuine motivation for Iphigeneia's decision.^
According to Bernard Knox, the audience is well prepared for Iphigeneia's
change of mind, inasmuch as "it comes as the cUmax of a series of swift and
sudden changes of decision which is unparalleled in ancient drama.'"^ Wesley
Smith, on the other hand, considers that Iphigeneia's decision is motivated
by the fact that she has fallen in love with Achilles.^ Erotic motivation of a
different sort is perceived by the psychoanalyst Andre Green, who speaks of
"the female masochistic movement of turning aggressive and erotic drives
back upon the subject," and of "the desire for the father's penis" as being
^ I should like to record here my gratitude to John C. Gibert and Walter Stockert, both of
whom read an earlier version of this paper and supplied valuable criticisms and
suggestions. In addition, Dr. Gibert kindly provided me with a copy of his splendid
dissertation, Change of Mind in Greek Tragedy (Harvard 1991) and Dr. Stockert with
portions of his forthcoming commentary on lA.
^ See in particular H. Funke, "Aristoteles zu Euripides' Iphigeneia in Aulis," Hermes 92
(1964) 284-99.
^ Untersuchungen zur "Iphigenie in Aulis" des Euripides (Heidelberg 1969) 9-90.
* "Second Thoughts in Greek Tragedy," GRBS 7 (1966) 229 (= Word and Action: Essays
on the Ancient Theater [Baltimore 1979] 243-44). See also J. Griffin. "Characterization
in Euripides: Hippolytus and Iphigeneia in Aulis" in C. Felling (ed.). Characterization and
Individuality in Greek Literature (Oxford 1990) 128^9. esp. 148.
'
"Iphigenia in Love," in Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to B. M. W. Knox
(Berlin 1979) 173-80; cf. also V. Castellani, "Warlords and Women in Euripides'
Iphigenia at Aulis" in Drama, Sex and Politics, Themes in Drama 7 (Cambridge 1985) 1-
10. Erotic motivation had already been stressed by W. E. J. Kuiper, "Aristoteles en
Euripides' Aulische Iphigenia," Hermeneus 3 (1931) 3-6.
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"realized through a renunciation demanded by the ego-ideal."^ More recently,
and more sensibly, Helene Foley has seen in the outcome of the play a
resolution in ritual terms, namely in terms of the convergence of the themes
of marriage and sacrificed
While I have profited greatly from these and a number of other
suggestive studies,* I should like to concentrate here on an aspect of
Iphigeneia's decision that has until now received insufficient attention. The
novelty of this last play of Euripides consists not only in \hQfrequency with
which characters change their mind,' but also in the nature of the
mechanism that brings the change about. For unlike Aeschylus'
Agamemnon, for example, who is persuaded to trample precious fabric, and
unlike Euripides' own Creon, who is persuaded to allow Medea to remain in
Corinth for one more day, no one persuades Iphigeneia to become a
sacrificial victim. (On the contrary, Iphigeneia and her mother are advised
by Achilles to employ persuasion against Agamemnon, who remains
adamant in his conviction that his daughter must be sacrificed.) Rather,
Iphigeneia's change of mind, the suddenness of which is underlined by the
antilabe}^ occurs just as Achilles and Clytaemestra are discussing their
plans to resist the forcible sacrifice of Iphigeneia. Let us, then, once again
examine this problematic scene, this time concentrating on the kind of
motivation that Euripides represents as causing Iphigeneia's change of mind.
In the previous scene, first Clytaemestra (1146-1208) and then
Iphigeneia (1211-52) had pleaded with Agamemnon to spare his daughter's
life. The concluding lines (1250-52) of Iphigeneia's speech leave no doubt
in Agamemnon's—or the audience's—mind about the young girl's attitude
at this point in the action:
TO <pcb(; x65* dvSpMJioiaiv Ti8iaxov pXeneiv,
xa vEpi9e 5' ov)5ev naivexai 5' oc, eiSxexai
GavEiv. KOKcaq ^fiv vpeicoov fi KaXoJ(; Gaveiv.
^The Tragic Effect: The Oedipus Complex in Tragedy (Engl. tr.. Cambridge 1979) 179.
^ Ritual Irony: Poetry and Sacrifice in Euripides (Ithaca 1985) 65-105; cf. A. Borghini,
"Consacrazione alia morte e ritualita malrimoniale," SCO 36 (1986) 113-16.
* In particular, B. Snell, "Euripides' aulische Iphigenie," in Aischylos und das Handeln
im Drama. Philol. Suppl. 20.1 (Berlin 1928) 148-60; H. Siegel, "Self-Delusion and the
Volte-Face of Iphigenia in Euripides* 'Iphigenia at Aulis'," Hermes 108 (1980) 300-21.
' See the important article by Knox (above, note 4) 213-32 (= 231^9).
^° It is rare in tragedy for a speech of more than twelve lines to begin in mid-line, the
only instances being Hipp. 1325. Suppl. 513, Phoen. 985. M 414. 1368 and Soph. Phil.
54. This instance is unique in being the only such speech in tetrameters and the only one
in which the speaker interrupts two other characters engaged in antilabe. This
phenomenon is inadequately treated in W. Kohler, Die Versbrechung bei den griechischen
Tragikern (Darmsudt 1913).
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She wishes to stay alive at any cost. But Agamemnon remains unmoved.^ ^
Saying that he is powerless to resist the compulsion of Calchas and the
entire Greek army (1255-75) Agamemnon leaves the stage, not to return.
Iphigeneia sings an emotional lyric monody (1283-1335) in which she
laments that she has been abandoned by her father^^ ^nd wishes that the
Judgment of Paris had never taken place. She recognizes that all hope is
lost now that her father refuses to help, and she sees that her death is
inevitable (1281-82, 1308-09, 1317). But there is nothing in the text of
her monody to suggest that her attitude toward life and toward the sacrifice
has changed. It is an "unholy" sacrifice sought by an "unholy" father
(1318). By the end of her song Iphigeneia is an object of pity to both the
chorus (1336-37) and the audience.
At this point the meter changes to trochaic tetrameters as Iphigeneia
sees Achilles and his attendants rushing onto the scene. Out of shame and a
sense of modesty Iphigeneia wishes to retire within. We are reminded of
Achilles' own uneasiness, in an earlier scene, at conversing with Clytaemes-
tra (compare aiSox; 821 and ai6co 1342, aioxpov 830 and aiox^vop.ai
1341). But Clytaemestra urges her daughter to remain (m.(|xv' 1344, xi . .
.
(pE-dyeic,; 1341), as she had earlier urged Achilles (compare ^leivov xi
(pevYeiq; 831). The purpose of these echoes is to enhance the point, made
in the following lines, that Achilles and Iphigeneia are now in similar posi-
tions. For, as Achilles tells Clytaemestra, the entire Greek army is now
demanding that he too be killed. But there is one crucial difference between
the situation of Achilles and that of Iphigeneia. For, whereas the latter'
s
death is not contingent upon anything she has done or will do, the former is
being pursued with murderous intent by the Greek army because of an action
he has freely chosen to take. This is emphasized for the benefit of the audi-
ence in the conversation (1354-65) between Achilles and Clytaemestra. He
is in trouble now because he spoke up against the proposed sacrifice of Iphi-
geneia, and he will continue to oppose the sacrifice even if it means a
single-handed fight against the rest of the army. It is clear that he can avoid
certain death at the hands of his fellow-soldiers simply by acceding to their
demand that Iphigeneia be sacrificed. But Achilles would not be Achilles if
he agreed to change his mind for no reason other than for the purpose of
saving his life. Now, it is true that some readers of this play have found
Achilles to be a distasteful miles gloriosusP but they are unable to sub-
^' There is, of course, great and deliberate irony involved in the fact that Agamemnon,
whose irresoluteness has been emphasized throughout the play, steadfastly refuses to
change his mind in the face of the entreaties of Clytaemestra and Iphigeneia.
^^ 1314 npoSowq; cf. 1278 napaSovc; (spoken by Clytaemestra). For Iphigeneia's
monody, see T. C. W. Stinton, Euripides and the Judgement of Paris, Soc. for the
Promotion of Hellenic Studies, Suppl. Paper 1 1 (London 1965) 29-34.
^' Pyrgopolynices is explicitly compared to Achilles (Plaut. Mil. 61, 1054) and,
within the context of that comparison. Mil. 58 {amant led omnes mulieres; cf. 1040)
perhaps recalls M 959-60, but this has no implications for the character of Achilles either
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stantiate their views without introducing subjective arguments that have no
basis in the text. Philip Vellacott, for instance, who calls the Achilles of
this play "uncouth, tasteless, rude, and above all totally self-centered," is
convinced that Achilles has no intention of fulfilling his promise to protect
Iphigeneia.*'* But we cannot speak of the unexpressed intentions of literary
characters without incurring the risk of perpetrating the "documentary
fallacy."^^ When Achilles says that he is prepared to risk his life to protect
Iphigeneia, we are, I think, obliged to believe him.^^ Nor are we justified in
condemning Achilles' action as "ludicrous," as George E. Dimock, Jr.
does,^^ on the grounds that he cannot possibly succeed in saving
Iphigeneia's life. Inasmuch as the other characters in the play take Achilles
seriously, we are, I think, obliged to take him seriously as well.
In particular, Clytaemestra, in the scene under discussion, takes
Achilles seriously enough to praise his action (1359) and to ask his advice
(1366). It is, indeed, at this point that Iphigeneia interrupts the conversa-
tion between her mother and Achilles with the speech in which she an-
nounces her change of mind. It is a stunning coup de theatre. The girl who
had earlier asserted her resolve to live at any cost now (1375) consents to
die. The audience waits with bated breath to hear Iphigeneia's reasons for
her change of mind. But what the audience hears, and what has frustrated
critics from the time of Aristotle, is a speech that contains a series of
points, virtually all of which could equally well have been made by Iphi-
geneia fifty lines earlier. She says, in England's translation, "It is hard to
bear up against impossible odds" (1370); but that was just as true before she
changed her mind as after. She claims (1378-84) that all of Greece depends
upon her for success in its mission to punish Troy and to free itself from
the threat of abuse at the hands of the barbarians; but, when these same sen-
timents were earlier expressed by her father (1271-75), she condemned him
for his betrayal of her and for his impious behavior (1312-18). She ob-
serves (1395-97) that it is the will of Artemis that she be sacrificed, and
that it is impossible for her, a mortal, to oppose the will of the goddess; but
die relentlessness of the divine machinery seems to be acknowledged already
in her monody, in which she refers to the sacrifice as "unholy." Finally,
she concludes her speech (1400-01) by insisting that it is contrary to reason
that the Greeks should be enslaved by barbarians, when the Greeks are by
nature free and the barbarians by nature slaves. This is, of course, merely a
in Euripides or in Homer. In any case, the Euripidean Achilles at IA 959-60 says
essentially what his Homeric counterpart had said at //. 9. 395-97.
'* Ironic Drama: A Study of Euripides' Method and Meaning (Cambridge 1975) 43-45.
^^ See A. J. A. Waldock, Sophocles the Dramatist (Cambridge 1951) 11-24.
** Again (see above, note 13), the model is the Homeric Achilles who, in the first book
of the Iliad, is prepared to risk his life to protect the seer Calchas; compare lA 1361 ejiov
yz CciJvToq with //. 1. 88 enew ^©vxoq.
" In his and W. S. Merwin's translation of the play (New York 1978) 15-16.
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more pointed version of what Agamemnon had said in the conclusion
(1273-75) to his own speech.
But there is one element in Iphigeneia's speech that is new, and we will
not be surprised if it turns out to be the most valuable clue to the under-
standing of Iphigeneia's motivation. She says (1385-91) that she and her
mother ought not to seek to save her life when there are thousands of young
men who are willing to die for Greece and whose death will be in vain
unless she, too, is willing to die. This is not the same point that her father
had made, when he emphasized the helplessness of one person standing in
opposition to the wishes of all Greece (1259-72). Rather, Iphigeneia im-
plies, it would be unreasonably selfish, under the circumstances, for one per-
son to consider his own life of more value than the lives of all the rest.^*
Where has this element come from? The following lines make it clear.
Iphigeneia points to Achilles and continues, saying that this man should not
have to fight against all the Greeks and die for her sake. We cannot help but
be reminded that the only thing that has happened on stage that can have
caused Iphigeneia to change her mind is the dialogue between Achilles and
Clytaemestra, in which Achilles offered to fight the entire Greek army in
order to protect Iphigeneia. In other words, what has happened is that one
character on stage is represented as having an emotional reaction to an action
on stage involving another character. Iphigeneia, witnessing the willing-
ness of Achilles (who is in a situation similar to her own) to die for her
sake, is emotionally transformed.
Before we examine the implications of this emotional transformation,
let us briefly consider a question that has divided scholars in recent years,
namely the question of how the audience is expected to react to Iphigeneia's
decision. There are those who are convinced that Euripides has portrayed
Iphigeneia's willingness to be sacrificed in an "ironic" light and that the
audience is expected to view Iphigeneia as a pathetic creature who is deluded
by the deplorable mass-hysteria that is afflicting the army in general.^^ It is
difficult to argue against the view that Euripides' "meaning" is the opposite
of what is in the text. Perhaps the best argument is merely to restate what
is in the text. Immediately after her speech Iphigeneia is praised in
extravagant terms by the chorus, who elsewhere have the task of pointing
out to the audience the delusions of the characters on stage,^^ and by
Achilles, whose name is synonymous in Greek tragedy with nobility .^^
'* Similar sentimenls are expressed in the fragments of Euripides' Erechlheus. With I
A
1386 compare NFE 50. 38 Austin; with M 1390 compare NFE 50. 34-35.
^'See VeUacoU (above, note 14) 174-77. 203-04. Dimock (above, note 17) 11-12.
16 and especially Siegel (above, note 8).
^Med. 811 ff.. Hipp. 891 f.; Aesch. Sept. 677 ff.. 686 ff., Ag. 1407 ff.. 1426 ff.
21 Even E. M. Blaiklock {The Male Characters of Euripides (Wellington 1952] 117-18)
recognizes that Euripides would have had absolutely no precedent for depicting Achilles as
the "spoilt and braggart boy" that Blaiklock sees in this play. There is greater support in
the text for C. E. Hajistephanou's view (The Use o/$YIII and its Cognates in Greek
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The chorus (1403-04) speak of Iphigeneia's nobility of character,
contrasting it with the "sickness" of the fate imposed on her by the goddess.
Achilles also praises her nobility (yevvaia yap ei 1412), and indicates
that he considers her worthy to be his wife. The only irony that we are
justified in seeing here proceeds from the fact that the Homeric Achilles had
said (//. 9. 388) that he would under no circumstances marry a daughter of
Agamemnon. But the irony consists in Euripides' portrayal of a couple
whose character ideally suits them to one another,^^ but whose very
character makes it impossible for them to be united: Iphigeneia's nobility
constrains her to give up her life before she can be married, just as Achilles'
nobility provokes his quarrel in the Iliad with Iphigeneia's father. Achilles
continues to sing the praises of Iphigeneia's character, referring again to her
nobility in 1422-23 (yevvaia yap / (ppoveiq) and, most notably, reacting
to Iphigeneia's repeated assertion that he must not die for her sake by saying
M Xr\[i' apiaxov (1421). Now, the significance of this expression is that it
is a quotation from Euripides' earlier Iphigeneia-play. At IT 609 Iphigeneia
had reacted to the Greek stranger's willingness to die in his friend's stead by
exclaiming, a> Xfj^i' apioTov, after which she had gone on to praise the
nobility of the young man (who would later turn out to be her brother
Orestes). If, then, Euripides is indulging in "irony" in M, that is to say, if
he is presenting Achilles' praise of Iphigeneia as something that is to be
held up to ridicule, then he is also indulging in self-parody, for which no
possible explanation can be imagined.
It will be seen, then, that my view of Iphigeneia's decision is that it is
something that Euripides intends his audience genuinely to admire. And, I
think, this view finds support in Euripides' portrayal of self-sacrifice, a
subject that has recently been admirably treated by E. A. M. E. O'Connor-
Visser.^^ The reader is referred to O'Connor-Visser's account for details of
Tragedy [Nicosia 1975] 99-102) that the presentation of Achilles' character has much in
common with that of Theonoe's in Helen. We should keep in mind that Euripides' model
for the Achilles of M was the Achilles of Aeschylus' Myrmidons, whose nobility cannot
be doubted (B. Snell, Scenes from Greek Drama [Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964] 1-22).
Specifically, Euripides derived from Aeschylus the motif of stoning (compare IA 1350 with
Aesch. fr. 132c. 1-2 Radt), as was first noticed by E. Loewy, Annuaire de ilnstitut de
Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales de I'Universite Libre de Bruxelles 2 (1934) 973 n. 2.
Note also that the Aeschylean AchiUes, like the Homeric, does not hesitate to praise his
own character (fr. 132c. 13-14 Radt), so that we cannot read lines like IA 926-27 as
evidence of the Euripidean Achilles' baseness.
^ Note 930 eXevGepav <pvoiv (of Ach.) and 994 o^l^' . . . eXeuGepov (of Iph.); 1063
SeooaXia ncya qKoq (of Ach.) and 1502 'EXXd8i (le q>do<; (of Iph.).
^ Aspects ofHuman Sacrifice in the Tragedies of Euripides (Amsterdam 1987). Cf. also
J. Schmiu, Freiwilliger Opfertod bei Euripides, Religion sgeschichiliche Versuche und
Vorarbeiten 17.2 (Giessen 1921), J. Wilkins, "The Slate and the Individual: Euripides'
Plays of Voluntary Self-Sacrifice," in A. Powell (ed.), Euripides, Women, and Sexuality
(London 1990) 177-94.
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the numerous similarities between the treatment of Iphigeneia here and the
treatment of Macaria in Heraclidae, of Polyxena in Hecuba, of Menoeceus in
Phoenissae and of Praxithea's daughter in Erechtheus. These similarities
require us to assume, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary,
that the dramatic function of the sacrifice is the same in all these tragedies,
which span a period of approximately a quarter of a century. In the Hecuba,
for instance, the virtue of Polyxena and the purity of her act present a stark
contrast to the sordid circumstances that surround her.^^ Likewise, in
Phoenissae, Menoeceus is the embodiment of the courage and selflessness
that are conspicuously lacking in Eteocles and Creon.^^ Just so, Uie
nobility and resoluteness of Iphigeneia are presented in a way that allows for
the strongest possible contrast with Uie characters of Agamemnon and
Menelaus. The effect on the audience of these various sacrificial victims is
a combination of admiration for Uieir nobility and pity at their plight.^^
This view of Iphigeneia's willingness to be sacrificed is, I think, sup-
ported by what we have noticed above concerning the dramatic circumstances
of her change of mind. But, at the same time, what we see in IA represents
an interesting and important innovation. We may speculate that this inno-
vation arose from Euripides' long experience of composing tragedies that
included the theme of human sacrifice and from his continuing concern with
what we might be inclined to call the "theory of drama." Throughout his
career, Euripides produced dramas that were designed to create striking intel-
lectual and emotional effects in their audience. Among those effects, pro-
voked particularly but not exclusively by those plays that contained scenes
of human sacrifice, is the transformation of Uie audience by the arousal of
feelings of pity and admiration. Euripides was undoubtedly as fully aware as
Aristotle that pity is one of the prime emotions which tragedy aims to
arouse, and that pity can best be aroused by admirable characters, that is, by
characters who are morally upright and who are, at the same time, enough
like us that we are able to relate to Uiem.^'' We might almost say that this
scene in IA represents a working-out in dramatic terms of problems regard-
ing the relationship between drama and its audience that had preoccupied
Euripides for decades and were to concern Aristotie as well in the following
century. Iphigeneia's response is dictated by two circumstances: the pity
that is aroused in her by witnessing Achilles' situation and the fact that she
is herself in a similar situation. As far as the first of tiiese circumstances is
^ O'Connor-Visser (previous note) 67. Cf. D. J. Conacher, Euripidean Drama (Toronto
1967) 165.
^ O'Connor-Visser (above, note 23) 183, C. Mueller-Goldingen, Untersuchungen zu
den Phonissen des Euripides, Palingenesia 22 (Stuttgart 1985) 161.
^ P. Decharme, Euripides and the Spirit of his Dramas (Engl. tr.. New Yoric 1906) 203-
11, O'Connor-Visser (above, note 23) 43.
^ I have formulated these last remarks in such a way as to show that, while Decharme
(previous note) 204 is correct to say that Aristotle in the Poetics does not mention it,
admiration for the tragic character is implicit in Aristotle's discussion.
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concerned, it is perhaps true that we might not use the English word "pity"
to describe Iphigeneia's feelings toward Achilles at this point, but Euripides'
contemporaries would surely have used the Greek word eXeoq—the word
used in Aristotle's famous definition of tragedy {Poet. 1449b27)—in this
case. Indeed, Iphigeneia's situation seems almost designed to illustrate Aris-
totle's definition of that term: eaxco 8t] eXeoq X\)nr[ xvq in\ (paivo^ievo)
KaKw
. .
. xo\) ava^iov) T\)YxavEiv, o Ktxv axixoc^ npooSoKTjaeiev dv
naGeiv {Rhet. 1385bl3-15, with the following discussion). As far as the
second of these circumstances is concerned, we have seen above that Euri-
pides emphasizes the similarities between the situations of Iphigeneia and
Achilles. But not only are their situations similar; Euripides has given
these two characters other similiarities as well. Both are young, both are of
noble birth and upright character; indeed, as is emphasized throughout the
play, they would be ideally suited as partners in marriage. The reason Euri-
pides has depicted Iphigeneia and Achilles in such similar terms is surely to
make the strength of this feeling of pity as intelligible as possible. For, as
Aristotle was to recognize, closeness in age, character and station encotu^ages
the feeling of pity.^* And, just as the tragic poet must be careful to
delineate his ch^acters in such a way that he best arouses feelings of pity in
his audience, so Euripides has here matched his characters in such a way that
he most convincingly arouses in one feelings of pity for the other.
What Euripides has done here, in projecting onto Iphigeneia the emo-
tional response that is proper to the audience, is novel, but not entirely un-
precedented. In fact, there is an anticipation of this device earlier in this
play. In the first episode there is a remarkable scene between Agamemnon
and Menelaus that has certain affinities with the scene we have been consid-
ering. Circumstances appear to have made it inevitable that Iphigeneia is to
be sacrificed, and Agamemnon laments the situation in terms similar to
those used later by Iphigeneia herself in her monody.^' Surprisingly, the
effect that this speech has on Menelaus is to cause him to change his mind.
Menelaus had previously reproached Agamemnon for his weakness of char-
acter but now, seeing his brother's tears (477-78) and witnessing his dis-
tress first-hand (489-90), he pities (wKxipa 478, eXEoq 491) both him and
Iphigeneia. The reaction of the chorus to Menelaus' change of mind is the
same as that to Iphigeneia's: They praise his nobility of character (yevvai*
eXe^aq 504) just as they praise hers (xo \ih/ aov, w vectvi, yzwaimc,
e'xei 1403). We may see Menelaus' change of mind as, in a sense, prepara-
^ Rhet. 1386a24-25 xo\><; byioiovq iXzovai Kata fiXiKiai;, Kaxa TJGti, Kaxa e^eii;,
Kaxd a^KOfiata, Kaxa yevTi.
^ Both Agamemnon (467-68) and Iphigeneia (1284 ff.) blame Helen and Paris for
causing their woes. Agamemnon (463) envisions Iphigeneia calling him her murderer, and
she later does just that (1318). At the conclusion of Agamemnon's speech the two-line
comment of the chorus (469-70) begijis xayoi Katcpiccip'; after Iphigeneia's monody the
chorus' two-line comment (1336-37) begins iya> fiev oiKxCpoj oe.
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tion for that of Iphigeneia.^^ But hers is more to be admired than his for
two reasons. In the first place, while Menelaus' pity is aroused primarily
by his brother's tears and laments, Iphigeneia's is aroused more by what
Aristotle might call "the structure of the situation itself."^^ In the second
place, the feelings that Menelaus has for Agamemnon and Iphigeneia are
readily understood as arising from the fact that they are close relatives,^^
whereas she had never so much as met Achilles before this scene began.
There is, as far as I am aware, only one other scene in surviving Greek
tragedy that is comparable to what we find in lAP It is in Prometheus
Bound, a play written by a dramatist no less concerned than Euripides about
the workings of pity as it affects both characters and audience.^'* As we
noted just above, the play begins with a scene in which Hephaestus expres-
ses his feelings of pity for his kinsman Prometheus. And, as the play con-
tinues, first the chorus, then Ocean and lo come on stage and repeat the sen-
timents that Hephaestus had expressed and the audience shares. But the
most striking expression of sympathy for the Titan comes at the very end of
the play. For the daughters of Ocean not only express their pity verbally;
they act on their feelings. And that act takes the form of a remarkable
change of mind. In the final trimeters of the play, before the meter changes
to anapaests, the chorus, appropriately to their watery nature, urge Prome-
theus to yield and to put aside his stubbornness (1036-39). But, in the
course of the brief anapaestic scene that closes the play, the chorus so far
change their mind that they willingly suffer along with Prometheus, al-
though they were given every opportunity to depart unharmed. The author
has even gone out of his way to underhne the chorus' decision by placing
their defiant speech (1063-70) at the very center of a strictly symmetrical
construction: Their speech is preceded and followed by speeches of equal
length by Hermes, whose speeches are themselves framed by speeches of
Prometheus that come within one metron of being equal to one another in
length. The chorus' change of mind has taken place within the space of
'"Gibert (above, note 1) 278-80 is particularly good on this.
Poet. 1453b2-3 e^ avxrii; zr\q avazaaeoiq x5)v npaynaxtov, onep eoxl Tipotepov
Kttl noiiiTov d}ie{vovo(;.
^^ At 491-92 Menelaus says that pity (eXeoq) came over him ovyyeveiav evvoovjievo).
This is reminiscent of PV 39, where Hephaestus, in response to Kratos' inquiry into his
reasons for pitying Prometheus, says to cnyyeviq xo\ Seivov.
^^ John Gibert reminds me of the scene in Soph. Anl. (526 ff.) in which Ismene tries to
share in Antigone's responsibility for the burial of Polyneices, after having earlier advised
her sister against such action, and in his dissertation (above, note 1) 83 he weU compares
that scene with the scene in M in which Menelaus changes his mind. But, from the
perspective here adopted, Ismene's decision is not strictly comparable, as she has been off
stage since the end of the prologue, and it appears that her change of mind took place while
she was off stage, and did not result from witnessing and reacting to events on stage.
'* Among the "Eigenworler" found in this play but not in the genuine plays of
Aeschylus are eXeivoc;, m)Y<aRvco, avvoKyio} and ovvaoxaXdo); cf. W. Burkert, Zum
altgriechischen Mitleidsbegriff (diss. Erlangen 1955) 59-60.
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twenty-two lines, and all that has happened on stage that can have caused the
change are the two brief sjjeeches, the defiant speech of Prometheus and the
threatening speech of Hermes. The change is sudden and surprising, but it
has been prepared—whether successfully or not is a matter for individual
judgment—by the constant emphasis throughout the play on pity and sym-
pathy. The author seems to expect his audience to accept the chorus' change
of mind on the basis of his own confidence that he has successfully aroused
in the audience the same sort of feelings that apparently lie behind the
chorus' action.
Whether Euripides was influenced in this particular by the author of
Prometheus Bound is difficult to say. If we had available to us all the evi-
dence of fifth-century tragedy we would be in a better position to judge. In
any event, there is one way in which Euripides has gone beyond his prede-
cessor: In the earlier play it is the chorus who change their mind as a result
of an emotional reaction to what has occurred on stage; in Euripides it is an
individual character. It had long been customary for the chorus to react to
and comment on what was taking place on stage, the chorus serving in a
sort of mediatory capacity between the characters on stage and the audi-
ence.^^ In a perhaps more interesting way (because the psychology of the
character is of more interest than that of the chorus), Euripides has chosen to
present Iphigeneia as reacting to Achilles' noble display of selflessness in
the same way that the chorus of Prometheus Bound react to Prometheus' ad-
mirable fortitude. And, as with so many of Euripides' innovations, we find
this device becoming a standard element in the subsequent development of
Western drama.
I conclude by mentioning briefly just two later occurrences of this de-
vice in the work of two very different dramatists. The first is to be found in
Pierre Comeille's Polyeucte (1643), which dramatizes the conversion and
martyrdom of St. Polyeuctes during the persecutions of the Emperor Decius.
Polyeucte had been a worshipper of pagan gods, but has now converted and,
with the excessive zeal of the new convert, openly smashes pagan idols and
disrupts pagan worship. He is arrested by his father-in-law Felix, the gover-
nor of Armenia. Felix and his daughter Pauline entreat Polyeucte to re-
nounce his evil Christian ways in an effort to forestall his arrest and execu-
tion. But Polyeucte merely enrages Felix with his stubborn adherence to
the strange cult and with his repeated insistence that Felix and Pauline them-
selves convert, and ultimately Felix himself orders his son-in-law's execu-
tion. At the end of the play, Pauline appears before Felix and declares that
she too is now a Christian. Her eyes have been opened while witnessing
the martyrdom of her husband, by whose blood she is baptized.^ Now, the
35 W. B. Stanford. Greek Tragedy and the Emotions (London 1983) 46-^7.
3^ Pauline actually slates (1725-28) that Felix can see the blood with which she has
been spattered, but the conventions of the Parisian stage in the 17th century would surely
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conversion of Pauline, which takes place off stage, is not entirely unex-
pected, and is explicable in terms of her frequently-expressed devotion and
obedience to her husband Polyeucte. What interests us here is the reaction
of F^lix. Before our very eyes, and within a very short space of time, he is
transformed on stage from persecutor to believer. Witnessing his daughter's
willingness to share the fate of Polyeucte has converted him from one who
inflicts punishment on Christians to one who would gladly suffer martyr-
dom himself. This conversion of Felix was not in Corneille's source
(Surius' Vitae Sanctorum), so there was no requirement that he include it.
Further, as a strict adherent to the principles of Aristotle, who had con-
demned Iphigeneia's change of mind, Comeille was aware that he was
risking censure with this bit of dramaturgy. But he felt that he was never-
theless dramatically justified. Apart from his appeal, in the "Examen" pre-
fixed to the published text of the play, to the "miraculous" character of con-
version, he has effectively prepared his audience for this development. In
the first place, Comeille stresses Felix's nobility and, especially, his feeling
of pity for Polyeucte.^'' In the second place, in a cunningly devised scene
(Act 5, scene 2) reminiscent of the confrontations between Pentheus and
Dionysus in Bacchae, Felix actually pretends that he wishes Polyeucte to
initiate him into the secrets of Christianity.^* Finally, emphasis has been
placed throughout the play on the ways in which one person's behavior can
serve as an example for others. For instance,^' Polyeucte declares (672) that
the example of his own death will do more to strengthen the Christians than
his continuing to live. Felix also shows himself to be a believer in the
value of example: He resolves to force Polyeucte to witness the martyrdom
of his friend Nearque, on the grounds that example has greater effect than
threats (885). Felix is right, but he does not recognize that the effect of
N6arque's martyrdom will be to strengthen the faith of Polyeucte, rather
than to change his mind. Felix's own mind will finally change only when
he has witnessed the effect that the example of Polyeucte has had on his
own daughter.
From the time of Louis XIV we move to that of Ludwig II of Bavaria.
Our second instance of this device comes from the nineteenth century's
greatest interpreter of Greek drama, Richard Wagner.'"' In the second act of
not have tolerated this touch of realism. Rather, the audience must be expected to imagine
the blood, as Euripides' audience was expected to imagine the "palace miracle" in Bacchae.
" See 804. 870. 1010. For pity as a theme in this play, see 85, 573. 577. 1443.
'* Although, unlike Pentheus. Felix does this in hopes of buying time for Polyeucte,
rather than in hopes of obtaining further evidence of his crime.
3' See also 684. 707-08. 1378.
*° For Wagner's relationship with Greek drama, see W. Schadewaldt. Hellas und
Hesperien^ H (Zurich 1970) 341^«)5; H. Lloyd-Jones. Blood for the Ghosts (London
1982) 126-42; M. Ewans. Wagner and Aeschylus (Cambridge 1982); N. O'Sullivan,
"Aristophanes and Wagner," Antike und Abendland 36 (1990) 67-81.
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Die Walkure, Briinnhilde appears before Siegmund. Wotan has decided that
Siegmund must be killed by Hunding, and Briinnhilde, who earUer in the act
had identified herself with Wolan's will, has come to lead Siegmund away to
Walhall. Siegmund's death is inevitable for, as Brunnhilde explains to him,
"wer mich erschaut, der scheidet vom Lebenslicht." In response to his
inquiries she tells him that he will be reunited in Walhall with his father
Walse and that there await him in this hero's paradise Wunschmddchen to
minister to his needs. So far, Siegmund finds nothing to object to, but he
has one further question of the Valkyrie, namely whether he can bring along
Sieglinde, his sister and bride, who is at the moment asleep with her head in
his lap. Brunnhilde replies that he will not see Sieglinde once he arrives in
Walhall. Siegmund refuses to go on this condition, and he threatens to kill
himself and his bride, choosing to be united in death with Sieglinde in pref-
erence to the everlasting bliss ("ewige Wonne") promised by Brunnhilde. At
this point, as Wagner's stage-directions^^ tell us, Brunnhilde is transformed
by an overwhelming sense of sympathy ("im heftigsten Sturme des
Mitgefiihls"). Because she has witnessed Siegmund's undying devotion to
his mortal bride (which devotion echoes the affection that Wotan has taught
the maiden Brunnhilde herself to feel toward Siegmund), and because she has
seen the extent of this hero's bravery in the face of death, she changes her
mind. No longer is she determined to carry off to Walhall Siegmund's
lifeless body after his inevitable defeat; instead, she has resolved to alter fate
itself ("Beschlossen ist's: Das Schlachtlos wend ich.") and to grant victory
to Siegmund. Brunnhilde's change of mind is remarkably similar to
Iphigeneia's: In both instances young maidens (who have been betrayed by
their fathers) are confronted by heroes whose situations arouse feelings of
pity and admiration which, enhanced by erotic undertones, inspire the one
maiden to change from bitter laments to glorious acceptance and the other to
change from dutiful compliance to heroic defiance. There is, however, one
striking dramaturgic difference between the two scenes. For, while
Iphigeneia's change of mind has taken audiences by surprise, Brunnhilde's
has been so skillfully prepared that it seems natural, even inevitable.
Indeed, this scene in Die Walkiire is in effect a dramatization of the division
within the will of Wotan, whose passionate desire for Siegmund's survival
was earlier in the act thwarted by the indignant protests of Fricka. We need
not see this as an indication of Wagner's superiority to Euripides as a
dramatist. Rather, it serves to underline the novelty in the use of this device
by the earlier dramatist, who (like the author of Prometheus Bound) had not
yet made it the established and familiar element of dramatic technique that it
was to become in subsequent centuries.
University ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign
** And his music: The score here indicates changes of tempo, dynamics and key.
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Fathers, Sons and Forgiveness
KENNETH J. DOVER
Theseus in Eur. Hipp. 1257-60 says that when he heard how the curse he
pronounced on his son had been fulfilled he rejoiced at the news through
hatred (^iiaei) of Hippolytus; but out of respect for the filial relationship
which is of concern to the gods he is "neither gladdened^ nor grieved" by
what has happened. When Artemis has disclosed the truth of the matter, he
abases himself in utter remorse (1325 6Xoi|it|v). Artemis heaps excoriating
reproaches on his intemperate failure to test the truth of Phaedra's false
accusation, but grants him forgiveness for that (1326 ex' eoxl Kai ooi
T©v8e av)YYV(b)4.T|(; tdxeiv) because the whole train of disaster was the
work of Aphrodite in her pursuit of her vendetta against Hippolytus.
Consoling Hippolytus, Artemis tells him (1435) "I advise you not to hate
your father (natepa ^.ti atuYevv)." Theseus has destroyed him cxkcov, i.e.
under a misapprehension which acted as a constraint; it is only to be
expected that mortals will go wrong when they are caught up in a train of
god-given events; and it was Hippolytus's ^oipa to die as he is now dying.
Artemis has no intention of forgiving Aphrodite (a goddess, after all, could
not claim to have acted in ignorance of the facts), and she proclaims (1420-
22) that she will kill "whatever mortal is dearest to Aphrodite"; the
innocence of that next victim does not worry her, any more than Phaedra's
innocence worried Aphrodite.
According to the story told in Xen. Cyr. 3. 1. 38-40, the king of
Armenia, father of Tigranes, executed a man who in his view was corrupting
(6ia(p0eipEiv) his son. Tigranes had greatly admired this man as koKoq,
KdYa06<;, and tells Cyrus, "When he was going to his execution, he said to
me, 'Do not be angry with your father (^t| xi at) . . . xaXeTiavGfiq xw
7iaxp{) simply because he has condemned me to death. He does this not
from ill-will (KaKovova) but from ignorance (ctyvoia), and all the wrong
that people do from ignorance I regard as action under constraint
^ By OV0' iiSojiai ktX., coming so soon after noGriv, he must mean that conventional
aiScoq is strong enough to pull him away from fi5ovf|, in the direction of Xvnri, to a half-
way point, but not beyond that. tjoGTiv normally describes the speaker's reaction at the
time of utterance (e.g. Ar. Nu. 174, 1240), but vvv 6' requires the audience to re-interpret
it as a true past tense.
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(dcKOiioia).'" Cyrus is impressed by so noble a sentiment. The king
excuses himself by admitting that he resented ((pGoveiv) his son's mentor,
believing that the man was usurping the respect (0ai)^d^eiv) which a son
owes to his father. Cyrus concedes that the king's fault was only human
(dvGpcoTiivd ^oi SoKEiq dp.apTdvEiv), and, turning to Tigranes, he
commands him, "Forgive your father (cuyyiYvoxyKE x<a naxpi)."
Consideration of the similarities and differences between these two
passages affords a good basis for comparison of Greek and modem attitudes
to forgiveness.
The most obvious difference between the passages is one of vocabulary.
If learners of Greek who have approached Uie subject through Classical
literature are asked, "What is the Greek for 'forgive'?" they are likely to say,
"o-oYYiYvcboKco." A student of the New Testament could hardly fail to say,
"dcpCimi," having in mind such famous texts as Lk 23. 34, "Father, forgive
them . . ." (dcpeq avxoic, ktX.). 'Acpievai is, of course, attested in that
sense from the fifth century onwards (e.g. Ar. Nu. 1425 f.), and is used in
Attic law of a victim who, before dying, absolves his killer (Dem. 37. 59).
The converse is not true, for avyyiYvtoaKeiv and avYyvwiiTi are not at all
favoured in Christian Greek. Unlike "forgive" and its equivalents in modem
European languages, ovYYiyvcoaKeiv declares itself by its composition a
verb of cognition. That much is clear from its usage by Herodotus and
Thucydides in other senses, "concur" in general (i.e. "share someone else's
opinion") and "admit" in particular (i.e. "share with one's accuser the same
assessment of one's own action"). The locus classicus is Thuc. 2. 60. 4,
"You blame me, who advised you to fight, and yourselves, oi ^weYvone."
The sense "forgive" arises from a recognition that people very commonly
regard their own actions as justified or at least, even if they feel some shame
and regret, as not deserving punishment. IvyyvtoGi }j.oi is an appeal for
empathy, "Share my view of the matter." That is not something which
Christians oppressed by a sense of their own unworthiness would demand of
God, but there is no theological reason why it should not be demanded of
the Olympian gods. Justin Dial. 9. 1 a\)yyvcb|iTi aoi . . . Kal dcpeGeiri aoi
combines a personal statement with a prayer; but the Lord's Prayer (Mt 6.
12 d(p£(; ...©<; Kal fiiieiq d(pTiKa^ev) and Mt 18. 21 d^iaptriaei zic, e^ie
. . .
Kttl d(pTioco at)tw show that humans too can dcpievai offences
against themselves. The connotations of a word do not necessarily persist
through its compounds, and it would be perilous to found an argument on
an insistence that they do, but in the case of avyYiyvcbaKeiv the other
compounds of YiyvcooKEiv and the first hundred words beginning with
a\)v- picked at random from the lexicon favour the argument from
etymology.
The striking fact about a^)YYi-YvcoaK:Eiv and ovyy\ai^r\ is that the
former is not auested before Simonides {PMG) 542. 27 (Danae apologises
to Zeus for venturing to voice the hope that her fortunes will change), and
the latter not until Herodotus. Until Simonides, Greek of the archaic period
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seems to have lacked a simple equivalent of our "forgive." The Attic law on
manslaughter uses ai5eia0ai (noun al'SeoK;, Dem. 21. 43, Arist. Ath. 57.
3) of the permission given by the victim's family to the guilty man to
return to Attica, and this is understandably translated "pardon," a term which
has a legal colouring and is somewhat closer to "concede" or "waive" than to
"forgive. "2 Pardon in accordance with legal requirements or social
convention and pressure can still leave a powerful residue of ill-will. The
Attic aiSeioBai seems to be a special application of the general sense of
the word, behaviour towards another person as if that other person had
precedence over oneself.
To infer from these lexical considerations that no one ever forgave
anybody in the Greek world until the late archaic period would be no more
intelligent than inferring, from the fact that English and German distinguish
between conscience and consciousness, whereas French and Italian do not,^
that the phenomenon of conscience is confined to certain parts of Europe.
The alternative inference, that early Greek poets chose (or happened) never to
portray anyone demanding or receiving forgiveness, is demolished by
observation: Achilles forgives Agamemnon in Iliad 19. Or is that the
imposition of modem categories on an alien text? The question must be
asked, but it need not be intimidating. To answer it, let us extricate
ourselves for a while from the history of words and get into the history of
experiences, which show much less diachronic change. We have all had the
experience of forgiving and being forgiven. What is going on in us when
we forgive, and what do we think is going on in other people when they
forgive us?
If you have harmed me, and later I have the capacity and the opportunity
to harm you but do not do so, then prima facie I have forgiven you. The
qualification "prima facie" is necessary, because there are many practical
reasons for abstaining from revenge on a given occasion, however
implacable my desire for it may be. Perhaps I see and relish the prospect of
an even better opportunity in the future; or, more often, abstention is a
means to some other end, e.g. maintaining good relations with a friend of
yours. The words "I forgive you" can be invested with an appearance of the
performative character of "I promise," but the performance is not
irrevocable; as the words constitute a statement about my feelings, to which
you do not have direct access, the statement may be false and shown to be
false by later events. It is true only if I no longer wish to harm you, no
2 Cf. C. E. von Erffa. AIAQI {= Philologus Suppl. 30. 2 [1937]) 105 f.; D. M.
MacDoweU. Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (Manchester 1963) 125 f.
' Cf. E. V. Kohak in the preface to his translation (Evanston 1974) of Paul Ricoeur, Le
volontaire et I'involontaire, xxxvi: "I have . . . rendered la conscience 'consciousness'
even in expressions where 'awareness' would have been usual, reserving the term
'conscience' for the few passages where this specific meaning is indicated by the context."
When lecturing in Italy on Greek moral values I had to discuss at some length with Italian
friends the circumlocutions needed to resolve the ambiguities of coscienza.
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matter how tempting and frequent the opportunities to do so. Then we can
speak of "true" or "genuine" forgiveness.
Remission of anger, of hatred, of the desire to hurt, call it what we
will, is the point at issue in the attempts of Agamemnon's envoys to move
Achilles in Iliad 9: 157 \i.ETaXkr\l,a\/ii xo^io, 255 f. ^eyaXTixopa 9-u|i6v
/ loxEvv ev atT|9eaoi' <piXo(ppoa-6vT| jap dp.eivcov, 496 f. 5d^aaov 0\)p.6v
p-eyav, o\)6i xi oe XP'H / vT|Xee<; TjTop e'xEvv, 675 xo^oq 6' ex' e'xei
^leyaXTixopa Gv^ov, 678 ovk eGeXei oPeooai xoXov. When events have
brought about Achilles' reconciliation with Agamemnon, he uses similar
terminology: 19. 67 f. eyco naxxa xo^v, ox)6e xi ^le xp^l / doKeXicoq
aiel )ievEaiv£|iev. Not surprisingly, in classical prose also forgiveness is
regularly contrasted with anger: Lys. 29. 5 (opyi^eoGai), PI. Euthd. 306c
(xaA-enaivEiv), Mnx. 244b (dyavaKXEiv), Phdr. 257a (opyn), 269b
(xaA,e7ia{v£iv), Rep. 366c (opyC^eoGai), E. Hipp. 1435 Ttaxepa \ir[
oxuyeiv and Xen. Cyr. 3. 1. 38 ^ti xi . . . xaXEnawQr{c, xw 7caxp{,
compared above, come in this category.
Orestes, in his plea for help to Menelaus (E. Or. 642-79), "forgives"
him for his part in Uie sacrifice of Iphigenia; I'm not asking you, he says,
to kill Hermione in compensation; 6E'i ydp a' e|io\) Ttpdaoovxoq ©q
Tipdoaco xd vv)v / jiXeov (pepeaGai, Kd|xe Gx>yy\<£>^T\v e'xeiv (660 f.).
The words are harsh and wry. Orestes does not mean that he shares the
YV(b)j,T| which Menelaus had about the sacrifice at Aulis, nor are we to
imagine that he no longer resents it, only that it is pointless for the weak to
hope for revenge on the strong. The strangeness of the "reason" for his
"forgiveness," the bitterness with which the words are charged, prompt us to
ask what reasons the Greeks usually offer for forgiveness.
Most of the time, though not quite all the time, they are the same as
we give nowadays.** Ignorance and error; duress; poverty, alcohol, lust,
provocation; weaknesses believed to be characteristic of the old, or the
young, or the female; inherited temperament; loyalty to relations and
friends; the mortal propensity to err. I may forgive you out of pity, if great
misfortune befalls you before I have any opportunity for revenge; or you
may buy my forgiveness by payment of compensation. It is easy to be
cynical about compensation, but cynicism is misplaced. Your payment to
me is your loss, and in so far as loss is a form of suffering, I have my
revenge, my desire to harm you is satisfied, and I have no more desire to
harm you. At the same time, generosity in giving is very commonly a
manifestation of affection and equally commonly a cause of affection, so the
payment restores us to friendship.^
* For detailed examples see my Greek Popular Morality (Oxford 1974) 133-60.
* In 1988 a well-known singer received £1.25 million from a newspaper in an out-of-
court settlement of a libel action he had brought against it. He then said, "I don't bear The
Sun any malice," and a spokesman for the paper said, "We are delighted that The Sun and
Elton have become friends again."
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There are however some differences between ancient and modem grounds
for forgiveness. I cannot expect nowadays to be forgiven on the grounds
that my wrongdoing was fated, a plea with which Gorgias plays (B 1 1. 6) in
his defence of Helen; but it was never an entirely safe plea, for "My action
was fated" invites the retort (as Clytaemnestra discovers in A. Cho. 910 f.),
"So is my revenge." Nor can I plead that God compelled me to do wrong,
though I might (especially if I were an evangelist caught in an embarrassing
situation) say that I was tempted by the Devil, and I might even get some
credit for being considered by the Devil a worthwhile target. A Greek might
say that a god distorted his mind, destroying his better judgment (cf.
Agamemnon in //. 19. 86-94), but whether that is accepted as a reason for
forgiveness depends on whether his adversary has independent grounds for
forgiving.^ If he has none, he may suggest that the god's object was
actually to put the victim in a situation from which punishment would
inevitably follow, and that it is imprudent to thwart a god's purpose (cf.
And. 1. 113, Lys. 6. 22). Theseus was forgiven by Artemis not because
Aphrodite intervened directly in his mind (as she had done in Phaedra's), but
because she created a situation in which he did wrong dvGpcoTiivcoq.
Diminished responsibility on grounds of mental illness, an important issue
in modern thinking about crime and punishment, was not recognised in
Greek penal codes, partly because the illness could be regarded as evidence of
divine disfavour, and partly because Greek society generally treated risk to
the community as deserving precedence over unfairness to an individual.
The variation "revenge . . . punishment . . ." in the previous paragraph
is not unconscious, and it remains firmly within the field of xi^icapia,
ti|xcopeio0ai. There are occasions on which wrongdoing by an animal,
slave, child, employee or subordinate incurs infliction of suffering without
incurring at the same time the anger, hatred or even ill-will of the owner or
superior who inflicts it; the suffering is treated as an ingredient of training
and education and as a regrettable necessity for the deterrence of others."^ The
Greeks denoted that by KoXd^eiv, Kohxaiq, and Arist. Rhet. 1269bl2-14
defines KoXaoic, as inflicted xox> jidoxovToq eveKa, Ti|xcopia as xo\>
7ioio\)vxo<; EVEKa. Clement of Alexandria adopts the Aristotelian
distinction in Paed. 1. 8 (p. 131. 8) and in asserting {Str. 7. 16 [p. 72. 20])
that God KoXd^Ei but does not TijicopeiaGai (a proposition not easily
defended in an eschatological context). Yet he slips into looser usage in Str.
7. 12 (p. 74. 6) when he refers to the tifitopia of malefactors, and 7. 10 (p.
41. 18) KoXdoEcoq Kttl TifitopCaq aTidariq, aq ek twv d|j.apTrmdTcov
Ei<; naiSEiav utio^ievo^ev otoxripiov. Plato's Protagoras (Prt. 324a-c)
appears at first sight to be drawing a clear distinction between ^Exd Xoyov
^ See further my Greek and the Greeks (Oxford 1987) 88. 138 f.
^ The legendary flogging pedagogues who said "This hurts me more than it hurts you" are
regarded with contempt because what they said was sometimes false; that does not preclude
the possibility that it was sometimes true.
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KoXd^Eiv, infliction of suffering for the purpose of making the sufferer
behave better in future, and (oonep Gripiov dXoYiaT(0(; xiixcopeioGai,
infliction tovtox) evEKa, oxi tidiKTiaev. We might think that he is
distinguishing between two genera of action by the criterion of intention.*
He continues, however: "This opinion is held by all those who
xi^icopovvTai, whether in a private or a public capacity. All people
Tincopottvxai Kal KoXd^ovxai^ those whom they think guilty of
wrongdoing, and your fellow-citizens, the Athenians, do it as much as
anyone." The first part of this statement, "This opinion . . . capacity" is
untrue, as we know from our own experience, but the statement as a whole
shows that Protagoras's distinction is between two species of the genus
Ti|i(op{a, one ^lexd Xoyo-u and the other aXoyioioc,. Even that distinction
does not count for much in the courts; the speaker of Lys. 6, who demands
the death penalty for Andocides, urges the jury in 13 and 42-44 to
KoXd^Eiv wrongdoers, and in 15, 18, 53 to xi|i.topEio9ai them. Modem
usage, except on the plane of theory, is hardly more inclined to
distinguish,'^ and the reason for that is simple enough: From the receiving
end, the distinction is not apparent. If I am sentenced to ten years in jail,
how can it matter to me whether it is called "correction" or "revenge"? I
may be told that I am "paying my debt to society," but a more concise term
is avoided. The reason for its avoidance leads us directly to what is by far
the most important difference between Greek and modem attitudes to
forgiveness, the powerful role played in our moral thinking by the
uncompromising command of Christ to forgive (Mt 18. 22) and his
prohibition of retaliation (Mt 5. 38^7). Acknowledgement of religious
duty causes Christian societies, whatever suffering they inflict on
wrongdoers, to deny that it is revenge. Realisation that no society will last
very long if it continues to forgive wrongdoing enables it to believe that
KoXaoic, and dcpEoiq can somehow exist Kaxd xa-uxov Kal npbq xat)x6v
djia. In individual cases, religious duty coupled with an un-hellenic belief
in a great moral gulf between God and humanity can induce someone whose
daughter has been killed by gunmen to say, "I forgive them, because I know
that I too have need of forgiveness."
Greek gods do not command us to forgive on an extravagant scale, if at
all. They themselves are not conspicuously forgiving, and we have some
allusions to particular cases in which the criteria they apply to forgiveness
are at best human, and at worst'' heroic. The most straightforward case is
* For a logical analysis of Protagoras's argument see C. C. W. Taylor's translation and
commenury (Oxford 1976) 90-96.
' The switch from the active voice (b2, b7) to the middle is unexpected; it is caused, I
think, by the introduction of the public domain (Simcaia) into the context, for the state
KoXd^ei but 6 YpoKpoM-evo<; KoXa^etai.
'° I have heard a vengeful husband say, "I want her to suffer. I want to punish her."
^' Cf. B. M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964) 19-25 on
the uncompromising disposition of the Sophoclean hero.
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that of Pheretime, queen of Cyrene, who impaled round the walls of Barce
those of its citizens whom she held most responsible for her son's murder,
and for good measure cut off their wives' breasts and nailed the breasts too
to the walls. Some time later she died of a horrible illness, so
demonstrating, says Herodotus (4. 205) ax; apa dvGptoTioiai al Xit|v
Tl^(op{al npbq GeSv £7t{99ovoi yivovxai. If she had been more
discriminating in her vengeance, seasoning it with clemency (as Xenophon's
Cyrus would have done) and abstaining from barbarous torture and offensive
display, the gods would not have been moved to hostiUty. They reacted as
humans do, and had the power to give expression to their reaction.
The second case, that of Herakles' murder of Iphitus, is more subtle.
According to the speech of Lichas in Soph, Tr. 248-90, Iphitus's father
Eurytus had grossly insulted Herakles; on a later occasion, therefore,
Herakles distracted Uie attention of Iphitus when they were on top of a high
tower, and pushed him over the edge. For this Zeus sentenced Herakles to a
year's servitude under Omphale; "If," says Lichas (278-80) "he had requited
Iphitus openly, Zeus would have forgiven him (Zetx; xav a-uvEyvco) his
just victory (t,h\ diKr\ xevpo\)^ev(p), for the gods too have no love of
hybris." To a modem scholar, killing a young man because one has been
treated hybristically by his father seems the act of a maniac; but there are
cultures and sub-cultures today (e.g. in Lebanon, to say nothing of points
much further west) in which it would be de rigueur, a salutary thought when
we are tempted to contrast "ancient" and "modem" without qualification.
Herakles is one of those tragic characters who do nothing by halves, and the
gods of tragedy, while sharing human distaste for treacherous killing, are
prepared to tolerate face-to-face revenge on a monstrous scale. •
Yet Herakles would not have fared well before an Athenian jury.^^
There is abundant evidence that in the fourth century magnanimity,
forgiveness, "niceness," very commonly designated enielKeia, were
admired and respected, and they were a product of civilised society to which
religious doctrine does not appear to have made any significant contribution.
Arist. EN 1143al9-24 associates auyyvcoiioviKog and iniziKr\q very
closely. The Athenian speaker in PI. Lg. 757e is notably uncomfortable
about the necessary conflict between to eTtieiKeq Kai ovyyvcofiov and
strict justice, and Arist. EN 1137a31-38a3 wrestles with their interrelation,
coming to the agreeable conclusion that eTiieiKeia is 6iKaioavvTi xiq. I
have explored enieiKeia elsewhere,^ ^ and draw attention now to two words,
etymologically related to each other, one common and one rare, which are
sometimes used with connotations of magnanimity: The common word is
Yevvaio(;, the rarer word Yevvd6aq, which is confined to Aristophanes,
'^ Nor would Antigone, confronted by a prosecutor like Lycurgus.
" Greek Popular Morality 61-63. 191.
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two passages of Plato and one of Aristotle.^'* Given their derivation from
yevva, they might have been used to imply pride, haughtiness and
arrogance, but that is just what they do not imply, and this fact tells us
much about Athenian attitudes to forgiveness.
The long-dead general Myronides is admiringly called yewdSag in Ar.
Ec. 304, but we do not know for what virtues, other than swift and resolute
military action, he was remembered in tradition; in Ach. 1230 the victorious
Dikaiopolis is hailed as © yzwaha; and one of the slaves in Eq. 240 f.
prevents the Sausage-seller from running away in panic by saying ©
Yevvd5a / aXXavtoncoXa, \iy\ npoSfix; xd Tipdy^axa. Nothing so far
to associate the word with magnanimity, but Frogs enlarges the field. In
179, when Xanthias has offered to carry all the luggage if no one else can be
found to do so, Dionysus compliments him by saying xptiaToq^^ el Kal
YEwdSaq, and Xanthias earns Uie same compliment from the Janitor (640
"You really are yevvaSaq dvrip!") when he displays a willingness to
submit to pain in the interests of fair play. 738^2, the opening of the
conversation between Xanthias and the slave of Pluto, throws fresh light on
the connotations of the word. "Your master," says the slave admiringly, "is
7evvd6a<; dvTjp!" "Of course he is," says Xanthias, "he doesn't know how
to do anything but drink and screw." Pluto's slave persists: "Fancy his not
beating you up when it was proved that you'd been claiming to be the
master, when you were a slave!" The slave calls Dionysus yzwahac,
because he forgave Xanthias; Xanthias agrees, because, in his view,
Dionysus's horizon is confined to drink and women, so naturally he's easy-
going. The connotation "easy-going" and therefore "magnanimous" suits
PI. Phdr. 243c, where yevvd^aq is coupled with npaoc, (which in turn is
coupled with evkoXoc; in Hp. Mi. 364d), and Arist. EN 1100b32, on the
man who endures great misfortunes eukoXcoc;, not through insensivity but
because he is yevvdSaq Kal ^eyaX6\j/\)xo<;. The last occurrence of
yEvvd6a(; in Frogs is at 997, where the chorus appeals to Aeschylus to
keep his temper in arguing against Euripides: aXV onax; w yEvvd5a / \iy\
7ip6(; opyfiv dvTiX£^Ei<;. Just as w y£vvd6a addressed to the fleeing
Sausage-seller was not an expression of a judgment on his character but an
attempt to give him a certain character by addressing him as if he akeady
possessed it—cf. "O most merciful king!" and the like, addressed to a
^* For the history of ftwabac, and its hypothetical prehistory see G. Bjorck, Das Alpha
Impurum und die tragische Kunstsprache (Uppsala 1950) 51-54. LSJ boldly labels it
"Dtoric," but it is not yet attested in any non-Attic text.
^^ XptioToq is often translated (even by people who should know better) "useful," for
which the Greek is xpTioinoq; xpTlo'c6<; is in fact the most general Atdc word for "good,"
and the translation "useful" is appropriate only in such phrases as xpryozix 6i5daKeiv,
XprioTci napaiveiv, because a useful lesson or useful advice is the same as a good lesson
or good advice. The translation of xpTiaroq as "noble" is also inappropriate except when a
writer loyal to the upper class treats that class as if it had a monopoly of goodness. On the
wide scope of xpiiotoc; see my The Greeks and their Legacy (Oxford 1988) 10 f.
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tyrant—so the chorus in Frogs hopes to induce in Aeschylus the behaviour
of a yevvdSac; dvTjp, That fits the only instance of w yzwahct in Plato,
Chrm. 155d. Socrates is telling Critias of his encounter with the young and
dazzlingly beautiful Charmides: "And then, © yzvv6.hcL, I saw inside his
himation, and I was all afire, head over heels . . ." This is just the sort of
context in which speakers elsewhere in Plato ask for forgiveness, e.g.
Euthd. 286e "My question may be rather a bore, aXkh ovyyiyvtoGKe"; cf.
Smp. 218b "That's why I'll tell you the whole story; you'll forgive what I
did then and what I'm saying now." Socrates is afraid that his candid
confession of erotic sensibility will embarrass Critias, and may bore him.
revvaio(; too, a term of positive evaluation which requires a very wide
range of translations to cover all the contexts in which we find it, may have
the connotation "easy-going," "magnanimous," "laid-back," as it does in PI.
Rep. 558c, a passage of caustic irony about the "marvellously agreeable"
way in which a democratic state is run. Socrates refers to its g-oyyvcouti
Kal oiL)5 ' oTiaxjxiow op-iKpoXxyyia ("total dismissal of mere details") and its
readiness to take on trust anyone in politics who asserts his goodwill to the
city. Glaucon, going along with the irony, agrees: Tidvu y', Ecpri,
yevvaia.
This completes a full circle and brings us back to Hippolytus.
Artemis' s recommendation that he should not "hate his father" is hardly
needed, because Hippolytus has already made his freedom from hatred
sufficiently clear in addressing Theseus as hxxsxaljaj;, . . . Tfia6e cru)j.(popa(;^^
(1407) and in saying that he mourns for his father more than for himself
(1409). After Artemis's exhortation, he takes the first step towards formal
forgiveness, X-oco 6e veTKO(; Tiaxpl (1442), but in adding that he does this at
Artemis's behest he still leaves unresolved the issue which, it seems, most
troubles Theseus at this moment. Attic law (Dem. 37. 59) provided that if
the victim of homicide forgave (dcpievai) the killer, there was no pollution,
no angry ghost to appease, and therefore no punishment. Hippolytus makes
the formal declaration which gives effect to this provision, oe Tot)5'
£A.£\)0epa> (p6vo\) (1449). Theseus is incredulous (1450 ti (pfiq; d^iriq
di\iaLx6c, ^i' eXevGepov;), and Hippolytus puts his declaration beyond
question by calling on Artemis to witness it (1451). Then Theseus
exclaims (1452) ox; yzvvaXoc, eK9aivTi naxpi.
Artemis is very far from issuing a divine injunction equivalent to
"Bless them that curse you"; she is sorting out a situation in a heroic family
in a way which will not conflict significantly with the existing corpus of
Attic myth about Theseus. For the purpose, she treats Theseus's fatal
cursing of Hippolytus as it if were (povoq dKovaioq (which it is not, 887-
90). Tigranes' tutor chooses to treat the king's sentence too as if it were
^* A defendant (or his sympathisers) may refer to a misdeed of his own as a m)H<popd. If
a prosecutor called it that, he would be as good as conceding the case; cf. D. M.
MacDowell's edition of Andocides, On the Mysteries (Oxford 1962) 126.
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dcKovoioq (which, again, it is not). Hippolytus and the tutor—and by
implication Tigranes himself, whom we have previously heard pleading for
his father's life and moving Cyrus to forgiveness of rebellion {Cyr. 3. 1. 7-
37)—earn praise by forgiving a murderous (and unforgiving) injustice.
University of St. Andrews
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The Koina of Epirus and Macedonia
N. G. L. HAMMOND
It is a particular pleasure to pay tribute to the outstanding scholarship and
warm friendship of Fritz Solmsen, whom I first knew at Cambridge in the
1930s. Then he was my host at the Institute for Research in the
Humanities at Madison, Wisconsin, in 1975-76 and in 1977, and he and
Lieselotte were most welcoming to my wife and me. Our friendship was
renewed most happily in Chapel Hill in 1986, when I was working at the
National Center for the Humanities. On many occasions, and especially at
Madison, where I took some seminars on Herodotus for him, we discussed
many problems of Macedonian history and he approached them all with his
fresh and penetrating mind and a wonderful grasp of the Greek language.
The subject which I have chosen is such as we discussed then.
The term to koivov was much in use in what we now call Northern
Greece in the fourth century B.C. In the treaty of c. 393 between
"Amyntas, son of Errhidaeus" and "Chalcideis" there were arrangements for
the export of such timber products "as to koivov does not need," and for
financial conditions affecting to koivov, i.e. the "Chalcideis" (Tod, GHI
111. 11-12). The term to koivov was certainly the official designation in
use, because the inscribed stone was found at Olynthus and gave the
Chalcidian version of the treaty. The literal meaning of to koivov is not
"the state" or "the league" as in LSJ^ s.v. koivo^, but "the community" or
"the commonality." If we keep to the literal meaning, there is no difference
in essence between the following examples of its use over a wide span,
geographically and chronologically: to koivov tcov 'Icovojv (Hdt. 5. 109.
3), InapTiTiTecav to koivov (Hdt. 1. 67. 5), AktoXrav to koivov (Tod,
GHI 137. 9 and 17), MoXooatov to koivov (SGDI 1334), to koivov
MaKe56vtov (IG XI. 4. 1102), koivov tcov Oaiovcov (SIG 394) and
KOIVOV T(bv BuXXiovtov (PAE [1965] 59). In each case it was "the
community."
The literal meaning was prominent in such expressions as fi Koivf|
EipTivti "the communal peace" (Tod, GHI 145. 6 and 11 ttiv vvv
YeYevT||a.evTiv fiixiv eipTivnv; cf. 177. 21), fi Koivq oumiaxia, "the
communal coalition" (Plb. 4. 9. 2, being the so-called Symmachy,
organised by Antigonus Doson). When the Apeirotai banished the
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Molossian king Aeacidcs in 317, they passed a communal decision, koivov
66Y|ia Tcov 'HTteiponcbv (Diod. 19. 36. 4).
The members which made up to koivov were not political units, such
as city-states, tribes or leagues, but people. Thus in the so-called
Corinthian League of 337 those sharing in "the common peace" were named
in the inscription, the certain surviving names being Thessalians, Thasians,
Ambraciotes, Phocians, Locrians, Malians, Dolopes, Perhaebians and
Cephallenians (Tod, GHI 177). We may make the comment that some were
organised in tribes, others in city-states and others in federal systems; but
those distinctions aie not to be deduced from "the common peace." And vice
versa it is a mistake to infer from to koivov or t| koivt] av^i^axva that its
members were organised only in one political form.^ There is no doubt that
any group of individuals could employ the expression. Thus the Spartiatai,
who were the elite citizens of the Lacedaemonian state, were described by
Herodotus as InapTiriTecov to koivov (1. 67. 5). There was no
implication that the Spartiatai were a federated body or a city-state. They
were a "community" of armed warriors, led by two kings elected from one
family.
The area in which this type of community survived and flourished until
the Roman conquest was most markedly Epirus, and the reason for that
survival was the fact that the transhumant form of pastoralism continued
from early times into the Hellenistic period.^ The evidence is provided by a
large number of inscriptions which reveal an extraordinary number of ethnic
terms and many decisions taken by ethnic Koivd. The basic unit was a
small community such as the Aterargoi, to koivov tSv 'ATepdpycov,
which passed its own resolutions {Ep. Chron. 1935. 261; Epirus 536).
When such a community was threatened, it tended to associate itself with
other such communities. Together they formed a cluster with a new
The following abbreviations are used in this article:
CAH The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd ed.
Epirus N. G. L. Hammond, Epirus (Oxford 1967)
Errington R. M. Errington, Geschichte Makedoniens (Munich 1986)
HMac I N. G. L. Hammond, A History ofMacedonia I (Oxford 1972)
HMac n N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, A History o/Macedonia E
(Oxford 1979)
HMac in N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, A History ofMacedonia
m (Oxford 1988)
Mac State N. G. L. Hammond, The Macedonian State (Oxford 1989)
Walbank F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius I-III
(Oxford 1957-79)
' This was implied, when the Symmachy was defined as "a League of Confederacies"
(Walbank I 256) or "a League of Leagues" {CAH VH. 1. 468). The strongest member at the
start—^Macedonia—was not a confederacy nor a league, and later members did not have to
become leagues. To say that "Macedones" (Plb. 4. 9. 4) were "perhaps only nominal
members" is to go beyond the Greek words, probability and actuality.
^ See Epirus 256 f. and 267 and Mac Stale 387, citing the results of a survey in North
Pindus led by A. K. Vavritsas.
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corporate name, e.g. Omphales. In course of time the clusters coalesced to
form a larger association, again with a corporate name, e.g. Molossoi. The
three stages led to an accumulation of ethnic terms: Thus we find MoXoaaol
"OjicpaXe^ XintoXioi (SGDI 1347 of c. 330-310; Epirus 566) and
Mokooobq 'Ovonepvoq KapTat6<; (SGDI 1346). To take another example,
the Prasaebi, themselves a member of the larger association 'The Chaones,"
consisted of at least five subsidiary tribes, since the officials and members of
their community had as ethnics Aixonios, Tharios, Kotulaios, O . . atas and
Prochtheios. Another cluster in the same region, the Pergamii, had as
officials of their community men with the ethnics Acralestos and Charadros.
Of the larger associations in Epirus the Chaones and the Molossoi were
known to Hecataeus in the sixth century (FGrH 1 F 103 and 108), and to
them Thucydides adds Atintanes, Orestai, Parauaioi and Thesprotoi in the
operations of 429 (2. 80. 5). The Dassaretii developed from being a
constituent tribe of the Chaones in the sixth century as the Dexaroi (FGrH 1
F 103) into being an independent association. There were other associations
to the southeast, such as the Agraioi (Thuc. 3. 106. 2). All these
associations were liable to have a fluctuating membership; for the basic
units—the small tribes—had freedom of choice and exercised it. Thus,
according to Strabo 323-24, whose information was derived from Hecataeus,
the Chaones were the strongest association in Epirus, probably in the period
before the mid-sixth century. They were then overhauled by the
Molossians, who had pride of place until c. 480. During their period of
ascendancy the strongest centre of economic power was in the area north of
Lake Ochrid (see CAH III. 3 [1982] 271). There were strong links at that
time between Trebenishte, where the royal cemetery of the rulers north of
Lake Ochrid was situated, and the oracular shrine of Dodona;^ and Strabo
attributed the Molossians' rise to power to the fact that Dodona was "beside
them" (cf. FGrH 1 F 108).
In this period the tribes of Upper Macedonia were members of the
Molossian association, and they were called, e.g. Orestai Molossoi (FGrH 1
F 107 'Opeotai- MoXoooikov e9vo<;). However, in the 480s most of them
were brought into the sphere of the Macedonian king by Xerxes, when he
was preparing his invasion of Greece,'* and most of them from then onwards
were "Macedones," e.g. AvyKTiaxcov MaKcSovcov in Thuc. 4. 83. 1; cf. 2.
99. 2 twv yap MaKeSovcov jcal A\)YKTiaTal Kal 'EXi^ioDTai. The
Orestai may have been an exception, because they operated together with a
western tribe, the Parauaei, in 429 (Thuc. 2. 80. 6). In the fourth century
the Molossian association increased in power; for, as we see from
inscriptions, its membership grew from ten to fifteen tribal groups, which
included the Orestae (SEG XXIII 471. 13) and some that were previously
members of the Thesprotoi (Epirus 527 and 530 f.).
^Epirus 431 {.
* Just. 7. 4. 1, as explained in HMac U 63 f.
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Since the publication in 1956 of two inscriptions from Dodona it has
been demonstrated beyond cavil that the tribes of the Molossian group were
Greek-speaking in the latter part of the fifth century; for the names and the
patronymics of men mentioned in the decisions of 370-68 B.C. were all
Greek, and the language and the institutions of the inscription were entirely
Greek. That is merely a terminus ante quern they spoke Greek. Moreover,
the dialect of questions asked evidently by local persons at Dodona was West
Greek, and not the Doric dialect of the Corinthian colonies which traded
with the Molossian group. The conclusion is certain that these tribes were
Greek-speaking from the beginning at least of the Iron Age. It follows that
the tribes of Upper Macedonia were also speakers of Greek; for non-Greek-
speakers would not have been admitted to a Greek association.^ That they
spoke the West Greek dialect is clear from an inscription in Seleucid Syria,
in which there were magistrates with a West Greek termination nEXiyavec,,
and from the mention of d6eiYavE(; in Plb. 5. 54. 10.^ The northern limit
of the Greek-speaking tribes is supplied to us by Strabo 326; for they
extended up to the southernmost Illyrian tribes, these being Bylliones,
Taulantii, Parthini, Brygi and Enchelii (the last being around the northern
part of Lake Ochrid),^ and these Greek-speaking tribes (he has just
mentioned the lands of the Pelagones, Lyncestae, Orestae and Elimeotae)
were said "by some to have tlie same hair-style, dialect, cloak and suchlike
things as far as Corcyra" (327).
The conditions of ancient transhumant pastoralism were unchanged
until very recent times, when flocks of sheep were transported by car and
winter pastures were turned into agricultural land. We can therefore gain
some relevant information from the pastoral groups of the Sarakatsani and
the Vlachs. The viable size of a group, known as a parea or stani, was
between 2(X) and 500 persons, varying with the extent and quality of
pastures. During the turbulence of the Turkish Empire some groups, which
had been entirely nomadic, combined to form clusters and built villages in
high Pindus at Vovousa (four groups) and Avdhella (five groups), for
instance. In each group the adult armed men met together to make some
decisions for the group and to elect a leader of the group with wide powers (a
tselingas or tshelniku). This leader usually held office for life, and his
family being held in honour often provided his successor. The larger
association, e.g. the armed men of Vovousa, elected a leader from one of its
' The inscriptions, from Dodona, were published by D. Evangelides in AE (1956) 1 ff.;
for comments see Epirus 524 ff. Inscriptions show that the names and the language of
Upper Macedonia was Greek; see HMac I 90 and F. Papazoglou in Chiron 18 (1988) 250 f.
* For peliganes see Syria 23 (1942^3) 21 f. Walbank I 583 proposed to emend
"adeiganes" to "peliganes" but not on any grounds of palaeography.
' This is disputed by Albanian scholars, e.g. in Iliria (1982) 2. 84 f. and (1984) 2. 79 f.,
and by P. Cabanes in Iliria (1986) 1. 83. See my arguments in JRS 79 (1989) 19 f.
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constituent groups.* We see a similar system in the larger associations
which Thucydides described briefly: The leader was normally a king, and
where he was lacking, e.g. for the Chaones, the leaders were two men of
"the ruling family" (Thuc. 2. 80. 5 ek xox> dpxiKou yevoix;). The smaller,
constituent groups are revealed in inscriptions as having each its own
assembly and officials in the fourth and following centuries. For instance,
there was mention c. 340 of a formal decision: eSo^e ta iKkr\aia tSv
. . . (SGDI 1335) and the officials included TipooTdxai, of which
Thucydides recorded an earlier instance (2. 80. 5 ejieTTioio) TipooTaxEia,
among the Chaones). The community passed resolutions about its internal
affairs and regulated relations with other communities.' The fact that they
were all ultimately subsumed into to koivov xtov 'Aneiponav did not
apparently diminish the vitality of their own institutions.
It is important to note that the expression to koivov means a
community of its own members and takes its corporate name for those
members only. Thus koivov twv B-oXXiovtov was the community of
Bylliones. I stress this point, because some scholars have recently imported
the concept of a federal system and have argued that the Greek words meant a
"League" of which the Bylliones were a leading member and other groups
such as the Amantes or Atintanes were members. ^^ That, however, was not
the sense of the word in the northwestern area; for the koinon of Apeirotai,
Molossoi, Thesprotoi, Aterargoi, Pergamioi, etc. in every case was the body
of its internal members and not the basis of a wider confederation. Thus
KOIVOV Twv BvXXiovcov was the community of the Bylliones, a group of
Hellenised lUyrians who were bilingual (Strabo 326).
We have seen that the large tribal associations of what was called Upper
Macedonia spoke the same dialect and had the same system of organisation
as those of Epirus. The evidence for the small tribes is less rich than that
for the small tribes of Epirus, probably because wood rather than stone was
used for recording decisions in classical and early Hellenistic times. Even
so, the evidence of Greek inscriptions of the early Roman Empire is valid
for earlier times, because the Macedonians were an unusually conservative
people. Inscriptions have recorded decisions by "Orestai" (/G XI. 4. 1118,
third century B.C.), by to koivov 'OpeoTwv (Tiva Antika 9 [1959] 163 f.,
first century A.D.) and by 'EXTniioycwv to koivov {Ancient Macedonia II
130, second century A.D.). Within the association of the Pelagones it
appears from inscriptions of the second century A.D. that a cluster of groups
were called t] tmv 'ApyeoTaicDv nokic, iSpomenik 71 [1931] no. 88) and
that one of the units in the cluster was NeaTcoXeiTtov to koivov (ibid., no.
63). Another association, that of the Derriopes, was called 6ti^O(;
* For a fuller description see my book, Migrations and Invasions in Greece and Adjacent
Areas (Park Ridge, NJ 1976) 37-51.
' Examples are given in Epirus 525-40.
^° See note 7 above, and add F. Papazoglou in Historia 35 (1986) 444.
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AEppioTicov in an inscribed jx)em of the first century A.D. (Chiron 18
[1988] 237), and noXic, with TioXixdpxai (L. A. Heuzey and L. Daumet,
Mission archeologique de Macedoine [Paris 1876] 315). One of its
constituent parts was IxvPeppalcov t) nokxc, (ibid., no. 501), cited as r[
noXiq {Chiron, loc. cit.), another was Aoatcovecov to koivov {Spomenik,
loc. cit,, no. 437), and a third part was the "Geneatai" (in Latin in BCH 47
[1923] no. 211)}^ In the land of the Lyncestae we hear only of "the
villages of Arrhabaeus" in Thucydides' narrative (4. 124. 4 xdc; xou
'Appapaiou Ka)^a(;); these may have corresponded with the small koina
farther north. ^^ In Orestis two parts of the association are known. An
inscription of the second century A.D. from Sisanion mentions a noXxc, (the
name not surviving) and gives a list of ephebes.^^ An inscription of the
same period recorded the decisions of a community called the Battynaioi,
referred to as t] TioXixeia, with regard to grazing rights and the cutting of
stakes (JHS 33 [1913] 337 f.); they were evidently a pastoral community.'"*
In Elimeotis a decision was recorded K]aTd to 86[^av xr\ P]o-uXti Kal [tq
6Tma) {AE [1936] Chron. 10); it is evident that the Maleiatae (vel sim.)
were a small tribal group within the association known as the Elimeotai.
Before we leave Epirus and Upper Macedonia we must consider the form
of leadership in these tribal systems. Where ownership of flocks, pasture
and timber was communal, it was essential that the leader, namely the
elected tselingas or tshelniku, should have very strong powers of directing
the movement and the activity of the "company," and of negotiating on its
behalf with other groups and with settled communities. When groups
joined together and formed a cluster, one of the group-leaders was elected
leader of the cluster, exercised similar powers, and was often succeeded by a
member of his family. The common name for such a leader was basileus,
similar to phylobasileus in early Attica. In our area most of the large
associations were ruled by men from "native" royal families (Strabo 326
vnb iOayevSv ripxcvto). But there were notable exceptions. The
Molossoi chose Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, and his descendants as their
kings; the Chaones stated that their kings were descended from Helenus of
Troy; and the Lyncestae elected in the mid-fifth century a descendant of the
Bacchiadae of Corinth as their king (Strabo 326). When a "native" was
" A stranger at Styberra had the ethnic AoXtiveoTTii; (Chiron 18 [1988] 249); he came
probably from this region.
^^ For other komai, see HMac I 89 f.
^^ See HMac 1114. Mr. N. D. Ziakas informed me by letter that the stone is still where
Leake saw it.
^* The meaning of political terms in Upper Macedonia may have differed from the
meaning in southern Greece. In the inscription from Sisanion the term r\ noXixtia seems
to mean the citizen body, which met in an EKKXriaia, according to the inscription of the
Battynaioi. In Epirus a noXiq xtov Xaovojv meant not a city-sute but simply "the state"
(PAE [1952] 298; Epirus 593); and in Ulyris Sesarethos figured as a polis of the Taulaniii. .
again a sute rather than a city-state (Hecataeus, FGrH 1 F 103).
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elected and the succession was in his family, the tribal group from which he
had come was called the royal tribe; and if a newcomer was appointed, he
was given the tribal affiliation of the royal tribe.
Because tribal affiUations were important, relationships were expressed
in the genealogy of eponyms. Thus the sons of Neoptolemus and
Andromache were "Molossos and Pielos and Pergamos, the youngest," and
it was from Pielos that the kings of the Molossoi took their origin (Paus.
1, 11. 1-2). Since Pielos was the eponymous ancestor of the Peiales, it is
evident that they were the royal tribe within the Molossian association both
before and after the election of Neoptolemus. On the other hand, Pergamos
was the eponymous ancestor of the Pergamii, a constituent tribe of the
Chaones, and it seems that they were the royal tribe in that association; for
the tradition was that after the death of Neoptolemus Andromache consorted
with Helenus. Associations which had "native" kings were the Parauaioi,
the Orestai, the Tymphaioi, the Elimeotai and the Pelagones (Thuc. 2. 80.
6, 2. 99. 2; IG V 89; Tzetz. ad Lycophr. 802 for Polyperchon). Great
honours were paid to the kings, as we have seen recently in the remarkably
fine tombs of the Elimeote kings in the fifth century at Aiane.
Although the kings had extensive powers, they were constitutionally
elected and had to deal with some form of Assembly, as we see from the
exchange of oaths between the Molossian king and his Molossians at
Passaron (Plut. Pyrrh. 5. 2) and from the expulsion of Aeacides by the
Koivov 667^a of the Epeirotai (Diod. 19. 36. 4). In the reign of Alexander
I, c. 340, there is mention of an Assembly's decision—of the Molossoi or
of a constituent tribe—which was recorded at Dodona: eSo^e xai EKX-TjoCai
Twv
. . . (SGDI 1335; Epirus 535). The monarchies of the tribal groups
of Upper Macedonia were terminated by Philip II, but the administrative
systems continued. Thus honours were paid to "King X, son of King X" by
"Orestae" in the third century (IG XI. 4. 1118), and during the armistice in
197 the Orestae absconded to join Rome (Plb. 18. 47. 6). Troops were
recruited territorially from the cantons of Upper Macedonia, and each canton
continued to have its own citizenship, which was controlled by an internal
administrative body.^^ Evidence of the meetings and decisions of such
bodies survives from the period of the early Roman Empire.
We turn finally to the Macedones. They enter history in the fragment
of a poem of Hesiod: "Magnes and Macedon , , . lived round Pieria and
Olympus" (fr. 7 M-W). To Hesiod the Magnetes and the Macedones were
Greek-speaking, since they were first cousins of Hellen's sons in his
genealogy. In 1979 I marshalled the evidence and said the evidence was
^* For the territorial regiments of infantry, see Mac Stale 163. The citizenship, e.g. of
Alexander Lyncestes, has often been misunderstood as indicating that he was a prince of
the Lyncestid royal house (e.g. Erringlon 60, "Abkommling des lynkestischen
Konigshauses"). It simply meant that a man was a resident and a citizen of a canton, e.g.
Lyncus. See Mac State 140 n. 8. See Arr. An. 6. 28. 4 and Ind. 18. 4-6.
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conclusive that Hesiod was correct, and that the Macedones spoke, like the
Magnetes, a local form of the Aeolic dialect of Greek. Since then M.
Andronikos has unearthed a large number of names of leading Macedonians
at Vergina, which lead independently to the certain conclusion that the
Macedones of the early fourth century were Greek-speaking.^^ Their dialect
differed from that of the tribes of Upper Macedonia; for instance, their
magistrates were neXiyovtc,, whereas those of Upper Macedonia were
mXiyaveq. Their dialect remained isolated over some centuries, because
the summer pastures of "Pieria and Olympus" were adjacent to the winter
pastures of the Pierian coast, whereas shepherds elsewhere had to move their
flocks over great distances between the pastures of high Pindus and the
lowlands of Epirus and Thessaly.
That the Macedones were an association of pastoral tribes is to be
inferred not only from their habitat but also from all their early traditions.
As such they had a royal tribe, which was recorded in genealogical form:
Macedon had a son Argeas, whose descendants were the "Argeadae" (Steph.
Byz. s.v. "Argeou"), and these "Argeadae Macedones," it was said, had come
originally from Argos in Orestis (App. Syr. 63 "ApYoq to ev 'Opeoxeiot,
o9ev ol 'ApYed6ai MaKe56ve<;). It was this tribe which led the way in
the conquest of the area round the river Axius (Strabo 7, fr. 1 1 and fr. 20),
and it was to this tribe that "the Argead kings," whether "native" or adopted,
belonged (Paus. 7. 8. 9 and App. Mac. fr. 2). It was incumbent on the
Macedonian kings to carry out the traditional sacrifices of this tribe, the
"Argeadika" (Ath. 14, 6590, and when a new king was chosen, "let the
Macedones with the king celebrate the customary rites for the Argeadae"
(PVindob. 31954).'^ Early in the seventh century the Macedones chose a
newcomer as king, Perdiccas, a member of the Temenidae, descended from
Heracles and rulers of Argos in the Peloponnese; and it was from Perdiccas'
line that all kings were chosen down to Alexander IV.'*
Perdiccas inherited the strong powers of the pastoral leader. He directed
the founding of Aegeae at Vergina and the settling of pastoral groups in the
Emathian plain, each as a noXiq, retaining its own institutions and
citizenship. In other conquered areas, such as Eordaea, the pastoral system
continued, and the Eordaioi were a typical association of pastoral tribes with
their own administration and citizenship. The Macedones, like the
^^ HMac n 39-54; M. Andronikos, Vergina: The Royal Tombs (Athens 1984) 84, who
shows the evidence to be "unambivalent." To suppose that the Greek language was adopted
from contact with Corinthian colonies, e.g. in the fifth century, by peoples as far inland as
Pelagonia is absurd. Errington (13) accepted that the Macedones were Greek-speaking but
hesiuted about their "nationality" ("die Frage des wirklichen Volkstums . . . kann . . .
nicht ausreichend beantwortet werden"). It is difficult to see what criterion other than
language distinguished Illyrians and Thracians from the Macedones in the fifth century.
" See further in Mac State 16 f.
^* Some still follow Abel's view of 1847 that this dynasty of kings did not come from
Argos in the Peloponnese; see Mac State 19.
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Molossoi, took an oath of loyalty to a new king,!^ and they served as the
king's forces (Diod. 18. 16. 1 al PaaiXiKal 6\)vd^Ei<;). We are afforded
two insights into their status. Thucydides distinguished the Macedones
proper, the conquering people, as ol MaKeSoveq oi)toi (2. 99. 6), from the
tribes of Upper Macedonia, which were semi-dependent and in a different
sense "Macedones" (2. 99. 2).20 Anaximenes, who was dealing only with
the Macedones proper, stated that Alexander (in my opinion Alexander II, c.
369) widened the Royal Companionship, so that it included both the
Companion Cavalrymen and the bulk of the infantrymen as Foot-
Companions.^^ These men evidently had a higher status than the remainder
of the armed forces, which had included, for instance, Greeks resident in the
kingdom (Thuc. 4. 124. 1).
That the "Macedones" met often in "Assembly" was noted at the start of
Philip's command, and at the time of Alexander's succession (Diod. 16. 3. 1
To\)<; MaK£56va(; ev owexeaiv EKKXriaiaK;; cf. 16. 4. 3 and 17. 2. 2);
and the term for "Assembly" (eKKXriaia) has political overtones, which are
not to be ignored. The number of Macedones was greatly enlarged when
Philip incorporated in his kingdom the cantons of Upper Macedonia and
brought the elite troops of those cantons into his King's Forces. It was
from these Forces that Alexander intended to send 10,000 men home in 324.
They were correctly described as "the citizens" (Diod. 17. 109. 1 i&v
noXnSiv), and it was before they returned home that Antipater found
himself short of "citizen soldiers" (Diod. 18. 12. 2 eoTtdvi^e ydp f|
MaKeSovia otpaxicotcov koXuikwv).
The king continued to deal with the use of conquered land and the
distribution of the citizen families of Macedones. Alexander III in 335/4
"gave to Macedones Kalindoia" and other lands, hitherto cultivated by the
Bottiaioi, so that the Assembly of Macedones could create a city of
"Macedones." Philip V moved "citizen men with their wives and children"
from cities of Lower Macedonia to settle on sites in inland Emathia (Plb.
23. 10. 4).22 For their part the "Macedones" tried and decided all allegations
of treason. The king and the Macedones were the two parts of the state. As
such they both figured on the dedication for victory at Sellasia in 222:
^aaikzxx; 'Avxiyo^oc, ^aaikicac, ArmTitpio-u Kal MaKE56ve<;. As a
" See Mac State 65-67. G. T. Griffith wrote in HMac 11 386 f. that an oath to a new
king "seems esublished," but he did not develop a case.
® The other peoples in this chapter (Pieres, Bottiaei, Eordoi, Almopes, Grestones and
Bisaltai) were not then, and never became, "Macedones," although they were subject to the
rule of the Macedonian king within Macedonia under Philip 11 and his successors.
21 FGrH 72 F 4, cited in HMac H 706 by G. T. Griffith, who held that the Alexander of
the fragment was Alexander the Great. See Mac State 98 for my reasons.
^ The evidence that "Macedones" were an elite group within the Macedonian kingdom is
irrefuuble. See most recently the inscription from the site of KaUndoia in which the land
of the Greek-speaking Bottiaioi in inland Chalcidice was transferred by Alexander in 335/4
to "Macedones." See CQ 38 (1988) 386 and M. B. Halzxjpoulos. "Bulletin epigraphique,"
REG 101 (1988) 444 ff.
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"community" the "Macedones" honoured their king, Philip V, in a
dedication at Delos (/G XI. 4. 1 102):
to Koivov M[aKe]56v[(ov]
PaaiXia Oi[Xi7C7iov PaaiXeax;]
AtiiiTiTpiov d[pEx-nq eveKtt]
Kai e\)vo{a[(; 'AtioXXxovi]
Clare College, Cambridge
16
The Eminence of Social Justice in Plato
RICHARD D. MOHR
In this paper I wish to chip away at one of the major received opinions in
Platonic scholarship.' The orthodoxy which I wish to challenge is that in
the Republic Plato takes individual or personal justice—the diverse but
integrated workings of the parts of the soul—as primary justice or justice
pure and simple and takes social justice—an individual's fulfilling his
distinctive function in the social division of labor—as a secondary and
derivative notion. I shall argue to the contrary that social justice rather than
individual justice turns out to be the architectonic principle of the two kinds
of justice. A great deal turns on this issue.
For if I am right then Plato is not foreshadowing Aristotle and the
whole tradition of agent-oriented ethical theorists, who claim that good
actions are to be understood as those which would be performed by the good
person—whose goodness must be capable of being defined independently of
the acts which he performs. For Plato, the parts-of-the-soul doctrine and in
particular justice viewed as psychic harmony is supposed, on this reading, to
provide the requisite independent means of assessing the goodness of an
agent and so derivatively of his acts.
The view that Plato is such an agent-oriented theorist was first clearly
articulated in the closing speculative paragraph of David Sachs' well-known
article, "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic":
I believe it likely that Plato held that there are allowable exceptions to
every moral rule, or virtually every moral rule, of conduct . . . [For
Plato,] rules of conduct do not constitute anything essential to
morality or justice. This, I believe, was one of the principal motives
for his characterization of justice, a characterization not in terms of
conduct and relations of persons, but in terms of the relation of parts of
the soul.^
^ The paper was read at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division
meetings March 1985 in San Francisco. It is a companion piece to "A Platonic
Happiness," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987) 131-45.
' D. Sachs, "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic" in G. Vlastos (ed.). Plato I (Garden City. NJ
1971) 50-51. That a philosopher recognizes exceptions to important moral rules, of
course, need not propel him into acceptance of an agent-centered theory. All the
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This view has been advanced more recently in the writings of Julia
Annas.^ I shall argue to the contrary that Plato advances an act-oriented
ethical theory, in which the goodness of an action is determined
independently of the motives, intentions, or even virtues of its agent. I
shall advance this view in two ways. First, 1 will show that Plato's
analogy between the parts of the city and the parts of the soul leads to
irresolvable paradox if individual justice is taken as primary justice, paradox
that can be handsomely resolved if social justice is taken as paramount.
Second, I argue that the alleged proof text of the orthodox
—
Republic 4,
443c^4a—does not require the interpretation it has traditionally been
assigned.
The orthodox view that the just society consists of individuals all with
similarly diversified and integrated souls places Plato in serious difficulty.
For Plato has a problem if he both wishes to claim that everyone in the
Platonically just state has some one social function which is accounted for
by the type of soul which the individual has and also wishes to claim that
everyone in the Platonically just state is just in such a way that all three
parts of the soul of each individual are diversified and integrated in the same
way from individual to individual. If Plato is claiming that the state is just
and integrated and that the individual is just and integrated in both cases as
being a harmony of diverse parts, he backs himself into the paradox that the
state will be just only if the individuals are not (for social distinctness
demands distinctiveness of psychic kinds) and all the citizens will be just
only when the state is not (for if every soul has the same kind of parts in
the same relations, so as to be balanced, there will be in the state no
division of labor based on diverse soul-types)."*
philosopher need do is to recognize some hierarchy of rules and principles. The structure
of principles would then explain when one rule overrides or trumps another, thus
incorporating exceptions to lower-ranking rules into a system of morality. The central
books of the Republic and the discussion of the Form of the good clearly show that Plato
thought ethical principles form a hierarchy. Further, he clearly thought he could
incorporate into a system of justice the exceptions which Sachs has centrally in mind
(justified lying, and the failure to retum "owed" goods). For Plato devotes large stretches
of argument to the issue of when and to whom one may or should lie and to the issues of
proper private ownership and distributive justice.
^ J. Annas, "Plato and Common Morality," CQ 28 (1978) 437-51 and An Introduction
to Plato's Republic (Oxford 1981) 157-69.
* When Plato speaks of psychic "harmony" (e.g., 443d5) he does not mean harmony in
the sense of a musical chord or arrangement of chords, rather he is referring to the tuning of
an instrument (see Plato's extended discussion of psychic harmony at Phaedo 92a-95a).
Harmonies in the former sense may, of course, be very various, but in the lauer sense there
can be but one harmony between instruments of the same type that are to play together.
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Through most of the Republic Plato studiously avoids confronting this
paradox, which results from viewing the good individual and the good state
as strictly parallel in structure.^ Even through most of Books 8 and 9, Plato
formally maintains the soul/state parallelism with the structures of unjust
individuals paralleling exactly the structures of unjust states. Finally, and
significantly, right at the end of Book 9, Plato gives us the equipment we
need to resolve the paradox.
I suggest that Plato's way out of the paradox is to hold that social
justice is the architectonic ordering principle of individual justice, that an
individual's psychic parts are distinct yet balanced only as the result of his
holding his position in the Platonically just, functionally diversified state.
The individual's internal balancing is a balancing that occurs as the result of
external forces provided from the Platonically diversified state; indeed, social
functions viewed as external forces are constitutive of the integration and
harmony of the state. The relation of individual balance and state
diversification is to be understood, I suggest, along the lines of the
following medical analogy.
Imagine an individual who is diseased, say, by leukemia or some other
similar form of cancer, in such a way that one part of the body is
manifesting an unlimited propensity to proUferate at the expense of other
essential body parts and that this is occurring because some other part of the
body, say the body's natural immune system, is underdeveloped and so is
not keeping in check the propensity of the disease-causing part to
proliferate, with the result that the totality of bodily functions is thrown
wildly out of kilter. Now, the bodily parts can be brought back into balance
by external forces, say, through injections of compensatory bodies,
irradiation, or drugs, all of which enhance or supplement the body's weak
immune system and so make the immune system effective in ways it could
not be on its own (for Plato's analogous views on bodily cures, see
Timaeus 89a-d). Thus the body could be said to come to be in balance
again, but only as the result of external forces which are able to come into
play just exactly because the external world is not homogeneous, but rather
is functionally differentiated, having ready repositories of medicine and
medical knowledge.
The paradox, then, cannot be resolved by claiming that Plato is thinking of individuals
differing as chords differ. In any case, given the components of the Platonic soul,
especially the appetites and ambition with their propensities to excess, there can be only
one right combination of them. Other combinations are not chords but discords: the
various unjust souls of Books 8-9 (e.g., 554d9).
* Bernard Williams has shown that to maintain strict soul/state parallelism Plato must
go to the extreme of performing a number of intellectual sleights of hand, "The Analogy of
City and Soul in Plato's Republic," in E. N. Lee, et al. (edd.). Exegesis and Argument,
Phronesis Suppl. 1 (Assen 1973) 196-206.
196 Illinois Classical Studies, XVI
The parts of the soul and their relation to the external world are, I
suggest, very much like this for Plato. The lowest part of the soul is an
unlimited appetite with a propensity to take over and completely disrupt the
functions of the other parts of the soul (for the appetites as boundless and
insatiable, see 442a, 555b, 562b, 586b, 590b, 604d; and as always tending
to disruption, see 577c-e, 579c-e, cf. Philebus 63d-e). The intelligence
which keeps these passions and appetites in check and so in balance is not
equally or sufficiently the possession of every man. Therefore, if every man
were to use only his own resources in balancing his soul, the Platonic state
would be impossible; rather we would have the chaotic flux of the
democratic state, in which the very possibility of diversified yet integrated
functions is destroyed (562b-64c; n.b. the disease metaphors in 563e, 564b-
c). Plato gives us the remedy for this situation as the final substantive
point which is made in the main sequence of Books (2-9). Plato claims
that in the Platonically just state the majority of citizens will be enslaved to
the wisdom of the philosopher (590c), and continues:
It is best that an individual should have divine intelligence within
himself, but if he has not, then it must be imposed from outside, so that
as far as possible we should be all alike and friendly, since governed by
the same principle. (590d3-6)
When finally here Plato briefly sketches what "rubbing together" individual
and social justice would look like—the project entertained at 434e-35a—we
find that the integration of the diversified parts of the individual soul is
dependent upon and results from the individual's position in the state's
division of labor. That all individuals are "alike," are equally, individually
just and balanced, is the result of the relations of the individual to other
parts of the state, rather than the result of the workings of the individual's
parts in themselves. Thus Plato resolves the paradox of the strict
parallelism of individual and state by claiming that the balance within the
individual is the relational result of external forces which are made possible
by individuals having different types of souls which in and of themselves
have psychic functions which are not in balance. The derivative, relational
balance of the individual occurs as the result of balanced diversity in the
state. The balanced diversity of the state is the result of the imbalance of
psychic functions in individuals. This imbalance of the individual holds
even for the philosopher, who qua philosopher no longer exercises as he did
in youth (537b, 539d) and so has an attendant atrophying of the middle part
of the soul (410b, e) requiring balancing in the state by others (519c-20c).
In this way it finally turns out that social justice is the architectonic
principle for individual justice. Parts of an individual's soul fulfill their
functions in major part because the functions are enhanced by external forces
provided from the functionally diverse state.
Usually, however, just the opposite is claimed. The critical tradition
holds that primary justice for Plato is an attribute of the relations of the
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parts of the soul and that social justice is somehow derivative upon this
personal justice. This position is generally thought to be unequivocally
stated near the close of Book 4, in a highly compressed and turbid passage,
443c-44a. I will suggest that this passage makes no such claim and is
committed to no more than the soul/state parallelism so far discussed. The
purpose of the passage, I claim, is simply to establish the surprising result
that there is a sense of justice that can be applied to an individual in
isolation. It is not the purpose of the passage, along the way, to deny that
social justice, the fulfilhng of social functions, also really is justice.^
When in the passage 443c^Wa Plato denies that justice lies in a man's
external affairs or in concerns extrinsic to his proper self (tt|v e^cd jtpa^iv
T©v amou 443c 10), he does not mean, I suggest, for social functions to
fall under the description "extrinsic concerns." Plato has just claimed that
all along he has been maintaining that fulfilling social functions is a
principle and mold of justice (dpxTiv xe Kal xvnov) and now he reaffirms
that this is in fact true (443c 1, 9). Rather, the extrinsic concerns which are
denied the status of proper loci of justice are things Uke the acquisition of
wealth, the care of the body, politics, and contract making. These are
immediately catalogued (443e3-4). The denial that these are an independent
source of moral and social concern is important. For it was these things
which formed the proper concerns of justice for all of Socrates'
interlocutors. The whole passage harks back to the long discussion earlier
in Book 4 on the status of wealth, contracts, and law at 422a-27a, where it
was also denied that these concerns constitute proper arenas of justice.
The two passages vary as follows. The later (443) claims that the
proper disposition (e^k; 443e6) of the parts of the soul is a chief and
necessary means by which we achieve what is appropriate in regard to our
extrinsic concerns. For the proper relations of soul parts, especially the
repression of the insatiable appetites, keep one from naturally running off to
excess in whatever course of action one takes with regard to money, the
body, and day-to-day relations with others. Thus, this passage bears the
burden of establishing that the Platonically just man will also be just as
that notion is commonly understood. Thus the passage continues the point
of 442e-43a: The man who has his aggressive appetites under control will
not rape, steal, or cheat. But the mere correct balance of soul parts does not
establish—how could it?—the determinately correct course of action with
regard to sexual relations, wealth, and contracts. Knowing the (often open-
ended) extremes of which we are capable, and towards which our appetites
propel us, does not tell us how we ought determinately to act in regard to
acquisitions, contracts, and other day-to-day affairs.
^ The phrase ox; aXtiSox; (443dl), which posits a personal dimension of justice, should
be seen as balancing, not superseding, the phrase to aXr\Qic, (443c9), which re-affinms
proper social functioning as justice.
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For Plato—and this is the point of the earlier passage (422-27)—our
social functions establish what our ends are to be regarding money making,
care of the body, and dealings with others, and determine what positive form
these activities are to take. In Book 5 this establishment of ends by
reference to social functions is extended even to cover familial and sexual
relations. Considerations of wealth, politics, civil law, and contracts all are
derivative from and take their proper form from the way in which they can
best serve in establishing Platonic social justice—each person's fulfilling
his proper task. How much money we have, with whom we have dealings,
and the like are all governed and molded by oiu* social tasks; our social tasks
are not governed and molded by them. This is the reason Plato wishes to
deny that justice is primarily concerned with affairs extrinsic to one's proper
self.
Now, for an individual to fulfill his social function and to order
correctly his derivative civil affairs, his soul cannot be in a chaotic state.
Further, if he is to be able to carry out his function, he must be the subject
of certain basic forms of consideration from others, or at least non-
interference in his affairs on the part of others. An individual cannot carry
out his social function in a social climate where rape, murder, cheating, and
theft are rife in the land. Therefore, if an individual is to possess a social
function, it is necessary not only that his own soul possess individual
justice but that the souls of others also possess individual justice. The parts
of everyone's soul must be distinct and must not meddle with each other and
so manifest individual justice, if social justice is to be possible throughout
the state.
The purpose of our passage (443) then is to complete the discussion
started earlier in Book 4 of the way in which the common arenas of justice
are subordinately incorporated into the Platonic state. The purpose of the
passage is not to dislodge social justice as a principle of justice but to
establish individual justice as one.
This purpose is sufficient to explain the rhetorical exuberance of the
passage. No reader uninitiated in Platonic ethics would suppose that it
makes sense to say that an individual in isolation could be just. It would
seem that unlike, say, bravery and prudence, which may be either social or
purely personal in their locus and effect, justice is a virtue which must be
social in its arena. It deals essentially with our relations with others.
Indeed it is typically taken to be synonymous with social virtue. So Plato's
claim that there is a sense in which it is appropriate to say that an individual
even by himself is just is quite revolutionary when set against the
background of common opinion. But it is revolutionary (or at least
revisionary) even set against the language of justice which Plato himself has
been developing heretofore in the Republic.
Even as late as 443b2 the phrase "the things proper to oneself (xoc
avtov) was being used, as it had been since Book 2 (370a ff.), as a stand-in
or paraphrasis for "function." The phrase describes, quite generally,
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something that a discrete, unified entity performs. Indeed, the possession
and performance of what is peculiar and proper to oneself (fj xox) oiKEio\) xe
Kttl eavTou e^k; xe Kal npa^ic;) was given as the definition of social
justice at 433el2-34al. But suddenly at the end of Book 4, this well-
established vocabulary of "things appropriate and peculiar to oneself is used
without prior warning to define not the operations of a unified self, but
(rather surprisingly) the parts of the self (xa oiKEia 443d3, certainly; xwv
ai)xo\) clO and Ea-uxov Kal xa eavxcu dl, probably)J It is therefore not
surprising that Plato draws attention to this shift in usage and claims that
the new use of the vocabulary is legitimate in the new context. He does
this by saying that the parts of the soul "really" and "truly" (xw ovxi 443d3,
ox; dJltiGccx; dl) are things proper and distinctive to an individual. But this
is not to say that all other dimensions of justice are sham, derivative, or in
some other sense less than real.^ To say that one type of thing is truly F is
not to deny that other types of things are also truly F. Further, it is
perfectly natural in ordinary discourse to use "truly" and "really" to describe
unexpected discoveries or surprising turns of events. It is in Uiis sense that
Plato's use of the terms in this passage is even to be expected, since he
describes the unanticipated discovery that there really is a sense in which an
individual thought of in isolation can be just and wishes to signal the
surprising malleability of the language of justice. But we must not mistake
the justified rhetoric^ exuberance of the passage for more than what it is.
Plato is not throwing out or even demoting his social conception of justice.
Republic 443 is not, then, the star passage for those who wish to claim that
for Plato justice per se is individual justice. But the orthodox have nowhere
else to turn in the Republic to establish their position. I suggest that they
should begin to doubt it.
University ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign
' I think it possible that these phrases at 443cl0, dl are vague in scope and are not
simply extensionally equivalent to the later expression xa ev xfj Y^xx\ yivr\, 443d3.
' When at 443c4 Plato calls social justice an "image," he is not thereby giving it a
status inferior to that of individual justice or claiming that individual justice is the original
of which social justice is an image—something he might easily have said if he were so
inclined. Rather Plato is contrasting social justice with a third sort of justice which is in
both the just man and the just state (444a4-5). The claim that the definition of social
justice is an image is simply part of the general acknowledgment throughout Books 2-4,
8-9 that the definitions of the virtues (and indeed all of these Books' substantive moral
claims) are tentative hypotheses, which in the terminology of the central Books are dream-
images of eternal certainties (533b-c). Even the doctrine of the tripartite soul is viewed as
tentative (435c-d). And at 506d the individual virtues (504a) are said to have been
discussed as the Idea of good will be, that is, through images and Ukenesses. For both
social and individual justice as tentatively understood when compared to some third more
fundamental form of justice (probably the Idea of justice is intended), see 543d-44a.

17
Combing and Curling: Orator Summus Plato^
HELEN F. NORTH
The title of this talk may recall the subjects taught in the school attended by
the Mock Turtle in Alice in Wonderland: reeling and writhing and fainting
in coils, but actually the first part (combing and curUng) comes from quite a
well-known passage in the treatise by the Greek critic, Dionysius of
Halicamassus, On Composition, and the second from Cicero, in De Oratore.
Dionysius was one of that influential group of Greek men of letters
—
teachers of rhetoric, literary critics—who settled in Rome in the age of
Augustus and provided guidance in the advanced study of Greek literature for
rich and cultivated Romans, often men with political ambitions. Most of
them regarded Demosthenes as the supreme master of oratorical style: They
found in him the ultimate exemplar of what they called deinotes (awe-
inspiring intensity)—ever the most admired trait in oratory of the grand
style. But they discussed and analyzed in minute detail passages from many
o^er authors as well, and one of them was Plato. In Chapter 25 of the
treatise On Composition Dionysius comments on the tremendous care that
Plato devoted to securing the most effective arrangement of words. Even at
the age of 80 he was still "combing and curling his dialogues and braiding
them in every way" (xotx; ea-uxoO 6iaX6YOD(; Ktevi^cov Kal PooTp-oxiC*^^
Kal ndvxa xpoTtov dvanXeKcov).
There follows the famous story about the notebook found among
Plato's effects when he died: It contained many different arrangements of the
first sentence of the Republic. It is not certain whether it was only the first
eight words (KaxePriv x^zc, ei<; OEipaia \izxcl rX,at>iccovo(; xou
'Apiaxcovoq) that Plato kept combing and curUng, or the whole sentence (up
to vvv np©xov dYOvxe<;). Quintilian, who also knows the story, seems to
imply that it was only Uie first four words (KaxePriv x^zc, zic, Heipaia, 8.
6. 64), which would be even more remarkable. Both ancient and modem
critics have been fascinated by what Dionysius rightly calls Plato's
philoponia (love of labor) in reworking this passage. Demetrius, perhaps a
^ Apart from supplying references, 1 have made only minimal changes in this lecture,
which I had the honor of delivering on March 22, 1989 at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, as part of a memorial to Friedrich Solmsen, revered teacher and friend for
more than forty years.
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contemporary of Dionysius, in his treatise On Style (c. 21) analyzes the
entire sentence (as far as ayovteq) and comments on the studied ease and
relaxation of the period that he finds there, while J. D. Denniston, in Greek
Prose Style, provides an enlightening discussion of the first eight words,
suggesting some of the reasons for their exU^aordinary felicity. ("The effect
may seem due to accident"—he says—"but such accidents do not befall
inferior writers.")^
I chose the quotation from Dionysius to emphasize an aspect of Plato's
achievement that exerted tremendous influence in antiquity, yet has received
comparatively little notice in our own time, compared, that is, with the
amount of attention devoted by modem scholarship to his dialectic, his
theory of Forms, his concept of love, of the ideal state, of education, and so
on. I mean his rhetoric. The scrupulous, unremitting attention to word-
placement, which caught the attention of Dionysius, is but one result of
Plato's upbringing in the Athenian world of the last quarter of the fifth
century, dominated intellectually by the Sophists and incurably infected by
sophistic rhetoric. The ancient critics recognized Plato as a product of this
revolutionary movement, and this is why Cicero says in De Oratore that, in
spite of making fun of the orators, Plato seemed himself to be the orator
summus, the consummate orator (1, 47): in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse
orator summus videbatur.
To be sure, one phase of Plato's relation to rhetoric has always received
more than adequate attention (as it does in the passage from Cicero just
quoted): his hostility, most systematically and fully expressed in the
Gorgias and the Phaedrus, but prominent in many other dialogues as well,
from the Apology with its ostentatious rejection of the sophistic kind of
deinotes, through the Menexenus, that devastating parody of the standard
funeral oration, and the Symposium, with its merciless imitation of
Agathon's Gorgianic style, to the Theaetetus, which contains a vivid
contrast between the forensic advocate and the philosopher, highly
derogatory, of course, to the advocate.
The reasons for Plato's opposition to sophistic rhetoric are too well
known and often rehearsed to warrant extensive analysis here.^ Let me just
recall that it was not only the perverse influence wielded by rhetoric on both
politics and the ethics of the individual that aroused Plato's hostility. Even
more basic was the fact that sophistic rhetoric took the side of appearance in
the conflict between appearance and reality that lay behind much of the
Socratic-Platonic philosophy. Rhetoric, as it was developed in the late fifth
century and practiced in the early fourth, was concerned, not with
knowledge, but with the appearance of knowledge. It did not care for truth,
^ Greek Prose Style (Oxford 1952) 41.
' This subject is discussed at greater length in North, "Swimming Upside Down in the
Wrong Direction: Plato's Criticism of Sophistic Rhetoric on Technical and Stylistic
Grounds," Traditio 32 (1976) 11-29. I quote from pp. 11-12 in slightly altered form.
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only for what was probable or persuasive. To seem, rather than to be, was
its goal. This indifference to truth for its own sake led sophistic rhetoric to
a position of neutrality about moral values. It sought to please and gratify
its audience, with a view to winning victories and scoring points, not to
arrive at an understanding of the Good, certainly not to leave its hearers
better than it found them. Success and power constituted the goal of
sophistic rhetoric; these were, after all, the reasons why students flocked to
the Sophists in the first place. As a consequence of these two
characteristics—being indifferent to truth and aiming at gratification
—
yet a
third grievous flaw emerged: Rhetoric used modes of persuasion repugnant
tojhe philosopher, appealing to the emotions rather than to the intellect.
HenceTTafo^ was boimd^lo oppose it on the same grounds as imitative
poetry in the Republic: It encouraged the domination of the lower faculties
of the soul over the higher. Such poetry is in fact a form of rhetoric
addressed to a mob, Plato tells us in the Republic (604e5). Hence both
poetry and rhetoric invite the same condemnation, and for the same reasons.
The arguments against sophistic rhetoric are set forth at greatest length
in the Gorgias, and it is fascinating to see how long they survived,
supplying the ammunition used by philosophers in the intermittent warfare
against rhetoric that broke out with new vehemence when the Romans
appeared on the horizon—those rich and powerful barbarians, eager to be
hellenized in certain limited ways, and willing to pay for the process. The
rhetoricians of course devised counter-arguments, which were in their turn
canonized. We may estimate the seriousness with which Plato's polemic
continued to be taken nearly five centuries after the Gorgias by the zeal with
which Aelius Aristides, a representative of the Second Sophistic, responded
to the Platonic attack in two long treatises written close to the middle of the
second century of our era. One treatise was a defence of rhetoric itself, the
other a defence of the four statesmen whom Plato had denounced in the
Gorgias for leaving Athens worse than they had found her. Yet at the
conclusion of the first treatise, Aristides^admits^Xhat Plato is the father and
teacher of ccators,'* and it is the positive aspect of Plato's love-hate relation
to rhetoric that I wish to pursue, not the negative.
The mention of Gorgias, the greatest of the sophistic rhetoricians of the
first generation, reminds me that by a curious coincidence Plato was bom
(according to the best tradition) in the very year in which Gorgias paid his
first, famous visit to Athens, 428/7 B.C. If the two events did indeed
coincide, it follows that the most vigorous and effective enemy of sophistic
rhetoric embarked on what was to be a long lifetime (Plato lived to be 80)
just as the greatest champion of that rhetoric, akeady half-way through an
even longer life (108 years), appeared on the scene of some of his most
glittering triumphs.
* Aristides 2. 465 Behr. For the dates of the two Defences consult C. A. Behr, P. Aelius
Aristides. The Complete Works I (Leiden 1986) 449. 460.
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The impact of Gorgias, Protagoras, and the rest of that first group of
Sophists on Athenian intellectual, political, and cultural life in the next two
decades is fully documented in the literature of the period. It would have
been quite impossible for Plato to escape exposure to the technical devices
introduced or popularized by the Sophists (any more than their moral and
political views), and his Dialogues are full of evidence that he did not, in
fact, escape. We know very little about Plato's education. Neither the
Dialogues nor the Epistles contain direct references to his schooling. The
names of his music teacher, his wrestling teacher, and the man who taught
him grammar survive in various anecdotes,^ but there is never a word about
any training in rhetoric. We know, of course, Plato's social position in
Athens, and we can guess what opportunities he would have had. His
father, who traced his descent from the mythical kings of Athens, died when
Plato was a child, and his mother (a descendant of Solon) married as her
second husband a man who was a close friend and supporter of Pericles. (He
was, in fact, the father of Demos, said to be the eromenos of Callicles in the
Gorgias.) A boy of Plato's connections would have heard and seen, at close
range, whatever went on in Athenian political life in the turbulent years that
followed the Sicilian disaster of 415: the fall of the democracy, the rise and
fall of the Four Hundred and then the Thirty Tyrants, the trial of Antiphon,
the overthrow of Theramenes, the return and second departure of Alcibiades.
During these formative years Plato obviously absorbed the rhetorical
techniques that were being adapted, not only to the needs of the lawcourts
and the public assemblies, but also to those of the tragic and comic theatre.
His friendship with Socrates would have given his life a specific orientation;
it would not have wiped out what he had observed all about him during the
years when he was growing up. So it is only to be expected that the
Dialogues are richly, endlessly rhetorical, owing so much of their form to
the strategies perfected by the Sophists that it may even be said that without
rhetoric there would have been no Dialogues as we know them, no Plato, in
fact—certainly no Platonic Socrates.
Let us consider a few of the ways in which Plato is revealed as the heir
of sophistic rhetoric. First and most obvious is his extensive use of formal
orations in the Dialogues. Plato is in fact a logographer (a writer of
speeches for others to deliver) of the first rank. For variety, range, mastery
of all the available means of persuasion (in Aristotelian terms ethos, pathos,
logos) he has no equal. It is, from one point of view, a pity that he was
deflected from his early ambition to be a statesman, because an orator greater
than Pericles may have been lost when Plato turned away from active
politics and took shelter under that famous wall (Rep. 6, 496).
What is probably the single, best-known dialogue of Plato is not a
dialogue at all, but a pseudo-forensic oration, the Apology of Socrates.
'See Alice Swift Riginos, Platonica: The Anecdotes Concerning the Life and Writings
of Plato (Leiden 1976) 39-51.
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Realizing as we must that there is no compelling proof that Socrates made
any speech whatsoever at his trial, and that if he made a speech there is no
reason to believe it was anything like this, we should recognize the strong
pressures that led Plato to choose precisely this form for his vindication, not
so much of Socrates, as of the philosophic life. The tension between the
familiar form of the courtroom oration, well known to us from the Attic
orators, and the substance that Plato embodies in this form is so dynamic as
to make the Apology the most successful, as it is the most thorough, of all
his adaptations of rhetorical forms. But other dialogues are almost as
profoundly indebted. The Menexenus and the Symposium, in their very
different ways, both depend on Plato's sovereign mastery of the form and the
topics of, respectively, the funeral oration and the encomium, just as the
Phaedrus is what it is because Plato can manipulate the paradoxical
encomium with the most dazzling virtuosity.
Some readers, I suspect, fail to notice how skillfully Plato exploits the
possibilities of formal oratory within a dialogue. No one, to be sure, is
likely to miss the way he focuses attention on the series of speeches in the
Symposium, adapts each speech to the speaker, organizes the whole set in
irreversible order, and relates them to the dominant image of the ladder, cul-
minating apparently in the speech of Diotima, but actually in that of Alci-
biades. Yet in the Gorgias, for example, Plato leads so unobtrusively into
the great speech of Callicles in praise of the life of ruthless ambition that
few, I imagine, think of it in terms of oratory. (Certainly few modem com-
mentators do justice to its rhetorical skill.)^ But from the very start Plato
gives us clues to what he is doing, as Callicles begins with an accusation
typical of rejoinders in the Assembly, a charge that his opponent is bab-
bling like a demagogue. The eloquence of his argument for the rule of the
strong is due in large measure to his employment of time-honored rhetorical
devices: quotations and interpretations of poetry, rhetorical questions, and a
great variety of figures, including parallel structure, climax, and poly-
syndeton. The sentence about the revolt of the man who is by nature strong
(484a) is especially instructive in its deployment of such devices, and it was
this passage, E. R. Dodds suggests,^ that inspired Nietzsche.
An instance of even more unobtrusive borrowing from the techniques of
the courtroom occurs at the outset of Republic 5, where Plato introduces
Socrates' discussion of the community of wives with what amounts to the
standard topics of the proem, spUt between Glaucon and Socrates in such a
way that the resemblance to oratory is disguised, yet the devices for arousing
interest, disclaiming expert knowledge, and winning favor are all effectively
manipulated (449d-51c). The adaptation of oratorical conventions to the
dialogue-form was one of PTafo's niost brilliant discoveries, especially
' Bui E. R. Dodds, Plalo. Gorgias (Oxford 1959) 267, comments on the "supeib
rhetorical vigour" of 483c7-84c3.
^ Dodds (previous note) 389
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evident in the Gorgias, Republic, Symposium, and Phaedrus. Whenever
reahstic dialogue is abandoned, rhetorical elements make an entirely different
contribution, as can be seen in the last of Plato's works.
The Laws resorts unashamed to the manner of a treatise, and at
moments of heightened intensity needs a change of pace, which is regularly
secured through the introduction of oratory or oratorical devices. But even
here the use of oratory has a function much more organic than mere stylistic
variation. The Address to the Settlers in the new city to be founded on
Crete (715e-18c) is a case in point It constitutes a model of the persuasive
proem that the Athenian Stranger (who replaces Socrates in this final dia-
logue) recommends for all the important laws of the new politeia. The ideal
situation (he says) would be one in which the citizens would be extremely
easy to persuade in the direction of virtue (718c), and the proem to any legal
code should help make them more docile and well-disposed (723a, cf. 718d).
These, of course, are the traditional functions of the proem according to
standard rhetorical doctrine.* The Stranger gives examples of legislation that
merely states the law and specifies the penalty, and the same legislation
when equipped with a persuasive proem, and Uien goes on to formulate a
long and elaborate proem to the entire legal code, while admitting that
everything that has been said up to this point (Books 1, 2, and 3) has in fact
been a kind of gigantic proem. The Address to the Settlers itself is
essentially a homily, dealing with the most lofty subjects (the nature of
God, the relation of man to God, the political consequences of piety and
impiety), and it accurately forecasts the religious context of the ideal state.
But beyond the obvious use of formal oratory of various types, Plato's
dialogues abound in rhetorical techniques that enrich and give form to the
expression of his thought. Consider his mastery of ethos, pathos, and
logos, the three Aristotelian modes of persuasion that I have already
mentioned. Logos (argumentation) we may take for granted in the
development of the dialogue form, but the other two are deployed in ways
that now seem obvious only because we are so familiar with what Plato
achieves by their use. Ethos (characterization) and pathos (emotional
appeal) are ideally combined in the persona of Socrates, nowhere more
effectively than in the Apology, where in a heightened manner they perform
the functions that ethos and pathos normally do in any courtroom speech for
the defence. But these essentially rhetorical methods of gaining assent
continue to appear in non-oratorical contexts. The very existence of the
Socrates who has dominated the history of ethics testifies to the rhetorical
genius of Plato, for the ethos established in the Apology, the Crito, and the
Phaedo is responsible for the pathos that so moves us in these works and
directs our response to the drama of Socrates' death.
' Consult H. Caplan on the Rhetorica ad Herennium 1. 4. 6 for the history of this
doctrine both before and after Aristotle. See also Quintilian 4. 1.5.
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Neither ethos nor pathos was invented by the rhetoricians, to be sure,
but it was they who systematized what had long been practiced in poetry and
was now being refined and defined for the benefit of the orators. We know
that Thrasymachus, the rhetor who speaks so forcefully in Book 1 of the
Republic, worked out ways of appealing to the emotions, especially pity,'
and while we cannot so easily identify the one who took the first steps in
establishing the doctrine of ethos, we need not doubt that the subject was
discussed among professionals. Aristotle tells us as much in the Rhetoric,
when he responds both to those who denied that ethos was of any
importance to the orator, and to those who thought it was indeed important
but could best be secured by means outside the speech itself (1. 2. 4-7,
1356al-27). Aristotle's own requirement (that ethos develop within the
oration) would have been more than adequately satisfied by the procedure
used in the Apology. There Plato's achievement is particularly worth
studying because of the ambiguity of his task, an ambiguity derived from
his twofold audience, the members of the jury supposedly being addressed by
Socrates and the readers of the Apology from that day to this. Because of
the historical fact that Socrates was condemned to death, Plato was obliged
to design a speech that would make this outcome comprehensible. Hence
the apparent arrogance evinced by Socrates at certain points in his defence,
an attitude that would inevitably have antagonized a jury (as it does many
undergraduates to this day). Because Plato was using the trial to
demonstrate the supreme value of the philosophical life, the speech had to
reveal a character that would win the admiration of thoughtful readers. It is
the readers who really matter, and the ethos of the Platonic Socrates
demonstrated in this speech is designed for its effect on them.^^
Another obvious debt is related to oratorical structure. The sophistic
rhetors usually organized their teaching around the concept of the "parts of
the oration," and while this approach ultimately proved less satisfactory than
the Peripatetic focus on the functions of the orator (known in Latin as the
officia oratoris)—invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery—it
did provide the novice speaker with specific, detailed guidance in shaping his
proem and his epilogue and all that stretched between. Plato was
thoroughly familiar with the stereotypes, and he uses them with
consummate skill, as when at the beginning of the Apology he
simultaneously derides and exploits the cliche about being inexperienced in
speaking, most overworked of all the topics of the proem. Adapting this
cliche, he makes Socrates protest his inexperience in the courtroom and at
' Cf. Plato. Phaedrus 267c-d.
^° For a comparison to the challenge faced by Euripides, when he wrote Hippolytus'
speech in his own defence before Theseus, see North, "Socrates Deinos Legein," in
Language and the Tragic Hero: Essays on Greek Tragedy in Honor of Gordon M. Kirkwood,
ed. P. Pucci (Atlanta 1988) 121-30. The portrayal of Socrates as the philosophic hero is
analyzed by E. Wolff, Platons Apologie (Berlin 1929). See also R. L. Fowler, "The
Rhetoric of Desperation," HSCP 91 (1987) 5-38.
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the same time redefine the supreme oratorical quality of deinotes as "to
speak the truth" (17a). The reader follows the paradoxical development of
this definition throughout the speech and ultimately realizes that under the
guise of the well-worn assertion of apeiria (inexperience) Plato has served
notice that his Socrates both rejects the values common to the Athenians
and gives a new meaning to their accepted vocabulary.
Still another example of Plato's exploitation of familiar sophistic
techniques appears in the speech assigned to Agathon in the Symposium,
where the Gorgianic style of the speaker is parodied and the topic of the
cardinal virtues as the basis of encomium is treated in a perverse and
sophistic manner. ^^ In both ways—by the parody of sophistic style and by
the exposure of sophistic thinking—he reveals Agathon's eulogy of Eros to
be seriously flawed. '
Most of what I have said so far applies to the dialogues in which long,
connected speeches play a prominent part. But Plato's debt to rhetoric is
equally pervasive, if less immediately obvious, in the non-oratorical
dialogues. It would probably go too far to claim that Plato owes to rhetoric
the very texture of his style, for Plato's style draws upon many sources
—
Ionian philosophy and poetry to name two that stand out
—
yet much of
what makes his dialogues memorable, much of what enables his thought to
find persuasive expression, springs from the devices, the figures, the
elements of style worked out by sophistic rhetoricians. The figures that we
associate with Gorgias (antithesis, isocolon, parison, homoeoteleuton) were
not, of course, invented by him; every one of them can be identified in pre-
Gorgianic prose, and before that in poetry. But Gorgias refined and
systematized the figures and inspired his students, such as Polus and
Antisthenes, to write treatises "On Style," which carried into the second
generation of sophistic rhetoricians the interest in elegance of diction and
figurative language that constitutes an enduring legacy of rhetoric to the
development of Greek prose.
Plato by no means confines himself to the Gorgianic figures, although
it is amusing to see how frequently he is reproached by ancient critics for
excessive Gorgianisms. His ability to mould a style capable of conveying a
vast range of ideas (a style that with equal effectiveness encompasses all the
gradations from the plain to the grand—^and there are many more than three
gradations) and his ability to fit the style both to the speaker in a given
dialogue and to the subject under discussion, these twin abilities derive from
his mastery of a multitude of rhetorical devices (figures of thought and
figures of diction), his penetration into the mysteries of ethos and pathos,
and ultimately his sure grasp of the principle of the prepon (what is
appropriate). This basic virtus dicendi enabled him to organize and adorn in
the most effective way what his powers of inventio had produced.
^^ For a more detailed analysis of Agalhon's speech as a parody of Gorgias, see North
(above, note 3) 19-20.
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One way to test this statement is to read the Phaedrus, both for its doc-
trine and for the way that doctrine is expressed. What I have in mind, very
briefly, is (1) the emphasis on the prepon and its synonyms in Socrates'
criticism of Lysias' speech as lacking in ananke logographike (264b), a term
immediately explicated as the organization of a discourse like a living thing,
whose middle and extremities are suited to one another (TipeTiovxa
aXXi\Xoi(;), (2) his praise of his own two speeches as demonstrating the
principle of definition, which leads to clarity and self-consistency (to avxb
a\)t© 6^oXoYot>)i£vov 265d), (3) his comparison of a genuine art of rhetoric
to the genuine art of tragedy, which consists of the appropriate integration
(7tpE7io\)oav ovoxaaiv) of dramatic speeches so that they are in harmony
(o-uvioxa^EVTiv) with one another and with the whole (268d), (4) his
insistence that one who practices the truly rhetorical and persuasive art must
adapt speeches to souls out of a knowledge of which arguments will be
persuasive to which souls (271b), (5) his comprehensive recapitulation in
which he requires a recognition of the kairos, the appropriate moment for
speech or silence, for one kind of speech or another, and finally (6) his
consideration of euprepeia and aprepeia in writing, as well as in speaking
(274b). These passages demonstrate Plato's exquisite sensitivity to the
prepon as a fundamental principle of discourse. The doctrine is present
throughout the Phaedrus, not merely as a theory emphasized in the rhetorical
section, but as the underiying justification for the variety of styles employed
in the earlier, dramatic and mythological parts.
If I may turn from style to a particular topic closely identified with
rhetoric in its political context—one that justifies the Sophists' concern for
the techniques of deliberative, as well as forensic and epideictic oratory-^let
me mention the orator-statesman, normally called a rhetor in Athenian
usage, ^^ but for Plato more often a politikos. Plato's attitude toward this
figure, while consistently hostile, shows variations related to the dominant
interest of specific dialogues.
As is well known, the Apology reflects the conviction that the
philosopher, not the orator-statesman, is the true benefactor of the polls.
According to Socrates, no just man can survive if he enters politics; he who
fights for the right must do so in private, not in public (31c). Socrates
himself, the self-proclaimed gadfly of Athens, has been prevented from
taking part in public life by his dalmonlon, the mysterious sign, internal
yet somehow divine, that warns him against certain actions, and he has
therefore accepted the paradoxical position of being at once apragmon, one
who minds his own business, a non-meddler, and polypragmon, one who
meddles in other people's business, performing the greatest service to the
state, but always as a private citizen (31d-32a).^^ Socrates' method of
12 See M. H. Hansen. "The Athenian 'PoUticians' 403-322 B.C.." GRBS 24 (1983)
33-55 for the customary terminology, and The Athenian Assembly (Oxford 1987) 49-69.
13 On this paradox see L. B. Carter. The Quiet Athenian (Oxford 1986) 183-86.
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dialectical refutation, the elenchus (not the statesman's oratorical deinotes) is
what truly advances the welfare of the citizens.
/
The same auitude is developed at much greater length in the Gorgias,
but it can also be detected in certain shorter dialogues, which are not
primarily interested in the position of the orator-statesman, but comment
tangentially on this topic. In the Euthydemus, for example, we find
Socrates debating with two teachers of eristic, and in the course of the
conversation sharply distinguishing the object of politics from the object of
philosophy (306a-b). He also briefly considers whether to subsume the art
of speech-making under the art of politics (290b-91d), and observes that
neither of these arts can make us happy. The Meno criticizes four celebrated
Athenian statesmen for failing to teach their sons the excellence that they
themselves possessed (93c-94b). In the Gorgias this charge is extended to
include the failiu^e to instruct all the citizens. When Callicles praises the
great statesmen of the past for having employed a noble kind of rhetoric,
Socrates retorts that they failed in the primary task of the noble rhetor, to
instil virtue. Not only their own sons, as in the Meno, but all the citizens
have thus been neglected, because they have been flattered by the orators
instead of being corrected and told the truth. And now Socrates, who earlier
in the Gorgias had reaffirmed the distinction between what the politikoi do
and what he does, saying explicitly, "I am not one of the politikoi" (473e),
startles us by saying, "I think that I am one of the few persons in Athens
(not to say the only one) who attempt the art of politics, and alone of men
living today, I attend to political affairs" (521d). Socrates is able to make
this statement because he now admits the theoretical possibility of a noble
art of rhetoric, in contrast to the debased kind used by the Athenian rhetors,
and the politikos who will use the noble rhetoric can be identified with the
philosopher, who aims to make the citizens as good as possible, saying
what is best, whether pleasant or the reverse (502e, 503a). '
How such a noble rhetoric would actually operate the Gorgias does not
reveal, nor does the Republic take us much farther, since although the
philosopher and the ruler are now identified, the resulting paragon is not
called a politikos, much less a rhetor, and under the conditions postulated for
the ideal state the philosopher-king has little need of oratory to convince the
citizens that they should adopt any given legislative proposal. The
Republic shows no interest in legislation or constitutional procedures. The
philosopher-kings are accepted by those they rule because of their expert
knowledge, attained through the long process of education that culminates in
dialectic and knowledge of the Forms. By a combination of peitho
(persuasion) and ananke (compulsion) they harmonize the citizens and
contrive to make each one do his own work for the good of the whole
(519b-20a), but we learn very little about the actual means of persuasion (or
o( ananke, for that matter).
An entirely different situation obtains in Plato's final work, the Laws,
which not only accepts the need for legislation to achieve the best politeia
Helen F. North 211
compatible with human weakness, but devotes serious attention to
persuasion as an instrument of the ruler. Two earlier dialogues, the
Phaedrus and the Politikos, help us to understand Plato's attitude in this
final treatment of the role of rhetoric in the state. The Phaedrus develops
the hint of the Gorgias about a philosophical art of rhetoric, illustrating it
by the accomplishment of Pericles under the guidance of Anaxagoras (269e),
and extends the scope of this rhetoric to include private and written logoi, as
well as spoken oratory, specifically mentioning written laws (278c).
The Politikos revives the suggestion made in the Euthydemus about a
political art that would know how to make use of the results of other arts,
such as speech-making and generalship. Now the statesman whose nature
and functions are discussed in the Politikos will make use of expert advice
in fields that he himself need not master. A kind of rhetoric called by the
novel term rhetoreia—perhaps invented by Plato to avoid the invidious
implications of rhetorike—shares in the ruler's art (304a). The task of the
statesman is to decide whether persuasion or compulsion or neither is to be
employed. The task of rhetoreia, once that decision has been made, is to
render persuasive what is just. It will persuade the general mass of the
population by telling them stories (mythologia), rather than by imparting
instruction (didache, 304d). Before we conclude that mythologia necessarily
conveys a contemptuous connotation, we should ponder Plato's own uses of
myth and the relation of myth to didache (or apodeictic) in such dialogues as
the Symposium, Phaedrus, or Timaeus. /
The Laws permits us to see rhetoreia functioning in the service of the
state. The official responsible for exercising persuasion is now called a
nomothetes (legislator), never a rhetor, and there are remarkably few
references to any related word, even rhetorikos, in the Laws, but a great
many to peitho and peithein, which are regularly coupled with words that
mean to teach
—
didaskein, paideuein, and the like. The uses of persuasion
in the Laws are so many and varied as to defy enumeration in a brief
suvey,^'* but they clearly demonstrate Plato's strong, continuing interest in
the relation of rhetoric to statesmanship and his originality in adapting
various rhetoricaFtechniques to the needs of the Cretan city. I have
mentioned the use of persuasive proems to the laws. A law not so equipped
is referred to as a nomos akratos (unmixed law), which constitutes a
tyrannical imposition, relying only on coercion (723a). Another rhetorical
technique employs praise and blame, the matter of traditional epideictic, as a
mode of education, used in connection with games and festivals and
governed by strict rules determining not only who is worthy to receive
praise, but who is eligible to bestow it. What Plato calls nappriaia ev
MovottK; (freedom of speech amid the Muses) turns out to be important for
the Cretan city (829c).
•* Consult G. Morrow. Plato's Cretan City (Princeton 1960) 552-60, and "Plato's
Concept of Persuasion." Philosophical Review 62 (1953) 234-50.
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One measure of the difference between the Republic and the Laws may
be seen in the different ways the two states come into being. In the
Republic philosophers become kings, and the philosophers are such by
virtue of their mastery of dialectic. In the Laws the ideal city could come
into existence under two conditions: first, if there should be a young tyrant
possessed of certain qualifications (youth, self-control, a good memory,
courage, a noble nature, and—best of all
—
good luck), and secondly, if this
young ruler should find a great lawgiver to give him advice (709e-10b).
The qualifications of the lawgiver in turn are summed up by comparison to
a mythical exemplar—Nestor, the honey-tongued orator of the Iliad, who
excelled all other men in the power of speech and in sophrosyne (7 lie).
The element of arete retains the same importance it has always had in
Plato's political thought, but dialectical ability has now made room for
rhetoric. /
It is time to turn to the other, perhaps less familiar, half of our subject:
Plato's influence on rhetoric, not his debt, but his legacy. Once again, I
shall omit the negative side, the way in which Plato's anti-rhetorical
arguments continued to be used, adapted, and elaborated by the Hellenistic
philosophical schools, by the enemies of rhetoric in Rome, and by
opponents in even later times, who repeated Plato's charges that rhetoric
was morally and artistically indefensible and that it harmed both the state
and the rhetorician himself. ^^ Let me instead mention some of the positive
effects that Plato had on rhetoric and oratory, prose-writing in general, and
literary criticism in particular.
It is, I think, widely accepted that the Rhetoric of Aristotle develops
certain notions sketched in the Phaedrus, the dialogue in which Plato at last
lays the foundation for a rhetoric acceptable according to his standards, as
sophistic rhetoric had not been. Friedrich Solmsen many years ago set forth
the main lines of this argument, especially with respect to the systematic
treatment of emotional appeals. I can do no better than to quote from his
influential article in Classical Philology in 1938 ("Aristotle and Cicero on
the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings"), where an Appendix on the
Phaedrus and the Rhetoric sums up the evidence for Aristotle's indebtedness
to Plato:
In both works rhetoric is based on dialectic, oacpriveia is regarded as
the most essential requirement of the diction, and a demand for the
intrinsic unity of the Xoyot; is put forward and illustrated by a
comparison with the organic unity of an animal's body. Add to this the
description in both of rhetoric as dialectical demonstration plus
yoXotyfOYia, the polemical attitude in both works toward the vulgar
rhetoricians with their systems of xa \i6pia xov X6yo\>, and the fact
^^ The continued use of the second of these arguments is discussed by North, "Inulilis
sibi, perniciosus patriae" ICS 6 (1981) 242-71.
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that tradition . . . has it that Aristotle's rhetorical ^e0o5o(; originated
in the Academy, (pp. 229-30)
The persistence of Plato's influence may be seen in other ways as well.
One that had far-reaching importance was the hierarchy of values that he
established, by which the dyaGa Tfi<; v^Xt1<5» ^^ "goods of the soul," took
priority, followed by those of the body and then by the external advantages
(wealth, friends). This doctrine, already prominent in the Apology (36b-c),
where it justifies Socrates' claim that he is the only true statesman,
exercised its most far-reaching influence on ethical and political philosophy,
but it had an impact on rhetoric also, because it helped to establish the topic
of arete as the essential subject for epideictic oratory, the oratory of praise
and blame. Nothing was more characteristic of the Platonic-Aristotelian (as
distinguished from the sophistic-Isocratean) strain in ancient epideictic than
the insistence that praise is due only to arete, not to the other so-called
goods that people sought or boasted.^^
Moreover, in the very definition of virtue and its various categories,
Plato exercised a unique influence. It had always been customary to
organize eulogy around a set of values approved by the community being
addressed (as in the Athenian epitaphios logos), but the group of virtues
available for such exploitation was shifting and amorphous, both in number
and in content, until Plato in Book 4 of the Republic established a canon of
four excellences (wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation) as necessary for
the perfection of the soul and the state. From then on, but especially after
they had been adopted by the Stoics as the core of their ethical system, these
four virtues were canonized and—to speak only of their role in rhetoric
—
they formed the basis for the regular school instruction in the oratory of
praise and blame. The Roman rhetorical handbooks and the treatises on
epideictic by Menander Rhetor and others make the dominance of the
Platonic ethical system unmistakable.^'^ It came to dominate judicial and
deliberative oratory as well as epideictic, and quickly spread to
historiography, since the schools of rhetoric provided the only training in
the writing of artistic prose available to aspiring historians.
Literary criticism, from Aristotle and Theophrastus onward, owed to
Plato certain doctrines so well known as Platonic in origin that it will
suffice merely to name them, especially since some have been alluded to in
my quotation from Professor Solmsen. In Peripatetic theory, among the
virtues of style (sapheneia, clarity, Hellenismos, correctness, paraskeue,
elaboration, and \heprepon, appropriateness), the first and last, clarity and
^^ See V. Buchheil, Unlersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias
bis Arisloleles (Munich 1960) 84-116.
^' See H. Caplan on the Rhetorica ad Herennium 3. 2. 3 and 3. 6. 11 for the cardinal
virtues in deliberative and epideictic oratory. Consult also D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson,
Menander Rhetor (Oxford 1981) 263.
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appropriateness, are strongly emphasized by Plato.^* The comparison of a
speech or a poem to a living thing, with a demand for organic unity, derives
from the Phaedrus (264c). The conception of the poet as irrational, while
neither original nor exclusive with Plato, found in his Ion and Phaedrus the
treatment that posterity was destined tc remember. Moreover, in the
Phaedrus Plato carried the notion into new territory when he demonstrated
the need both for divine madness and for strict control, derived from the
knowledge of dialectic and psychology. Ultimately the theia mania, divine
madness, of the poet in the Phaedrus was transmuted into the theory of
sophron mania (sane madness), controlled inspiration, which was made to
account for such extravagantly admired oratorical quaUties as the deinotes of
Demosthenes. It contributed also to the concept of to hypsos, the sublime,
in "Longinus."^'
Related to the influence of Plato's theoretical advice about the choice
and arrangement of words and the structure of a speech, and deserving of
close attention (because at certain times it seems to have been much more
widely studied than his theoretical principles) is the emergence of Plato him-
self as a model of style. This is the final topic that I should like to address.
We may begin by returning to Dionysius of Halicamassus, the Greek
historian and rhetorician working in Rome in die time of Augustus, whom I
quoted at the outset In his essay on Demosthenes, part of a series on the
Attic orators, he tells us that certain persons (xiv£<;)
—
probably philoso-
phers, although he does not say so—consider Plato to be daimoniotatos, a
supreme genius, accepted as the definitive model {horos kai kandn) for both
the plain and the forceful styles (23). Such persons even say that if Zeus
spoke Greek, he would sound like Plato. Dionysius maintains that he
himself admires Plato's deinotes in \h& Dialogues, especially those in which
he preserves the Socratic character (rather surprisingly, he cites the
Philebus), but he is highly critical of him when he abandons the style
proper to the dialogue-form. Most especially he dislikes it when Plato
introduces praise and blame into political discussions and tries to convert
them into speeches for the prosecution or the defence. When he does so, he
becomes different from himself and disgraces the philosophical profession.
This is a revealing comment; it shows Dionysius the rhetor on the
defensive. The prominence of speeches in some of the Dialogues is
precisely what attracted to their study young men interested in becoming
orators, especially orator-statesmen in the Ciceronian tradition. Dionysius,
who is above all determined to maintain the supremacy of Demosthenes as
the model of models, mounts a clever attack on Plato the would-be rhetor.
'* Clarity. Phaedrus 265d: appropriateness. 268d. 274b, and see above, pp. 208-09.
'' For the steps by which sophron mania became equivalent to theia mania (with a
striking reversal of the implications of sophron in the Phaedrus), see North, "The Concept
of Sophrosyne in Greek Literary Criticism," CP 43 (1948) 1-17, esp. 14-16 on Ps.-Lucian
and Ps.-Longinus.
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First he ridicules him by applying to him the lines addressed by Zeus to
Aphrodite in the Iliad (5. 428-29), when she flees to him for comfort, after
being wounded by Diomedes:
Not to you, my child, are given the works of war,
But do you busy yourself with the lovely tasks of marriage.
The analogy tends to remove Plato from serious consideration as a model for
the professional speaker. His style is identified with what is soft, charming,
incapable of real polemic. Dionysius then proceeds to compare the
Menexenus with Demosthenes' On the Crown (all the while insisting that it
is a fair comparison because this is the most effective
—
kratistos—of
Plato's politikoi logoi). To compress a very long discussion of Plato's
faults, let me just say that Dionysius tears to pieces passage after passage of
the Menexenus, finding in them unnecessary repetition, defective rhythms,
excessive ornamentation, youthful indulgence in Gorgianic theatrical tricks,
clumsiness, incoherence, even meanness (tapeinotes) and general bad taste
—
akairia, a word that turns up more than once in rhetorical criticism of
Plato's rhetoric (24-29).
Dionysius concludes with still another derogatory comparison, this
time saying that Plato's style is like a flowery spot affording a traveller a
pleasant resting place, while the style of Demosthenes is like a fertile field
providing an abundance of the necessities of hfe, as well as the luxuries that
make for pleasure (32). He repeats his charge that Plato's oratory aims only
at formal beauty, while that of Demosthenes is useful and practical. (One of
the cliches of Greek and Roman criticism is to compare Plato's style to
weapons used on parade, Demosthenes' to weapons of war, Plato's to a body
accustomed to a life of ease in the shade, Demosthenes' to a body hardened
by exercise in the sunlight.)^*'
Yet when he is not attempting to exalt the virtues of Demosthenes,
Dionysius is capable of more objective criticism, and he tells us, in the trea-
tise On Composition, that Plato excelled in the arrangement of words
(though not always in their choice), that he, with Herodotus and Demos-
thenes, merited praise for variation (metabole 19), and that, like Homer and
Sophocles, he used the best kind of synthesis, the well-blended (eukratos),
which constitutes a mean between the austere and the flowery (24), high
praise from a Peripatetic critic. Dionysius is not talking about the middle
style, in the normal sense of the term as used in Greco-Roman criticism,
but rather the middle type of composition or word-placement, yet in fact
Plato is almost invariably cited (along with Isocrates) as a model of the
middle style, a category that he regularly exemplified in Byzantine criticism.
Especially penetrating are some of the observations of "Longinus," an
enthusiastic admirer of Plato. He too compares him with Demosthenes,
^ See F. Walsdorff, Die antiken Urteile uber Platans Stil (Bonn 1927) for a variety of
critical cliches.
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especially in their use of amplification (auxesis), and he likens Plato to a
kind of sea (pelagos), flooding a vast expanse, steady in his majestic and
stately dignity (12). The key words are onkos (weightiness) and
megaloprepes semnotes (great-souled dignity). Plato achieves grandeur
imegethos) in spite of the fact that he flows along with a noiseless current
(a phrase borrowed from the Theaetetus 144b). "Longinus" uses Plato as
the supreme exemplar of how sublimity may be attained through imitation
{mimesis). What Plato imitated was Homer. "Plato irrigated his style with
10,000 rivulets from the great Homeric spring," says "Longinus," and
concludes with the memorable statement that Plato contended with Homer
for the first prize (13. 4).^^
Imitation was of course the basis of the educational system in Greece
and Rome, a circumstance that lent enormous influence to Plato as stylist.
However sharply any rival or critic disagreed with the substance of Plato's
philosophy, the fact remained that he wrote like an angel (or like Zeus in
the ancient commonplace). The desire to understand how he did it and to
imitate his virtuosity has obsessed critics, rhetoricians, and even some
philosophers from antiquity to modem times. Among the rhetorically
oriented critics the most influential in late antiquity was certainly
Hermogenes of Tarsus, a contemporary of Marcus Aurelius, whose treatise
Perildeon (On Ideas or Forms of Style)^^ left its impress on Byzantine
literature and criticism, as well as on writing of the imperial age in Greece.
Brought to the West by George of Trebizond in 1426 and translated into
Latin by 1538, it exercised a pervasive influence on Latin and vernacular
literature of the Renaissance.^^ The very title of this treatise betrays its
Platonic inspiration. As George Kustas has said, "... in Hermogenes we
are witnessing the decisive step in the process of the Platonization of
rhetoric."^"* We might also say that in Hermogenes we witness the
culmination of the process of "rhetoricizing" Plato, a process that had long
since proclaimed itself in such remarks as that of Dionysius of
Halicarnassus about the expectation that Plato should serve as a kandn
orthoepeias, a standard of correct diction {Dem. 26). By the imperial age the
philosopher had become a model of style, and although readers who cared
only for style, with no regard for content, must have been in the minority,
as De Lacy observes,^ one or two such readers are on record, including the
^^ Consult D. A. Russell, "Longinus" On the Sublime (Oxford 1964) esp. xxxix-xl and
109-17.
"Translated by C. W. Wooten as Hermogenes. On Types of Style (Chapel Hill 1987).
^ For its influence in the West, consult A. Patterson, Hermogenes and the Renaissance:
Seven Ideas of Style (Princeton 1970).
'^Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric (Thessaloniki 1973) 163.
^ P. De Lacy, "Plato and the Intellectual Life of the Second Century A.D." in Ap-
proaches to the Second Sophistic, ed. G. W. Bowersock (University Park, PA 1974) 7-8.
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student of Taurus mentioned by Aulus Gellius, and Pronto, the teacher of
Marcus AureUus.^^
The judgments pronounced by Hermogenes were to be decisive in
defining Plato's stylistic impact in late antiquity and Byzantium. His Peri
Ideon identifies seven Porms of style (each of them with several
subdivisions) and describes each Porm according to eight categories (such as
diction, figures, composition, rhythm). Several of the Porms are illustrated
by references to Plato. Beauty (hallos). Grandeur (megethos). Solemnity
(semnotes)—a subdivion of megethos. Sweetness (glykytes) and Modesty
(epieikeia)—two subdivisions of Character {ethos)—are regarded as
eminently Platonic, and Hermogenes advises his readers to study specific
passages in the dialogues in order to recognize and imitate these qualities.^^
Most revealing among Hermogenes' comments on Plato's style is his
repeated assertion that Plato is the supreme model of what he calls
panegyric, a term that is now equivalent to the epideictic genre, but has a
greatly expanded meaning. Panegyric includes historiography and most
other forms of prose-writing (what Plato prophetically called logographia in
the Phaedrus), and even, at one point, includes poetry as well.^^
Hermogenes maintains that Plato's is the most beautiful panegyrical style
in prose. In fact, he is to panegyric what Demosthenes is to deliberative and
judicial oratory, and what Homer is to poetry.^
Menander Rhetor also, in the late third century, author (or supposed
author) of influential treatises on epideictic, makes it clear that Plato
dominates the genre.^^ This dominance continued into Byzantine times,
when the schools were heavily influenced by Neoplatonic commentaries on
Hermogenes and other rhetorical writers, as well as on Plato's Gorgias €Jid
Phaedrus themselves, and rhetoric was used, not for its original purposes,
but to prepare for the study of philosophy.^^ A remarkable development
was the equation of the three types of oratory with the three Platonic
faculties of the soul. As reported by the Prolegomenon of Marcellinus (late
fourth or early fifth century), the highest faculty (the rational) is associated
with panegyric. ^2 What had been regarded in earlier times as the more
important types, the judicial and the deliberative, were linked with the
inferior faculties, the spirited and the appetitive. Hence the kind of rhetoric
in which Plato was thought to excel corresponded to what, in his
organization of the tripartite soul, was undeniably the highest faculty.
^ Both cited by De Lacy (previous note) 6, 8.
'" Peri Ideon, ed. Rabe. 297. 246. 247. 386. 387. 243. 244. 337. 348.
^ Consult Wooten (above, note 22) 138-39.
2' Rabe (above, note 27) 386-90.
^ See Russell and Wilson (above, note 17) xxxviii and Index under "Plato."
'^ See G. A. Kennedy. "Late Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric
13 (1980) 181-82.
'^Rabe, Prolegomenon Sylloge, 286; consult Kennedy (previous note) 188.
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Another source of Hermogenes' influence on later attitudes toward
Plato's style lay in the unprecedented flexibility of his critical method. By
considering the possible combinations and permutations of the seven Forms
and their thirteen sub-Forms, Hermogenes far outstripped such predecessors
as Demetrius and Dionysius in the subtlety with which he could analyze and
describe the characteristics of any particular author. Thus, as Kustas
observes, ^^ he came to have a special appeal for Christian thinkers,
conscious of the uniqueness of the individual soul. Moreover, some of the
Forms that Hermogenes identified were themselves particularly attractive to
Christianity. Simplicity (apheleia) and Dignity (semnotes) were both
considered characteristic of Christian literature. In Hermogenes' system
these two Forms were opposed, yet they were both exemplified by Plato,
who thus became of interest, not only for what he said, but for how he said
it. Furthermore, the quality of grandeur (megethos), which ancient critics
found in Plato (and of which semnotes is a subdivision for Hermogenes)
was thought to include an element that the Neoplatonist Proclus terms the
enigmatic and identifies as one source of Plato's vigor (pathos). Since for
Byzantine criticism obscurity (asapheia) is sometimes a virtue of style
(when clarity would reveal to the uninitiated what they should not be told),
the Platonic example could profitably be studied in this connection too, as
the relation of the enigmatic to the obscure was analyzed.^
Among other associations between the style of Plato and the special
concerns of Byzantine Uterary culture traced by Kustas, particular importance
attaches to the increasing use of moral terminology derived from Plato to
describe stylistic distinctions, and the consequent tendency to identify
aesthetic with moral standards. The extension of the concepts of propriety
(the prepon) and appropriateness (Jcairos) in Byzantine Uterary theory, as a
means of giving suitable expression to the divine or cosmic order, and the
relation of this development to Plato's Timaeus deserve notice.^^
Long before the Byzantine era, to be sure, the Timaeus had been
prominent in stylistic criticism, as well as in the study of Plato's thought.
"Longinus" cites the famous description of the human body in Timaeus
65c-85e as a series of metaphors making for sublimity (while noting also
that it is because of such passages that Plato is criticized for his Bacchic
frenzy, 32. 7). If we look ahead many years to the renaissance of Byzantine
literature in the eleventh century, we learn that Michael Psellus set for
himself twin goals: to improve his stylistic eloquence through rhetoric and
to purify his spirit through philosophy. "Philosophy without rhetoric has
no charm (charis), and rhetoric without philosophy has no content
(schema) "^^ The model for what he hopes to achieve is the Timaeus. In
" Studies (above, note 24) 17.
^Consult Kustas (above, note 24) 12, 39-40.
'' Kusus (above, note 24) 41-42.
^ Chronographia 6. 107.
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this determination to reconcile rhetoric with philosophy and this choice of a
model Psellus may serve as our final example of the persistent, benign
influence of Plato, orator summus.
Swarthmore College
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Plants as Aristotelian Substances
ROSAMONfD KENT SPRAGUE
Farewell, beloved Fritzl
When Aristotle lists the things that exist by nature, as he does, for instance,
in the first line of Physics 2. 1 , he mentions "the animals and their parts
. . . and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)" ^ 192b9-10
(and cf. Metaph. 7. 2, 1028b9-13). Things like these, he says in
Metaphysics 1. 7, "are substances if anything is" (1032a20). Since, then,
plants are full-fledged natural substances for Aristotle, it should be of
interest to give them some special attention. After all, as he reminds us in
the de Partibus, "respecting perishable plants and animals we have abundant
information, living as we do in their midst, and ample data may be collected
concerning their various kinds, if only we are willing to take sufficient
pains"(1.5,644b26-31).
In this paper I first collect some information about Aristotelian plants,
then try out the thesis that in some respects his plants are superior to* his
animals, and, finally, discuss some of the philosophical implications of an
interesting distinction made by Aristotle between two grades of nutrition, a
topic having special relevance to plant function.
I
As things that come to be and pass away, plants will naturally be subject to
Aristotle's general principles for perishable things, as, for example, the
principle of substratum. "For," he says, "we find in every case something
that underlies from which proceeds that which comes to be; for instance,
animals and plants from seed" (Ph. 1. 7, 190b3-4). The direction of
coming to be is of course towards form, and, in the normal Aristotelian
way, runs true to type: Not only does man beget man, but plant begets
plant (cf. EE 2. 6, 1222bl8-19 and PA 2. 1, 646a34).
To this point nothing has been said about plants which does not apply
equally to animals, but if we consider the location of natural substances in
' Translations of Aristotelian passages are from the Revised Oxford Translation, ed. J.
Barnes (Princeton 1984) unless otherwise noted.
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the cosmos, a difference at once appears. In the Generation of Animals
Aristotle attempts a systematic correlation of living things with the
elements in which they spend their time and flourish: "Plants belong to the
earth, aquatic creatures to the water, and land-animals to the air . . . " (3.
11, 761bl3-14, Peck). This correlation is certainly not an unqualified
success: It immediately occurs to one to ask, what about birds? Do they
not also belong to the air? And, as Aristotle is himself aware, the scheme
is not complete without the identification of a group of living creatures
whose natural element is fire. "This fourth tribe," he concludes, "must be
looked for on the moon" (761b22). (The possibility that anyone would
actually do this no doubt seemed to him remote.) Aristotle does not make
much use of this projected scheme, but that plants have a special
relationship to earth is a point of which he remains convinced.
This special relationship of plants to earth calls for some additional
comment. Plants not only, as is obvious, have earth as their natural
habitat, but earth is the principal element of which they are themselves
composed (Juv. 19 [13], 477a28). That such should be the case is not
surprising, since earth is an important part of the diet of plants. "It might
be thought," Aristotle says, "that [plants] are fed by one substance only,
viz. by Water," but in fact they "are fed by more than one, for Earth has
been mixed with the water" (GC 2. 8, 335al2-14).
The close relationship between plants and earth accounts for another
characteristic of plants, their disinclination to move. Unlike animals, who
must go about to acquire their food, plants are fed in situ. Having no need,
then, to seek food elsewhere, they remain in one place. As a result they are
able to dispense with a whole complex of functions needed by animals:
Plants do not need sensation or imagination in order to apprehend the
location of food, nor appetite to encourage them to pursue it, nor
locomotion to accomplish this pursuit.
This simplicity of plant functions (these are, of course, restricted to
nutrition, growth, and reproduction) is, furthermore, reflected in their
structure. As Aristotle puts it concisely in the de Partibus:
Plants . . . inasmuch as they are without locomotion, present no great
variety in their heterogeneous parts. For, where the functions are but
few, few also are the organs required to effect them. (2. 10, 656al-4)
In Other words, it is because plants have nowhere to go that they have no
feet. Not only do they have no feet, but, in spite of the fact that they take
in food, they have no stomachs. "The earth and its heat serv[es] them in the
place of a stomach," Aristotle tells us in the de Partibus (2. 3, 650a23).
The function of the stomach is the concoction of food into nutriment; the
food of plants, however, is "already treated and prepared" (650a21, Peck).
Animals here are at a definite disadvantage. Being creatures of locomotion,
they not only have to search for food, but need also to carry supplies. They
have, Aristotle says, "as it were an earth inside them" (650a25, Peck), and it
Rosamond Kent Sprague 223
is from this ambulatory dining-room, the stomach, that they draw their
concocted food.
The fact that plants are so wedded to their native habitat has its effect
not only upon their diet and upon their structure, but also upon their
position. By this I mean not simply their position in the scale of nature,
which is firmly inferior to that of animals, but their position with respect to
function. "All living beings have a superior and an inferior part," Aristotle
observes in the de Incessu (4, 705a30), and he emphasizes the point that this
arrangement is to be found just as much in plants as in animals. The
superior part, however, is so designated with respect to its function as a
recipient of food, and since plants, as we have seen, obtain their
nourishment from the earth, they are, strictly speaking, upside down, their
roots being their mouths. As Aristotle remarks epigrammatically in the de
Anima, "up and down are not for all things what they are for the whole
world" (2. 4, 416a4). Empedocles, then, was wrong in attempting to
explain "the downward rooting [of plants] by the natural tendency of earth to
travel downwards, and the upward branching by the similar natural tendency
of fire to travel upwards" (416al-2). Not only does Empedocles display a
fine disregard for function, but he also consigns the growing plant to a
dreadful fate: As earth and fire rush in opposite directions, the unfortunate
plant will be torn in two. Aristotelian plants, however, being unified by
soul, are in no such peril.
A final point concerning plants and earth has to do with epistemology.
Plants, in Aristotle's view, have no sensation, and the reason is that "they
consist of earth" (de An. 3.13, 435b 1). Their bodies are uncompounded
(Aristotle does not, apparently, think of water as a significant part of plants
in spite of its role in their nutrition), and thus they cannot have even the
most basic sense, the sense of touch (de An. 3. 12, 434b28). Sensation
requires the possession of a mean of contrary qualities, and the ability to
receive the forms of sensible objects without Uieir matter (de An. 2. 12,
424a32-b3). Plants, however, are affected by form and matter together.
Their manner of apprehending objects is, in fact, to eat them, as is evident
from the beginning of 2. 4. Perhaps this simply shows their low earthy
natures and their preoccupation with food.
What I have said about plants so far has, I hope, indicated that they are
subject to Aristotle's general philosophical principles, and that what he tells
us about them, although sometimes rather quaintly expressed, is not at all
unexpected. As we proceed, it will continue to be evident that plants have a
well-defined and also quite an important place in Aristotle's scheme.
In emphasizing, in the first part of this paper, the relation between
plants and earth, I have, one might say, emphasized the lower side of
vegetable nature. It may even be said of plants, and is said by Aristotle in
the History of Animals (8. 1, 588b9), that the whole genus, if compared
with that of animals, is "devoid of life." But then, "as compared with other
corporeal entities," plants are "endowed with life" (588blO-ll). In fact.
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"there is observed in plants a continuous scale of ascent towards the
animal." And, if we turn to final causes, more can be said than this: We
shall find that plants as well as animals are interested in eternity.
This mood of aspiration on the part of plants is most neatly expressed
in de Anima 2. 4, when Aristotle writes (in a mood reminiscent of Plato's
Symposium 207d):
... for any living thing that has reached its normal development
.... the most natural act is the production of another lUce itself, an
animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its
nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine. (415a27-29,
and cf. GA 2. 1, 731b32-36)
The nature of such partaking is, as Aristotle indicates, not completely
successful: the individual plant or animal must perish, leaving the
attainment of eternity to the species. As he says, again in the de Anima,
the living thing "remains not indeed as the self-same individual, but
continues its existence in something like itself—not numerically but
specifically one" (2. 4, 415b6-8). The final cause, then, of plants is
reproduction, and the other plant functions, those of nutrition and growth,
subserve this end. To speak more generally, plants, like other Aristotelian
entities, are controlled by teleology. As Aristotle himself expresses it in
the Physics, "in plants too we find that for the sake of which, though the
degree of organization is less [than it is in animals]" (2. 8, 199bl0-ll),
and, in the de Anima, he points out that "the parts of plants in spite of their
extreme simplicity are organs" (2. 1, 412b29).
Clearly, in spite of their resemblance to animals in the matter of
teleology, plants retain their inferior position in the scale of nature. They
are less highly organized and, as a result, have fewer functions. I now
proceed, however, to mention a few respects in which it might be argued
(and argued on purely Aristotelian grounds) that plants are superior to
animals.
For one thing, the functions of plants, that is, those of nutrition, growth,
and reproduction, are the absolute minimum conditions for admission to the
scale of nature. Life can exist without the animal and rational functions; it
cannot exist without the plant functions. Aristotle even goes so far as to
write, in the Generation of Animals, that "the business of most animals is,
you may say, nothing else than to produce young, as the business of a plant
is to produce seeds and fruit" (1. 4, 717a22-23), implying that even in
things higher than plants, the plant functions remain dominant. Of plants
themselves he writes that "to the essence of plants belongs no other
function or business than the production of seed" (1. 23, 731a25-26).
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Then again, it is quite noticeably the case that plants are longer-lived
than animals; the date-palm is a good example (Long. 4, 466a9, and cf. 6,
467a6-b3). Although, like animals, plants will die if deprived of
nourishment, yet they "continually renew themselves and hence last for a
long time" (6, 467al2). Animals are not only less efficient in this respect,
but also, because of their inveterate habit of running about, they are far
more prone to suffer accident and come to an early grave.
Further, there is at least one instance in which plants may be said to
benefit from an experience which for animals constitutes a serious and
usually mortal injury, I refer here to division, an event which Aristotle
mentions quite often, usually in relation to insects^: A divided insect will
live for a short time, but lacks the organs necessary for continued self-
maintenance. But with plants, Aristotle says, there is a difference: "The
portions of the divided insect live only for a limited time, whereas the
portions of the plant actually attain the perfect form of the whole, so that
from one single plant you may obtain two or more" (PA 4. 6, 682b32-34).
In other words, division (through the taking of slips or separation of bulbs),
far from being an injury to a plant, is a means by which it attains its
reproductive purpose.
One final way in which, it might be argued, plants have the advantage
over animals, is in the matter of sex differentiation. It has been mentioned
that plants share with animals the final cause of reproduction, and also that
nutrition, which is a function of animals as well as of plants, subserves
reproduction. Animals, unlike plants, do not have the good fortune to be
rooted in their source of nourishment, but must move about to seek it.
Such being the case. Nature has provided them with the needful organs, that
is, mouths, stomachs, and feet, in varying forms. Food, however, is not
the only thing sought by animals: Each, or at any rate each male animal, is
seeking its reproductive partner. Thus in animals male and female are
distinct and separate. In plants, however, Aristotle writes, "male and female
are not found" (GA 1.1, 715bl9, Peck); in them "these powers are mingled,
female not being separated from male" (1. 23, 731al-3). What is more, the
copulation of animals is really an attempt to achieve the plant condition:
For when there is need for them to generate the sexes are no longer
separated any more than in plants, their nature desiring that they shall
become one; and this is plain to view when they copulate and are united
[that one animal is made out of both]. (1. 23, 731all-14)
It could be argued, further, that sexual contact on the part of animals is
not only an attempt at physical integration, of a type already existing in
plants, but also an attempt at metaphysical integration, and that this too
ah-eady exists in plants. The point will be made clear if we remember that
^ I have discussed some of these points at greater length in a paper entitled "Aristotle
and Divided Insects." Melhexis 2 (1989) 29-^0.
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for Aristotle the male parent is the vehicle of form, and that the female
provides the matter. The sexual union of male and female may be regarded,
then, as an effort to achieve the union of form and matter. This union takes
place most obviously in the new substance, which will utilize the parental
contributions as the basis for its own matter and form. But it takes place,
in a different way, in sexual contact, where the parents as it were imitate the
new substance by coming as close to each other as is physically possible.
In animals, of course, this parental union is extremely transitory, but in
plants it is permanent. Thus plants, I should say, attain better than animals
to the status of natural substances.
Aristotle comes close to saying this himself when he writes, in the
Generation ofAnimals, that "animals seem to be almost like divided plants,
as though one should separate and divide them, when they bear seed, into the
male and female existing in them" (1. 23, 731a21-23). He implies, that is,
that plants are the norm and animals the aberration. In the beginning of
Book 2, however, he makes a spirited defence of the separation of the sexes
in animals, arguing that because form is more divine than matter—I suspect
he really means that men are more divine than women, who are, after all,
"deformed males" (2. 3, 737a27)—it is better that the sexes should be
separate. But he was also the philosopher who maintained in the de Anima
that questions about the unity of matter and that of which it is the matter
were beside the point: "It is as though we were to ask whether the wax and
its shape are one" (2. 1, 412b8). Plants, I should say, represent this
fundamental type of unity far better than animals. In the case of animals, in
fact. Nature, by separating male from female for what appears to be the sole
purpose of bringing them back together, comes perilously close to doing
things in vain.
Now I am conscious of being in a sense perverse in attempting to argue
for the thesis that in some respects plants are superior to animals for
Aristotle. After all, reproduction is not the only road to divinity; there is
the way of contemplation, and contemplation, in anything other than the
Unmoved Mover, is normally performed by animals—rational animals, it is
true, but still animals. Plants, although they may be thinking deep
vegetable thoughts, are hardly, I should guess, devoting themselves to
philosophical tasks such as distinguishing between Socrates and Socrates
seated. Then too it might be said that whereas there is a certain efficiency in
being rooted to the spot if the spot is one's source of nourishment, there is
also a certain divinity in motion, in that in moving one comes closer to the
condition of the heavenly bodies. That locomotion is primary and therefore
superior to the other types of motion such as growth (the kind peculiar to
plants) is clear from Physics 8. 7, where Aristotle writes:
Now all things that go through the process of becoming acquire
locomotion last. It is this that accounts for the fact that some living
things, e.g. plants and many kinds of animals, owing to the lack of the
Rosamond Kent Sprague 227
requisite organ, are entirely without motion, whereas others acquire it
in the course of their being perfected. (261al4-18)
And we know, of course, that "what is posterior in the order of becoming is
prior in the order of being" (261al2), Perhaps it would be somewhat
unkind, in the circumstances, to point out to Aristotle that the most divine
entity in his philosophy, the Unmoved Mover, is rather plant-like in not
moving at all.
ffl
The topic with which I wish to conclude has a particular relation to the
doctrine of the categories, and possibly—although this is a good deal more
speculative—to the doctrine of hexis. It concerns a distinction made by
Aristotle between two types or grades of nutrition, a distinction which is
therefore of special relevance to the vegetable soul.
It will be convenient to begin by reminding ourselves that the basic
functions of the vegetable soul are nutrition and growth. (The third plant
function, reproduction, is dependent on the other two.) Now nutrition,
Aristotle tells us, "though the same as growth, is yet different from it in its
being" (GC 1. 5, 322a25). What is the meaning of this somewhat cryptic
remark?
The easiest way of answering this question is to consider the particular
phenomena that Aristotle is intending to describe. In the life of any creature
possessing soul, the following stages are discernible: 1) coming-into-being
from appropriate seeds or parents; 2) growth to a certain limited size (a size
controlled by logos); 3) a stage concurrent with but also succeeding grdwth
that may be called preservation or maintenance; 4) reproduction (not
essential to life but a natural expectation of any mature living thing); 5)
decay, a stage in which maintenance weakens; 6) death, or passing-out-of-
being.
Aristotle's distinction between two grades of nutrition relates to the
second and third of these stages, that is, to the stage of growth and to the
stage of maintenance. He delineates this difference as follows:
In every instance, of course, there is nourishment of two grades
present: 1) "nutritive," that is to say, which provides both the whole
and the parts with being; 2) "growth-promoting," that is to say, which
causes increase of bulk. (GA 2. 6, 744b33-37, Peck)
It is to clarify and emphasize this distinction that Aristotle employs the
doctrine of the categories. Growth is motion occurring in the category of
quantity; nutrition, however, is motion occurring in the category of
substance. The point is particularly well stated in de Anima 2. 4:
Food has a power which is other than the power to increase the bulk of
what is fed by it; so far forth as what has soul in it is a quantum, food
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may increase its quantity, but it is only so far as what has soul in it is a
"this-somewhat" or substance that food acts as food; in that case it
maintains the being of what is fed, and that continues to be what it is
so long as the process of nutrition continues. (416bll-14)
Reproduction does of course also involve motion in the category of
substance, since, in reproduction, a new substance comes into being. But,
as Aristotle is precise in pointing out, nutrition concerns a substance which
is already in being: "Nothing generates itself, but only maintains itself
(416bl6).
I did, however, mention (and this is the most speculative part of the
paper) that there might be some connection between Aristotle's distinction
between two grades of nutrition, quantitative and substantive, and his
doctrine of disposition or hexis. As a preliminary we need to bear in mind
that, roughly speaking, hexis corresponds to first actuality. That is, if we
think in terms of a progression from potentiality to actuality, there is a
stage at which certain functions may be possessed or had without necessarily
being exercised. The subsequent exercise or use of these functions may be
called (although Aristotle inconsiderately failed to coin the expression)
"second actuality." This type of terminology enables Aristotle to give
accurate ontological descriptions of, say, the powers of sensation with
which we are bom (we already have them ready for exercise and are not bom
with a mere potentiality of acquiring them: de An. 2. 5, 417bl7-19 and EN
2. 1, 1103a26-32) or of a sleeping animal (which may be regarded as
possessing life without utilizing life: de An. 2. 1, 412a25-26).
The point which suggested to me the parallel with nutrition was the
fact that Aristotle, in contrasting the transition from initial potentiality to
first actuaUty or hexis with the transition from hexis to second actuality or
use, speaks of the first transition in terms of the extinction of contraries,
and the second in terms of maintenance or preservation. So at de Anima 2.
5 he writes:
Also the expression "to be acted on" [as for instance by food] has more
than one meaning; it may mean either the extinction of one of two
contraries by the other, or the maintenance of what is potential by the
agency of what is actual and already Uke what is acted upon, as actual to
potential. (417b2-5)
The two types of nutrition fit neatly into this pattern: Growth involves
the extinction of smallness and immaturity by maturity and size; after a
certain point, however, maturity and the appropriate size are possessed and
growth ceases. The work of nutrition is then devoted to maintenance, and,
as an extension of maintenance, to reproduction. If the parallel was in fact
in Aristotle's mind, it could then be said that one of his most important
philosophical distinctions was intimately associated with his reflections on
nutrition and the vegetable soul.
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A connection between philosophical reflection and the phenomena of
nutrition and growth can be seen as far back as Anaxagoras, who had asked
the question, "How can hair come from what is not hair and flesh from what
is not flesh?" (fr. 10). Such questions were no doubt the sort of thing that
caused Socrates to say, at Phaedo 96c, that his study of the natural
philosophers had caused him to unlearn what he had previously thought he
knew "about the cause of growth in human beings." And it was Aristotle's
detailed consideration of such problems in a more generalized form in the
first book of On Generation and Corruption that occasioned the remark with
which I began this section, that "nutrition, though the same as growth, is
yet different from it in its being" (322a25).
Conclusion
In giving some attention to Aristotelian plants, I have merely scratched the
surface of an intrinsically interesting topic. There is the ecological
observation in the Politics (1.8, 1256b 15- 19) that as animals are for the
sake of man, so plants are for the sake of animals. The special connection
of plants with eating and growth leads to consideration of such topics as
mixture and the void. Oysters are a kind of water-plant and could do with
inspection. There are intriguing details such as that "it is among plants that
tastes occur in richest variety" (Sens. 4, 441b7), and that, although plants
derive from the air assistance in the preservation of their natural heat (Juv.
6, 470a21-22), yet they do not breathe (de An. 1. 5, 410b31). Nor indeed
do they sleep, as Aristotle explains in detail in the de Somno, as at 1,
454b26-31 and 454al2-17. It is sufficient here, however, to point out that
plants, being genuine Aristotelian substances, cannot be discussed apart
from such normal Aristotelian concepts as potentiality and actuality, form
and matter, and final cause.^
University ofSouth Carolina
' Portions of this paper were presented in lecture form at the Georgia State University,
the South Carolina Society for Philosophy, and the Open University (London).
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The Plan and Intention of Aristotle's
Ethical and Political Writings*
PAUL A. VANDER WAERDT
My objective here is to reconstruct the plan of Aristotle's exposition of
political science ipolitike) in his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, and to
show that this plan reveals certain fundamental but unnoticed features of his
philosophical intention. First I demonstrate, on the basis of numerous
programmatic but unfulfilled forward references in the extant Politics, that
Aristotle planned to complete this work in certain promised "discourses on
the regimes" (Pol. 1260b8-20) by reconsidering his accounts of moral
virtue, education and household management from the perspective of the
different forms of regime and the divergent ends each promotes. Secondly, I
explore the philosophical intention of this plan of politike, arguing that
Aristotle's enquiry remains fundamentally incomplete without this
reconsideration. His aim of providing the statesman with the knowledge of
"legislative science" necessary to apply the teaching on the human good
presented in the ethical writings, I suggest, requires this promised account of
the way in which the moral virtues vary according to the ends promoted by
the different forms of regime. Our enquiry will help to clarify the
philosophical significance of Aristotle's conception of "ethics," as tradition
has come to know it, as political science.'
*This paper has a long history: I first conceived many of the views here presented when
I studied Aristotle's political thought with David O'Connor in 1984, and I remain indebted
to him for much valuable discussion over the years. This paper was first presented at Duke
University in December 1988, as part of a lecture series on Aristotle, and a subsequent
version was read to the seminar in Traditional and Modem Philosophy at The University of
Sydney in September 1990. I am grateful to these audiences, as well as to Michael Frede,
Phillip Mitsis and A. E. Raubitschek, for helpful suggestions. Particular thanks are due to
my late colleague in Chapel Hill, Friedrich Solmsen, who helped to shape my thinking on
this subject through much stimulating discussion. It is an honor to dedicate the final result
to his memory.
^ In recent years three valuable studies on this subject have ap(>eared: E. Trepanier, "La
politique comme philosophic morale chez Aristote," Dialogue 2 (1963) 251-79; S.
CashdoUar, "Aristotle's Politics of Morals," JHP 11 (1973) 146-60; R. Bodeus. Le
philosophe et la cite: Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans la pensee
d' Aristote (Paris 1982); see also P. A. Vander Waerdt, "The Political Intention of
Aristotle's Moral Philosophy," Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985) 77-89.
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Study of this problem has been plagued by confusion since antiquity.
Traditional assumptions notwithstanding, abundant evidence demonstrates
that Aristotle's ethical writings do not constitute an "autonomous moral
science,"2 but rather form part of his comprehensive political science.^
Despite the unfortunate title of one recent article, Aristotle never "calls
ethics ethics.'"* He never employs the terms "ethics" (*e'thike) or "ethical
science" (*ethike episteme).^ Whenever he refers to the subject-matter of his
ethical writings, he always designates it as politike. Thus in the Rhetoric,
when discussing "the investigation concerned with matters of character,
which it is just to call political" (1356a26-27; cf. 1359b9-ll), he outhnes
the whole complex of topics treated in the ethical writings under this
heading.^ Numerous passages of the EN, moreover, clearly identify his
^This is the view of R. A. Gauthier and J. Jolif, L'Ethique a Nicomaque (Louvain 1959)
n.l 1-2, 10-12; see contra Cashdollar (previous note) 157-58 and Bodeiis (previous note)
81, who rightly insist that one cannot infer an "autonomous moral science" from
Aristotle's use of the term e'lhikoi logoi (see below, note 13). This confusion may be
traced back to the early Peripatos. The author of the MM, an early Peripatetic of
Theophrastus' generation who frequently defends the framework of Aristotelian doctrine
the philosophical motivation of which no longer is understood (cf. W. Jaeger, "Uber
Ursprung und Kreislauf des philosophischen Lebensideals," SBBerlin [1928] 402-12; P.
A. Vander Waerdt, "The Peripatetic Inteipretation of Plato's Tripartite Psychology," GRBS
26 [1985] 283-302), undertakes to speak "concerning ethics" (\)7iep t)Gik(ov [1181a25-
81bl]), but insists repeatedly that his enquiry is part of politike (cf. 1182bl-6, 27-32;
1183a3-5, 21-24, 33-35; 1197b28-29), evidently to save Aristotle's official des-
ignation of his enquiry. Aristotle's presentation oi politike in separate treatises seems to
have led even early Peripatetics to isolate his enquiry into character from politike' as a
whole.
^ Cashdollar (above, note 1) 148-49 argues that Aristotle "never speaks of a
subdivision or branch of politics which treats moral matters apart from matters of sute,"
but his division of the science of the human good into politike', oikonomike and phrone'sis
(EE 1218bl2-16) suggests that Aristotle considered enquiry into the individual, household
and city each to be subdivisions of politike' as a whole, a view confinmed by his plan of
exposition (cf. Vander Waerdt [above, note 1] 82-84). In the further discussion here
promised (1218bl5-16), he distinguishes between phronesis as (a) concerned with the
individual; (b) concerned with the household; (c) the architectonic part concerned with
legislation, phronesis nomothetike; and (d) the "political" part, subdivided into
deliberative and judicial components (1141b23-42all). Thus one subdivision of po-
litike is concerned with "moral matters."
^C. Chamberlain. "Why Aristode CaUed Ethics Ethics," Hermes 112 (1984) 176-83,
who argues that Aristotle invented ta e'thika to designate "the new field of ethics" (he
follows Gauthier and Jolif uncritically).
^ As J. Burnet pointed out long ago. The Ethics of Aristotle (London 1900) 25-27. The
curious scholarly fashion of rejecting Aristotle's stated position is well exemplified by M.
Riedel's claim that Aristotle's designation of his enquiry as politike' "indicates conceptual
confusion" ("Concerning Several Aporiai in Aristotle's Practical Philosophy," Ancient
Philosophy 1 [1981] 156-57 with 159 n. 28; similarly, e.g., H. H. Joachim, Aristotle.
The Nicomachean Ethics [Oxford 1951] 16).
^ In treating the subjects of deliberative, forensic and epideictic oratory (1358b4-
59a5), Aristotle resumes all the basic topics treated in the ethical and political writings,
explicitly stating that these topics properly belong to politike rather than rhetoric; cf.
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subject-matter as p<?//rf^", as do parallels in the EE? Such evidence shows
plainly that this subject-matter belongs to political science, not to an
independent science of ethics. More importantly, as I shall argue,
Aristotle's doctrine in the EN can only be properly understood in light of
the political framework in which it was conceived and presented.
If we are to understand Aristotle's intention in offering a teaching on
politike, we must first clarify the place of the ethical writings within its
plan. Failure to reconstruct this plan precisely, I suggest, has obscured the
interpretation of Aristotle's moral philosophy in fundamental ways.
I
Let us begin, for purposes of orientation, by surveying Aristotle's
programmatic statements concerning his plan and intention in the EN. We
will then consider the genuine difficulties which have hindered understanding
of this plan in the past, and outline our proposed solution.
In the opening pages of the EN, Aristotle designates the subject-matter
of his inquiry as politike, the architectonic science of the human good
(1094a26-bl5), specifies the proper audience oi politike (1095a2-13), and
discusses its methodology (1095a30-bl3). The aim oi politike is to educate
citizens in accordance with the human good, a final end which is chosen for
its own sake (1094al8-22), as Aristotle explains (1094a28-bll):
Politike determines which of the sciences are to exist in the cities,
which sciences each [of the citizens] is to learn, and to what extent.
And we see that even the most honored of the capacities are subordinate
to it—military strategy, household management and rhetoric, for
example. Since politike uses the rest of the sciences and since,
furthermore, it legislates what [the citizens] are to do and what they are
not to do, its end would seem to encompass the ends of the other
sciences and capacities, so that the end of politike would be the human
good. For even if this is the same for the individual and for the city,
the good of the city would appear to be the greater and more perfect
thing to attain and preserve, for the attairunent of the good by one man
below, note 19, and Poetics 1450b4-12 with G. Else, Aristotle's Poetics (Cambridge, MA
1957) 265-70.
^ Aristotle's audience in the EE consists of statesmen (1216b35-39), and he attempts
(at 1216b26-17al8) to identify the mode of enquiry necessary to achieve the conjunction
between the individual's good and the good without qualification which it is the purpose of
politike to produce (cf. 1236b39-37a3. 1248b26-37; Pol. 1331b24-32bl0). (For other
hints that the EE is conceived as a political inquiry: 1216al0-37 with 1153b7-25,
1214a30-b5, 1215bl-5; 1216bl8-25 with EN 1112bll-14; 1218a33-35; 1218bll-16
with 1141b21-42all; 1234b22-23; and. in the common books. 1130b25-29 with
1276bl6-77b32; 1137bl7-24; 1152bl-5.) At 1216b37 I accept the emendation x©
noXixiKcp for the z5>v noXixiKoiv of the MSS (M. Woods in his edition of the EE [Oxford
1982] 201 ascribes this emendation to Ross/Walzer. but it may be found in H. Richards'
Aristotelica [London 1915] 53).
234 Illinois Classical Studies, XVI
alone is desirable, but it is even nobler and more divine for f>eoples and
cities. Our inquiry, then, aims for these things, being a political one.
Thus politike aims to direct the other practical sciences in achieving
ends, both for individuals and cities, which properly conform to the human
good. Its aim, in short, is not knowledge but action (1095a5-6).* And this
is why Aristotle's audience consists of statesmen (actual or potential),'
whose training in politike is intended to enable them to produce citizens
who are good, obedient to the laws and practitioners of noble deeds (cf.
1099b28-32, 1102a7-10, 1103b3-^, 1140b7-ll, 1177bl2-15).io
Accordingly, Aristotle aims throughout the EN to provide this audience
with the knowledge of the human good necessary to legislate well. Thus,
for example, he explains that inquiry into pleasure and pain is of particular
importance for the political philosopher (cf. 1095alO-12, 1152al-3), just
as study of the voluntary and involuntary is useful for the lawgiver in
allocating honors and punishments (1109b30-35; cf. 1180a5-14). Above
all, when introducing his programmatic division of the soul in 1. 13,
Aristotle explains that the true statesman must study the human soul in
order to attain a knowledge of eudaimonia sufficient to legislate well
(1102a7-25). His psychology in the EN accordingly is not intended, like
that of the De Anima, to account for all the soul's functions, but only for
those directly relevant to human conduct; ^^ thus it is fundamentally
^Ci.EN 1099b28-32. 1102a7-12. 1103b3-6. 1140b7-ll. 1177bl2-15, 1179a35-
b2; EE 1236b39-37a3. Of course Aristotle does introduce "theoretical philosophy"
wherever appropriate {EE 12 14a 15)—an important example of which is his introduction of
"disembodied nous" from the De Anima in EN 10 (see below, note 12). But his use of it is
subservient to his practical intention: While theoretical knowledge is an end in itself, it
may be useful "accidentally" (1216b3-17al8), and the statesman must acquire such
knowledge to attain the ends of /Jo//r«A:e- (1216b35-39. 1236b39-37a3; cf. 1215b2-4,
1216a25-26).
' For the evidence, see Bodeiis (above, note 1) 123-25. Since legislative science is
useful (and necessary in inferior regimes) for individuals who seek to turn others toward
virtue, Aristotle's enquiry benefits not just statesmen. Still, Aristotle can achieve his
practical aim only by educating political men, who alone are able to bring about the
conjunction between the citizens' good and the good without qualification which politike
aims to produce.
^° Aristotle holds that the city exists by nature to foster eudaimonia among its citizens
(cf. 1252b29-30, 1278b21-24, 1281al-4, 1325a5-10, 1328a35-41), a purpose of
course realized only in the case of the best regime, whose educational program accords with
the human good (cf. EE 1236b38-37a3, 1248b26-37; Pol. 1293bl-7, 1328b34-29a2.
1331b24-32a38); see C. Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle
(Ithaca 1982); P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best
Reeime," Phronesis 30 (1985) 249-73.
This contrast between Aristotle's moral and theoretical psychology emerges clearly
from his criticism of the familiar divisions of moral psychology at De Anima 432a24-b7;
see P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Aristotle's Criticism of Soul-Division," AJP 108 (1987) 627-
43.
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informed by the political intention animating his enquiry as a whole. ^^
Finally, as Aristotle explains in detail in EN 10. 9, his teaching on
politike remains incomplete without an account of legislation and the forms
of regime.
Let us turn, then, to restore Aristotle's moral philosophy to this
political framework. We must first clarify three genuine difficulties which
have impeded this task in the past: (i) the relation of the two ethical
writings to the Politics; (ii) the latter's plan of argument; and (iii)
Aristotle's intention in dividing his account of politike into separate
treatises.
(i) Although the EE is not, like the EN, elaborately linked to a political
work, all citations of the ethikoi logoi in the extant Politics refer to the EE
or to the common books {EN 5-7 = EE 4-6), which—as is generally
agreed—were originally written for the EEP the earlier of the two treatises.
Thus the composition of the extant Politics postdates the EE and antedates
the EN}^ Given this chronology, which has been strangely neglected, it is
'^I have argued this thesis in detail in an essay on "The Statesman and the Soul," which
I plan to publish in the near future.
13 Cf. 1261a30, 1280al8, 1282b20. 1295a36. 1332a8. 1332a22 and Mel. 981b25
with W. Jaeger. Aristotle (Oxford 1948) 283-85, F. Dirlmeier. Eudemische Ethik (Berlin
1962) 111-15 and A. Kenny. The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford 1978) 5-8. Kenny argues in
detail for the Eudemian origin of the common books, although much of his case is
seriously flawed (cf. J. M. Cooper. Nous 15 [1981] 381-92). Cooper claims that Aristotle
reworked the common books for inclusion in the EN, but his sole argument in support
—
that 1130b26-29 refers not to the Politics as generally thought but to 1 180b23-81a31
is not cogent. Aristotle does not discuss the individual's education in 10. 9 (1180b7—8)
insofar as he is haplos anir agathos, nor is the relation between the good man and good
citizen—which, as the gar (1130b29) clearly shows, is part of the evidence for the
promised discussion—even mentioned in 10. 9. Therefore 1130b26-29 must refer to the
themauc discussion at Pol. 1276bl6-77b32 (subsequently elaborated at 1278bl-5.
1283b40-84a3. 1288a38-b2. 1293b5-7. 1328b33-29a2, 1333all-16). and Cooper's
claim is left without support.
1* The fact that the Politics cites the EE rather than the EN is strangely neglected by
Kenny (above, note 13) 226-30 in his attempt to prove the priority of the EN to the EE,
but it is incontrovertible proof of the relative chronology here advocated: If the Politics
postdated the EN, after all. it would follow the plan of 1181bl2-24. and it would not cite
the EE. Kenny's claim that EE 1244b29-36 criticizes EN 1170a25-b9 fails: (a) There is
no evidence that Aristotle is criticizing a written text: the phrase ev t« Xoyo) does not
mean "in the book," but merely refers to the aporia raised at the beginning of 7. 12 (cf.
1244b31, which refers to the "argument" of b29-30; 1245a27 and 1245bl2, where logos
refers to the aporia raised at the beginning of 1244b2). (b) The EN does not advance the
position criticized at EE 1244b29-36. since it never asserts that the happy man will have
no friends, which the logos in question maintains, (c) Kenny's claim that to yivcEKJKeiv
avTO {EE 1244b29) is a criticism of the EN for "the exaggerated value placed upon the
abstract awareness of one's own or other's existence" misses Aristotle's point about the
relation between friendship and self-sufficiency: God escapes the need for friendship by
being his own object of cognition, whereas we, in order to know ourselves as good, require
an object for the operation of our cognitive capacities, a need which our friend fulfills.
Kenny's argument thus provides no evidence at all for the chronological relation between
the two ethical writings.
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no surprise that the EN and Politics do not provide a straightforward,
comprehensive exposition of politike.
(ii) There are in fact serious discrepancies between the political work
outlined at EN 1 181bl2-24 and the extant Politics: Not only does the lauer
diverge in detail from the program outlined, but it fails to provide the
account of the laws appropriate to each form of regime which Aristotle says
is necessary to complete his enquiry. Hence the overall plan of politike has
remained quite obscure. Fortunately, however, the numerous unfulfilled
forward references in the Politics, also so^angely ignored, prove conclusively
that Aristotle intended to complete his work with an extensive account (his
"discourses on the regimes" [Pol. 1260b8-20]) of legislation and the forms
of regime. These plans for the completion of the Politics, I shall argue,
correspond exacUy to the work outlined at EN 1 181bl2-24.
(iii) Finally, Aristotle's division of his teaching on politike into
separate treatises has encouraged scholars to abstract the EN from its
political context. For although the EN forms part of politike , it
nevertheless abstracts from the political considerations—such as the forms
of regime, their laws and ways of life—which in practice always inform the
individual's moral education. And the Politics, in its extant incomplete
form, contains no thematic account of how to relate the doctrine of the EN
to the divergent ends promoted by the various regimes, or of the practical
use the statesman is to make of this doctrine when legislating. Hence it has
remained unclear precisely how the EN is incomplete without the Politics.
These difficulties concerning Aristotle's intention can be resolved by
reconstructing precisely his plan of politike. In his "discourses on the
regimes," Aristotle intended to reconsider his accounts of moral virtue,
education and oikonomia (already treated in EN and Pol. 1) from the
perspective of the various forms of regime and their divergent ends. When
Aristotle abstracts from the political conditions of moral education in the
EN, he does so quite intentionally, because he plans to complete this
account by reconsidering it from a political point of view in his "discourses
on the regimes." This is the intention that underlies the structure of
Aristotle's plan oi politike.
My argument is organized as follows. We first (Section II) discuss the
unfulfilled forward references in the Politics, which demonstrate that
Aristotle intended to complete it as promised at EN 1181bl2-24. Next
(Section III), we consider Aristotle's promised "discourses on the regimes,"
their place in the plan oi politike, and the philosophical motivation of this
plan. In Section IV we examine how to reconcile the teaching on moral
education in the EN with the doctrine that education must conform to the
ends promoted by the regime in force, and how the statesman's education in
legislative science enables him to turn the citizens even of inferior regimes
toward the good life properly understood. Finally, we conclude (Section V)
by showing that the moral virtues vary according to the "character" and ends
promoted by the different forms of regime.
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In the concluding chapter of the EN (10. 9), Aristotle turns to explain why
an enquiry into legislation and the forms of regime is necessary to complete
his account oipolitike}^ Discourses alone do not suffice to produce moral
improvement, he says, because some human beings are not amenable to the
j)ersuasion of reason; hence the compulsion of law is necessary (1179b20-
80b25). And since politike has the practical purpose of improving moral
conduct, the EN itself remains fundamentally incomplete without a teaching
on law to effect this improvement. Aristotle's practical intention thus
inevitably subsumes enquiry into human character into what he calls
"legislative science" {phronesis nomothetike), which is the "architectonic"
component in Aristotle's division of politike}^ Accordingly, legislative
science takes on an extraordinary scope. First, legislative science regulates
the education not merely of the young, but rather of all citizens throughout
their lives (1180al-4):
Doubtless it is not sufficient for men to receive the right nurture and
discipline in youth, but they must practise what they have learned and
reinforce their lessons by habit even when they have grown up. For
this purpose we need laws to regulate the discipline of adults as well,
and indeed the whole of life.
This continuing education in virtue for mature citizens accords well, of
course, with the educational program of Aristotle's best regime in Pol. 1-
%}'^ Second, anyone who wishes to improve the moral conduct of others
must acquire legislative science; one who does so will become like Pencles,
skilled in managing his own affairs as well as those of the household and
city.^^ The scope of legislative science is due in part to the neglect with
which cities (Sparta excepted) treat their citizens' moral education. In the
absence of an adequate program of public education, Aristotle says,
legislative science enables an individual to turn his children and friends to
virtue (1180a24-34). As the architectonic component oi politike, it directs
the moral education both of whole cities and of individual citizens in inferior
'' See the analysis of Bodeiis (above, note 1) 95-132.
**Cf. Bodeus (above, note 1) 113-14. Since Aristotle holds ihdX politike And phronesis
are the same hexis, the architectonic component of phronesis is identical with the archi-
tectonic component of politike.
^^
Cf. Lord (above, note 10) 34-35, 100-04, 177-79.
^* Cf. 1142a7-10 (where I accept Richards' noXiTiKfiq for the MSS' noXixtiac,).
Aristotle's conclusion here that one cannot attain phronesis in one's own affairs without
oikonomia and politike proves that the individual, in order to manage his own affairs well,
must acquire legislative science. Cf. 1180b23-26: "Presumably, then, one who wishes to
make others (whether many or few) better through discipline must endeavour to acquire
legislative science—if indeed we may become better through laws."
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regimes who seek to educate their families and friends in accordance with the
human good.
Before turning to outline the enquiry necessary to complete the
statesman's education in legislative science, Aristotle considers competing
claims to teach this science, which is, he says, a "part" of politike
(1180530-31). In this case its practitioners, the statesmen, do not
themselves teach it, apparently relying upon experience {empeiria) rather
than thought (dianoia). And the sophists who claim to teach it fail,
principally for two reasons: First, they fundamentally misconceive the
proper relation between rhetoric and politike, wrongly considering the latter
identical with or even inferior to the former (1181al2-19);^' and second,
"they think that it is easy to legislate by collecting the best-reputed of the
laws ... as though the selection did not require understanding (synesis)."'^^
For Aristotle, on the other hand, rhetoric is a subordinate component of
politike which the statesman employs to achieve the ends fixed upon by his
legislative science.^^
" Aristotle opposes the sophistic assimilation of politike to rhetoric in order to
restore politike to its proper status as the architectonic science which governs all the other
practical capacities. In fact, he apparently objects to the study of rhetoric in controversy
with Isocrates over its proper relation to politike, defending the study of "political
rhetoric" on grounds similar to those advanced in the concluding section of EN 10. 9 (cf.
Cic. De Oratore 3. 141; Philodemus, Rhet. 6 with H. M. Hubbell, "Isocrates and the
Epicureans." CP 11 [1916] 405-18, "The Rhetorica of Philodemus," Trans. Conn.
Academy of Arts and Sciences 23 [1920] 243-382; I. During, Aristotle in the Ancient
Biographical Tradition [Goteborg 1957] 299-311). For the precise sense in which he
considers rhetoric subordinate to politike see especially his discussion of deliberative
oratory in Rhetoric 1. 4 (1359b2-16). In the earlier passage to which Aristotle here
aUudes, he says that, because rhetoric is a kind of offshoot of dialectic and politike', it
"slips into the garb of politike;" those sophists who claim to possess it do so partly
through lack of education, partly through boastfulness, and partly through other all-too-
human causes (1356a25-30). Their chief mistake is that they fail to recognize the
difference between "common" topics, which furnish syllogisms and enthymemes for all
sciences, whatever their difference in species, and "specific" topics, which are derived from
propositions peculiar to each species or genus and which correspondingly furnish
syllogisms and enthymemes applicable only to a particular science (1358al0-33; cf.
1356a30-33). The sophists' failure to understand this difference leads them to transgress
the limits of rhetoric (1358a2-9) and to lose sight of the fact that only politike can supply
the "specific" topics necessary for deliberation about political matters. By clarifying the
nature and limited scope of rhetoric Aristotle shows why it must be subordinate to
politike, the architectonic science which provides these "specific" topics.
^° Aristotle holds that the sophists' assumption that it is easy to legislate by
collecting the best-reputed of the laws merely reveals ignorance of the understanding
(synesis) necessary to judge which laws are suitable in which circumstances (1181al5-
bl2). The sophists fail to recognize that the regime is the guiding source of law, and that
different regimes and ways of life are appropriate to different peoples, depending upon
their natural character—^laws which are appropriate to one form of regime can endanger
another's very preservation.
^' Cf. C. Lord. "The Intention of AristoUe's Rhetoric," Hermes 109 (1981) 326-39;
and, on Aristotle's critique of Hippodamus, L. Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago 1964)
17-25.
Paul A. Vander Waerdt 239
The fundamental deficiencies in the sophists' understanding of the
proper task of legislation require Aristotle to consider how the study of
regimes may advance the statesman's education. The concluding paragraph
of the EN requires close attention as his most precise statement of his plan
(1181bl2-24):
Since our predecessors have left the question concerning legislation
unexamined, j>erhaps it is best if we ourselves investigate it, and indeed
the question concerning regimes generally, in order to complete the
philosophy concerning human affairs. First, then, let us try to review
any discussion of merit contributed by our predecessors on any
particular part of the subject; then, on the basis of our collection of
regimes, to investigate what kinds of institutions save and destroy
cities in general, and each of the forms of regime in particular, and
through what causes some are well governed and others the reverse. For
after we have investigated these things perhaps we will understand
better what is the best regime, and how each of the regimes is ordered
and what laws and customs each uses. Let us then begin the discussion.
The discrepancies between this outline and the extant Politics frequently
have led scholars to declare 1181bl2-24 spurious.^^ 7^^ ^q^[ serious of
their objections is easily removed,^^ and their conclusion is quite
^^ For a review of the objections brought against this passage and an able defence of its
authenticity, see Bodeiis (above, note 1) 147-52. C. Lord's attempt ("The Character and
Composition of Aristotle's Politics" Political Theory 9 [1981] 472-74) to attribute this
passage to Theophrastus as the outline of his Politics in six books (D.L. 5. 45) is not
cogent.
Aristotle's statement that legislation has been left uninvestigated by his
predecessors (1181bl2-15) has been widely misunderstood by commentators, who do not
see how Aristotle could have written this in view of Plato's works (thus e.g. F. Susemihl
and R. D. Hicks speak of their posited interpolator's "madness," The Politics of Aristotle
[London 1894] 69). To explain this criticism one need only consider his statement that
"The Laws is concerned for the most part with laws, and little is said about the regime"
(1265al-2). Aristotle holds that the regime is the taxis of offices which detemiines what
is sovereign in the city and what is its end, the source of the laws laid down to promote the
city's way of life (cf. L. Strauss, Natural Right and History [Chicago 1953] 135-38 and R.
Bodeiis, "Les legislations malheureuses: Remarques sur la constitutionnalite des lois
d'apres Aristote" [forthcoming]). Plato's Laws, however, is not an account of the regime
in this technical sense (cf. G. R. Morrow, "Aristotle's Comments on Plato's Laws," in
Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. 1. During and G. Owen [Goteborg 1960]
147-48). Moreover, since Aristotle correctly recognizes that the "second-best" regime of
the Laws by virtue of its abandonment of radical communism is only a more practical
version of the best regime of the Republic, as the Athenian Stranger himself suggests (cf.
1265al-9 and 1265b31-66a6 with Laws 739a-e, 711a-12a, 875c-d), and therefore that it
presupposes the same educational program and the rule of the same philosophy (cf. H.
Chemiss. Gnomon 25 [1953] 377-79 and T. L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato [New York
1980] 376-77, 459-62, 504, 509-10). he can legitimately deny that Plato as well as his
other predecessors (cf. 1288b39-89alO. 1316b25-27) had investigated legislation.
Since the laws are laid down to suit the regime and not vice versa, an account of legislation
presupposes enquiry into the forms of regime, and Plato had concerned himself only with
the best regime and not with the "collections of regimes and laws" which would be useful to
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unjustified. This passage, I shall argue, rather indicates Aristotle's plan for
the revision and completion of the Politics?^ Its numerous unfulfilled
forward references show conclusively that Aristotle planned to revise it as
promised at 1181512-24. We may begin by considering how well the
extant Politics conforms to this outline.
This passage does not clearly account for Pol. 1: While its argument
originates in a refutation of Plato's identification of the forms of rule with
one another {Statesman 258e-59c), and hence might be regarded together
with Book 2 as the promised critique of Aristotle's predecessors (bl5-17),
an account of oikonomia does not obviously fall under the heading of
nomothesia, the neglect of which by Aristotle's predecessors requires him to
undertake the enquiry promised at 1181bl2-24. Thus the work here
outlined might well have begun with Book 2, if this is the critique of his
predecessors that Aristotle has in mind here.^^ The following lines (bl7-
20) do not obviously account for Books 3 and 4; but in promising to
explain, on the basis of his collection of regimes, what preserves and
destroys them, Aristotle clearly refers to Books 5 and 6 (cf. 1289b23-26,
1301al9-25, 1316b31-36). He then mentions the best regime of Books 7-
8 (b20-21), but the further investigation of how each regime is ordered and
what laws and customs it uses (b22) does not occur in the extant Politics.
This fact is of the greatest importance. The emphasis throughout EN 10. 9
on the study of legislation does not square well with our Politics, which
investigates the regimes and does not provide the account of legislation
which Aristotle says is necessary to complete his enquiry,^
train the statesman in legislative science. Aristotle criticizes Plato because his exclusive
interest in the best regime leads him to ignore the fonms of regime with which the
statesman ordinarily must concern himself, and therefore makes his work insufficient to
serve as the basis for the education of Aristotle's statesman (set out in Pol. 4. 1).
^ Bodeiis' most recent discussion of this passage, "La recherche politique d'apres le
programme de L'Elhique a Nicomaque d'Aristote," LEC 51 (1983) 23-33, offers several
stimulating suggestions; but his central claim, that "le philosophe . . . pourrait avoir
vouler seulement mettre son auditoire en mesure de voir et comprendre, sans envisager
expUquer lui-meme ce qui devait etre vu et compris," is contradicted not only by the plain
syntax of the passage (note the subjunctive verbs), but also by the numerous unfulfiUed
forward references in the Politics, collected herein, which prove that he planned to revise
and complete it as outlined at 1181bl2-24.
^ Cf. 1260b20-24, where Aristotle undertakes a new beginning by considering his
predecessors' views on the best regime. Whatever Aristotle's reasons for beginning the
Politics with a critique of Plato on the forms of rule and oikonomia, the argument of Book
2 does not obviously depend upon Book 1 , and so a revised version might have begun with
Book 2. If Aristotle did plan to begin with a critique of his predecessors' views on the
regime, he certainly would have focused upon the best regime, since his predecessors had
left legislation uninvestigated by their exclusive focus on the best regime (cf. above, note
23).
^In fact the whole argument of the Politics from the end of Book 1 (1260b22-24) is
devoted to the study of regimes, as may be seen by considering the programmatic remarks
at the beginning of each of Books 2-8.
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Fortunately, however, abundant evidence shows that Aristotle planned
to provide this promised (1181522) account in his "discourses on the
regimes." There are several forward references, unfulfilled in our Politics,
which demonstrate that this work was to include an account of legislation,
considered in light of the various forms of regime which lay down the end to
which the laws are directed
—
precisely what Aristotle's account of the
lawgiver's education in EN 10. 9 would lead one to expect. Thus Aristotle
dismisses at the first stage of his argument a discussion of whether it is
expedient for a general to hold office for life on the ground that this is more
the form of enquiry into laws than of that into the regime (1286a2-7). The
implication is that at a later stage, when the enquiry into regimes is
completed, Aristotle will take up that concerning the laws. This inter-
pretation is confirmed by his programmatic remarks in 4. 1, where he says
that the lawgiver, in order to aid existing regimes, must know not only the
various forms of regime but also which laws are suited to which regime; the
laws promote the regime's particular ends, and so the lawgiver must
understand the forms of regime in order to legislate well (1289a5-25).
Hence enquiry into regimes must precede that into legislation (1181bl3-
14). This evidence, together with EN 1181b22 and unfulfilled forward
references in Books 4 (1300b5-9) and 6 (1316b40-17al)—hence Books 4
and 6 cannot be taken as the promised investigation of legislation—show
that Aristotle planned to follow his enquiry into the various regimes, which
culminates in the account of the best regime in Books 7-8, with one into
the laws appropriate to the others as well.^
To reconstruct more precisely how Aristotle planned to revise the
Politics, let us consider the concluding paragraph of Pol. 1, which provides
an invaluable guide to the plan of the work as a whole. Here Aristotle
explains why his account of the forms of rule and of the virtue and education
of members of the household in Book 1 is incomplete and why it must be
reconsidered in his promised "discourses on the regimes" (1260b8-20):
^^ Note also Aristotle's unfulfilled promise at 1135al3-15 to consider the various
forms of justice and injustice, which he may have planned to do in the "discourses on the
regimes" in light of the various forms of regime (at 1130b26-29 there is an unambiguous
forward reference to the Politics [cf. above, note 13)). Note also his account of the five
subjects of deliberative oratory in Rhet. 1. 4, which he prefaces (1359bl6-18) and
concludes (1360a37) by saying that these subjects belong properly to politike' rather than
rhetoric. The five subjects are ways and means, war and peace, the defence of the country,
imports and exports, and legislation (cf. Xen. Mem. 3. 6)—the last being of particular
importance, since the city's safety lies in its hands. Consequently, Aristotle says, the
deliberative orator must know how many forms of regime there are, what is expedient for
each, and how each is destroyed (1360a2{)-23). And, in order to legislate well, he needs to
learn from other peoples "what forms of regime are suiuble to what kinds of people"
(1360a33), for which purpose he recommends travel books for instruction about the laws
of other races. This summary of the subject-matter of politike underlines the crucial role of
legislation in Aristotle's thought, and confirms our contention that he planned to consider
the laws and forms of regime appropriate to various peoples. See also Rhet. 1365b21-
66a 16.
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Concerning the virtue belonging severally to the man, woman,
children and father and their intercourse towards one another—what is
the noble and the ignoble course of action, and how it is necessary to
pursue the good and flee the evil—it is necessary to go through in the
discourses on the regimes. For since every household is part of a city,
and since the members are parts of the household, and one must see the
virtue of the part with reference to the virtue of the whole, it is
necessary for both children and women to be educated with a view to the
regime, if it makes any difference for the goodness of the city whether
the children and women are good. And it must make a difference: For
the women comprise half of the free population, and from children
come the partners in the regime.
Aristotle's promise here to reconsider oikonomia from the perspective of the
various forms of regime corroborates his plan (1 181b22-24) to complete his
enquiry by considering how each of the regimes is ordered and what laws and
customs each employs. Moreover, this passage also clarifies the contents of
the "discourses on the regimes," whose purpose was to discuss the
legislation and educational programs appropriate to each of the forms of
regime. The many unfulfilled forward references in the Politics, to which
we now turn, show that this account also was to contain a reconsideration of
the contents of Book 1 generally, including natural slavery and acquisition.
(i) In discussing the natural character of the slaves of his best regime,
Aristotle states that if possible they should not be of the same stock, and
not thymoeidetic (1330a25-33; cf. 1264a34-36; [Ps.-Ar.] Oec. 1344bl2-
14), so that they will be useful for work and unlikely to engage in sedition;
or, in the second instance, they should be barbarian subjects who are not
thymoeidetic (cf. 1285al9-22).2* He then concludes, "how slaves should be
employed, and why it is advantageous to set freedom {eleutheria) before
them as a reward, we shall explain later" (1330a31-33; cf. [Ps.-Ar.] Oec.
1344a23-b22; Xen. Oec. 5. 16; Cic. De Off. 1.41). Aristotle probably
considered it necessary to reconsider slave-management because he thought
that each regime will use slaves differently in accordance with the different
ends each promotes (cf. 1322b30-a5).
(ii) The territory of his best regime, Aristotle says (1326b30-39),
should be of such a size as to enable the inhabitants to live liberally
(eleutherids) and moderately; but he promises to reconsider this definition
more precisely later, when speaking generally about acquisition and the
proper use and ownership of wealth. Since Aristotle akeady has discussed
acquisition as a part of oikonomia in 1. 8-11, he apparently plans to
reconsider it in light of the various forms of regime, because the role of
acquisition in a regime varies according to its end (cf. 1280a22-81a8). This
^ Note the reference to the ethnology of 7. 7 at 1285al9-22. Aristotle's insistence
that the best regime's slaves not be of a thymoeidetic character is of considerable
importance for the interpretation of his account of natural slavery in Pol. 1; see "The
Sutesman and the Soul" (above, note 12) Section TV.
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promised account apparently was to form part of Aristotle's reconsideration
of oikonomia in light of the various forms of regime.^'
(iii) Aristotle also planned to discuss education in detail in the
"discourses on the regimes"—not surprisingly, given its central role in his
political thought. At the conclusion of Pol. 1, Aristotle defers discussion
of the education of women and children on the grounds that they must be
educated with reference to the particular regime in force, since different forms
of regime promote different ends, which ends in turn determine its laws and
educational program.^^ At 1337al4-18, Aristotle states that a city's
educational program must correspond to its form of regime, for each regime
has its own ethos, which safeguards its particular way of life. Thus
Aristotle's account of the laws appropriate to the various forms of regime
(1181522-24) must include discussion of their corresponding educational
programs.
Five passages show that he planned to do so. At 1335b2-5, Aristotle
promises to discuss the bodily constitution in parents which is most
beneficial to children in his discourse on the education of children (peri
paidonomias), presumably referring to the account promised at 1260b8-20.
At 1336b24-27, he promises to consider whether the young should be
prevented from seeing iambic verses and comedy; and at 1338a32-36, he
promises to consider whether there is one educational program or several in
which boys (of the best regime) should be trained with a view to the noble
rather than to the necessary. Apparently Aristotle planned to correlate
various educational programs with different regimes. Finally, at 1339bl(>-
1 1 Aristotle promises to consider a series of questions concerning whether
music education is able to improve character, and at 1341b38-40 to discuss
the meaning of katharsis?^ The wide variety in subject no less than the
specificity of these unfulfilled forward references point to an extensive
account of the various programs of public education.
(iv) Aristotle's best regime offers its mature citizens a continuing
education in virtue,^^ ^^d his promise at 1330a3-5 to explain why common
meals are beneficial suggests that he intended to consider the institutional
arrangements best suited to educate mature citizens.
One or two of the foregoing examples might conceivably be taken to
refer to discussions in other works. But taken cumulatively, they clearly
confirm Aristotle's promises to consider how each of the regimes is ordered
and what laws and customs each uses, and to complete the Politics in his
"discourses on the regimes" by reconsidering his initial accounts of virtue
and education in light of the various forms of regime. For our purpose it
^' See further above, note 12.
'°Cf. above, note 16 and below, notes 41-42.
'* For recent accounts, see Lord (above, note 10) 105-50 and R. Janko, Aristotle on
Comedy (London 1984) 136-51.
^^ Cf. above, note 17 and the corresponding text.
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does not matter whether these "discourses" have been lost through a
mechanical accident, or whether they were planned but never written,^^ for
the extant Politics both in its doctrine and plan of argument unambiguously
assumes it. Accordingly, let us consider the place of tlie "discourses on the
regimes" in the plan and intention oipolitike.
m
The persistent scholarly failure to take seriously Aristotle's programmatic
statements concerning the political intention of his enquiry into politike is
due in part simply to failure to reconstruct its plan precisely. Now that we
have seen that Aristotle planned to complete the Politics with the account of
legislation promised at the conclusion of the EN, we may turn to consider
what philosophical considerations led Aristotle to present his teaching on
politike in separate treatises—in his apolitical ethikoi logoi, on the one
hand, and his account of the various forms of regime and their corresponding
laws and educational programs, on the other. We shall focus on how the
"discourses on the regimes" bring his enquiry to completion.^^
The central difficulty which structures Aristotle's presentation of
politike is that of considering the individual's moral education in light of
the wide variety of regimes in which such education takes place. Aristotle
holds that any regime must provide its citizens with a universal, public
education conforming to its particular ends and way of life to ensure its self-
preservation; cities which fail to do so are thereby harmed.^^ The
statesman's first task, accordingly, is to educate his citizens according to the
ends promoted by the regime in force, whether it be democratic, aristocratic
or some other, not to make them good human beings without regard to their
regime's way of life (cf. 1276b30-33). Since only the best regime
promotes ends which accord with the natural hierarchy of human goods,
most human beings receive an education intended to make them good
citizens of their particular regime, not good human beings without
qualification. The doctrine that human beings are to be educated in
accordance with the regime in force thus drives a wedge, except in the
exceptional case of the best regime, between an education intended to
^^ Lx>rd (above, note 22) 470-71 proposes the hypothesis of a mechanical accident to
explain the compositional anomalies of the Politics, but this accident must have taken
place very early in the transmission of the text, if at all, for the Politics alone among the
major works is assigned the correct number of books in the pre-Andronican lists, and the
contrast Cicero draws (Fin. 5. 11) between Aristotle and Theophrastus is explicable only if
the Politics in his day did not include the "discourses on the regimes." Since the numerous
compositional anomalies of the Politics cannot be fully resolved by any rearrangement of
the text, I doubt that it ever was a finished work.
^ Further arguments in support of the interpretation here advanced are presented in the
essay mentioned above, note 12.
35 Cf. 1282bl0-ll, 1289al-25. 1308b20-24. 1310al2-36. 1337all-32.
Paul A. Vander Waerdt 245
produce good citizens
—
good relative to their regime's end—^and one intended
to produce human beings who are also good without qualification.
Now politike aims, of course, to effect a conjunction between the
citizens' good and the good without qualification (cf. above, note 10).
Aristotle's explanation of how the statesman may make men good human
beings in inferior regimes is explored in Section IV. At present, we need to
consider how this problem shapes Aristotle's plan oi politike as set out in
Section II.
There are, of course, other plans of exposition that he might plausibly
have adopted. Thus Aristotle could have treated the forms of regime and
their corresponding educational programs before the moral education of
individuals. Such is his order of exposition, after all, in the Rhetoric:
When considering deliberative oratory he enumerates the five most
important subjects for political deliberation (1.4) before he takes up the
individual's eudaimonia in 1. 5; and, again, in 1. 8-9 he considers the forms
of regime before turning to virtue and vice. In both cases the dependence of
virtue upon the forms of regime leads him to consider the political
phenomena with which oratory is concerned before considering moral
phenomena. Why then did Aristotle not adopt a similar plan in his
exposition of politike, which would enable him to treat moral education in
light of the divergent ends promoted by the various regimes?
Aristotle adopts the plan he does adopt, I suggest, because of his
normative intention: Just as the city exists by nature to foster not mere life
but rather the good life, so Aristotle's enquiry into politike is intended to
enable human beings to lead the good life properly understood.
Consequently, the statesman in legislating is guided by a double teleology
whereby his minimal aim is to preserve his regime, but his higher aim is to
turn it toward the good life, so far as circumstances permit (see below, pp.
249-50). He does not merely legislate in the interest of the regime in force,
but rather fosters eudaimonia for his citizens as far as possible through
political virtue.
Now a moment's reflection shows why this intention precludes the
alternative plan of exposition just suggested. That plan would enable
Aristotle to treat the individual's moral education in light of the different
ends promoted by the various regimes. But, since his purpose is to provide
the statesman with the knowledge necessary to turn any regime toward the
good life, Aristotle could hardly have treated these regimes without first
treating the best regime, dedicated to the promotion of human virtue and
eudaimonia properly understood, from which all other regimes in some
sense are deviations. Yet Aristotle's account of the best regime relies upon
his account of the best way of life for the individual, as he makes plain at
the beginning of Pol. 7 (cf. 1323al4-21, 1324a5-13).36 AristoUe's
normative intention thus requires him to adopt the plan he does adopt: first,
^*Cf. Lord's commenury on 7. 1-3 (above, note 10) 180-89.
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to inquire into the individual's virtue and eudaimonia, abstracting from all
political considerations; then to consider the forms of regime, their laws and
educational programs; and finally, in his "discourses on the regimes," to
reconsider the individual's moral education in light of the divergent ends
each form of regime promotes. In adopting this plan, Aristotle is able to tie
his teaching on moral education to the diversity of regimes in which
education takes place.
This plan obviously gives a crucial place to the "discourses on the
regimes," which relate the individual's eudaimonia to the divergent ends
promoted by the various regimes. In order to aid regimes of all kinds,
"divergent" as well as "correct" ones, the statesman must know how to
apply the doctrine of the ethical writings, always seeking to preserve the
regime even as he turns it toward the good life. In relating moral education
to the forms of regime, the "discourses" enable the statesman to apply his
knowledge of the human good in all circumstances.
Moreover, Aristotle's plan of exposition entails that his teaching in the
EN is fundamentally incomplete, in that it abstracts from the political
circumstances which regulate the individual's moral education. Since all
regimes but the best promote views of justice which are partial or even in
conflict with the human good, and since education always takes place within
a particular political context, the statesman requires a knowledge of
"legislative science" to make this teaching effective in inferior regimes.
This point deserves particular emphasis, because scholars of Aristotle's
moral philosophy, nearly without exception, have ignored the political
intention of his teaching.
To see how the doctrine of the EN and of Pol. 1 is incomplete, and how
the "discourses on the regimes" complete it, let us consider the example of
oikonomia. As we saw, the "discourses" were to reconsider the topics
treated in Pol. 1: the virtue and education of subordinate members of the
household, the fonns of rule (1260b 10- 13), natural slavery (1330a25-33)
and acquisition (1326b33-34). Each topic is incomplete without Aristotle's
promised reconsideration. His initial account of these topics is incomplete
because of the natural differences in the citizen bodies of the various
regimes.^'' In the ethnology of Pol. 7. 7, where Aristotle considers the
natural characters of the Europeans, Asians and Greeks, he explains that
different peoples (including different Greek peoples) have different natural
characters, which make them suited to different kinds of regimes; the
diversity in regimes therefore corresponds to natural differences among
human beings (1327b23-38):
The nations in cold places, and particularly those in Europe, are filled
with spiritedness (thymos), but are relatively lacking in intelligence
{dianoia) and art {techne); hence they remain freer, but lack political
institutions and are unable to rule their neighbours. Those in Asia, on
^' See Section V of the essay oiled above, note 12.
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the other hand, have souls endowed with intelligence and art, but
lacking in thymos; hence they remain ruled and enslaved. But the race
of Greeks shares in both qualities, just as it occupies the middle
position in space. For it is endowed with both intelligence and
thymos; hence it remains free, possesses the best political
institutions, and is capable of ruling over all, if it should obtain a
single regime (politeia). And the nations of the Greeks display the
same differences in their relations with one another; for some have a
nature that is one-sided, whereas others have a nature that is well-
blended in relation to both of these capacities. It is clear, therefore,
that those who are to be readily guided by the lawgiver toward virtue
must be endowed with both intelligence and thymos in their nature.
Aristotle's purpose here is to define the natural qualities of the best regime's
citizens, whose way of life is dedicated to the leisured cultivation of
philosophy (cf. above, note 10). These qualities consist in a natural
endowment of thymos and dianoia, which together make the citizens natural
freemen capable of being educated in virtue (cf. 1332b8-10, 1334b7-8), and
of maintaining their political freedom. Peoples which lack these natural
qualities, Aristotle holds, cannot share in the best way of life.
These natural differences among peoples considerably complicate
Aristotle's exposition of politike. For it entails that the diversity among
regimes has a natural rather than merely conventional basis. Since peoples
differ in their natural characters, different forms of regime and educational
programs are needed to promote the different ways of life of which each is
capable. The various "correct" forms of regime thus correspond to natural
differences among peoples, differences which the statesman must take into
account when seeking to make the citizens' good identical with the good
without qualification.
It is in consideration of the natural differences among various peoples, I
submit, that Aristotle adopts the plan oi politike that we have reconstructed.
In his initial accounts of the moral virtue and education of the individual and
of members of the household, Aristotle plainly wishes to avoid the
complexities that would arise from considering them in terms of the
divergent ends promoted by various regimes. Accordingly, he abstracts from
all relevant political considerations in the EN and Pol. 1. Similarly, as I
have argued in detail elsewhere,^* Aristotle bases the doctrine of Pol. 1 on
the moral psychology of the ethical writings, abstracting from thymos,
whose central role in his psychology does not emerge until Pol. 1. 7. Thus
in his initial account of the eide arches, for example, he treats the natural
relations of rule and subordination in the household on the assumption (later
modified by the introduction of thymos in Pol. 7. 7) that the capacity for
prudent deliberation alone constitutes the psychological basis of human
freedom. He does so because he holds that not all peoples—or all Greek
^* See Section FV of the essay cited above, note 12.
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peoples
—
possess thymos, and that its conjunction with dianoia is even
rarer. Yet, since the individual's moral education is dependent upon the ends
promoted by his regime, Aristotle must reconsider his initial account in
light of the natural characters and corresponding forms of regime appropriate
to the various peoples. Aristotle planned to provide this reconsideration in
his "discourses on the regimes," and the absence of this section from the
extant Politics has greatly impeded our understanding of the plan and
intention animating Aristotle's presentation of politike. Still, our re-
construction of the contents and philosophical motivation of the
"discourses" has enabled us to see that the EN must be understood in light
of the political framework in which it was conceived and presented.
IV
Now that we have reconstructed the plan of Aristotle's exposition of
politike, we need to clarify how the statesman uses the teaching of the
ethical writings when legislating in particular regimes. In other words, how
is that teaching related to the requirement that a regime educate its citizens
in accordance with the ends it promotes? As Aristotle explains in Pol. 7.
1-3, the statesman's view of the best way of life for his city depends upon
his view of the best way of life for the individual.^^ But his first task, as
Aristotle also emphasizes, is to legislate in accordance with the ends
promoted by the regime in force.'*^ Hence Aristotle considers how to
preserve not only the "correct" forms of regime, but even tyranny, the worst
of the deviant forms. Since the ends promoted by the forms of regime (apart
from the best regime) often are incompatible not only with one another but
even with the human good,'*' a fundamental dilemma arises. While
politike aims to make the citizens' good identical with the human good, the
statesman in an inferior regime, if he is to secure its preservation, may well
have to legislate with a view to ends which are incompatible with the
human good.
It is Aristotle's account of legislative science (phronesis nomothetike),
I suggest, which resolves the dilemma. This science enables an individual,
in the absence of an adequate program of public education, to turn his
children and friends toward virtue (1180a29-34). Since only Sparta among
actual regimes possesses such an educational program, legislative science
enables individual citizens as well as the statesman to educate others in
accordance with the human good even in inferior regimes which promote
^' Cf. above, note 36 and Vander Waerdl (above, note 1) 84-85.
*° Cf. the passages cited above, note 35.
*^ Although Aristotle designates regimes which aim at the common advantage as
"correct," and regimes which aim at the ruler's advanuge "deviant" (1279al7-21), even
correct regimes diverge from the best way of life because the ends they promote are partial
and do not accord with the natural hierarchy of human goods (see below. Section V).
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ends incompatible with the human good.'*^ In legislating he is guided by a
double teleology whereby his first task is to secure his regime's
preservation,"*^ but his higher task is always to turn it toward the good life
and to foster genuine eudaimonia as far as possible through pohtical virtue.
This double teleology well accords with the role Aristotle assigns to
political life in realizing man's natural capacities. As a "political animal"
man requires a certain kind of political community in order to survive and
live well, and the city comes into being for the sake of life, but it exists for
the sake of the good life.'*'* The statesman's purpose, accordingly, is to
investigate how cities, families and human beings may share in the good
life and eudaimonia.^^ To secure this end he must ensure the city's
preservation, and so may be said to be concerned in the first instance with
"mere life" as opposed to the good life. But his higher purpose is always to
improve his citizens' way of life in accordance with the normative intention
oipolitike.
The most striking example of this double teleology at work is
Aristotle's discussion in 5. 9 of the two ways of preserving tyranny: First,
the tyrant may seek to humble his subjects, keeping them in mutual distrust
and incapable of action—thus preserving his power but in no way falling
short of wickedness (1313a24-14a29); or he may attempt to make his rule
kingly, governing in his citizens' interest and protecting only his power
—
thus his rule will become more honorable and longer lived, and his character
will become nobly disposed toward virtue or at least only half-base
(1314a30-15blO). This second course of action shows how the tyrant's rule
may be turned toward virtue even as it is preserved. This example also
illustrates how legislative science can aid in effecting the mpral
improvement of inferior regimes within the constraints imposed by its ends.
In seeking to reform an existing regime or to found a new one, then,
the statesman aims to turn it toward the good life, so much as circumstances
permit. To discharge this task, as Aristotle explains in 4. 1, he needs to
understand each of the forms of regime, their corresponding laws and
*^ Bodeiis (above, note 1) 113 n. 26 goes seriously astray in his contention that "il
s'agit, en roccurrence, de remedier aux carences du legislateur et non d'edicter des regies de
conduite pretendument meilleures que les nonmes implicitement recommandees par la
legislation," an assumption which vitiates his conclusion (221-25). This interpretation
of the intention of legislative science is unsupported by any text and is refuted by the
evidence adduced below which proves that the statesman's task is not merely to legislate in
the interest of the regime in force, but to foster eudaimonia among his citizens.
^^ On Aristotle's preference for reforming a deviant regime rather than replacing it
through revolution, see R. Bodeiis, "La duree des regimes poUtiques comme condition de la
morale selon Aristote," Justifications de I'ethique, XIXe Congres de 1' Association des
Societes de PhUosophie de Langue Fran9aise (Louvain 1983) 103-08.
'*'*Cf. 1252b29-30 with 1278bl9-30, 1280a31-34, 1280b39-81a4, 1283al4-22;
EN 1160all-30.
^^Cf. 1325a7-10 with 1333a33-39; EN 1099b29-30, 1103b2-6, 1113b21-26,
1129bl4-30al3.
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educational programs, and what tends to preserve and destroy them. In order
to realize his normative intention, in other words, he requires a wide body of
empirical knowledge, partly provided in Books 4-6 and partly promised for
the "discourses on regimes," to guide him in legislating for the various
regimes. The task of poUtike, Aristotle holds, is four-fold (1288521-35):
It is clear that, with respect to the regime, it belongs to the same
science to investigate (i) what the best regime is, and what quality it
should have to be what one would particularly pray for, with external
things providing no impediment; and (ii) which regime is fitting for
which [peoples]. For perhaps it is impossible for many to obtain the
best, so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman ought not to
overlook the one that is superior simply and the one that is best under
the circumstances. Moreover, thirdly, [it belongs to the same science
to investigate] (iii) the regime based upon a presupposition: for any
given regime ought to be investigated [to determine how] it could arise
in the beginning and in what way, once it has come into existence, it
could be preserved for the longest time (I mean the case where it
happens that some city neither conducts politics in the manner of the
best regime—and lacks even the necessary equipment for it—nor in the
manner of the regime possible for it under the circumstances, but some
inferior one); and, besides all these things, (iv) the regime that is
especially fitting for all cities ought to be recognized . . .
Aristotle's program of politike is intended to avoid his predecessors'
errors of failing to investigate the best possible regime and the one more
attainable for all, or of praising some existing one, such as the Spartan (cf.
1260b27-36). In contrast, Aristotle holds that the statesman should be able
to aid existing regimes by reforming them in accordance with an
airangement that arises directly out of those that exist (1289al-5; cf. above,
note 43). His knowledge of legislative science enables him to educate his
citizens in accordance with the human good even in regimes which promote
ends conflicting with that good.
Our purpose has been to reconstruct the political framework of Aristode's
mord philosophy. In dividing his account of politike into separate works,
he does not seek to establish "ethics" as an autonomous science, but to
account for the variety of regimes in which moral education takes place. In
his "discourses on the regimes," as we have seen, Aristotle planned to
explain the relation between these two works by reconsidering the topics
treated in the EN and Pol. 1 in light of the divergent ends and ways of life
promoted by the various forms of regime. Let us now turn to consider the
implications of this plan for interpretation of one aspect of Aristotle's
ethical writings, his account of moral virtue.
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It is not controversial that an individual's views about the human good
are decisively informed by the laws, customs and educational programs of
his regime. What is most striking about Aristotle's position, however, and
what has gone entirely unnoticed in the scholarship, is that justice and the
moral virtues vary according to the end promoted by the regime in force.
Since the "discourses on the regimes" are not extant, we lack the
comprehensive account of the relation between the virtues and the forms of
regime that Aristotle planned to provide here. But when discussing
deliberative oratory in Rhetoric 1. 8 he writes as follows (1365b21-66al6):
The greatest and most authoritative of all the means of persuasion and
of noble counsel is to know all the regimes and to distinguish the
customs, manners and advantage of each. For all men are persuaded by
what is advantageous, and that which preserves the regime is
advantageous. Moreover, the declaration of authority is authoritative,
for there are as many [forms of] authority as there are [forms of] regime.
And there are four [forms of] regime—democracy, oligarchy,
aristocracy and monarchy—so that the deciding authority is always a
part or the whole of one of these . . .
One should not neglect the end of each regime, for men make
choices with reference to the end. Now the end of democracy is liberty,
of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things relating to education and the
laws, [ . . . ] and of tyranny self-preservation. It is clear, then, that
one must distinguish the customs, manners and advantage relating to
the end of each, since men choose with reference to this. But since
proofs are established not only by demonstrative but also by ethical
argvmient (for we trust one who appears to be of a certain sort
—
good or
well-intentioned or both), we would need to be acquainted with the
__
characters of each of the regimes, for with reference to each the
character most likely to persuade is that characteristic of it. These
characters will be grasped by the same means, for characters are
manifest in accordance with intentional choice, and intentional choice
has reference to the end.
Aristotle does not discuss the "character" of each of the forms of regime
in the extant Politics, but it is clear that this character decisively informs a
regime's way of life. At the outset of his account of the best regime's
educational program, Aristotle says "it is necessary to educate with a view
to each [form of] regime; for the special character of each regime both
customarily preserves the regime and establishes it in the beginning, for
example the democratic character democracy and the oligarchic character
oligarchy; and the best character is always the cause of a better regime"
(1337aI4-I8; cf. 1310al2-18). Aristotle ranks regimes according to their
character because this character reflects the partial or incomplete way in
which the various regimes promote the best way of life as elaborated in Pol.
7-8. Similarly, his account of justice and the other virtues depends on the
divergent ends promoted by the various regimes. In Pol. 5. 9 he says that a
ruler ought to possess virtue and justice: "in each regime the kind that is
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relative to the regime; for if justice is not the same in all regimes, there
must also necessarily be differences in [the virtue of] justice" (1309a36-39).
Thus not only the good citizen's justice but his other moral virtues as well
vary according to the end promoted by his regime (cf. 1276b30-33, 1284al-
3). In the extant Politics Aristotle does not spell out how the moral virtues
are adjusted to the ends of the various regimes.'*^ He does state, however,
that "[the virtue of] justice is a virtue characteristic of associations, and that
all the other virtues necessarily follow upon it" (1283a38^0). The other
virtues evidently follow upon justice because justice is perfect virtue not
simply but toward others and so in a sense is not a part of virtue but the
whole of virtue (cf. 1129bll-30al0).'*'' Hence the moral virtues depend
upon a regime's ends just as justice as a whole does. In short, the good
citizen's virtue varies according to his regime's end.
Aristotle provides some indication of how the moral virtues depend
upon the forms of regime in his account of the partial claims to justice
advanced by the democrats and oligarchs. Both parties agree that justice
consists in a certain kind of equahty, but the democrats suppose that those
who are equal in one respect, freedom, are equal simply, whereas the
oligarchs suppose that those who are unequal in another respect, wealth, are
unequal simply (cf. 1280a7-25, 1282bl6-83a22, 1301a25-b4). Both
parties, Aristotle argues in Pol. 3. 9, overlook the decisive consideration:
the end for which the city is constituted. If the city were constituted for the
sake of possessions, the oligarchs' argument would be strong; but since it is
rather constituted for a complete and self-sufficient life, for the sake not
merely of living together but of noble actions, the decisive consideration is
virtue. Both democratic justice and oligarchic justice only partially reflect
justice properly understood. And since the other moral virtues follow upon
inclusive or universal justice, democratic and oligarchic regimes presumably
educate their citizens according to an understanding of the human good as
partial as their principles of justice. A regime's character comes to light in
the laws it enacts to promote its ends, and this character is better the more
closely its ends, whether democratic, oligarchic or some other, correspond to
the human good (cf. 1310al2-18, 1337al4-18).
The fact that justice and the moral virtues vary according to a regime's
ends sharply underscores the importance of the political framework of
Aristotle's moral philosophy. In practice, the moral virtues always come to
light in a particular regime, whose perspective is partial to the extent that
its ends diverge from those of the best regime. The account of the moral
virtues presented in the ethical writings, accordingly, is incomplete
inasmuch as it abstracts from the political circumstances which in practice
always govern the individual's moral education—the "character," laws and
^ As W. L. Newman recognizes in his commentary (Oxford 1902) IV 403.
^^ On this subject see D. O'Connor, "The Aetiology of Justice," to appear in a volume
of essays on the Politics edited by C. Lord.
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educational programs of the various forms of regime. In fact, it is only in
the exceptional case of the best regime, which educates its citizens in
accordance with the natural hierarchy of human goods,'** that the moral
virtues appear just as they are presented in the ethical writings. In all
inferior regimes, they emerge in the partial perspective of ends which
diverge from the best way of life. But since all regimes educate their
citizens in accordance with the ends they promote, one who wishes to
employ legislative science to turn others towards virtue must understand
these inferior regimes in order to apply his knowledge of the human good
properly. It is only through the statesman's legislative science that the
political face of virtue in inferior regimes may somehow come to resemble
virtue properly understood. That is why, after all, the enquiry into polidke
that Aristotle begins in the EN is incomplete without the extant Politics
and the promised "discourses on the regimes."
Contrary to the near-universal assumption of modem scholarship, then,
Aristotle's teaching in the ethical writings emerges in its proper light only
within its political framework. The scholarly practice of reading the ethical
writings in isolation from the Politics has no foundation whatsoever in
Aristotle's thought. If we wish to understand his moral philosophy, we
must restore it to the political context in which it was originally conceived
and presented.
Duke University
*^ Or at least as far as is possible on the level of politics: see Vander Waerdt (above,
note 1) 84-85.

20
Aristotle's Elegiacs to Eudemus
(Fr. 673 Rose^ = Olymp. in PL Gorg. Comm.
p. 214. 25 ff. Westerink)
R. RENEHAN
oxi 5£ Kal 'ApiaxoT£XT|(; aePei avxov ©q 6i5daKaXov, 8fiX,6q eoxv
Ypdya^ oXov Xoyov eyKco^iaoxiKov • eKxlGexai ydp xov piov
av)xoij KOI •uJCEpenaivev- oi) }j.6vov 5e eyKconiov noiriaaq avxov
EJiaivei a\)x6v, aXkb. koi ev xoiq zXtytioxq xoiq Tcpoq EvSrmov
avxov enaivmv nXxxxcova eyKconid^ev ypdcpcov ovxocx;-
eXBtov 5' kc, kXeivov KcKponiTiq SdneSov
£\)O£Pe(0(; oEiivfiq ^iXiTiq l6pijaaxo P(0|i6v
dv5p6(; ov o\)5' aiveiv xoiai KaKoiai Geniq-
oq iiovoq ti TrpoJxoq Svtixojv koxeSei^ev £vapY(b(;
oiKEicp XE Pio) Kal )j.e965oioi Xoycov, 5
(HQ, dyaBoq xe koI E\)5ai|i(ov d^a yivExai dvrip-
OV) vuv 5' Eoxi XoPeiv ovSevi xauxd koxe.
V. 2 I5pvoaxo] i6p-uoao Bergk II v. 6 malim yiyvExai, ut persuasum
habeo Aristotelem sic scripsisse II v. 7 verba saepe in dubium vocata,
varie tentata; haec exempli causa adfero: ox> vvv] xwv vvv Bergk,
ov)KO\)v Geffcken I oxt vvv 5' eoxi] vtiv 5' ovk eoxi Wil. I Xa^tiv
o\)5evi] XoGevv ot)5£va Rose I xavxd jioxe] xavx' txTiopov Theiler
That these verses are genuine is not in doubt, their meaning is. Much of
the difficulty is directly traceable to the two facts that (1) the poem itself is
incomplete and (2) the time and circumstances of its composition are
uncertain. It is essential to keep these unfortunate gaps in our knowledge
ever present in attempting to interpret the verses; more than one scholar
who has tried his hand at this has put forward unproven assertions as if they
were undoubted matters of historical record.
The number of problems which these few verses raise is remarkable; for
convenience I list the main difficulties: (1) Olympiodorus cites these verses
from xa eXeyeia xa 7ip6(; E\S6rmov. Which Eudemus is intended? (2)
Who set up the altar mentioned in verse 2? (3) Is the dvTip of verse 3
Socrates or Plato? (4) Was the altar set up in honor of the goddess
Friendship (<^iXia) or of the man mentioned in verse 3? If the latter, does
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this imply deification? (5) Who are the KaKoi mentioned in verse 3? (6)
What is the meaning of verse 7? To these difficulties I would add a seventh,
hitherto ignored: What is the meaning of the Greek in verse 3, ov oijS'
aiveiv xoioi KaKoioi Geixiq?
Of the numerous discussions of this poem the most important are those
of Wilamowitz* and of Jaeger.^ Konrad Gaiser's useful study, "Die Elegie
des Aristoteles an Eudemos," in Mus. Helv. 23 (1966) 84-106, provides a
very full bibliography; for further details the reader should consult this
paper.
There are two presumptive candidates to be the Eudemus of Aristotle's
poem, (1) Eudemus of Cyprus, a fellow Platonist of Aristotle's who died in
battle at Syracuse, probably either in the year 354 or in 353,^ and in
memory of whom Aristotle composed his dialogue Eudemus, and (2)
Eudemus of Rhodes, a well-known student of Aristotle's. Both men have
found their supporters. For instance, Wilamowitz and Gaiser (for very
different reasons) favor the Cyprian, Jaeger and During the Rhodian. At first
sight Eudemus of Cyprus seems an attractive choice; what more natural than
that Aristotle should address a poem on friendship to the friend whose death
so moved him that he named a dialogue after him? "Sehr viel ansprechender
[sc. than that the poem is addressed to Eudemus of Rhodes] ist dagegen, dass
der Unbenannte, dem das Gedicht gait, der Kyprier Eudemos war, und dass
das Gedicht durch die Freundschaft zu diesem dem Aristoteles entlockt ist,
ganz wie der Dialog seines Namens," wrote Wilamowitz^ who dated the
poem to before the year 357. But there are difficulties: "The traditional text
is ev xoi(; iXzydoic; xoic, npbq E\S5t||iov. That is to say, a living Eudemus
The following abbreviations are used in this article:
During' I. During, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition
(Goteborg 1957)
Diiring^ I. Diiring, review of Vita Aristotelis Marciana, ed. O. Gigon,
Gnomon 35 (1963) 342^6
Diiring^ I. During, Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines
Denkens (Heidelberg 1966)
Gaiser K. Gaiser, "Die Elegie des Aristoteles an Eudemus," Mus. Helv.
23 (1966) 84-106
Immisch O. Immisch, "Ein Gedicht des Aristoteles." Philol. 65 (1906) 1-
23
Jaeger* W. Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his
Development^. Translated with the Author's Corrections and
Additions by Richard Robinson (Oxford 1948)
Jaeger^ W. Jaeger, "AristoUe's Verses in Praise of Plato." CQ 21 (1927)
13-17 = Scripta Minora I (Rome 1960) 339-45
Wil.* U. von Wilamowilz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen II
(Berlin 1893)
Wil.2 U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. Platon l^ (BerUn 1959)
»Wil.i 412-16.
^Jaeger' 106-10 and Jaeger^.
' Gaiser 102 n. 62.
"Wil.' 413.
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is addressed. This can be none other than Eudemus of Rhodes, the pupil of
Aristotle. The poem, I take it, is composed after the death of Plato; and this
Eudemus is appropriately addressed in a poem directed, after a recognized
convention, to an exaipoc; for his enlightenment." So pronounced Jaeger,^
and Greek usage favors his position. His point is that npoq EiSStmov is
normal Greek when someone is being directly addressed (and therefore alive);
the Greek for "in honor of Eudemus" would be ei<; E\S5ti(iov and that is not
what Olympiodorus wrote.^ Moreover, KaxeSei^ev . . . oikeico pCo) (vv.
4-5) clearly suggests that the ^ioc, in question is over (otherwise one might
expect a present tense) and the emphatically contrasting ov vt)v in verse 7
leaves no doubt that such is the case. Furthermore, KaxaSeiicvD^i was
often applied, as Jaeger pointed out, "in a pregnant sense to religious
revelation."^ Such is surely its force here. Now it has not been observed
that these verbs, when so used, almost invariably occur in the aorist, as
here, and refer to a time now past. For examples see N. J. Richardson's
note to the Horn. Hymn to Demeter AlA-16 and my Greek Lexicographical
Notes, vols. I and II s.v. KaxaSedcvuixi.* Plato, who is referred to here (as
all now agree: see below), died some six or seven years after Eudemus the
Cyprian, so that it follows that this latter individual cannot be directly
addressed in this poem, which is what the Tipoq in the expression ev xolc,
eXeyeCok; Toiq npoq E-uStdxov would unambiguously require. As noted
above, the Greek for "in honor of Eudemus," not necessarily implying direct
address, is Eiq E\36Tmov, and that is what we actually find in Plutarch, when
he refers to the dialogue Eudemus, written after the death of Eudemus the
Cyprian: . . . o xe K-oTipioq E\55Ti)i.o(;, z\c, ov 'ApiaxoxEXriq ocTioBavovxa
xov TiEpl v|/-uxfi<; 6idXo7ov etioitioe {Dion 22. 5 = Eudemus fr. 1 Ross^who
translates, "... Eudemus the Cyprian, to whom after his death Aristotle
dedicated his dialogue On Soul . . ."). Note that Plutarch makes no
mention of the Elegy to Eudemus here. Has no one observed that this is a
minor argumentum e silentio against the identification of the Cyprian
Eudemus with the addressee of the poem? If Aristotle had composed the
^Jaeger^ 14 = 340-41.
^ I caution the inexperienced against assuming that such fine distinctions are artificial
or imaginary; they are in fact very real. As good an illustration of this as any is the legal
distinction seen in npoc, c. ace. versus Kaxd c. gen. See Demosthenes' twenty-sixth
oration, the title of which is Ilepl zf\q dxtXtiaq npbc, Aenxwriv {vel sim.). One of the
argumenta prefixed to this speech in the MSS begins '0 Tipoq AentCvTiv Xoyoi;
e7ii7pa<pT)v exei ToiawTTiv, e7tei6fi7tep napeXSovtoq tov xpovo-u ev 9 unevGuvoq rjv
Kpioei Ktti Tin(op{a 7pd<pcov tk; vouov, ecpaivexo AentCvTiq dKiv8\)voq- oGev npoq
awTov, oKX' OV) kut' aiiTow 6 Xoyoq. The distinction enunciated here is no
grammarian's invention but a reflection of actual classical usage: Isaeus 11. 34 ei 6e \ii\xt
npbc, ene (ifite Kat" ejiou 8{ktiv eivai <pTioi t^ nai8i, xov KcoXvovxa vojiov eiJidxco
KxX. For the legalities at issue see W. Wyse's edition of Isaeus (Cambridge 1904) ad loc.
(p. 701) and J. E. Sandys' edition of Demosthenes' Leplines (Cambridge 1890) xxii-xxiii.
' Jaeger^ 16 = 343.
* See also Gaiser 96 n. 41.
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poem for this Eudemus, it would have been entirely appropriate for
Plutarch, who was a man of wide and varied learning, to have mentioned the
fact in this context.
Wilamowitz recognized the difficulty presented by npoc, but could not
explain it.' Years later, he still adhered to his belief in the Cyprian, and
still dated the poem after Eudemus' death despite the npoc,: "... das
Gedicht auf Eudemos von Kypros gemacht war, natiirlich als Totenklage."^^
There is the additional difficulty that a Totenklage for Eudemus, presumably
composed not long after his death in 354/53, would have been written while
Plato was still alive, and that cannot be reconciled with the Greek of verses
4-7. Gaiser returns to the older view (considered, but not favored by
Wilamowitz) that the poem was addressed to Eudemus the Cyprian y^Hle he
was still alive, which would account for the npoc, at least, but his new
interpretation of the meaning of the poem seems completely untenable to
me (see below). On the whole, despite the natural wish to associate the
Eudemus of the poem with the Eudemus of Aristotle's dialogue on the soul,
the position of Jaeger and some others is best supported by the evidence.
Beyond the likelihood that Eudemus of Rhodes is intended by the words
npcx; E\S5ti|iov we know nothing of the external occasion of the poem.
The related question of the identity of the person who dedicated the altar
can be dealt with expeditiously. Wilamowitz seems to have always
remained convinced that Eudemus of Cyprus was the dedicator. Jaeger
described the dedicator of the altar as unknown to us. The Aristotelian vitae
preserve a garbled account which makes Aristotle himself the dedicator.^^ In
modem times Immisch and Diiring have argued for this identification. This
latter scholar is almost dogmatic: "1st wirklich die Elegie so ratselhaft?
Wem ist das Gedicht gewidmet, und wer ist Subjeckt zu l6pt)aaTo? Ich
kann nicht verstehen warum die Antworten, die auf der Hand liegen, nichts
taugen: (1) Eudemos von Rhodos, sein treuer Schiiler, (2) Aristoteles
selbst, der nach langer Abwesenheit nach 'Kekropias heiligem Boden'
zuruckkehrte."^^ To this theory more than one scholar has objected that it is
excluded by the verb in the third person. The objection is serious, but not
decisive. So long as the poem remains fragmentary, and therefore the
context unknown, it remains possible, despite the third-person verb, that the
speaker is in fact Aristotle. It is even possible that the speaker of these
words was not Aristotle himself; he could have put them in the mouth of
another person referring not to himself, but to Aristotle. In sum, with our
present knowledge we cannot answer the question; we just do not know.
Here again Jaeger was correct.
' Wil.* 413: "Dann war es aber nichl an ihn gerichtet, da er in driller Person erwahnl
wird, und Olympiodor halle eiq Ev6tihov sagen soUen. Wenn ich nun auch diese . .
.
Auffassung vorsiehe, so muss ich doch geslehn, dass die Sache keineswegs sicher ist"
1° Wil/ 561 n. 4 (emphasis mine).
^^ For details see Jaeger^ 107 with n. 2 and Gaiser 97-100.
'^ Diiring^ 345; see also During^ 317.
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A far more interesting question is the identity of the dvrip of verse 3:
Socrates or Plato? Bemays and Theodor Gomperz argued for the former. No
one, I think, would agree with them nowadays, and it would be superfluous
to refute anew in any detail. Suffice to point out that Olympiodorus' sole
reason for adducing these verses was to provide evidence that Aristotle was
not hostile to Plato. If the verses referred to Socrates they are pointless in
this context, and surely it is most improbable that Olympiodorus, or rather
his learned source, presumably still with access to the entire poem, was
guilty of such a gross confusion.^ ^ There is no doubt that the reference is to
Plato and the verses do reflect Aristotle's attitude towards Plato. They
constitute a precious human document which strikingly illustrates
Aristotle's veneration for Plato, as Jaeger has eloquently demonstrated.
Scholars in antiquity at times assumed that Aristotle's disagreements with
Plato meant that he must have been his enemy; we know better. Aristotle
himself, practicing what he had learned from Plato, gave beautiful
expression to his own attitude in the famous passage of the Nicomachean
Ethics, 1096all-16 ( . . . Ka{7tep Jtpoadvxo-uc; xfjc; xoia-uxTiq ^TixTjaeox;
YivofXEVTiq 5id TO (piXovc, avdpac, eiaayaYeiv xd el'6T| kxX.).
The poem also contains some slight doxographical clues, both about
Socrates and about Plato, and these have perhaps not been adequately
explored. There is a minor point of grammatical usage which is of interest
because it proves that Aristotle regularly distinguished carefully between (1)
the historical Socrates and (2) the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues. I refer
to the so-called "Fitzgerald's Canon," according to which Aristotle wrote
ZcoKpdxTiq (anarthrous) when he was referring to the Socrates of history and
6 ZooKpdxTiq when he meant the Platonic Socrates of the dialogues.^'* I^ow
in verse 6 of our poem the revelation (Kaxe6ev4ev) is announced: (oc,
dyaGoc; xe Kal e\)5aip.cov djia yivexai dvrip. At first glance the
thought looks "Socratic" and one understands why some scholars wished to
assign it to Socrates. Others, correctly, objected both that Socrates taught
nothing (he certainly never proclaimed a religious "revelation"!) and that this
doctrine is that of the Republic and Gorgias}^ As Jaeger observed, "it is
improbable that the ethical rigorism of the Gorgias and the Republic is
^' For further particulars see Jaeger^ 106 n. 3. I add only that it is inconceivable that
Aristotle could have written (lovoq in v. 4
—
qualified by fi npanoc, or not—of Socrates.
Even a tentative exclusion of Plato's primary claim here on the part of Aristotle would be
psychologically unconvincing. The enormous impact which contact with the living
Socrates had on Plato was not, indeed could not be, experienced by Aristotle. Contrast his
relatively subdued assessment of Socrates at Met. 1078bl7-31.
^* For Fitzgerald's Canon see W. D. Ross' edition of the Metaphysics (Oxford 1924),
vol. I, xxxix-xli; the evidence for the validity of this "rule" (which is actually only a
particular application of the normal use of the definite article) is quite convincing.
'* For references see Gaiser 84 n. 2 (on p. 85). Scholars also rightly refer to the Laws
660e ( . . . ojq 6 (iev aYa06(; avfip oaxppcov civ Kal 8{Kaioq evSaijicov taxi Kal
(laKdpioq) and 742e (axe56v ^ev yap ev8a{n.ovaq ajia Kal ayaSovc; dvayKTi
yiyveaBai).
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substantially Socratic."'^ In verse 4 Aristotle explicitly states npcoxoq
9vT|Ta)v KaxE6ei^£v Evapyox; and, as we have seen, all now agree that the
reference is to Plato. From this we may legitimately draw the inference that
Aristotle did not believe that Socrates had clearly demonstrated both by his
life and by his philosophical teachings that "a man becomes both good and
happy at the same time." Plato was the first to achieve that. Whether
Aristotle felt that Socrates could not make such a claim because of his life's
unhappy end'"' or because of his lack of positive teachings, or both, who can
say? This conclusion is negative; it has a positive counterpart.
That Aristotle had great admiration for (much oO Plato's philoso-
phizing
—
^E0o6oi ^.oycov—is hardly a new discovery. But this poem tells
us explicitly that Aristotle believed Plato to be good (ayaQoc,) and happy
(e\)5ai^a)v) and that he became so not only because of his philosophical
dialectic, but also because of his personal way of life (oikeio) pCw). This is
a precious testimony, of a sort not found in his formal philosophical
treatises, for Aristotle's own opinion of Plato the man, and it is deserving
of comparison with Plato's judgment of Socrates in the Seventh Letter}^ It
merits greater attention than it seems to have received.
Next we consider briefly the meaning of vv. 2-3 (evoePeox; . .
.
dvSpoq). Of these words Wilamowitz once wrote: "Und nun die
Hauptfrage: zxxsz^kdic; oE|ivfi<; (piXiTi(; iSpiSoaTo Pcojiov dv5p6<;
(n^dxcovoq), was heisst das?"*' His answer was that p(0}i6v dvSpoc; go
together and <^\X\.r[c, is a genitive of cause ("der Genitiv ist der des Grundes
. . . zu dem die alten Grammatiker ein Xeitiei ti EVEKa zu bemerken
pflegen"). That is, he took the Greek to mean, as he paraphrased it,
oePo^evoc; t^v oE^ivTiv (piA,{av P(0|x6v i6pt)aaxo IlXxxxcovoq. Wilamowitz
then went on, in eloquent and stirring language, to argue that Aristotle here
represents Plato as a god. Jaeger argued vigorously against this notion of an
apotheosis of Plato, and printed OiXiriq with a capital phi for clarity,
correctly in my view. Wilamowitz's interpretation involves a curious and
compound aberration both of style and sense. Verse two is an integral unit:
'^ Jaeger^ 15 = 342.
'^ One tends to forget that the Greeks did not fully share our romantic view of Socrates'
death. That it was a noble end they understood; that it was a desirable end would have
struck them as paradoxical, not to say quixotic. Aristotle's own views on happiness are
well known from his Ethics; he looked to the end in deciding whether a man was truly
happy. At EN 1101a6-8 he states a0XiO(; jiev o\)8znoxt yivoix' av 6 ev6a{jicov, ov
jifiv jiampioc; ^e, av npiamKaiq vvxaic, nepiTiecrn. However he is not fully consistent
in his views on what the prerequisites for happiness are (W. K. C. Guthrie, History of
Greek Philosophy VI [Cambridge 1981] 342-43, has some good remarks on Aristotle's
inconsistencies in this regard) and, in any event, it is not at all clear to what extent, or
how rigorously, one should apply Aristotle's formal ethical teachings to the interpretation
of this poem.
324 d-€: . . . <p£X,ov avSpa z\io\ 7tpeo(3i>Tepov IcoKpatii, ov eyo) 0%e66v ov>k
av aiaxwoijiTiv einoav SiKaiotatov eivai xcov tote.
1' Wil.i 414.
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evaePeax; aefivfiq ^iXiTjq i6p\)oaTo Paj^ov. What Greek who read thus far
could have failed to join <I)iXiti<; Pcofxov together? If that question, so put,
seem too facile to any, I shall be more specific. In a dedicatory epigram,
real or literary, a certain neatness of diction is expected. For the name of the
recipient of the altar to be postponed to the following verse when there is an
abstract noun capable (1) of being personified as a deity and (2) of being
governed by the word "altar" in that same verse is stylistically intolerable,
and not to be explained away as due to Aristotle's lack of poetic ability
when another explanation is ready to hand. Go now to the third verse.
However one interpret dvSpoq, it is undeniable that the following clause, ov
o\)6' aivEiv loiai KaKoioi Gejiiq, must go closely with it. Take dv6p6(; as
Wilamowitz does and the result is a dedicatory statement of the form "X set
up an altar of the man whom it is right for the wicked not even to praise."
In a dedication one wants a simple genitive of the name, not such a verse as
dv5p6(; . . . Qi\ii<;. Compare Aelian, Var. Hist. 8. 19 = Anaxagoras A 24
D-K: OTi Kttl Pco)j.6(; a\)TW lOTaxai Kal iniyiypanxai ol fiev No\!), oi
6e 'AXrjGelaq.^^ Far smoother stylistically is Jaeger's interpretation: "He
piously set up an altar of holy Friendship / For the man whom it is not
lawful for bad men even to praise."
Not only the style, but also the sense of the verses is most peculiar, if
Aristotle has intended to proclaim the apotheosis of Plato: He introduces
him by the word dv5p6q (v. 3), then seems to reinforce the point in verse 4
(GvTiTcov), and, above all, in verse 6 incorporates dv-qp in the philosophical
truth exemplified by Plato in his own person. Wilamowitz himself seems
later to have quietly dropped this interpretation: "Der Altar war von
Eudemos der Freundschaft errichtet; mehr als dies ein Wort brauchte ijicht
auf ihm zu stehen. Gemeint war die Freundschaft Platons; das schliesst
Aristoteles in einem zweiten Genetiv an . . ."^^
Moreover, there is a passage in the Magna Moralia which, if it
represents Aristotle's own position (as it probably does), raises the
fundamental question whether friendship with a deified Plato would even be
possible according to Aristotle: "First, then, we must determine what kind
of friendship we are in search of. For there is, people think, a friendship
towards god and towards things without life, but here they are wrong. For
friendship, we maintain, exists only where there can be a return of affection,
but friendship towards god does not admit of love being returned, nor at all
of loving. For it would be strange if one were to say that he loved Zeus."^^
The fact remains, nor is it my intention to deny it, that Plato enjoys a very
^ W. Haase ap. Gaiser 96 n. 39 adduced this passage.
21 Wil.2 561 n. 4 (on p. 562).
22 1208b26-31 (ir. S. G. Stock). I do not wish to press this passage too much, not
only because (1) it occurs in the Magn. Mor. and (2) because we cannot know whether
Aristotle's formal doctrines are to be imposed upon this poem (cf. above, note 17), but
also (3) because the date of composition of the poem is unknown, and Aristotle's beliefs
could, and did, change.
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special, indeed unique, position in these verses; we could describe him not
unfairly as a Geicx; avrip.
Next we must consider the meaning of verse 3, for it may be that no
one has understood the Greek quite correctly. There seems no disagreement
as to its rendering: "... for the man, whom it is permissible for the
wicked not even to praise." What, precisely, is the reference? Wilamowitz:
"... so war [Platon] ein Gott, und es war eine Blasphemie, wenn ein
schlechter Mensch selbst lobend von ihm redete. Dies sagt Aristoteles von
ihm aus: aber die notwendige Folge daraus, dass er ihn fur einen Gott
erklart, will man nicht ertragen?"^ Jaeger: "The name of 'friend' in Plato's
sense could be claimed only by the good. If we remember that, we shall feel
it no accident that Plato is characterized in this context as 'the man whom
bad men have no right even to praise.' The words are no mere rhetorical
hyperbole, they have reference to actualities. They are directed against a
eulogy of Plato, which was of no account, against the sharp tongues of
fellow-pupils who reproached Aristotle with unworthiness of Plato's
friendship because he had criticized certain doctrines of the master. "^^ And
again: "... the 'bad men' whose praise Aristotle thinks damaging to the
master are not just any misera plebs, but those mistaken admirers who
thought it their duty to defend Plato against Aristotle's criticism of his
doctrine."^ Earlier Gomperz and Immisch had thought that the reference
might be to such Cynic or Cyrenaic philosophers as Diogenes, Aristippus
and Antisthenes. Gaiser proposes the tyrant Dionysius the Younger or
Callippus, the Academic philosopher who killed Dion.^^ We may say at
once that the notion that Aristotle would describe Academic philosophers as
KttKoi is incredible. That he would so describe any philosopher, qua
philosopher, is most doubtful. Gaiser's suggestion in and of itself may
seem a bit more plausible, for such a characterisation of either Dionysius or
Dion would be founded on a moral, not a philosophical, judgment. The
difficulty here is that we do not know that Aristotle would have so described
them and, as Gaiser himself points out (103 n. 68), in Rhet. 1373al8-20
Aristotle treats Callippus without hostility, going so far as to say of Dion's
murder, tcc xoiavxa eyyvx; xot) |j.ti d5iKeiv cpaivexai! More importantly,
Gaiser's identification is closely connected with his general interpretation of
the poem, which assumes that both Eudemus the Cyprian and Plato were
still alive at the time of composition and this, as we have seen, cannot be.
What all these proposals have in common is the assumption that some
KaKoi, whoever they may be, actually do praise Plato and that Aristotle is
condemning them for so doing (ov) 0e|j,i(;).^^ These wicked men, we are to
23 Wil.' 416.
2* Jaeger^ 15 = 341.
"Jaeger^ 106-07.
2<* Gaiser 101.
^ Bemays, who believed that the reference was to Socrates, took verse 3 to mean that
wicked men could not praise him without thereby condemning themselves as
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understand, have lauded Plato and thereby have been guilty of blasphemy.
See especially Jaeger's explicit comments. On this interpretation, currently
orthodox, we have the rather curious (though not impossible) situation that
Aristotle is reproaching people for speaking well of Plato.
I call attention to several details. First, in this poem aiveiv perhaps
does not mean "praise" at all. The primary meaning of this non-Attic verb
is not "praise," but "tell" or "speak of (see LSJ s.v.), and the most natural,
and expected, thought in such a context is, "in honor of a man whom it is
right for the wicked not even to mention."^^ Compare Aesch. Agam. 97-
98, o Ti Kal 5\)vax6v Kal Ge^iiq, aivei.^' What is more, it is a curious
fact that, if (it is a large "if") Aristotle is employing his formal
philosophical vocabulary in this poem, it would, strictly speaking, be
inappropriate for anyone to make Plato the object of aiveiv in the sense of
"praise" (i.e. = EJiaiveiv). For, while, pace Wilamowitz, Aristotle does not
look upon Plato as a god in this poem, he clearly looks upon him as
godlike, as Qeioc,, and it is a tenet of Aristotle's that such people, like gods,
are not the proper recipients of praise at all. They are above it.^^
"Ungliickselige," because they would thus be acknowledging the truth of the doctrine set
forth in verse 6 that only the good man is simultaneously "glijcklich"—and they
themselves are not good (Rh. Mas. 33 [1878] 232-33). We need not linger over this
curiosity, which seems to assume that the allegedly "wicked" men would have the same
opinion of themselves as Aristotle had of them. Surely they would not.
^ This and similar expressions are widespread; compare a tomb marker in Tama, Iowa,
U.S.A.:
Assassinated
July 19, 1913
By a dirty coward
Whose name is not worthy
to be mentioned here.
(Quoted in Sudden & Awful: American Epitaphs and the Finger of God, by T. C. Mann and
J. Greene [Brattleboro. VT 1968] 53.)
^' al'vei Wieseler: aiveiv MV, a corruption which shows how naturally aiveiv can
follow Genii; (and here the verb cannot mean "praise"; note also that there is another
variant, namely eineiv).
In his formal philosophy Aristotle uses eJtaivo<; and enaiveiv in a technical sense.
EN llOlblO ff.: eniaKe\|/cofie6a nepl tfiq evSainovioq noxepa xoiv enaivexcov eoxlv t)
fiaXXov xoiv xifiiojv (i.e. does Happiness possess relative or absolute value?). The
distinction between xa enaivexd and xa xifiia is that the fomier is relative, not absolute;
it is applied with reference to a discrete standard (8i ' avacpopaq). For this reason Aristotle
regards praise of the gods as ridiculous (YeXoioq); he states explicitly xoiv dpioxcov owk
eaxiv eTiaivoc;, aXKa nei^ov xi Kai PeXxiov . . . xoitz, xe ydp Geovq ^laKapi^onev
Kal eiL)5aijiov{^onev Kal xcov dvSptov xoi)c SeioxdxoDq (1 101b22-24'). Compare
further MM 1183bl9-27; EE 1219bll-16. As M. Nussbaum succinctly observes at MA
700b34: "Geioxepov Kal ximcixepov. These words are Linked elsewhere, and contrasted
with enaivexov: the xijiiov and the divine are above praise; the object of praise is praised
because it stands in a certain relation to something else." If, I say, Aristotle intended a
strict distinction here, there can be no doubt that Plato is to be ranked among the objects
of xijifi, not of enaivoq. If such be the case, the meaning of aiveiv is settled.
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Next, I list some expressions, the relevance of which will soon become
apparent: (1) Lysias, fr. 53. 1 Thalheim = Athcn. 12. 555 e-f ox>x oxtxoc,
EOTiv 6 toiavxa nepl Geoxx; e^aiiaptdvcov, a xoi^ ^ev aXkoic, aioxpov
eoxi Kttl Xeyew kxX.; (2) Isocr. 4. 92 o\) yap 6ti tovto ye GejXK; EiTietv;
(3) Dem. 18. 128 tiou . . . nai6eia<; aoi Be^iq p.vTio0fivai; (= ou Ge^iiq
aoi . . . ; compare the context); (4) PI. Tim. 29a ei 6e o ^ti5' eijieiv xivi
Ge^iiq KxX.; (5) [PL] £p//i. 986b . . . o'l 6e xoiovxoi xiveq oiovq o\)6e Ge^vq
EiTieiv r[\iG>v o\)6evi; (6) Plut. Mor. 1076b ei yovv, o ^-qSe Gep.i<; eaxlv
EiTieiv, KxX. These passages show how common verbs of mentioning are
with OX) Ge)ii<; and comparable phrases. While this evidence does not prove
that such is the meaning of aivEiv here, it lends support to such an
interpretation. Se^k;, as well as o\) Geiik; (fas/nefas) is common in such
expressions, PI. Phdr. 250b £XE>.ot)vxo xcav xeIexcov t^v Geiik; A.eyeiv
^laKapKoxdxTiv; Soph. 258b ei Ge^ik; eitieiv; Symp. 195a ev Ge^i^ Kal
dvE|X£OTixov EiKEiv. Naturally, where the context calls for it, other
infinitives also occur, e.g. Eur. Hipp. 1396 Kax' ooocov 5' ov Qi^ic,
PaA.Eiv 6dKp\); PI. Apol. 30c-d oij ydp oio^ai Gejiixov Eivai djiEivovi
dv6pl vnb xzipovoc, P^dirxEoGai; Theocr. 1. 15-16 o-u Ge^ik; d|i)iiv
0'opia5Ev; [Dem.] 25. 81 xo-uxcov y' o\jG' oaiov o-uxe Gejik; xw ^iiapw
xot)xcp ^Exa5ot)vai.^^ In any event, the basic interpretation of the poem is
not dependent upon the specific meaning of aivEiv here, since either
"mention" or "praise" makes sense.
On the other hand, what is crucial for an understanding of our passage is
the recognition that o\) G£|j.iq with an infinitive of saying or mentioning (or
praising) does not necessarily imply that anyone has actually mentioned the
person or carried out the practice in question. In this regard ov Geiik; with
any infinitive is at least neutral; the speaker who uses ov Geiik; is
expressing a moral judgment on an activity which may or may not have
actually occurred. Very often the context shows that it did not and cannot.
This is particularly clear at PI Apol. 20b, where Apollo, 6 Geoc; 6 ev
AeX,(poi<;, is the subject: xi o\)v tioxe Xiyei [sc. b Ge6<;] (pdoKcov eiie
oo(pcoxaxov Eivai; ov) ydp 5ti7io\) \|/Et>SExai yE- ot) ydp Gejik; a\)xa) .
Inspection of the contexts of the other examples of ov Ge^k; cited above will
provide further confirmation of this.
In other words, contrary to the widespread assumptions of previous
interpreters, in the clause ov oil)5' aivEiv xoioi KaKoiai Geiik;, the dative
xoiai KttKoiai need not, and, I would say, certainly does not contain an
allusion to any definite individuals. The clause is generic and there is no
reason to assume that Aristotle has any specific person(s) in mind. Gaiser
observed, "Dass der aristotelische Vers zum Teil formelhaften Charakter hat,
beweist der Anklang an einen Vers des Euripides (Hippolytos 81), wo es den
^' For more examples of oii 6eniq c. inf. and a discussion of the meaning of oij Befiii;
see A. W. BuUoch. Callimachus. The Fifth Hymn (Cambridge 1985) 185-86 (note to verse
78).
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Schlechten verwehrt wird (xolc, KaKoiai 6' ov Gejo-ii;), die Blumen der Gottin
zu pflucken."^^ This is a useful observation, even if Aristotle's words are
hardly a "reminiscence" of the Hippolytus passage. What that passage rather
suggests is that ot) Se^k; xoiq KaKoic; cum infinitivo was a stock religious
expression. In the nature of things we would expect it to be so, and
Aristotle's verse further suggests this. One should notice immediately that
in Euripides, as in Aristotle, the dative xolc, KaKoi(; is most naturally
understood as generic. I call attention to another passage, "Hippocrates" Lex
c. 5: Toc 5e lepa eovxa TtpTjYjxaxa lepoiaiv dvGpcoTioioi SeiKvuxai-
PePt|Xoioi 5e ot) Ge^k;, Tiplv ii xeXeaGcooiv opyCoiaiv inioxT\[n]<;. Note the
striking parallelism with Aristotle here. There is the same transference of
mystery terminology to intellectual revelation (6eiicv\)Tai/KaTe5ei4ev),
and the same expression of religious prohibition (PePriXoiai ov Ge|j.i<;/Toiai
KaKotai OIL) Ge|j.i<;), Above all, observe that the dative PePrjA^oioi is
unquestionably generic; no specific individual is, or can be, intended. This
argues strongly that the article in xoiai KaKoiai is generic and that both
expressions should be interpreted along similarly general lines.
Let us return to Euripides' Hippolytus, verses 78-81, to which
reference has just been made above:
Ai5d)q 5e Jioxanioiai ktitievei 6p6aoi(;,
oook; 5i5aKx6v ^.tiSev aXX' ev xfi <p\)oei
x6 aoxppoveiv tiXr\xty tic, xct navx* oei,
xovxoiq 5p£jieo9ai, xoiq Kaxoiai 5' ov Qi\iic,.
Hippolytus is the speaker, and his gospel is, in its own way, as strange for
the fifth century as Plato's was for the fourth. Who are the KaKoi whojn he
has in mind? W. S. Barrett ad loc. observes the following: "Eur. is not
concerned to pass allusive judgement on any particular beliefs of his own
day: his theme is not contemporary but timeless, and his purpose is simply
to dehneate in its beauty and inadequacy alike the puritan austerity of which
Hipp, is the type. . . . this picture ... is no piece of contemporary
polemic but a dramatist's characterization of a type . . ." (p. 173). This is,
mutatis mutandis, as good an exegesis as any of Aristotle's ov o\)5' aiveiv
Toiai KaKoiai Ge^ik;.
Now verse 7, ov vvv 5' egxi A^aPEiv otjSevI xavxd tioxe: What does
this mean? Not a few, including Wilamowitz, pronounced it corrupt. None
of the numerous conjectures proposed carries conviction; in such a situation
it is always prudent to return to the paradosis and attempt to extract sense
from it. The verse has been approached from several directions. Rose's
conjecture, AxxGeTv ot)5£va for XaPfitv oil)5evI (= "No one can now fail to
notice this"), cannot be correct, because it goes too far. Aristotle would not
say that Plato's holy revelation was now obvious to everyone; only certain
philosophers could hope to grasp it. The same objection applies to
'^Gaiser 101 (after H. Hommel: n. 60).
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Theiler's xaux' anopov for Tav»Ta noxe. Gaiser, retaining the MS text,
understands vvv to mean "in this world," "in the here and now," in contrast
to the incorporeal other world of the disembodied soul, so that for him the
verse means: In this world of matter no one can grasp (XaPew) the know-
ledge of ultimate reality; only in another existence can one truly acquire
(XaPeiv) the ideal knowledge of Platonic philosophy. He goes so far as to
see an allusion to anamnesis in the poem. The meaning which he gives lo
vt)v here is, in this context and without further qualification, impossible,
and his whole interpretation is, in my judgment, quite mistaken. To go no
further, it was in the here and now that Plato showed clearly by his hfe (= 6
v\)v pioq!) the truth expressed in the sixth verse. Jaeger also defended the
paradosis and explained ovk eaxi XaPeiv as a "standing expression in
Aristotle's treatises for the unattainability of the ideal." (Against this
interpretation of the Greek see Gaiser 91.) Jaeger renders the verse, "But
now it is not possible for anyone ever to attain this." By "this" (xama) he
understands what everyone else seems to, namely the philosophical "gospel"
announced in the sixth verse. The objection to Jaeger's interpretation is the
opposite of that to Rose's and Theiler's: It does not go far enough. By
denying the possibility of anyone else's attaining this ideal,^^ Jaeger would
have Aristotle deny the possibility of the philosophical life in a most un-
Platonic, and un-Aristotelian, manner. Here it is relevant to recall the
metaphor KaxeSei^ev, which it was Jaeger's own merit to have elucidated.
It is an image drawn from the sphere of religious revelation. It would be
pointless, and no grounds for veneration, to have revealed the unattainable.
Rather, literal sacred mysteries (xeA^exai) are revealed to the elect, to those
capable offull initiation into them. As applied to philosophers, the select
few, the analogy here is obvious and perfect.
Let us try a different approach. That the verse, beginning with ot) vvv
5' and ending with Tioxe, is inelegant seems clear. Aristotle was not a
professional poet and some of his experiments with diction do not succeed.
He has been harshly judged by distinguished critics: "... ein Dichter war
Aristoteles nicht, das zeigen alle seine Verse;"^'* "... Aristotle, whose
memory for poetry was as lamentable as his talent for composing it."^^
Others, including Guthrie^^ and Jaeger, have been kinder; in GRBS 23
(1982) 251-74 I have tried to show that Aristotle's Hermias poem was a
technically sophisticated production. But rough edges there undoubtedly are.
In verse 4 jiovoq t\ npGnoq is prosaic; the collocation is partly borrowed
from Aristotle's own technical rhetorical diction. See Rhet. 1368alO,
1375a2, 1385a21 (noted by Gaiser, after K. Thraede: 96 n. 42). In verse 7
'3 Jaeger^ 17 = 344: "The doctrine is not the less true for the fact that only Plato
himself was able whoUy lo realize it."
^ Wil.^ 561 n. 4 (on p. 562).
^5 M. L. West, Hesiod. Theogony (Oxford 1966) 68.
'<* W. K. C. Guthrie. History of Greek Philosophy VI (Cambridge 1981) 33 (on the
Hermias poem).
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ox> vOv . , . ot)5Evl . . . noxe should be taken closely together: "But not
now is it ever possible for anyone . . ."^^ The general meaning would be
more clearly represented by v\)v 5* o{)KeTi eoxi kxX. Aristotle seems to
have attempted a stronger denial by using ovnoxe (i.e. "never again now")
rather than ouketi, and by placing o\> at the beginning and tcote at the end
of the verse, somewhat infelicitously. Wilamowitz's vOv 5' ov)k eaxi
(Hermes 65 [1930] 246) seems to me a rewriting of Aristotle rather than a
correction of the MSS,
If the reader is prepared to follow thus far, namely to accept (1) that the
text is sound and (2) that Aristotle is stating, somewhat cumbersomely, that
it is not now—and never will be
—
possible for any to attain this (ka^eiv
tauxa), to what, then, does Tat>Ta refer? We have seen that scholars
understand it of the content of the sixth verse and that the resultant sense is
problematic. Greek often uses plural demonstratives where we expect a
singular. May not Tat)Ta refer rather to Plato's achievement as expressed
in verses 4 and 5, namely )x6vo<; fj npGnoq Bvtitcov KaTe5ei^£v evapycoc;
KxX.l Aristotle glorifies Plato as the npSnoc, eupexric; of this philosophical
truth, much as Lucretius has glorified Epicurus, especially in the proems to
his third and fifth books. Plato it was who first revealed, by his life and
teaching, this great mystery, that a man becomes good and happy
simultaneously. To have revealed that—this is the distinction which no one
else can ever attain, the prize which no one can now win (XaPeiv can mean
either or both).^* The glory is all Plato's and his alone.
University of California, Santa Barbara
^^ Compare Jaeger^ 17 = 344: "vuv and Ttoxe do not exclude one another, as has been
thought, viiv includes all time since Plato; Ttoxe stands for any moment of time within
this period . . . Attempts to alter the words o\) vuv are due to a failure to see that the
sharp opposition is needed to distinguish the present of the writer from the time when
Plato still moved among men."
^* Aa^l^dvo) in the sense of "winning" a prize is common; see LSJ .y.v. dGXcv I. It is
curious, and perhaps no mere coincidence, that the phrases jiovoq Kai Jtptoroc; and npSytoc,
Ktti (lovoi; are technical terms of the vocabulary of athletic competition. See M. N. Tod,
"Greek Record -Keeping and Record-Breaking," CQ 43 (1949) 111: "But by far the
commonest phrase is the combination fiovoq Kai npSrzoc, or Ttpcotoc; Kal \i6voc,, used
interchangeably . . ." For occurrences in non-athletic contexts, see e.g. PI. Menex. 237e
(ji. Ktti 7t.) and Polyb. 4. 20. 3 {n. Kal p..).

21
Livius und Augustus
ERICH BURCK
Obwohl Friedrich Solinsen sich weder in seinen eigenen Studien mit dem
Geschichtswerk des Livius beschaftigt noch eine Vorlesung oder ein
Seminar dariiber gehalten hat, griff er es doch mit lebhaftem Interesse auf,
wenn ich ihm dies oder jenes von meiner Beschaftigung mit Livius
berichtete. Daher sei es erlaubt, ihm in dieser Gedenkschrift einen Beitrag
iiber Livius zu widmen.
I
Das persOnliche Verhaltnis des Livius zu Augustus und seinem Prinzipat ist
oft und unter sehr verschiedenen Aspekten erortert worden, ohne daB man
bisher zu einem Konsens gekommen ware. Das liegt vor allem daran, daB
die direkten Zeugnisse dariiber sehr sparlich sind und daB die indirekten
Schlusse auf Textstellen beruhen, deren Aussage und personlicher Bezug
vieldeutig sind. Immerhin besteht dariiber weithin Ubereinstimmung,-da6
Livius wie seine Zeitgenossen Vergil und Horaz nach zwanzig Jahren
Biirgerkrieg den durch Octavians Sieg bei Aktium heraufgefiihrten Frieden
und die durch seine ersten MaBnahmen erreichte Stabilisierung der
Lebensverhaltnisse begruBt hat. Das wird u.a. dadurch bewiesen, daB er die
SchlieBung des Janus im Jahre 27 als ein Geschenk der Gotter feiert^ und daB
er unbeschadet der vielen Kriegsberichte und des Stolzes auf die romischen
Siege die Vormachtstellung Roms iiber die ganze Welt in der Eintracht des
romischen Volkes und im Frieden gesichert sehen will. Wann und unter
welchen Umstanden eine erste Beriihrung zwischen beiden Mannem erfolgt
ist und wie sich ihr Verhaltnis zueinander entwickelt hat, ist nur
andeutungsweise zu ermitteln.
Drei Notizen erlauben vielleicht wenigstens einen Hinweis. Als Livius
davon berichtet, daB er einen Irrtum iiber die Erringung der spolia opima
^ Bis deinde post Numae regnum (scil. Janus) clausus full, semel T. Manlio console post
Punicum primum perfectwn helium, iterum quod nostrae aelati dii dederunt, ut videremus,
post helium Actiacum ah imperatore Caesare Augusto pace terra marique porta (1, 19, 3).
Vgl. den dringenden Wunsch zur Erhaliung des Friedens am Ende des Alexander-Exkurses
(9. 19. 17).
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durch A. Cornelius Cossus berichtigen will—wir werden darauf gleich
zuriickkommen
—
, weist er auf eine AuBening des Augustus hin, mit der
dieser die bestehende Unklarheit mit Hinweis auf seine Autopsie der
Weihinschrift geklart habe: hoc ego cum Augustum . . . se ipsum in
thorace linteo scriptum legisse audissem (4, 20, 7 ff.). Diese Formulierung
zeigt, daB er nicht von Augustus selbst, sondem von dritter Seite den
Ausspruch des Augustus gehOrt hat und daB offenbar damals noch keine
Beziehung zwischen beiden bestand. Das liegt ja auch nahe, da nicht damit
zu rechnen ist, daB der Paduaner Livius, selbst wenn er Buch 1 als Probe
seines Schaffens in einem kleinen oder grOBeren Kreise vorgetragen haben
sollte, in Rom die Aufmerksamkeit des Publikums und vor allem des
Princeps vor der Publikation der ersten Pentade auf sich gelenkt haben
durfte. Da ich, was ich hier nicht begriinden kann, mit zahlreichen
Forschem damit rechne, daB Livius erst nach der Ruckkehr Oclavians nach
Rom im Jahre 29 oder gar erst 27 mit der Arbeit an seinem Werk begonnen
hat und daB die erste Pentade im Jahre 25 fertig vorlag, wird man die
Bekanntschaft des Livius mit Augustus nach diesem Termin ansetzen.
Die viel zitierte Stelle des Tacitus, daB Augustus Livius einen
Pompeianer genannt habe, daB dies aber ihrer Freundschaft keinen Eintrag
getan hatte,^ laBt sich vielleicht chronologisch andeutungsweise verwerten.
Wir erfahren namlich durch Sueton, daB der spatere Kaiser Claudius in
seinen jungen Jahren auf Anraten des Livius angefangen habe, sich mit
historischen Studien zu beschaftigen: historiam in adulescentia hortante T.
Livio . . . scribere aggressus est.^ Da Claudius im Jahre 10 v.Chr. geboren
war, durfte der Beginn dieser historischen Arbeiten in das erste Jahrzehnt
n.Chr. zu datieren sein. Das ist etwa die Zeit, in der Livius das Leben und
Schicksal des Pompeius in den Buchern 91-112 behandelte. Es ist gut
denkbar, daB damals das Urteil des Augustus uber Livius als Pompejaner
gefallen ware, sei es im personlichen Gesprach des Princeps mit Livius uber
seine laufende Arbeit, sei es auf Grund einer Vorlesung des Livius aus
seinem Werk oder auf Grund der Lekture eines Werkteils durch Augustus.
Sowohl die Notiz des Tacitus als auch die Nachricht Suetons sprechen fiir
die Annahme, daB eine auf Vertrauen begriindete und wohl auch schon langer
wahrende Verbundenheit zwischen beiden Mannem bestand.
SchlieBlich sei noch erwahnt, daB sich vor der Periocha des Buches 121
die Notiz findet: (liber) qui editus post excessum Augusti dicitur. Falls
diese Bemerkung auf eine Anordnung des Livius zuriickgeht, wird man nach
dem Grund dieser Verfugung fragen. In Buch 120 hatte Livius uber den
ZusammenschluB von Antonius, Octavian und Lepidus zum sog. zweiten
Triumvirat und die unmittelbar darauf folgenden Proskriptionen berichtet,
denen nach Ausweis der Periocha zahlreiche romische Ritter und 130
^ Titus Livius, eloquentiae ac ftdei praeclarus in primis, Cn. Pompeium tantis laudibus
tulit, ul Pompeianum eum Augustus appellaret (Tac. Ann. 4, 34, 3).
3 Suet. Claud. 41. 1.
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Senatoren zum Opfer fielen, unter ihnen auch Cicero. Die Zustimmung
Octavians zur Ermordung Ciceros war wahrlich kein Ruhmesblatt fiir ihn.
Voller Blut und Opfer waren auch die von Buch 121 an berichteten folgenden
Jahre bis zum Perusinischen Krieg, an dessen Ende Octavian im Februar des
Jahres 40 zwar gegeniiber dem belagerten Antonius und seinen Soldaten
Milde walten UeB, aber als Akt der Rache fiir den Tod Caesars 300 Senatoren
und Ritter hinrichten lieB. Wir wissen nicht, wie Livius diese Octavian
schwer belastenden Jahre dargestellt hat. Aber die Vermutung liegt nahe,
daB er diese Bucher dem Augustus vorenthalten wollte: vielleicht weniger
aus Furcht, das bestehende Vertrauensverhaltnis zu storen oder sich gar den
Zorn des Princeps und eine Strafe zuzuziehen als vielmehr aus
Riicksichtnahme und Taktgefiihl, Augustus zu einer Stellungnahme zu
seiner Behandlung dieser Jahre zu notigen. Auch hier kommt man uber
Vermutungen nicht hinaus. Als eine solche erweist sich auch die—sehr
wahrscheinliche—Annahme, daB Livius und Augustus sich bei einer
Vorlesung des Historikers zuerst begegnet sind, wie eine Bemerkung
Suetons dies nahe legt: recitantis et benigne et patienter audiit nee tantum
carmina et historias, sed et orationes et dialogos.^
Welchen Eindruck gewinnt man von den Erwahnungen des Augustus in
den erhaltenen Biichem? An den beiden bereits erwahnten Stellen spricht
Livius vom imperator Caesar Augustus^ und bei den spolia opima des
Cornelius Cossus von Augustus Caesar, templorum omnium conditor aut
restitutor.^ das erste gleichsam ein offizioser TitelJ das zweite ein
naheliegender Hinweis bei der Erwahnung des von Augustus
wiederhergestellten Tempels des Jupiter Feretrius, in dem die spolia opima
aufbewahrt waren, auf eine der ersten kultischen Regelungen des Augustus.
Dieser Erwahnung der AuBerung des Augustus, daB er die Weihinschrift fiir
Cossus im Tempel gesehen habe, fiigt Livius die Worte hinzu: prope
sacrilegium ratus sum Cosso spoliorum suorum Caesarem ipsius templi
auctorem subtrahere testem. In dieser Formulierung hat G. Stiibler^ einen
Hinweis auf eine gottliche Erhohung des Augustus gesehen und hat sich
bemuht, in weiteren Textstellen eine solche Huldigung fiir Augustus zu
finden. Dabei ist er so weit gegangen, daB er die These aufstellte, daB
Livius Augustus als Gott und Gottes Sohn auf Erden—wie Romulus
—
gesehen wissen wollte.' Das ist voUig verfehlt. Das Wort sacrilegium hat
sich offenbar eingestellt, da Augustus gleichsam aus dem Tempel heraus
gesprochen hat und der restitutor dieses Tempels mit dem obligaten Hiiter
* Suet. Aug. 89, 3.
5 1. 19. 3.
^ 4, 20. 7.
^ Das Schwergewicht liegt in diesetn Salz auf dem Geschenk der Gotter, nicht auf der
Leistung des Augustus.
* G. Stiibler. Die Religiositat des Livius. Tiibinger Beitr. z. Allertumsw. 35, 1941.
'
"Gott hat Augustus gesandt. der Welt die Segnungen des Friedens zu vermitleln . . .
Augustus. Gott, Gottes Sohn ist gekommen, die Wek selig zu machen" (43).
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des Heiliglums gleichgcselzt wird. J. Briscoe'^ und H. J. Mette'^ haben aus
der S telle—zu Unrecht, wie ich meine—eine gewisse Skepsis gegenuber der
Allwissenheit des Augustus heraushoren wollen. Das Richtige hat meiner
Meinung nach P. G. Walsh gesagt, der die Worte als "respektvoU" und als
Zustimmung zu den kultisch-religiOsen Emeuerungen deulele.^^
Eine dritte Erwahnung findet sich zum Jahre 206 bei der Vertreibung der
Punier aus Spanien, als Livius darauf hinweist, daC erst in der Gegenwart
{nostra demum aetateY^ Spanien ductu auspicioque Augusti Caesaris
endgijltig bezwungen worden ist. Auch hier handelt es sich urn eine
sachliche Feststellung, die gewiB ehrenvoll ist, die Livius aber notiert, ohne
sie zu einem Ruhmesblatt fiir Augustus zu machen. Die Gelegenheit dazu
hatte hier—wie an manchen anderen Stellen der erhaltenen Bucher—nahe
gelegen, zumal Augustus nach langerer Abwesenheit bei seiner Ruckkehr
nach Rom freudig begriiBt^'^ und die Ankiindigung der endgiiltigen
Unterwerfung Spaniens sicher mit groBer Genugtuung aufgenommen worden
ist.
SchlieBlich haben einzelne Forscher wie L. Ross Taylor,^ ^ K. Scott'
^
und Stiibler gemeint, daB Livius mit dem relativ haufigen Auftreten des
Wortes augustus das dem Octavian im Jahre 27 beigelegte Cognomen
Augustus in der Offentlichkeit habe beliebt machen wollen. Das ist schon
deshalb abzulehnen, weil das Wort, wie H. Erkell'^ dargelegt hat, nur in der
^° J. Briscoe, The First decade, in Livy ed. by T. A. Dorey (London-Toronto 1971) 1-11.
^^ H. J. Metle, Livius und Augustus, Gymn. 68, 1961, 269-85. Mette hat aus der
Behandlung des Augustus durch Cassius Dio, der in den Buchem 45-51 nach dem Nachweis
von Ed. Schwartz (R.-E. I 3, 1899) Livius als Hauptquelle benutzt hat, den SchluB gezogen,
daB Livius gegenuber den MaBnahmen des Augustus kritisch war und blieb. Auch Walsh
(vgl. Anm. 12) sieht ihn bis zuletzt als traditionellen Republikaner. R. Syme, Roman
Revolution (Oxford 1939) 317; 468 spricht dagegen von einer bleibend freundlichen
Annahme der neuen Ordnung wie durch Vergil und Horaz. Andere meinen, daB Livius nach
der ersten wiUkommenen Annahme von Ruhe und Frieden die Hoffnung auf
Wiederherstellung der alien Ordnung aufgegeben und sich resignierend den neuen
politischen Realitaten angepaBt hatte: W. Liebeschutz, JRS 57, 1967, 45-55; E. Lefevre,
Die unaugusteischen Ziige der augusteischen Literatur, Saeculum Augustum 11 (Darmstadt
1980) 173-96; Luce (vgl. Anm. 22) glaubt, sogar eine MiBbilligung der Plane des
Augustus durch Livius annehmen zu konnen.
f2 p. G. Walsh, Uvy (Cambridge 1961) 15; R. von Haehling, Zeitbeziige des T. Livius in
der ersten Dekade seines Geschichtswerks: Nee vitia nostra nee remedia pati possumus,
Historia, Einz. Schr. 61 (Stuttgart 1989): "weit von einer panegyrischen Wiirdigung
entfemt." (180).
^^ 28, 12. 12. Ob sich diese Wendung auf das Jahr 23 oder 19 bezieht, kann hier nicht
erortert werden und ist fiir unsere Fragestellung belanglos.
»* Vgl. Hon. c. 3. 14.
^5 L. Ross Taylor. Livy and the name Augustus. Qass. Rev. 32. 1918, 158 ff.
'^ K. Scou, Identification of Augustus with Romulus, TAPhA 56, 1925, 82 ff.
^' H. Erkell. Augustus. Felicitas. Fortuna, Diss. Goteborg 1952. W. Liebeschutz. The
religious position of Livy's history, JRS 57. 1967. 45-55, betont die kaum aufhebbare
Schwierigkeit, von seinem Werk auf die religiose Haltung des Livius Riickschliisse zu
Ziehen. Walsh (vgl. Anm. 12) riickt ihn nahe an die sloischen VorsteUungen seiner Zeit.
wie etwa im Sirme Ciceros. heran (passim), ohne dies jedoch giiltig beweisen zu konnen.
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Form augustiora im Gegensatz zu den res humanae auftritt und weil die
religiose Haltung des Livius in dem Geflecht von Schicksalsfugungen,
gottlichen Wendungen und Zufallen kaum zu eruieren ist. Alles in allem
wird man also festhalten diirfen, daB Livius bei der Erwahnung des Augustus
an alien Stellen in Distanz zu ihm steht und sachlich-nuchtem von ihm
spricht.
Auf der anderen Seite liegt es offen zu Tage, daB Livius in der hohen
Wertschatzung des fruhen Romertums den Bemuhungen des Augustus urn
eine innere Erneuerung Roms nach dem Bilde der Vorfahren nahe steht.
Jedem Leser des Livius sind die zahlreichen Bemerkungen gegenwartig, in
denen er direkt oder indirekt auf den Vorbildcharakter einer Handlung oder
Person aus der Friihzeit Roms verweist oder einzelne Verfallserscheinungen
im Lebensstil der Gegenwart wie die MiBachtung religioskultischer
Gepflogenheiten und Tradition, ^^ die luxuriose Lebensfuhrung,^^ den Hang
zu Biirgerkriegen^o in einen schroffen Gegensatz zu den Normen der mores
maiorum setzt. Eine solche Verklarung der Vergangenheit, verbunden mit
mehr oder minder heftiger Zeilkritik, war bei dem hohen
TraditionsbewuBtsein der Romer in der vorlivianischen Annalistik bereits
angelegt, und manche der kritischen oder lobenden AuBerungen des Livius
mag er seinen Quellen entnommen haben. Aber es diirfte kein Zweifel
bestehen, daB eine solche Beurteilung der Geschichte durch die Zeitereignisse
mit der Beendigung der Biirgerkriege und der Einkehr eines umfassenden
Friedens eine erhebliche Verstarkung erfahren hat. R. Syme^' und R J.
Luce,^^ die beide die erste Pentade bereits vor 27 abgeschlossen halten,
vertreten die Ansicht, daB Augustus fiir seine ReformmaBnahmen
Orientierungshilfen durch Livius erhalten habe und von ihm zu eigenen
Entscheidungen und MaBnahmen angeregt worden sei. Walsh nimmt an,
daB Livius vierzig Jahre in Frieden mit Augustus gelebt und "groBen
EinfluB" auf ihn gehabt habe.^^
Sed nondum haec, quae nunc tenet saeculum, neglegentia deorum venerat (3, 20, 5);
nunc nos tamquam iam nihil pace deorum opus sit, omnes caerimonias polluimus (6, 41,
9); vgl. 4,6, 11; 3,57,7; 8, 11. 1.
" Adeo in quae laboramus sola crevimus, divitias luxuriamque (7, 25, 9); vgl. 7, 2, 13;
3, 26, 7; 3, 57, 7.
^ Nondum eranl (scil. cives) tarn fortes ad sanguinem civilem nee praeter externa
noverant bella (7, 40, 2); von Haehling 51-52.
^' R. Syme, Livy and Augustus, Harv. Stud, in Class. Philol. 64, 1959, 50; ders., Roman
Aristocracy (Oxford 1986) 39; 445 erwahnt Livius als loyal historien, eloquent patriot.
^ P. J. Luce, The dating of Livy's first decade, TAPhA 56, 1965, 240.
^ Walsh (vgl. Anm. 12), Livy 18.
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Solche Annahmen unterschatzen die Eigeninitiative des Augustus^ und
finden im Text des Livius keine Stutzen. Es liegt vielmehr nahe, daB
Livius bei seiner Arbeit an der erslen Pentade in den Jahren nach 29 (27) mit
seiner hohen Bewertung des friihen ROmertums die auf die Emeuerung der
mores maiorum gerichteten Reformen des Augustus bejaht hat und sie
vielleicht sogar habe unterstutzen wollen. Dabei braucht man in dieser
Zustimmung keineswegs, wie das gelegenllich geschehen ist, eine
Huldigung an Augustus zu sehen. Diese Konfrontalion der vorbildlichen
Friihzeit und gewisser Dekadenzerscheinungen der Gegenwart bietet einen
Einblick in die Diskussion, die in Rom in den Jahren nach Aktium und
besonders nach der Ruckkehr Octavians stattgefunden hat und der Frage gait,
wie sich das neue Regiment entwickeln und welchen Kurs der Princeps
einschlagen werde. Solche Erorterungen sind um so lebhafter zu denken, als
wir wissen, daB bereits in den beiden vorangegangenen Generationen die
Probleme einer Umgestaltung der romischen Fiihrungsschicht und einer
kritischen Uberprufung der traditionellen romischen Politik und
Staatsfiihrung aktuell waren. Ich erinnere, um nicht weiter zuriickzugreifen,
im theoretischen Bereich nur an Ciceros Schrift De re publica und in der
praktischen Pohtik an die Regelung des Jahres 52, als Pompeius consul sine
collega war. Sogar bis in die Dichtung hatten diese Probleme Eingang
gefunden. So stellt Vergil im Prooemium des ersten Buchs der Georgika^^
die Frage, uber welchen Bereich der Welt Octavian quern mox quae sint
habitura deorum concilia, incertum est nach seinem Tode und seiner
Aufiiahme in den Kreis der Gotter seine Herrschaft ausuben wolle. In seinen
visionaren Versen iiber die Veranstaltung kiinstlerischer Agone in Mantua
gelobt er einen Tempel zu errichten, in dessen Mitte Octavian verehrt werden
soil: in medio mihi Caesar erit templumque tenebit}^ Er schlieBt die
Georgika mit dem Hinweis auf Octavians Siege und Rechtsprechung im
Osten und wahlt dafiir das aussagestarke Bild Caesar dum magnus ad altum
fulminat?'^ Auch Horaz laBt uns die Unsicherheit erkennen, die uber der
Institutionalisierung des neuen Herrschaftssystems und der kiinftigen
Stellung Octavians lag. In der wohl ins Jahr 29 zu datierenden Ode 1, 2, in
der er die Frage stellt, welche Gottheit die Romer nach den Freveln der
Biirgerkriege entsiihnen werde, nennt er nach Apoll, Venus und Mars an
letzter Stelle Octavian, den Racher Caesars, in dem er eine Epiphanie des
^ Abwegig ist die These von H. Petersen, Livy and Augustus, TAPhA 92, 1961, 440-
57, daB Livius mit der Zeichnung von machlliistemen, vorrevolutionaren oder
tyrannischen Gestalten Augustus vor MiBrauch seiner Macht habe wamen wollen.
" Georg. 1. 24-^2.
26 Georg. 3. 16.
'^ Georg. 4. 560 f.
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Merkur preist.^* Auch in einigen Oden der folgenden Jahre riickt er
Augustus in die Nahe von Heroen oder HalbgOttem, wie Pollux, Romulus
und die Dioskuren^ oder sieht ihn gar als Stellvertreter Jupiters auf Erden.^
Es ware fast unverstandlich, wenn Livius an diesen tastenden Versuchen
nicht teilgenommen und einen eigenen Weg zu einer Stellungnahme
gefunden hatte. Liegt es schon nahe, daB ein Historiker bei seiner
Behandlung vergangener Perioden und Personlichkeiten—unbewuBt oder
bewuBt—die eigenen Erfahrungen und Uberlegungen in seine Darstellung
einflieBen laBt, um das vergangene Geschehen sich zu verdeutlichen und
seine Ursachen und Wirkungen zu klaren, so haben die annalistischen
Vorganger des Livius, insbesondere die Vertreter der sog. jungeren
Annalistik,^' wie der Niederschlag ihrer Werke noch bei Livius zeigt, sich
nicht gescheut, die Vergangenheit in erheblichem AusmaB aus
zeitgenossischem Geschehen und dem eigenen Erleben zu deuten. Dies ist
teils aus ihrer poUtischen Uberzeugung, teils aus darstellerischen Griinden
zur Belebung der vergangenen Ereignisse geschehen. Natiirlich lag die
Versuchung nahe, Perioden der friihen Geschichte, fiir die wenig
zuverlassiges Quellenmaterial vorlag, durch eigene Erfindungen von
politischen oder militarischen Ereignissen "aufzufullen" und anzureichem.
So darf es uns nicht wundem, daB Livius dieses Material benutzt hat, um
seine Stellungnahme zu den akuten Diskussionen iiber die Gestaltung der
poUtischen Entscheidungen und der Neuordnung des gesamten Lebens nach
dem Sieg von Aktium zum Ausdruck zu bringen.^^
Als eine der gegenwartigen Lage vergleichbare historische Periode bot
sich eine der scharfsten Caesuren der romischen Geschichte an, in der die
RSmer eine existentielle Wende sahen: Rom nach der Zerstorung der Stadt
durch die Gallier und die Phase des auBeren und inneren Wiederaufbaus durch
Camillus. In der Darstellung seiner Person und Taten haben wir eine
indirekte Stellungnahme des Livius zu der Neuordnung der Jahre 29-27 und
zu Augustus und seinen politischen Zielen zu sehen. Zugleich bot die
gewahlte Epoche mit der groBen Zahl der iiberlieferten Ereignisse die
Moglichkeit einer spannenden Dynamik und starken Verlebendigung des
Geschehens. Es spricht viel dafiir, daB bereits die Vorlagen des Livius diese
Epoche des Camillus einer Heraushebung fiir wert gehalten und sie ziemlich
2«Hor. c. 1.2.41-44.
29 Hor. c. 3. 3, 9 ff.
3° Hor. c. 3. 5. 1 ff.
^^ Vgl. D. Timpe. Erwagungen zur jungeren Annalislik. AuA 25. 1979. 97-119.
'2 Er selbst hat, soweit wir sehen, es unterlassen, solche stoffliche Erweiterungen
vorzunehmen.
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ausfiihrlich aus dem Geist ihrer Person und ihrer Zeit behandelt hatten. Nun
erhielt die gesamte Ereigniskette durch Livius eine neue Ausrichtung und
Sinngebung.^^
Den ersten Ankupfungspunkt an die politisch-geistige Situation in
Rom zwischen den Jahren 29 and 27^^ liefert die Tatsache, daC Livius darauf
Bezug nimmt, daB man damals nach einem Ehrennamen fiir den Sieger von
Aktium und den neuen Herrscher suchte und daB dafiir verschiedene
Vorschlage (indirekt auch von Octavian selbst?) im Umlauf waren. Dazu
gehOrte auch der "Titel" (alter) Romulus, bis schlieBlich die Entscheidung
fiir "Augustus" fiel. So ist es wohl kein Zufall, daB Livius Camillus bei
seinem verschiedenen Auftreten mit wechselnden Beinamen charakterisiert
und auszeichnet. Als Camillus nach seinen zwei Siegen iiber die Gallier als
gefeierter Triumphator in Rom einzieht, laBt Livius ihn durch die Soldaten
als Romulus ac parens patriae conditorque alter urbis (5, 49, 7)^ gepriesen
werden. Am Beginn des folgenden Jahres fuhrt er ihn mit den Worten ein:
ceterum primo adminiculo (scil. urbs) erecta erat, eodem innixa, M. Furio
principe,^^ stetit (6, 1, 4) und fugt bei seinem Erfolg in der Schlacht gegen
die Volsker die Wendung ein: in ea parte, in qua caput rei Romanae
Camillus erat (6, 3, 1). In die Nahe der religiosen Sphare riickt er ihn mit
der fundamentalen Wende, die mit dem Sieg des Camillus iiber die Gallier
fiir Rom eintrat, wenn er schreibt: iam verterat fortuna, iam deorum opes
humanaque consilia rem Romanam adiuvabantmd fortfahrt: eiusdem ductu
auspicioque Camilli (scil. Galli) vincuntur.^ Uber diese Annaherung an die
opes deorum, mit deren Hilfe Camillus den Sieg erringt, ist Livius aber
nicht hinausgegangen und hat es vermieden, die mit dem Wiederaufbau der
Stadt Rom und seiner Tempel beschaftigten Romer erwagen zu lassen,
" Vgl. J. Bayel. Tite-Live. Histoire Romaine T. V, L.V (Paris 1954) 140-53;
(wiederholt nachgednickl); R. M. Ogilvie, A commenUry on Livy, Books I-V(C)xford
1965) 741 ff.; E. Burck. Wege zu Livius (Darmstadt. 3. Auflage, 1987) 310-28; J.
Hellegouarc'h, Le Prinzipat de Camille. REL 49. 1970.
^^' Vor der Annahme gezielter. aber unausgesprochener Anspielungen auf besiimmte
PersonUchkeiten oder Talbestande der eigenen Zeit und vor der Annahme intendierter
assoziativer Gedankenverbindungen beim Leser hat von Haehling wiederholt mit Recht
gewaml (23 f.; 53 ff.). Wenn sie sich aber—wie es im Folgenden der Fall ist—in groBerer
Zahl in einem zusammenhangenden Erzahlungskomplex feststellen lassen und einen festen
Sinnzusammenhang konstituieren. kann ihnen die Beweiskraft nicht abgesprochen
werden. Auch von Haehling nimmt in mehreren Fallen solche intendierten Anspielungen
an (203-15). von denen aber die vermuteten Hinweise auf die gegenseitigen Vorwiirfe von
Antonius und Oktavian iiber ihre "Trunksucht und Feigheit" (56; 185 f.) ausgesprochene
MiBgiiffe sind; dagegen isl dem Zeitbezug von 6, 6. 4-18 zuzustimmen (195. Anm. 16).
^Von Haehling 208 f. Man muB sich freilich hiiten. diesen Lobpreis zu uberschatzen.
worauf auch Hellegouarc'h hinweist. Cicero gebraucht ahnliche Formulierungen, die wohl
unter Gebildeten, namentlich in Reden, gangig waren, z.B. Lentulus consul, parens, decus,
salus noslrae vitae (Cum pop. grat. egit 11); video P. Lentulum, cuius ego patrem, deum ac
parenlem status, forlunae ac nominis mei (Pro Sest. 144) u.a.m.
^* Vgl. im Elogium princeps pace belloque (7. 1, 9).
3<* 5. 49. 5-6.
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Camillus einen Kult und gottliche Ehren zu erweisen, wie es Vergil und
Horaz als MOglichkeit erwogen hatten. Er begnugt sich mit dem Satz:
omnium primum, ut erat diligentissimus religionum cultor, quae ad deos
immortales pertinebant, rettulit et senatus consultumfacit,fana omnia . . .
restituerentur?'^ Dieser Satz stellt eine enge Assoziation zu den von
Augustus getroffenen religios-kultischen MaBnahmen dar, die er unmittelbar
nach seiner Ruckkehr in Gang gesetzt hat. Die Ruckkehr des Camillus nach
seinem Sieg iiber die Volsker und nach der Einnahme der von den Etruskem
eroberten Stadt Sutrium formuliert Livius mit den Worten in urbem
triumphans rediit trium simul bellorum victor?^ Es kann kaum ein Zweifel
bestehen, daB der Leser des Livius mit diesem monumentalen und
einpragsamen Satz an die Ruckkehr Octavians und an seinen dreifachen
Triumph im Jahre 29 erinnert werden sollte. Dies wird noch dadurch
unterstrichen, daB aus dem Erlos der durch den Verkauf der Gefangenen
eingebrachten Summe zu Ehren des Camillus drei Schalen aus Gold mit
seinem Namen gefertigt wurden, die in der Cella des kapitolinischen
Jupitertempels aufgestellt wurden, so wie der im Jahre 27 vom Senat und
Volk Augustus verliehene Ehrenschild mit den eingearbeiteten vier virtutes
(virtus, dementia, iustitia, pietas)^^ in der curia Julia Aufstellung fand.
m
Die Ereignisse des Jahres 386 bediirfen einer besonderen Priifung. Damals
war Camillus mit fiinf Kollegen tribunus militum consulari potestate.
Rom stand unter schwerem militarischem Druck, und Livius laBt den Senat
den GOttern danken, daB Camillus in der Magistratur steht: dictatorem
quippe dicendum eumfuisse, si privatus esset. Die Amtskollegen stimmen
zu, daB Camillus diktatorische Befehlsgewalt erhalt,"**^ und bringen zum
Ausdruck, daB sie bereit sind, sich ihm unterzuordnen: nee quicquam de
maiestate sua detractum credere, quod maiestati eius viri concessissent.^^
Diese Formulierung laBt an die beruhmte Aussage des Augustus im
Monumentum Ancyranum denken, daB er an amtlichen Befugnissen nicht
mehr als seine Amtskollegen besessen habe und non potestate, sed
auctoritate das Regiment in der Hand gehabt habe."^^ Ob eine sinngleiche
3''
5, 50. 1.
'" 6. 4. 1.
^' Mon. Anc. 34. Eine ahnliche Kumulation von virtutes bei Camillus: Camillus
consilio et virtule in Volsco bello, felicitate in Tusculana expeditione, utrobique singular
i
adversus collegam patientia et moderatione insignis (6, 27, 1). Zur Erganzung: fides
Romana, iustitia imperatoris in foro et curia celebratur (6. 27, 11). In dieser Wurdigung
faCt Livius die vorbildlichen Eigenschaflen und Leistungen des in seinen Augen idealen
Staatsmanns zusammen.
*0 6.6.6.
^' 6. 6. 7.
*^ Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestate auiem nihilo amplius habui
quam ceteri, qui mihi quoque in magistratu collegae fuerunt (Mon. Anc. 34).
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Aussage als WillensauBerung des Augustus bereits am Anfang der zwanziger
Jahre gefallen sein und in der Offentlichkeit bekannt geworden sein
kOnnte?''^ Livius laBt Camillus fiir den ihm erwiesenen Vertrauensbeweis
danken, die Schwere der ihm iibcrlragenen Verantwortung zum Ausdruck
bringen und versichem, daB er alle Krafte einsctzen werde, ut tanto de se
consensu civitatis opinionem, quae maxima sit, eliam constantem ejficiat.^
Diese Erkiarung erweckte beim Leser mit groBer Wahrscheinlichkeit die
Erinnerung an den Bid, mit dem Octavian im Jahre 31 vor dem Krieg mit
Antonius ganz Italien und die Provinzen sich zur Treue verpflichtet hatte und
der ihm den von ihm genutzten consensus universorum eingebracht hatte,
wie er es spater im Monumentum Ancyranum bezeugt hat.'*^ Livius laBt
Camillus in der Verteilung der militarischen und politischen Aufgaben L.
Valerius als socius imperii consiliique agieren und ubertragt Ser. Cornelius
die verantwortungsvoUe Aufgabe als praeses huius publici consilii, custos
religionum, comitiorum, legum, rerum omnium urbanarum zu
fungieren'*^—wie es Octavian getan hatte, als er nach Aktium aufbrach und
Maecenas die Obergewalt in Rom ubertragen hatte.
Bei aller Anerkennung der auf gleiche Achtung und Aufgaben der
Amtskollegen bedachten Regelungen des Camillus darf aber eine
Einschrankung nicht uberlesen werden, die Livius am Beginn seines Berichts
macht. Die Amtskollegen betonen bei ihrer freiwilligen Unterordnung unter
die Befehlsgewalt des Camillus, daB es sich hierbei um eine durch den
drohenden Krieg herbeigefiihrte Sonderregelung handelt: et collegae fateri
regimen omnium rerum, ubi quid bellici terroris ingruat, in viro uno esse
(6, 6, 6). Dieser Sonderfall wird dadurch moglich und gerechtfertigt, daB
zwei Voraussetzungen erfiillt sind: die Amtskollegen haben die Einsicht und
den Willen, zur Behebung einer Notlage des Staates einem ihnen
iiberlegenen Kollegen eine Sonderstellung einraumen und ihm
auBergewohnliche Machtkompetenzen ubertragen zu mussen, aber auf der
anderen Seite darf der Herausgehobene von der ihm iibertragenen VoUmacht
nur so viel Gebrauch machen, wie es die Krisensituation und die Achtung
*^ Eine solche Assoziation wird dem Leser durch einen spateren Salz aus dem
Camillusbericht nahegelegt. Als die Soldalen unerwarteter Weise vor einem Angriff
zuriickschrecken, laBl Livius im Riickblick auf die vorher geschilderle
Kompetenzverleilung die provokative Frage an sie richlen, ob sie ihn etwa nicht
anerkennen woUten, da er seine Befehle nicht als Diktator, sondem als Militartribun gebe
und fiigt hinzu: neque ego maxima imperia in vos desidero el vos in me nihil praeler me
ipsum intueri decet (6, 7, 5).
'^ 6. 6. 9.
** Juravit in mea verba tola Ilalia sponle sua el me bello, quo vici ad Aclium, ducem
depoposcil. Juraverunt in eadem verba provinciae Galliae, Hispaniae, Africa, Sicilia,
Sardinia (Mon. Anc. 25); vgl. D. Kienast, Augustus (Darmstadt 1982) 60; 67 ff.; dazu: in
consulatu sexlo el seplimo . . . per consensum universorum potilus rerum omnium rem
publicam ex mea poleslale in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transluli (Mon. Anc.
34).
^ 6, 6, 12-14.
Erich Burck 279
vor der PersOnlichkeit der socii imperii consiliique gebieten.'^'^ Camillus ist
sich dieser Ausnahmesituation bewuBt und iibt moderatio ^^ Zugleich
betont er die Notwendigkeit einer doppelten Fiihrung, wenn er seine Antwort
auf die Gewaltabtretung der anderen Militartribunen mit dem Satz schlieBt:
circumsederi urbem Romanam ab invidia et odio finitimorum; itaque et
ducibus pluribus et exercitibus administrandam rem publicum esse^^ Als
die von Antium und den Volskem drohende Gefahr abgewendet ist, erteilt der
Senat, nachdem er mit Camillus verhandelt hat (!) (senatui cum Camilla agi
placuit);'^ den Auftrag, den Krieg gegen die Etrusker aufzunehmen. Trotz
einer gewissen inneren Hemmung kommt Camillus dem Senatsauftrag nach:
quamquam expertum exercitum adsuetumque imperio, qui in Volscis erat,
mallet, nihil recusavit. Valerium tantummodo imperii socium depoposcit.^^
Wieder hort der Leser aus der Betonung des Gehorsams des Camillus
gegeniiber dem Senat und aus der emeuten Hervorhebung der Teilung des
Kommandos, dafi Livius mit seiner Darstellung der gesamten MaBnahmen
sowohl des Camillus als auch der Amtskollegen einen starken Nachdruck
darauf legt, daB trotz aller Bedrangnis Roms die AUeinherrschaft eines
einzelnen Fiihrers begrenzt wird. Dieser Tendenz gibt Livius starken
Ausdruck, indem er die freudige Zuversicht der Senatoren hervorhebt, daB die
von Camillus getroffenen Dispositionen die beste Regelung et de bello et de
pace universaque re publica darstellen und daB der Staat keinen Diktator
benOtige: si talis viros in magistratu habeat, tam concordibus iunctos
animis parere atque imperare iuxtaparatos laudemque conferentis potius in
medium quam ex communi ad se trahentis.^'^ Dieser Satz faBt den Zustand
der Concordia ordinum zusammen, den Livius als eines der hochsten Ziele
des rOmischen Gemeinwesens, vor allem in der ersten Dekade, aber auch in
den folgenden Biichem in eindringlichen Szenen herausgearbeitet hat.^^ Man
kann vermuten, daB dieses bereits von Cicero erstrebte politische Ideal
*^ R. von Haehling hat eine Vermutung von F. Hellmann, Livius Interpretalionen
(Berlin 1939) 54 f. aufgegriffen und hat wahrscheinlich machen konnen (191-217), daB
Livius in der eingehenden Darstellung der Ereignisse des Jahres 446 (3, 66-70) einen
Bezug auf die Situation in Rom im Jahre 28/27 hergesteUt habe. Er sieht in dem Verhaltnis
der beiden Konsuln Titus Quinctius Capitolinus und Agrippa Furius, die bei ungleicher
Gewaltverteilung, aber in personlichem Konsens einen Feldzug durchfiihren und dank der
Riicksichtnahme des ersten den Ruhm des Sieges teUen sowie in dem Namen des zweiten
einen Hinweis auf das Verhaltnis zwischen Augustus und M. Vipsanius Agrippa.
** Ein wie groBes Gewicht Livius auf diese moderatio legt, lehrt die Tatsache, daB er sie
in der kurzen Laudatio des Camillus am Ende des Amtsjahres 381 als letzte und wichtigste
virtus auffuhit (6. 27, 1).
^' 6, 6, 11, Vgl. In exercitu Romano cum duo consules essent potestate pari, quod
saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est (3, 70, 1); von Haehling 197 f.
50 6, 9. 5.
6. 9. 6.
6, 6. 18; vgl. von Haehling 195, Anm. 16.
Dies hier nachzuweisen wiirde vom Thema dieses Beitrags zu weit abfiihren.
280 Illinois Classical Studies, XVI
sowohl einzelnen Politikem als auch Livius als erhofftes Leitbild fiir die
nach der Riickkehr des Augustus im Jahre 29 einsetzende Neuorientierung
des romischen Gemeinwesens vor Augcn gestanden haL^^
IV
Wenn wir auf die von uns betrachteten Camillusberichte zuriickblicken,
konnen wir folgende Feststellungen treffen und festhalten: 1) Livius hat
diesen Berichten schon durch ihre Plazierung an herausgehobenen
Buchstellen^'* in seinem Werk eine besondere Bedeutung zugemessen. Der
erste Teil bildet den AbschluB der ersten Pentade, der zweite Teil den Anfang
der zweiten Pentade. 2) Beide Teile entsprechen einander im Umfang, sind
als kontrastierende Gegenstucke gearbeitet und weisen die Merkmale
hochster Livianischer Gestaltungskunst auf. Der AbschluB von Buch 5
entbehrt jeglichen Tatenberichts und wird durch eine der bedeutsamsten
Reden des Livius gebildet; die Einleitung von Buch 6 ist im Gegensatz
durch hohe Dynamik wichtiger Entscheidungen und Handlungen
charakterisiert. Die Rede des Camillus ist wesentlich riickwarts gewandt und
stellt eine Besinnung auf die religios-kultischen Grundlagen und bewahrten
Traditionen der Stadt Rom dar mit dem Ziel ihrer Wiederaufnahme an dem
von der Natur und den Gottem ausgezeichneten Platz.^^ Die Schilderung der
ersten Jahre nach 390 ist auf die Zukunft gerichtet, zeigt den Eifer, mit dem
der Wiederaufbau der Stadt betrieben wird,^^ und berichtet die neuen
militarisch-politischen Regelungen und Erfolge.
3) In dem Aufbaubericht finden sich Formulierungen von Fakten und
Reden, die beim Leser Assoziationen an die Neuordnung in Rom in den
ersten Jahren nach dem Sieg von Aktium und an Entscheidungen und
Handlungen des Augustus wecken soUen. Diese Hinweise auf Augustus
sind im ganzen verhalten^^ und konnen nur in einigen Fallen, wie etwa in
dem indirekten Hinweis auf den dreifachen Triumph des Camillus und die
Weihung der goldenen Schalen als eine indirekte Huldigung an Augustus
gesehen werden. Als abwegig wird man die Vermutung zuriickweisen, dafi
^'' Es sei mit Nachdruck festgehalten, daB die Zeichnung dieses Leiibildes fiir das ersie
Dezennium des Prinzipals wahrend der Arbeit des Livius an der ersten Dekade Giiltigkeit
beanspruchen darf, daB aber iiber die Einstellung des Livius in den folgenden Jahren nichls
prajudiziert werden darf.
^ Dariiber besteht Konsens, daB Buchanfang und Buchende bei Livius in vielen Fallen
eine besondere inhaltliche Heraushebung bedeuten.
^^ Eine Assoziation zu den merkwurdigen Uberlegungen friihaugusteischer Zeit, die
Hauptstadl nach Troja oder Alexandria zu verlegen, ist moglich (Suet., Jul. 79, 3; scharfe
Ablehnung bei Hor. c. 3, 3. 57 ff.).
^^ Et Roma cum frequentia crescere . . . intraque annum nova urbs stelit (6, 4, 6). Uber
dem Eifer zum Wiederaufbau uberhoren die Plebejer die Versuche der Volkstribunen, sich fiir
Ackergesetze einzusetzen (6, 5, 1-5).
^' Dies gilt auch fiir den verdeckten Hinweis auf die vorbildliche Haltung des Augustus
gegeniiber Agrippa; s. Anm. 47.
Erich Burck 281
Livius mit dem Camillusbericht auf einzelne Entscheidungen des Augustus
habe EinfluB nehmen woUen oder dafi dieser sich durch Livius in einzelnen
Planen und Handlungen habe beeinflussen lassen.^^'
4) Von entscheidender Bedeutung ist die Tatsache, daB Livius die
Ubeitragung der Herrschaftsgewalt auf eine Person nur in Sonderfallen, wie
z.B. in schweren Kriegsnoten gerechtfertigt sieht, und daB die concordia
ordinum ihm als hochstes Ziel fiir das Gemeinwesen vor Augen steht.
Dabei soil dem Senat die letzte Entscheidung zufallen, nachdem er ein
Einvernehmen mit dem im Konsens mit seinen Amtskollegen
herausgehobenen Inhaber der hochsten Befehlsgewalt erzielt hat.
5) Wenn wir abschlieBend fragen, warum Livius die lockere
Verschmelzung des Camillusberichts mit den Ereignissen der Jahre 31-27 in
Rom vorgenommen hat und in welchem Sinne er diese Verquickung vom
Leser aufgenommen wissen wollte, so bieten sich zwei Antworten an. Die
eine ist in dem Wunsche zu sehen, die Ereignisse der Vergangenheit
mOglichst verstandlich und aus dem eigenen Erleben heraus nacherlebbar zu
machen. Dies war deswegen moglich, weil die miteinander in Beziehung
gesetzten historischen Abschnitte in ihrer Grundsituation einander ahnelten.
In beiden Fallen handelt es sich, wie bereits oben erwahnt, darum, daB nach
einer die Existenz Roms bedrohenden Kriegslage, die durch die Kelten, bzw.
durch Antonius und Kleopatra herbeigefuhrt worden war, eine grundlegende
Wende fiir Rom erreicht und ein Neuanfang consensu omnium gesetzt
worden ist. Die zweite Antwort ist darin zu sehen, daB die Ereignisse der
jungsten Gegenwart in wichtigen Entscheidungen festgehalten werden
sollen. Beide Abschnitte bilden zusammen einen Modellfall, aus dem der
Leser die Moglichkeiten und Wege erkennen kann und soil, eine existentielle
Krise der Gemeinschaft zu bewaltigen. Die Losung nach 390 hat sich durch
mehr als drei Jahrhunderte bewahrt. Die Losung von 29-27 soil sich in der
Zukunft bewahren, wenn die Leser des Livius seinem in der Praefatio
ausgesprochenen Rat folgen: inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere
capias, indefoedum inceptu,foedum exitu, quod vites (10).^^
Universitdt Kiel
^*- Von HaehUng 15.
^* Mit Recht ist wiederholt, u.a. auch von Hellegouarc'h (vgl. Anm. 33), darauf
hingewiesen worden, daB Livius die Gesult und Handlungen des nach der Konigsherrschaft
strebenden M. Manlius Capitolinus, die er im AnschluB an die Camillus-Berichte—^mit
Anklangen an Catilina und Caesar—berichtet, als schwarzes Gegenbild zu CamUlus
entwickelt hat (6, 11, 3-25, 14): ein Volkshets^r und Revolulionar, der sine moderatione
nach der Herrschaft strebt, ein iihcher parens plebis Romanae (14, 5), ein falscher vindex
Ubertatis (14, 10), ein falscher ^erva/or patriae (17, 4), vor dessen Verurteilung Livius
feststellt: illud notandum videtur, ul sciant homines, quae et quanta decora foeda cupiditas
regni nan ingrata solum, sed invisa etiam reddiderit (20, 5): ein zweiter Modellfall fiir
seine Leser, vgl. E. Burck, Das Bild der Revolution bei romischen Historikem, Gymn. 73,
1966. 86-109 (=Vom Menschenbild in der romischen Literatur [Heidelberg 1981] 118-
43).

22
Galen's Response to Skepticism
PHILLIP DE LACY
Galen's commitment to a science of medicine that could accurately diagnose
diseases, identify symptoms and causes, and prescribe treatment brought him
into conflict not only with physicians who questioned the need for such
medical theory or the reasoning by which it was constructed, but also with
the skeptics, whose arguments raised doubts about the possibility of gaining
knowledge of the truth about any subject whatever and who held that it is
possible to live with suspension of judgment.^ Galen sometimes refuses to
talk to the doubters; they are "boorish Pyrrhonists"^ and contentious
The following abbreviations are used in references to Galen's writings:
CMG: Corpus Medicorum Graecorum.
K.: Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia, ed. Karl Gottlob Kiihn. 22 vols. (Leipzig 1821-
33; repr. Hildesheim 1964-65).
MM: Galen, Methodus Medendi.
PHP: Galen, De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (= CMG V 4.1.2).
SM: Claudii Galeni Pergameni Scripta Minora. 3 vols. (Leipzig 1884-93; repr..
Amsterdam 1967).
Miiller, B ewe is (note 20) refers to L Miiller, Uber Galens Werk vom
wissenschaftUchen Beweis, Abh. Bayer. Akad. 1895, No. 2.
Other editions of Galen's writings are identified by the name of the editor. The
following require an explanation, since they are in works not primarily on Galen:
De opt. doct. . . . Barigazzi (e.g. note 6) refers to A. Barigazzi, Favorino di
Arelate. Opere (Florence 1966).
Subf. emp. . . . Deichgr. (e.g. note 2) and De sectis . . . Deichgr. (e.g. note 164)
refer to K. Deichgraber, Die griechische Empirikerschule (Berlin 1930; repr.
1965).
' Cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 107, 108. Where possible pre-Galenic sources for skepticism are
cited. When Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius are cited, it is with the caveat that
their arguments may to some extent be post-Galenic. On possible echoes of Galen's
language in Sextus see below, 302-03.
Galen did not limit this abusive term to avowed Pyrrhonists. In An in arteriis 1 (4.
727. 9-12 K. = 172. 1-4 Furley-Wilkie), those who fled lo the altar of boorish
Pyrrhonism were Erasistrateans. In De praecognitione 5. 14-15 {CMG V 8.1, p. 98. 4-8),
it was Alexander of Damascus who would not believe his eyes. In De puis. diff. 4. 2 (8.
710. 13-17, 711. 1-3 K.), they were skeptics and aporelics, who were not sure of their
own feelings, and the physicians who were influenced by them. Similarly, in Subf. emp. 4
(49. 29-50. 1 Deichgr.), Galen calls the physician Cassius a Pyrrhonist. Galen expresses
the relation of skeptic to empiricist in Subf. emp. 11 (82. 28-31 Deichgr.) with the words:
Qualis autem est secundum totam vitam sceticus, talis est circa medicativam empericus.
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arguers.^ Yet he does not ignore them. Indeed counter-arguments, he says,
must be answered if one is not to be tossed about on waves of uncertainty."*
The first step in the defense of scientific method is to establish, in
answer to the skeptics' doubts, that there are criteria of truth. Galen
maintains that there are criteria in the specialized disciplines, and these
specialized criteria could not exist if human beings had no natural criteria.^
The person who devised the instruments of the arts such as the compass and
the yardstick started from the natural criteria,^ and it is by calling on the
student's natural criteria that the teacher points out his errors and corrects
them.'' Not only are there natural criteria; they are common to all of us.
For, Galen says, what is natural must be common to all and have a
common nature.* A possible reason for stressing that all persons have these
natural criteria may have been a desire to avoid the skeptics' argument that
what is not common is not natural,' or the charge to which the Stoics were
liable for their view that only the wise man has scientific knowledge. From
that it would follow that the rest of us do not share the ability to separate
true from false. ^^ There are some, Galen says, who admit that the criterion
requires no proof but who do not admit that it is natural or common to all.^^
He may have had the Stoics or Epicureans in mind.
In opposing the argument from the arts the skeptics say that
appearances are sufficient criteria for choice and avoidance,^^ and the arts
provide things useful for life through the observation of appearances.^^ The
arts do not require a criterion that separates true from false. ^"^ Galen
concedes that right opinion is as good as knowledge in practical matters, but
it lacks stability and permanence.^ ^ It was the certainty that he found in
3 Cf. De peccat. dignot. 3. 23-24 {CMG V 4.1.1. pp. 51. 22-52. 11) and De ord. libr.
suor. 1 (19. 52 K. = SM 2. 82. 3-11).
* Synops. libr. suor. de puis. 1 (9. 432. 8-12 K.).
^ PHP 9. 1. 10 (p. 542. 7-8). The same point was made by LucuUus, the spokesman for
Anliochus, in Cic. Acad. 2. 22; cf. also 2. 146.
^De opt. doct. 4 (1. 48^9 K. = 184. 2-6 Barigazzi).
'Dc opt. doct. 2 (1. 44 K. = 180. 33-81. 11 Barigazzi).
^ PHP 9. 1. 11 (p. 542. 8-11). On nature as common to aU members of a class see
below, 293.
' The skeptics used the proposition that what is not common is not natural in arguing
that there is no common good; see Sextus, PH 3. 179 and AM 1. 147; Diog. Laer. 9. 101.
^°Cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 145; Sextus, AM 7. 152. Arcesilaus, according to Sextus (AM 7.
153), argued that on the Stoic view there can be no middle ground between the knowledge
of the wise man and the opinions of the ordinary man. Galen recognizes, of course, that
not all men are equally adept at using the natural criteria; cf. Thrasyb. 24 (5. 846-47 K. =
SM 3. 62. 9-12).
i> PHP 9. 7. 5 (p. 586. 23-27).
12 Cf. Sextus. AM 1. 29-30.
13 Cf. Sextus. AM 5. 2; Cic. Acad. 2. 107.
1* Cic. Acad. 2. 146.
1^ Gal. De ord. libr. suor. 2 (19. 54 K. = SM 2. 83. 17-23), with an apparent allusion
to Plato. Meno 96d-98a.
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mathematics that saved him from Pyrrhonic skepticism. ^^ Mathematical
reasoning was for him the model for philosophy and medicine. ^^ The
skeptics had of course questioned the fundamental concepts of mathematics.
Cameades, Galen tells us, refused to believe that magnitudes equal to the
same thing are equal to each other. He dismisses such an attack on the
evident as a sophism.'*
Having established the existence of natural criteria, Galen now identifies
them. They are, according to De plac. Hipp, et Plat., the eyes in their
natural state seeing things that are visible, the ears in their natural state
hearing things that are audible, the tongue tasting savors, the nostrils
smelling odors, the skin touching things touchable, and the mind or
intellect or whatever you want to call it, by which we distinguish what
follows and what conflicts and the like.'^ Trusting in these natural criteria
we accept as true what appears clearly to the senses or the mind.^ They are
the criteria that make possible the special criteria of the special disciplines.^'
It is necessary, then, to distinguish between appearances that are clearly
true and those that are not. Galen considered clear sensation and thought
equivalent to the Stoic KaxaXriTiTiKTi (pavTaoia,^^ and he therefore had to
defend his view against the attacks of the skeptics on that Stoic view. It
was first criticized by the Academic skeptics, and their criticism was
broadened by the Pyrrhonist Aenesidemus to refute any attempt to move
from the evident to the non-evident.^^ Aenesidemus' ten tropes give a list of
^^De libr. prop. 11 (19. 40 K. = SM 2. 116. 20-23).
'^ See for examples PHP 8. 1. 25 (p. 486. 12, with the note on p. 684). Other
examples, of which there are many, include Subf. emp. 12 (90. 2-4 Deichgr.) and De
peccat. dignot. 3. 2-A {CMC V 4.1.1. p. 46. 7-23). In PHP 8. 1. 20 (p. 484. 22-26).
Galen asserts that those who have mastered Euclid's proof that the earth is the center of the
universe accept it as confidently as they do that 2x2 = 4. In calling the elements of the art
of medicine its theorems (Gecopfmata) Galen may have intended an allusion to the
theorems of mathematics; see De part. art. med. 4, 5 (CMC Suppl. Or. 11, pp. 122. 30-34,
124. 19-20) and the reference to Gecopfinata ypajiniKa in De usu part. 10. 14 (3. 838 K.
= 2. 110. 23-24 Helmieich).
^^ De opt. doct. 2 (1. 45 K. = 181. 14-82. 5 Barigazzi). Galen often refers to the
arguments of the skeptics as sophisms; see below, 286.
^^PHP 9. 1. 13 (p. 542. 13-20). In A/M 1. 3 (10. 29. 3 K.) Galen identifies the criteria
as neipa and X6yo<;. Ileipa is the criterion of drugs in De simpl. med. 3. 6, 10 (11. 552.
13-15. 560. 18 K.).
^ See for example De opt. doct. 4 (1. 49 K. = 184. 16-18 Barigazzi) and the discussion
in Miiller, Beweis 29-34. For examples of things clear to the mind see below, 305 and
306.
2^ Cf. PHP 9. 1. 10. 23 (pp. 542. 7-8, 544. 17-21); De opt. doct. 4 (1. 48-50 K. =
184. 2-6, 18-19 Barigazzi).
^^Cf. PHP 9. 7. 3 (p. 586. 18-21). In De opt. doct. 2 (1. 42 K. = 180. 5-8 Barigazzi)
Galen equates the Stoic KataXriTixof; with PePaiax; TvcoaTO^.
^^ For Aenesidemus see Pholius, Bibl. 212 (3. 121 Henry). One of Aenesidemus'
arguments was quoted by Sextus in AM 8. 234.
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obstacles that confront anyone who wishes to determine which, if any, sense
perceptions give accurate information about anything beyond themselves.^^
In general terms Galen counters the arguments of the skeptics in three
basic ways. (1) He appeals to the universal agreement of mankind.
Everyone agrees that the judgment of true and false is to be referred to clear
perception and thought.^^ Everyone except Academics and Pyrrhonists
believes that what we see when awake is a source of firm knowledge, and
what we see in dreams is false.^^ (2) He calls the skeptics' arguments
sophistical. Those who would argue that it is unclear whether we are awake
or asleep, or, if that is clear, whether what we see when awake is any more
to be trusted than what we see when asleep, do not believe their own
arguments. They are indulging in eristic.^^ (3) He charges the skeptics
with upsetting human Ufe. If what we see when awake, in good health, and
sane is no more credible than what we see when asleep, sick, or mad,^* the
criteria of truth are thrown into disarray (ovyKixoxai)?^
A fourth general charge, aimed at those who fall under the influence of
the skeptics, is that they lack training in logic and scientific method. Some
physicians, Galen says, doubt the evident because of sophisms that they are
unable to solve.^^ And philosophers of all schools, including Academics
and Skeptics, are blind to their own errors when they dare to make
statements about things apart from proof and logical method.^^
But in addition to his overall denunciation of skepticism Galen responds
to specific difficulties raised by the skeptics. One such difficulty was that if
some appearances are true and some are false, there must be a criterion by
which we judge which appearances are true. But this criterion requires a
^ The ten tropes are presented by Sextus in PH 1. 36-163 and more briefly by Diog.
Laer. 9. 79-88. It is impossible to tell how far Sextus and Diogenes departed from
Aenesidemus' text; but presumably they did not greatly alter the overall import of the
tropes. Sextus may have added some of the medical examples that he gives. I follow
Sextus* numbering of the tropes.
^^ See for example PHP 9. 7. 3 (p. 586. 19-20). Galen appeals also to common
notions; see for example De plenit. 8 (7. 551. 9-10 K.).
^De opt. doct. 2 (1. 42 K. = 180. 8-14 Barigazzi). The argument from dreaming and
being awake is in Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sextus, PH 1. 104.
^Wn Hipp. De vicl. acut. convn. 1. 16 {CMG V 9.1. p. 132. 10-15). See also below,
note 47.
^Cf. Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sextus. PH 1. 100. 104.
^' Gal. De opt. doct. 2 (1. 43 K. = 180. 19 Barigazzi). Cf. also MM 2. 7 (10. 155. 1-5
K.); De caus. procatarc. 92. 201 {CMG Suppl. E. pp. 22. 26-27. 54. 20-23); De simp,
med. 1. 36. 37. 39 (11. 443. 4-12. 448. 13. 16-17. 455. 4 K.). In De puis, dignosc. 1. 2
(8. 786. 5 K.) Galen dismisses an otnopia of the empiricists as of no importance, as it
cannot overturn the use of clear appearances. See below. 295. Sextus. AM 8. 157 denies
that the skeptic causes life to be confused. In De elem. 1. 5 (1. 451 K. = 28. 18-20
Helmreich) Galen includes the monists among those who overturn life.
3°De caus. procatarc. 115-25. 141 {CMC Suppl. II. pp. 28-30. 36. 3-5). See also
below, note 68.
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demonstration, which in return requires a criterion, and so on.^^ Galen
replies that it is madness, it is Pyrrhonic nonsense, to require a criterion
prior to sense-perception or a logical demonstration of the truth of
perceptibles. If that were so, one would need a proof that snow is white.^^
We don't need a criterion from outside for what we all have by nature.^'*
Things clear to sense-perception and thought are the starting-point of all
proof, and the person who doubts them has left himself nowhere to begin.^^
It was no doubt to avoid the regress of criteria for criteria that Galen says in
PHP 9. 1. 12 (p. 542. 1 1-13) that he is reminding us of the natural criteria,
not teaching or proving them.^^
Of course Galen recognized that the same thing may appear different to
different persons or to the same person at different times and under different
circumstances.^^ He recognized also that things clear to thought may
sometimes appear to be in conflict with things clear to sense. But the
person trained in these matters will show that there is no real conflict.^
^
One source of seeming conflict is rashness of assent. Some people are
deceived when from rashness they assent to things not yet clear as though
they were clear.^' Seeing a person at a distance, they say confidently that it
is Theon, but they are proved wrong when at close range it turns out to be
Dion.'^o
^^ Again Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sexlus, PH 1. 114-17. See also Sextus, AM 7.
340. 342; Diog. Laer. 9. 91. The first of Aenesidemus' tropes (Sextus, PH 1. 59-61) also
raises the issue of proving the truth of perceptions: Since things appear differently to men
and animals, we can say how they appear to us, but not how they are in their own nature.
We cannot assert without proof that our appearances are better, nor can we prove it, since
proof would require a judge above both men and animals. The demand for a sign by which
true appearances can be separated from false was made by the Academics in their
controversy with the Stoics. What is the distinguishing mark, the propria nota, of the
cognitive appearance? Cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 35, 101, 103.
^^ There is probably an allusion here to Anaxagoras, whose black snow is sometimes
mentioned in controversies about the accuracy of sense-perception. See for example Gal.
De simp. med. 2. 1 (11. 461. 14-16 K.); De temp. 2. 2 (1. 589 K. = 50. 26-29 Helmreich);
and for the skeptics, Cic. Acad. 2. 72 and Sextus, PH 1. 33.
^PHP 9. 8. 25 (p. 596. 20-21).
35 De temp. 2. 2 (1. 588-90 K. = 50. 13-51. 17 Helmreich). Cf. also De simp. med. 1.
30. 2. 1 (11. 434. 16-35. 3. 459. 1-61. 9 K.).
3^ Galen's term for reminding is avajiijivfiaKcov. One would expect it to be used by
empiricists and skeptics, but the evidence is slight. Janacek's index to Sextus lists only
two occurrences. For the empiricists see Gal. De sect. 8 (1. 92 K. = SM 3. 22. 4-5) (the
empiricist is speaking): eoxai 6e Kai vvv 6 Xoyoi; dvdjivnaii; xov (paivojievou and De
plenit. 9 (7. 558. 5-7 K.): apd ye ndvG' djia tci eipTijieva o\)veX,9eiv 8ei Jtpoq xfjv ox;
avToi X,eYO\)Oiv dvdnviioiv zr\c, Kevcooeox; . . . ;
"See for example De san. tuend. 1. 5. 7 {CMG V 4.2. pp. 8. 32-9. 1).
^^De peccat. dignot. 6. 3 {CMG V 4.1.1, p. 63. 7-10).
"Ibid. 6. 3 (p. 63. 11-13).
^ Ibid. 6. 4 (p. 63. 15-18); cf. 6. 6 (pp. 63. 25-64. 2).
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Those friends who heard a report that a traveller had returned and rashly
announced his arrival were proved to be in error.'*^ If people persist in
assenting rashly in matters that can be verified, what will they do in obscure
matters?'*^ The cause of their rashness, Galen decides, is their desire to show
that they are quicker than their neighbors to make some discovery, whether
by the senses or by ihought.'*^ To a skeptic rashness is a disease afflicting
dogmatists that the skeptic, being a man of good will, would like to cure.'*'^
But Galen maintains that those who have honored their rational power as
their greatest glory and have sought to train and perfect it are neither rash
nor boastful.'*^
A different kind of problem is raised by the relativity of hot and cold,
dry and wet. It often happens that the same thing appears warm to the touch
at one time, cold at another."*^ If you say that Dion's crasis is dry and hot, a
sophist could easily say that in comparison with those whose crasis is
hotter and dryer, Dion's crasis is wet and cold."*^ Galen's answer is that
there are standards that make it possible to say that a crasis is in fact hot or
cold, dry or wet. For each class of animal and plant there is a mean crasis
best suited in each case to its proper activity. If an animal or plant is above
the mean for its class, it may be said to be hot; if below it, cold."^* But
there is also a midpoint that applies universally to all substances of all
kinds, the mean between the cosmic extremes of hot and cold, dry and wet.
In terms of this mean a crasis may in absolute terms be said to be hot or
cold, dry or wet."*^ Now as it happens, the human skin is precisely at the
midpoint of these cosmic extremes, and of the human skin that of the hand,
and of the hand that on the inside.^^ The skin of the inner side of the hand,
therefore, of the well-tempered person, whose hands have not been hardened
or calloused by digging or rowing, is the standard (Kavova xe Kal olov
*' Ibid. 6. 8 (p. 64. 15-17).
« Ibid. 6. 10 (p. 65. 2-5).
*^ Ibid. 6. 1 1 (p. 65. 9-14).
** Cf. Sexlus, PH 3. 280-81. The charge of Ttponeteia had a long history in the
controversies between skeptics and dogmatists. Colotes had used it against the Academy
of Arcesilaus, and Plutarch in reply turned it against the Epicureans. See Plut. Adv. Col.
1124b-c. It appears in Cicero as temeritas; see for example Acad. 1. 42, 45; 2. 31, 66.
*^De peccat. dignot. 5. 17-18 {CMC V 4.1.1, p. 59. 9-15).
^De simp. med. 3. 8 (11. 554. 11-12 K.).
^'' De temp. 1. 6 (1. 549 K. = 25. 15-23 Helmreich). The sophist here is not
necessarily a skeptic. Galen may have had in mind a commenutor on Hippocrates; see De
temp. 1. 7 (1. 553-54 K. = 28. 12-21 Helmreich). The skeptics, however, did use the
relativity of hot and cold as an argument against the trustworthiness of sense-perception.
See for example Sextus, PH 2. 56, and Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sextus, PH 1. 101, 1 10.
^'^De temp. 1. 6 (1. 544-47 K. = 23. 1-24. 19 Helmreich).
'*' Ibid. 1. 6 (1. 550 K. = 26. 6-16 Hebnreich).
5° Ibid. 1. 9 (1. 563-65 K. = 34. 20-35. 16 Helmreich).
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KpiTTipiov) by which you may discover faulty erases in all parts of the
body.5i
Galen gives a very different explanation of the taste of honey. Honey
when heated changes to yellow bile. In the body of a person who is cool it
keeps its sweetness and easily changes to blood; but it quickly turns to bile
in the body of a person who is hot and feverish, and for that reason it tastes
bitter.52 Sextus raises the problem of the taste of honey in his account of
Aenesidemus' fourth trope,^^ and he goes on to argue that if one says that it
is the combination of humors in a perceiver whose state is unnatural that
gives the honey its unnatural taste, one might equally well say that the
combination of humors in the healthy person gives the honey an unnatural
taste.^'* If this argument was actually made by Aenesidemus and is not
merely Sextus' own elaboration of the fourth trope, it could have been
known to Galen; and he may have tried to avoid it by placing the change in
the honey itself. The two different tastes are of two different substances.
A much more serious problem for Galen is that of distinguishing
between objects whose appearances are very similar, for the differentiation of
things in terms of similarities and differences was an essential part of his
scientific method.^^ The Academic skeptics had argued that a perception is
not cognitive if, on seeing one of two or more very similar things, we don't
know which one we are looking at. Their examples included twins, eggs,
imprints of a seal, and Lysippus' statues of Alexander.^^ In De peccat.
dignot. Galen takes up the problem of the twins which he finds analogous
to the nXdvaq Kai dnopiaq that closely similar things cause for
physicians as well as philosophers. Like Cicero's Lucullus, he points out
that those who are familiar with the twins can easily distinguish one from
the other.^'^ In De crisibus Galen draws an analogy between recognizing
diseases and recognizing persons. Each, he says, has its own distinctive
mark, which the person who has seen it frequently and continually can
^> Ibid. 1. 9 (1. 566-68 K. = 36. 20-37. 24 Helmreich); see also 2. 1 (1. 575-77 K. =
41. 24-43. 9 Helmreich). Similarly in De simp. med. 3. 8 (11. 555. 17 K.) Galen calls
touch the yvcoficov of hot and cold, and on the next page (556. 12-15 K.) he warns that
something may be called hot or cold in an absolute sense only when compared to the mean
and best human crasis.
"De simp. med. 4. 17 (11. 675. 15-77. 6 K.); cf. also De alim. fac. 3. 38. 3. 6. 7
{CMG V 4.2. pp. 380. 20-81. 4. 381. 21-29); De antidotis 1. 4 (14. 21. 5-15 K.).
^' Sextus, PH 1. 101. Sextus raises the problem of the taste of honey also in AM 8.
53-54.
5^ Sextus. P// 1. 102-03.
^* The ninth book of PHP, for example, is devoted entirely to the problem of knowing
how to distinguish between very similar things.
5^ Cic. Acad. 2. 54. 84-86.
^^ De peccat. dignot. 2. 4-5 {CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 43. 25-44. 11); cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 57.
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easily recognizees Here Galen has conceded that one must have prior
knowledge in order to identify a veridical perception, and to that extent he
has departed from his doctrine that the clear perception is the starting-point
of knowledge. Clear perception in the case of twins requires prior
knowledge of the difference between them.
Other problems in the differentiation of things in terms of similarities
and differences were raised by the sorites. The skeptics used the sorites to
point out the difficulty of establishing boundaries. Their examples included
the boundary between grain and heap, hill and mountain, deity and non-
deity, rich and poor, clear and unclear, few and many, small and large, short
and long, narrow and wide, virtue and vice, good and evil, true and false.^'
In a more specific attack on Stoic epistemology Sextus argued that as the
last cognitive appearance lies beside the first non-cognitive appearance and
no boundary can be drawn, the cognitive cannot be differentiated from the
non-cognitive. If "fifty are few" is a cognitive appearance, and "ten
thousand are few" is non-cognitive, where is the dividing line?^
Of course the sorites, which Galen also calls 6 napa ^iiKpov Xoyoq,^'
was not used exclusively by skeptics. Dogmatists used it against
empiricists, and empiricists in turn used it against dogmatists.^^ It was first
formulated and named, apparently, by the Megaric Eubulides,^^ ^ut there is
something very much like it in a passage from Plato's Phaedrus that Galen
quoted in PHP, where Socrates says that it is easier to go undetected from
one thing to the opposite if one proceeds Kaxa o|iiKp6v, and that the one
who is to deceive another without being deceived himself must distinguish
accurately the similarity and difference in things.^
Galen responds to the problem of the sorites in several ways. He
acknowledges that it is common to many things in life and has been
discussed by many philosophers and physicians.^^ You can ignore it, he
says, and in many places you have to; but when it is possible to set clear
boundaries it is not a good idea to expose yourself to unnecessary
difficulties.^
^* De crisibus 2. 9 (9. 684 K. = 153. 15-25 Alexanderson). Cicero, as spokesman for
the New Academy, had argued {Acad. 2. 84) that the inability to distinguish between twins
results from the lack of a mark (noia) by which true is distinguished from false.
^^ See for example Cic. Acad. 2. 49. 92-95; De nal. dear. 3. 43-50; De div. 2. 11;
Sextus, AM 9. 182-90.
^ Sextus, AM 7. 415-21; cf. PH 2. 253-54.
" Cf. Gal. De loc. aff. 1. 2 (8. 25. 16-17 K.).
"See De exp. med. 7. 5-10; 12. 8; 15-18; 20 (95-97, 106. 111-21. 123-26 Walzer);
Subf. emp. 3 (47. 1-4 Deichgr.).
^^ Diog. Uer. 2. 108.
" Plat. Phaedr. 261e6-62c3, quoted by Galen in PHP 9. 2. 14-16 (pp. 546. 35^8.
13).
^^ De loc. aff. 1.2 (8. 25. 17-26. 1 K.).
^De marcore 4 (7. 680. 4-9 K.).
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Insofar as the sorites leads to the conclusion that there is no mountain,
since the addition of a single foot, at whatever point, is not enough to
change the hill into a mountain, Galen would no doubt agree with the view
that he attributes to the empiricists in De exp. med., that the sorites is
fallacious since it is contradicted by what is plain to the senses.^'' Denying
that there is such a thing as a mountain is like denying that there are such
things as vision, generation and destruction, motion, aging, change of
winter to spring, spring to summer, summer to fall, because you cannot
explain how they come about.^*
But the problem remains how to find the boundaries between kinds of
things. When faced with the soritic question—^When does old age begin?
—
Galen finds the answer in the increase in the relative amount of liquids
discharged from the body. Old age is a drying out.^^ It is thought to be wet
because the discharge of liquids increases, the body being no longer able to
retain them.^^ A clear boundary, therefore, between the decline from the
prime of life and the beginning of old age is the predominance
(eTUKpaxTioK;) of those fluid discharges that deceived people into thinking
that old age is wet.^'
Galen has a very different explanation of the beginning of disease. It
rests on the distinction between change in form and change in magnitude.
In homoeomerous parts of the body a disease begins the moment the hot or
cold or wet or dry exceeds healthy limits in the crasis of the body. At that
point the boundaiy has been crossed. The disease now has its proper form,
but it may be too small to be detected by the physician or the patient, just
as the first drop of water to hit the rock begins to hollow it out, although
the hollow is not yet perceptible. Nature can cure small affections, but
when they become too large for nature to overcome, then outside help is
needed.^^ The form of the disease, however, is independent of its magnitude.
^''De exp. med. 17. 6-8 (118-19 Walzer).
^ De exp. med. 15-16 (113-15 Walzer); cf. also 19 and 20 (122-26 Walzer). The
theme that to deny the existence of something that is evident because one cannot explain
it is the result of misguided reasoning appears also in De semine 2. 4 (4. 620. 5-6, 10-13
K.); An in arteriis 6 (4. 721. 10-12 K.); De caus. procatarc. 115-16, 123 (CA/G Suppl. E.
pp. 28-29. 30); De consuet. 1 {CMG Suppl. Ill, p. 2). Galen does not teU us which
argument against motion he has in mind. The argument of Diodorus Cronus is given by
Sextus, AM 1. 311-12, 10. 85-87. 143; it is not in the fonm of a sorites. Neither Galen
nor Sextus, so far as I know, mentions Zeno's paradox of motion.
^De marcore 3. 4 (7. 672. 10-13. 678. 15-17 K.).
'"Cf. De temp. 2. 2 (1. 580-82 K. = 45. 9^6. 14 Helmreich).
'I De marcore 4 (7. 680. 9-12 K.).
'^De loc. aff. 1. 2 (8. 26. 3-28. 18 K.). Compare Ars med. 4 (1. 316. 4-17. 13 K.).
where the continuum from the best condition of the body to painful and crippling disease is
divided by clear visual differences; but when there is a weakening of activities the
difference between the extremes is easy to recognize but lesser differences are unclear. A
condition in this ambiguous middle zone is neither, owBexepa. This analysis, like that in
De loc. aff., recognizes the difference between the nature of things and their appearance.
The author says that appearance should be used in setting boundaries. He rejects setting
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Still another response is simply to leave the boundaries imprecise and
to make the uncertainty a matter of name-giving. Galen says in De febr.
diff. that paroxysms of different durations are given different names. It is
not possible to define the boundaries precisely because of the soritic puzzle;
but it is not necessary to look for such precision in names, since we can
prescribe treatment without them.'^^ Similarly in In Hipp. Progn. comm.
the question whether a fever with a crisis after the fourteenth day, on up to
the seventeenth or even the twentieth day, can still be called acute, becomes
a soritic problem which involves names only.^"*
What limits can be set to great and small, fast and slow? Galen faces
this problem in De puis, dignosc. 2. 1-2. One of his students suggested
that they have an indefinite range but are limited in the sense that one can
think of things outside the limits. The size of a city is indefinite, but no
city consists of only three households, and no city stretches out to a
thousand stades. No mountain is a foot high, but no mountain reaches the
moon.^^ On this view both the upper and the lower limit of a class of
objects is left indeterminate. But Galen rejects this analogy. There is no
upper limit too large, and no lower limit. Such terms as large and small,
hard and soft, have a fixed meaning only within a class of objects in which
there is a midpoint, a mean, a measure, jieao) xe Kal iiexpico Kai
a\)|ijiExptp, that can serve as canon and criterion. This mean, Galen says, is
sought in all of life. The arts, especially, are engaged in the pursuit of it."^^
Then after a long discussion Galen explains how to find the a-umxexpoq
The recognition that a clear perception does not always become clear
until the proper preliminaries have been carried out is nowhere more evident
than in Galen's identification, in PHP 9, of his (pavxaaia evapynq not
only with the Stoic (pavxaaia KaxaXrjTixiKTi but also with Cameades'
persuasive appearance, including its three requirements: ot) jxovov TiiGavriv
aXkcL Kal 7tepito6et)|ievT|v Kal dTiepianaoxov.^* Consistent with this
natural boundaries between disease and health on the ground that it would lead to the
doctrine of oteindGeia (317. 11-13). I take this warning to mean that if disease is a lack
of the proper proportion in the crasis of hot and cold and dry and wet, then only the best
constitution would be free of it, since bodies that are healthy but not in the best state have
already some small defect in their crasis (cf. 314. 15-15. 2; 315. 14-17). Here the author
of Ars medica, whether Galen or not, is clearly trying to avoid the sorites.
''^Defebr. diff 2. 10 (7. 371. 10-72. 14 K.).
"*/n Hipp. Progn. comm. 3. 15 {CMG V 9.2, p. 342. 12-30).
^^Z)c puis, dignosc. 2. 1 (8. 840. 11-41. 12 K.). Compare the Epicureans on limits of
variation, Philodemus' man of iron who walks through walls {De sign. col. 21), and
Lucretius' superman who wades through the sea and tears great mountains apart with his
hands (1. 199-201).
''^De puis, dignosc. 2. 2 (8. 841. 13^3. 12 K.).
" De puis, dignosc. 2. 2 (8. 857. 10-58. 17 K.).
78 pffp 9 7 3 (p 586 16-20); cf. also PHP 9. 9. 37 (p. 606. 20-21). For Cameades'
three requirements see Cic. Acad. 2. 33-36 and Sextus, PH 1. 227-29, AM 7. 166-84.
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identification is his warning against assenting to an appearance
d7uepiaKE7tTC0(;7' These preliminaries, as described in PHP 9. 2, are
themselves a modified sorites. As a method for distinguishing between very
similar things Galen says that one should start with the greatest and easiest
differences.*^ Having established these, one may advance Kaxa Ppax'u to
the differences that are slight. In other words, instead of starting at one pole
and advancing gradually from that, as the sorites does, we should first
establish two polar opposites and then advance gradually from each toward
the other, using the same criteria that we used to establish the poles.*^ The
well-trained master of a discipline will be able by this means to separate the
false from the true.*^
After defending the trustworthiness of clear appearances, Galen must
next defend against skeptic attack the method of passing from the evident to
the non-evident. Galen's term for this is endeixis, "indication," which, he
says in Meth. med.l. 7 (10. 126. 10-11 K.), is as it were the disclosure of
the consequence, olov eVtpaaw vv\c, dKoA.o\)0ia<;. It is not an inference from
a particular perceived thing; it is rather an inference from the very nature of
the thing, e^ a\>xx\c, xr\c, xot) 7ip(X7|iaTo<; (pTJoecoc; (ibid. p. 127. 1). Here
"the very nature of the thing" is not a periphrasis for "the thing" or "the
thing itself."*^ Nature in this context is something that transcends the
individual and is shared by other members of the group to which the
individual belongs. As Galen says about the natural criteria, what is natural
must be common to all.*'* It is from this common nature that inferences are
made by endeixis, and endeixis gives us truths that apply generally to all
members of a class. Applying this to medicine, Galen says that in order to
find the cure for every disease one must first find the generic and conimon
endeixis of all diseases and from there proceed to the species (ibid. p. 128.
4-6).
In explaining this generic approach to disease Galen introduces a
Platonic term. The reason all diseases are called diseases is necessarily
because they all participate in one and the same thing, evoq Kal xavxot)
This Cameadean scheme may have been one of the things that Galen recognized as sound
(vYieq) in the earlier Academics; see De opt. doct. 3 (1. 47 K. = 183. 3-4 Barigazzi).
^» PHP 5. 4. 12 (p. 314. 33); In Hipp. Epid. HI comm. 3. 76 {CMG V 10.2.1, p. 166.
19); In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 2. 27 {CMG V 10.2.2, p. 91. 8-11, 16). Cf. also PHP 9. 9.
38-39 (p. 606. 22 [oKeyiq] and 606. 28 [aoKentoi]).
*° PHP 9. 2. 3 (pp. 544. 36-46. 1). The allusion is to the Hippocratic dno xoiv
HeyvoTtov Kal ptiioxtov {De off. med. 1 [3. 272 Littre]), quoted in PHP 9. 1. 14 (p. 542.
22). Quoting this same phrase in In Hipp. Progn. comm. 1. 5 {CMG V 9.2, p. 210. 1-2)
Galen says that this is the starting-point not only for prognosis but also for the
indications (ev6ei^ei<;) of what must be done.
81 PHP 9. 2. 4 (p. 546. 1-2).
*2Cf. PHP 9. 7. 18-19 (p. 590. 2-9).
*^ On "the nature of as periphrasis see Plutarch's charge in Adv. Col. 1112f that when
Epicurus says "the nature of the void" he simply means "the void."
** See above, 284 and note 8.
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|j.E0e^£i (ibid. p. 128. 7). He then gives examples of things that have the
same name by virtue of what is the same in them (ibid. p. 128. 8-15).
When two or more different kinds of things have the same name for each of
its meanings, the name refers to what is one and the same in some one kind
of thing. A dog may be a land dog or a sea dog. They have only the name
"dog" in common; they do not have a common nature (ibid. p. 129. 2-4).
At this point Galen introduces another Platonic term: For all land dogs
there is one eiSoq by virtue of which they are called dogs (ibid. p. 129. 17-
18); and two pages later iSea is used along with ei5o<; as that to which the
name refers (ibid. p. 131. 17-18).^^ There is clearly some close relation
here between <px>oiq and eISck; and i6ea. They all refer to that shared unity
of members of a class on which the dogmatist bases his endeixis}^
Empiricists and skeptics had doubts about the possibility of knowing
the nature of things. Aenesidemus had argued that since the appearance of
things differs with the difference in animals, we will be able to say how an
object is seen by us, but we shall stop short of saying what kind of thing it
is in its nature, onoiov jiev T\\nv Gecopeixai to {)7ioKe{^evov e^o|i£v
Xiyeiv, oTioiov 8e eoxi npbc, Tqv (pijoiv ecpe^o^ev.^'' In De puis, dignosc.
Galen says that the empiricists professed ignorance of the nature of things,
1X115' oXcoq |j.Ti5ev ctTtavxcov cuq e^ei (puaei yivcooKEiv,** and he links
them to the Pyrrhonists by quoting a Une from Timon that was quoted also
by Sextus and Diogenes Laertius, to (paivo^ievov TidvTn oGevei oiinep av
eX0-p.*' Galen rejects their talk about not knowing the nature of things as
*^ Galen uses the term ei6o(; frequently in the following pages of MM 2. 7. See also
Inst. log. 12. 8 (29. 5 Kalbfleisch): Kal yap eotiv ox; ei5o<; ev and ibid. 18. 3 (45. 19-
21): TO yap eiSoi; ri\c, SiKaioovivtn;, d(p' o\> Xiycxai ndvxa xa Kaxa \i.ipoc, 6iKaia.
Things are given their ei8oi; by the four eiSonoiol jioiottitec;, De simp. med. 3. 4 (11.
546. 17-47. 5 K.) or by eiSonoiol Siacpopai, MM 1. 3 (10. 23. 10-14 K.). For iSEa see
Ti (or xi) . . . npayna fiiav i6eav ezov, MM 2. 7 (10. 144. 3, 5 K.). Galen sees a
reference to this unifying one also in the terms yi\/o(^,MM 2. 7 (10. 139. 10 K.), p
(favored by empiricists), ibid. 129. 8. 130. 5-9. 136. 4-5. 140. 9-13. 142. 13 K.. and
KOivoTpq (favored by methodists). ibid. 141. 14-16. 142. 12 K.
*^ The close relation between <p\)a\.q and tlSoq and i6ea is evident also in such
passages as De simp. med. 3. 4 (11. 546. 16-17 K.): Kaxa xr\\/ ovoiav oXtiv
aXXoiovxai (sc. 6 apxoq) Kal xf\c; apxaiac, E^ioxaxai <pvo£(oq. tic, EXEpov EiSoq
\icQiaxa.\itvoc„ Inst. log. 12. 9 (29. 7-8 Kalbfleisch): aX\a xo\> xoioiixou ye ei5o-o<;
aiixou \iia cpvaic; taxi, and In Hipp. Aph. comm. 2. 34 (17 B. 532. 7-8 K.): eoxiv oxe
yap ovond^owoi. <pvoiv Kal xaiixriv (sc. xfiv i6£av). Endeixis may be from an i6Ea: ek
xfii; Eauxcov \hia^ EvSEiKvvxai. In Hipp. Epid. I comm. 2. 47 {CMG V 10.1. p. 72. 19).
In conjoining nature and form Galen may have been influenced by such Platonic
expressions as x6 cpvaei 6iKaiov. Resp. 6, 501b2.
" Sextus. PH 1. 59; cf. 1. 117. 128. 129. 134. 163; Diog. Laer. 9. 86; and
Aenesidemus, 170bl5-16 in Phot. Bibl. 212 (3. 121 Henry).
^* Gal. De puis, dignosc. 1. 2 (8. 782. 6-7 K.).
*^ De puis, dignosc. 1. 2 (8. 781. 10 K.); Sextus. AM 7. 30; Diog. Uer. 9. 105. Cf.
also Galen's ridicule of those who sit oKEnxonevovc; Kal aTiopowvxou;, De puis, dignosc.
1. 2 (8. 783. 4 K.). The passage from 8. 780. 14 to 785. 1 K. is quoted by Deichgraber.
Die gr. Empirikerschule 133-34, with textual corrections.
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no more than idle talk.^*' Since in their actions in medicine and in the rest
of life they trust their senses and follow them, just like everyone else, their
aporia cannot overturn the use of clear appearances.'^
Empiricists and skeptics had also doubted the existence of an txhoc, that
is common to many particulars. Sextus raised the question how a genus,
being one thing, could be present in all its species;*^ and he asked how it is
that the av0pto7io(; by participation in which we are held to be human
beings is not one of us.'^ The empiricists, Galen says, asked to be shown
this avGptoTioq auToq Ka0' Eavxov apart from individual avGptoTioi.''*
Galen's answer is again aimed at the empiricists. He defends his own
position by an argument from names. The unifying one is something, for
it can be named, e.g. horse, empiricist, disease; and the name is the name of
something. 95 jf ^^ name signifies one thing, the form of the thing is
necessarily one.^
Arguing from names is treacherous. Names can be the names of more
than one thing, such as "dog" and "tongue."'^ They may be mere words,
signifying nothing, like pXkvpi and aKiv6a\}/6(;,'* or they may, like Scylla
and Centaur, have a meaning for which there is no corresponding object.'^
They may say nothing because they arise from a mistaken view of things,
like Archigenes' "heavy pulse."^^ Such names as hot, cold, dry, wet may
be ambiguous because of the many different objects of which they are
used.^^^ Theambiguity of names is a source of sophistical arguments. ^^2 ^
is clear, then, that when Galen says that there is one thing signified by such
a name as avBpcoTtcx; or voock;, he does not mean that from the name we can
infer the existence of a class of objects that are in some sense one, but rather
9°De puis, dignosc. 1. 2 (8. 785. 2 K.).
**' Ibid. 1. 2 (8. 786. 4-6 K.). See also 783. 18 and 785. 4 K.
'2 Sexius, P// 2. 219-22.
" Sextus. AM 10. 288-91.
^ Galen, MM 2. 7 (10. 140. 14-16 K.); cf. ibid. 152. 6-10; 154. 15-16.
'5 See MM 2. 7 (10. 128. 13-15. 143. 1, 144. 2-4. 155. 10-13 K.).
^^MM 2.7 (10. 131. 17-18 K.).
" Af A/ 2. 7 (10. 131. 2-9 K.). Galen uses the same examples in a discussion of
definition in De puis. diff. 2. 3 (8. 573. 1-15 K.).
'* A/M 2. 7 (10. 144. 9-1 1 K.). See also De diff. febr. 2. 6 (7. 348. 7 K.); De puis. diff.
4. 1 (8. 696. 19 K.); De usu part. 8. 4 (3. 629 K. = 1. 456. 3-13 Helmreich); De med. nom.
pp. 8. 17, 32 Meyerhof-Schacht.
" MM 2. 7 (10. 144. 13 K.); cf. De puis. diff. 4. 1 (8. 697. 4-5 K.). The centaur
appears alone in MM 2. 7 (10. 153. 19 K.).
'°° De puis. diff. 3. 3 (8. 652. 2-10 K.). In 3. 4 (8. 662. 4-7 K.) Galen compares
Archigenes' heavy pulse to pXCropi and OKivSayoq.
^°^ The ambiguity of the names of the qualities is a theme to which Galen often returns.
See for example De elem. 1. 6 (1. 460-65 K.); the convenient summary in De simp. med.
3. 2 (11. 542. 11^4. 6 K.); and above. 288-89.
^°2 See for example PHP 2. 4. 4. 5. 26. 8. 2 (pp. 116. 30-31. 132. 25-28. 158. 1-2).
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that the class can be given a name because one and the same thing is present
in all its members. *°^
Galen also makes an argument from definitions. Definition of a name,
6 Xoyoc, xov ovo^axoq,'^ resolves into simple terms the things that the
name combines. The name "fever" combines heat and damage to activity,
and "phrenitis" combines fever and delirium. '^^ 7^5 name av0p(O7io(;
combines animal, rational, and mortal.^^ But if phrenitis is a thing, disease
is also Tipay^d xi. It makes no sense to recognise that phrenitis and
human being, which are non-simple, are things, and not recognize that
disease and animal are things.^^^ Animal, in turn, is a body with sense-
perception. It is absurd to say that body is something and sense-perception
is something, but a body with sense-perception is nothing, or that there is a
body with sense-perception but not an animal. ^^*
This argument from definition in MM 2. 7 places definition on the
level of universals and holds that the universals defined and the universals in
the definition are things (Tipdy^iaTa). There is no hint here of skeptical
doubts about definition. But Sextus questioned it;^^ and Galen tells us that
the empiricists attacked definitional^ and avoided the term.m There were
also some who in their ignorance wanted to define everything,^^^ and some
who considered it useless.^ ^^ Galen himself says in De puis. dijf. that there
are not definitions of everything,^^'* and when everyone knows what a word
means definition serves no useful purpose.^^^
Yet in that same work Galen points out the usefulness of definition
when a concept is not clear. ^^^ But there is a difference between definition
i°3 MM 2. 7 (10. 128. 9-15. 144. 2-45. 2 K.).
i°* MM 2. 7 (10. 151. 15 K.); cf. De puis. dijf. 4. 2 (8. 705. 11-14 K.).
i°5a/A/ 2. 7 (10. 150. 11-51. 11 K.).
^°<*Ibid. 151. 11-12 K.
lO' Ibid. 152. 1-6 K.
>°* Ibid. 153. 14-54. 10 K.
109 Sextus, AM 7. 269-82; PH 2. 205-12; cf. PH 2. 22-32.
"° Gal. De sectis 5 (1. 77 K. = SM 3. 10. 26-11. 2).m The empiricists speak instead of vnoYpatpai and WTtoxyncooeiq. See Gal. De puis,
diff. 4. 2. 3 (8. 709. 1-5, 720. 3-9, 721. 15-16 K.); Subf. emp. 7 (63. 1-10 Deichgr.).
Sextus too uses unoYpacpfj in place of opoe;; see for example AM 6. 42, 8. 9, 12, 244, 314,
454.
"2cf. De puis. diff. 4. 1, 17 (8. 696. 10-13. 698. 4-6, 763. 2-4. 13-15. 764. 10-11
K.).
"3 De puis. diff. 2. 17 (8. 764. 17 K.).
"-* De puis. diff. 2. 3 (8. 570. 16-18 K.).
115 De puis. diff. 4. 1 (8. 696. 13-16 K.); cf. 4. 2 (8. 717. 6-13 K.). See the remarks on
definition in J. Kollesch, "Anschauungen von den dpxcxi in der Ars medica und die
Seelenlehre Galens." Le opere psicologiche di Galeno (Naples 1988) 218-20.
"<*De puis diff. 4. 2. 17 (8. 718. 12-15. 763. 4-8 K.). Galen says in PHP 6. 1. 3-4 (p.
360. 15-21) that sometimes a clear statement of the meaning of a word can by itself solve
a problem.
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of a concept and definition of o-ooia,^^"^ which Galen describes as Xoyoc,
5i5aaKaA,iK6<; xfjq xov npdy\iaxoq oixjiaq.^^^ Ov)aicb5T|(; opcx;, however,
is not a good starting-point for instruction."' Instruction, Galen says,
leads the student from the evvoia to the knowledge of ovoia;^^ and in fact
in his treatise De elementis and also in PHP 8. 2 he begins with a definition
of axoixeiov and proceeds to the proof that the elements are fire, air, water,
earth.121
It appears, then, that Galen's view of definition was complex. But
whatever the varieties and usefulness of definitions, the important point for
the present discussion is that what makes definition possible is the oneness
of the thing defined.
Two parts of Galen's defense of universals remain to be mentioned.
One is his appeal to the authority of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Plato. '^^
The other is his exploitation of Uie curious circumstance that although the
empiricists doubted such universals as disease and human being, they did
recognize that phrenetic is one thing and empiricist is one thing. ^^^ When
asked whether a live empiricist is one with a dead empiricist, they answer
that they are one qua empiricists. Galen's argument is that if Serapion and
Menodotus are one qua empiricists, it is stupid or perverse not to recognize
that since they are both human beings they are one qua human beings. ^2"*
Having now established that the members of a class have a common
nature and participate in a single form, Galen is ready to make inferences by
endeixis to the non-evident. Endeixis reveals what follows from the very
nature of a thing. In MM 2. 7 he explains it in these words: toy (read to)
Toivuv e^ ax>xT[q xT\q xov TipdYiiaxoq (pijoecoq 6p|xa)|ievov e^e\)p{aKeiv to
dcKoXovGov avei) xr\c, 7iE{pa<; £v5£i4£i<; Kal evpeoiv eoti 7ie7ioif|o9(jci.'^
It is the instrument of the rational physician: 6 6e XoyiKo^ ini xt\v (piSaw
De puis. diff. 4. 2 (8. 704. 5-14 K.).117
"" Ibid". 713. 12-13 K.
'^' Ibid. 718. 15-19. 2 K.
12° Ibid. 718. 12-13 K.; cf. MM 1. 5 (10. 40. 12-42. 9 K.).
12' Galen's treatises De lypis, De marcore, and De partium homoeomerium diff. also
begin with definitions.
"22MM 2. 7 (10. 137. 15-38. 4. 139. 16-^0. 1, 141. 16-42. 4 K.); cf. also 143. 12-
14 K. The reference to the Philebus (138. 4 K.) is perhaps to Phileb. 14c, quoted by Galen
in PHP 9. 5. 30 (p. 570. 17).
123mm 2. 7 (10. 135. 10-12 K.).
MM 2. 7 (1
up to p. 144. 9 K.
125 MM 2. 7 (1
Tiiq aKoX,ov6{aq evSei^iv XeYOnev {MM 2. 7 [10. 126. 10-11 K.]); ck xr\q zo\)
jipdyjiaxcq (pvoeox; evSeiKTiKccx; {In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 1. 2 [CMG V 10.2.2, p. 14.
20]); T) evSei^iq ck -^c, xov npdYfiato^ (pvoeco^ opjicojievTi to 6eov e^evpiaKei {MM 3.
1 [10. 157. 1-2 K.]); amf) xcov npayndxcov fi cp-uoii; evSeCtcvvxai {De constit. art. med.
8 [1. 251. 12-13 K.]). There are similar phrases in MM 2. 5, 3. 1 (10. 104. 12, 161. 15
K.); In Hipp. Prorrhet. comm. 2. 59 {CMG V 9.2. p. 104. 17); In Hipp. Epid. Ill comm. 1.
6 {CMG V 10.2.1. p. 32. 21-22).
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avTTiv to\> Tipdy^aToq epxoM-evoq ev6£iKTiKca<; an' cKeivTiq eXq te xt\v
Twv eoo^Evtov npoyvtoaiv Kal eiq tt|v xt\c, Qepanziaq eupEOiv
ovivaxai, xptb^ievoc; ^ev anaai Kal xolc, 8ia neipaq evpiaKo^evoic;,
npoGTiGelq 5e a\)Toi<; ek xfic; XoyiKfiq ^e965o-u noXkd.^^ It is rejected by
empiricists and skeptics.^^"^ It is sequential, the first endeixis followed by
others until the goal, which is to find the cure for every kind of disease, is
reached.'28
The uses of endeixis are not limited to the discovery of cures.^^' An
example from natural science is that winds indicate that when moisture is
changed to air a small amount of moisture produces a very large amount of
air. ^3^ Among animals, the fact that the calf butts before it has horns, and
the young of winged animals try to fly before they are able, indicate that the
souls that use the parts understand and use them as their own creation.* ^i
Among human beings the conflict of reason with desire indicates that there
are two contending powers in us;*^^ and it is by endeixis that the rational
part of the soul is discovered to be in the brain, the spirited part in the
heart. '3^ The variety and consistency of the veins and arteries indicate that
they contain all the humors.*^ The source and power and use of the nerves
are all discovered by endeixisP^ Especially important for Galen's
teleological view of organisms is the inference by endeixis from the
^^^De diff. febr. 1. 3 (7. 282. 1-5 K.); cf. also De sectis 1 (1. 65 K. = SM 3. 2. 2-3);
MM 2. 7, 3. 7 (10. 127. 9-12, 204. 11-13 K.); Subf. emp. 2 (44. 10-13 Deichgr.).
^^ For the empiricists see below, 301 and note 164. Sextus' attack on the evSeiictiKov
onjietov is in PH 2. 99-129. AM 8. 143-298 (see below. 302). We must assume that both
Stoics and rational physicians had theories of endeixis in late Hellenistic times, but there
is httle evidence outside the vague references in Sextus and Galen. The verb £;v8e{Kv\)o6ai
occurs three times in Philodemus, De signis in anti-Stoic contexts, twice (col. xi 1 1 and
xiii 26) in denials of the cogency of Stoic arguments, and once (col. xxxv 26) in an
explanation of the use of Ka66 and p. Endeixis is in Posid. test. 87 Edelstein-Kidd = Gal.
PHP 5. 7. 84 (pp. 356. 31-58. 1) in an epistemological context. In Cicero the terms
declarare, declaratio may be translations of ev5eiKv\)a9ai. evSei^iq in such passages as
De nal. dear. 2. 43: sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxime declarat ordo
eorum atque constantia, and Acad. 1. 41: visis . . . eis solum quae propriam quandam
haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur. In such passages, however, endeixis
does not appear to have the methodological significance that it has for Galen.
^"^ MM 2.1 (10. 127. 12-18 K.).
^^' Excluded from consideration here is the use of endeixis in the explanation of the
meaning of a word or in the inteipretation of a text, whether of Homer or Hippocrates or
Plato or Chrysippus or some other. This usage is very common in Galen. See for example
PHP pp. 156. 11. 158. 22. 218. 11, 236. 16, 244. 15. 252. 28. Endeixis is used also of
the meaning of gestures in PHP pp. 108. 2-A, 8-10; 114. 13-16.
'3°Dc semine 1. 4 (4. 520. 6-16 K.).
131 Defoel.form. 6 (4. 692. 10-18 K.).
132 p^p 5 7 22 (p. 342. 1-5).
i"p//p 2. 7. 17; 6. 3. 4; 6. 8. 39. 44 (pp. 154. 28-32. 372. 29-32. 416. 6-9. 21-24).
1^ De atra bile 5. 1 {CMG V 4.1.1. p. 79. 1-3).
135 PHP 1. 7. 55. 7. 5. 17. 7. 8. 7 (pp. 90. 22-25. 456. 21-25. 476. 19-21).
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structure of the body to the wisdom and power of the divine artisan who
fashioned it.^^
In pathology endeixis is on the level of the individual. The patient's
behavior or his symptoms indicate his condition, and his condition indicates
what action should be taken. A dry tongue combined with fever of a certain
kind is sufficient indication of the state of the liver. ^^'^ An injury to the
spinal cord is indicated by the parts that receive their nerves from it.^^^ The
patient's habits are indicative of the nature of his body.^^' His condition
may be indicated even by what he dreams about. ^"^^ Here universals are
present, presumably, in that the patient's symptoms enable the physician to
classify him and so draw the appropriate inference. ^'*^
From the patient's condition the cure is found by endeixis: a
dispositionibus inveniri indicative curam}^'^ This indication of the cure
depends on one's medical theory. Galen tells us that the physician must
master logical method in order to know by genus and species how many
diseases there are and how to take from each disease an indication, endeixis,
of the cure.^'*^ Galen's training in the methods of proof enabled him to
judge the views of others, and in his cures he was guided by the endeixis of
what he discovered: iac, r[ xcov eupEGevxcov £v6ei^i<; e7to6TiY£i jie, xocq
GepoTieia*; eTtoioiS^riv.^^
Finding the endeixis of the cure in the diathesis of the patient has a
superficial resemblance to the endeixis of the methodists. As Galen
explains it, the methodists held that unnatural conditions indicate their
remedies. A stone in the bladder indicates removal. A dislocated joint
13^ See for example PHP 9. 8. 12 (p. 594. 2-A); De foet.form. 6 (4. 687. 13-14. 693.
12-15 K.); In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 5. 4 {CMC V 10.2.2. p. 265. 14-15). In De usu
partium Galen finds many indications of the wisdom and skill of the artisan who fashioned
the bodies of men and animals; see for example 17. 1 (4. 346-62 K. = 2. 437-49
Helmreich).
1" In Hipp. Epid. in comm. 1. 6 (CMG V 10.2.1. p. 30. 30-31).
^^* In Hipp. Prorrhet. comm 2. 34 (CMG V 9.2. p. 80. 17-20). reading aux© with
Comarius at 80. 19.
139A/M9. 16(10.654. 15-16 K.).
^*°In Hipp. Epid I comm. 3. 1 {CMC V 10.1. p. 108. 1-21).
^^^ See below, note 143. and De curandi ratione per venae sect. 3 (11. 258. 14-18 K.),
where Galen speaks of the need to classify by species and differentia the conditions that
require evacuation.
^^^De caus. content. 10. 8 {CMC Suppl. Or. H. p. 141. 33-34; cf. p. 73. 14-15). There
are many similar statements in Galen's other works. See for example De sectis 3 (1. 70 K.
= SM 3. 5. 16-17). Other circumstances besides the patient's 6id0eoi<; may enter into the
indication of what is helpful; cf. De sectis 3 (1. 70. 72 K. = SM 3. 5. 16-6. 1. 6. 25-26);
In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 3. 47 (CMC V 10.2.2. p. 187. 4-9). Indications of cures derived
from differences in eXtoi are mentioned in MM 3. 10 (10. 221. 15-17 K.).
^*^ Quod opt. med. sit quoque philos. 3. 4 (1. 59-60. 62 K. = SM 2. 6. 10-14, 7. 2-3,
8. 5-6).
^**MM 1. 5 (10. 469. 14-70. 2 K.).
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indicates a return to its proper place.^''^ The methodists' endeixis, however,
does not depend on logical method or medical theory. Indeed Sextus found it
consistent with skepticism. ''^^ Galen gave it a limited role in medicine.
Everyone agrees that the first indications are taken from the diathesis, but
this is only at the beginning of the science of medicine. ^"^"^ It requires no
medical skill; it is obvious even to the layman.'"** Although it indicates
what is to be done, only the physician knows how to do it.''*' The
methodists are at fault also in that they neglect circumstances relevant to the
treatment of the diathesis, and they are not even clear about the distinction
between natural and unnatural.'^^
The superficial resemblance to the methodists' endeixis is in Galen's
use of such phrases as to p.ev yap v6aTip.a a-uxo rnq ea-uxot) SiaGeoecoq
ev6eiKv\)Tai xa PoTiGrmaxa, and xtiv ^ev evSei^iv xo\> PoTi0Ti|j.axo<; octio
zr\<^ Kttxa x6 aal»|j.a 6ia0EOEa)<; zka.^z}^'^ But the difference is that for
Galen endeixis is a relation of dKoX,ot)0ia. One diing follows from another
in accordance with some rational principle. Normally there is a causal
relation behind the endeixis, or one thing is a necessary condition of
another. In the visible symptoms, Galen says in De sectis, there is for the
dogmatist an indication of the cause, and from that he finds the cure.'^^ The
choice of drugs is indicated by the degree to which the affected part must be
dried and cooled. '^^ Symptoms may also indicate the strength or weakness
of the body.'^ When there is a conflict between the treaunent indicated by
the affected part and that indicated by the patient's nature, the well-trained
physician is best able to estimate (axoxa^eoGai) what drug should be
used.'^^ A future event may be indicated by a symptom when the symptom
and the future event are both effects of the same cause. '^^
Galen describes the endeixis of the methodists in De sectis 6-7 and MM 3. 1.
"*^ Sextus, PH 1. 236-41, especiaUy 240.
"*'MAf 3. 1 (10. 157. 7-58. 4 K.).
^^^MM 3. 1 (10. 158. 10-12 K.).
^^^MM 3. 1 (10. 158. 15-16 K.).
'^^ Galen presents criticisms of the methodists made by both empiricists and
dogmatists in De sect. 8-9.
"^1
In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm. 1. 43, 44 {CMG V 9.1. pp. 159. 15-16. 160. 19-20).
See also De curandi rat. per venae sect. 3 (11. 258. 16-17 K.): xov apiGnov xuv
evSeiKvunevtov tfjv kcvoxtiv SiaGeoetov. and De sectis 3 (1. 70 K. = SM 3. 5. 16-18):
otTi' auxfiq xr\c, SiaGeoeox; fi evSei^iq aiixoii; (sc. xoiq SoyjiaxiKoii;) xou o«|i(pepovxo(;
yCyvexai.
"2d« sect. 4 (1. 73 K. = SM 3. 7. 19-21; cf. 3. 7. 23-25).
*"A/M 3. 8 (10. 212. 11-17 K.).
*^ See for example In Hipp. Progn. comm. 1. 8, 2. 28, 3. 15 (CMC V 9.2. pp. 216. 23.
284. 3-7, 343. 22-23).
^^^ MM 3. 9 (10. 216. 8-17. 17 K.). There is another example of conflicting
indications in In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm. 1. 43 (CMG V 9.1. p. 159. 15-23).
15* For examples see In Hipp. Progn. comm. 1. 21 (CMG V 9.2, p. 234. 16-22) (death),
and ibid. 2. 27 (p. 282. 18-24) (recovery).
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Galen also speaks of indication, perhaps improperly, when there is
more than one explanation of a symptom. *^^ Even more surprising is the
remark in De semine 2. 6 (4. 651. 1-2 K.): ti yap xoxt ^wpiov Koivcovta
Kttl TTiv xfiq xpzioic, avxGiv Koivtoviav eve5Ei^aTo, TtiGavox; ^lev, ovk
dXiiGaK; 6e. Apparently Galen allowed himself some latitude in the use of
the term.
Galen recognized that endeixis is an inference from a sign, ormEiov or
Yvcopio|a.a,*^* We find such phrases as EvSeiKvuiievtov xcav oTijieicov
veviKfjoGai,^^' ^o^Gripov eivai to oTHJ-eiov xotiTo, veKpcoaiv xiva . . .
ev5eucv'u^evov,^^^ td te xoiavxa yvtopia^iaxa Kal xd xa>v a(pvy^G)v
EvSEi^Exai xiva Sidjcpioiv,^^^ etiI ydp dvo^ioion; yvtopio^aoiv dvo^ioiov
Eivai xpTl Kttl XTiv £v6ei^iv,^^2 g^^ g^g gj, indicativis signis noticiam}^^
It is as a sign-relation that endeixis was rejected by the empiricists and
doubted by the skeptics. In his De seeds Galen gives the argument of the
empiricists that one thing cannot be known from another: \ir\S' ev5ei^iv
undpxEvv x6 Tiapdnav )iti6' EXEpov e^ kxipov 6ijvao0ai yvcooGfivai-
Tidvxa ydp 6EiaGai xf|<; e^ a{)xcov yv(oa£co<; |iti6' Eivai xi armEiov
d6TiXo\) (p-uaEi npdy^iaxoq ox>bE\/6c,.^^ They argued also that the same
appearance may be accompanied at different times by different non-evident
things, and thus disagreement arises for which there is no test.^^^
In De peccat. dignot. Galen again presents the argument from the
disagreement of dogmatists. This time the context is ethical, and his
The examples that I noted are all in commentaries on Hippocrates, In Hipp. Epld. I
comm. 2. 27 {CMC V 10.1, p. 65. 1-2); In Hipp. Epid. Ill comm. 1. 6 {CMG V 10.2.1, p.
30. 19); In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 5. 14 {CMG V 10.2.2, p. 286. 23-26). Sextus points
out (AW 8. 201) that the indicative sign must be the sign of one thing only.
*^* In In Hipp. Progn. comm. 3. 44 {CMC V 9.2, pp. 372-76). in discussing the tenms
ormeiov and TCKufipiov, Galen remarks that according to the xap'-e<J^epoi. ormeiov is
used of that which is ek TT|pf|oe(o<;, xEKuripiov of that which is e^ evSei^eox;. In his own
usage, however, Galen does not observe this distinction.
^^ In Hipp. Prorrhel. comm. 1. 2 {CMG V 9.2, p. 10. 27); cf. ibid. (p. 11. 6-8, 12-15)
and 3. 76 (p. 177. 21-22).
'^/n Hipp. Progn. comm. 1. 15 {CMG V 9.2, p. 230. 2-3); cf. ibid. 3. 15 (p. 343. 22-
23).
1" In Hipp. Progn. comm. 1. 8 {CMG V 9.2, p. 217. 16-17).
^^^PHP 6. 5. 5 (p. 388. 22-23). Cf. also In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 3. 30 {CMG V
10.2.2, p. 168. 4-5).
^^' De caus. content. 10. 5 {CMG Suppl. Or. 11, p. 141. 23); cf. mifieiov evSeiKTiKov,
In Hipp. Epid. VI comm, 5. 14 {CMG V 10.2.2. p. 286. 23).
^^De sectis 5 (1. 77 K. = SM 3. 10. 22-25 = 105. 26-29 Deichgr.). Cf. also Subf.
emp. 1 and 2 (43. 4-10 and 44. 4-6 Deichgr.). In De sect. 8 (1. 89 K. = SM 3. 19. 23-24)
Galen puts ev8eiKvu^ev(ov in the mouth of his spokesman for empiricism, but it is in a
criticism of the methodists and reflects their usage.
1" De sectis 5 (1. 78-79 K. = SM 3. 11. 19-12. 4 = 106. 8-16 Deichgr.). In De caus.
content. 10 {CMG Suppl. Or. 11, pp. 71-73, 141) Galen charges the empiricists with
violating their own principles when they call syndromes of symptoms signs of non-
evident states of the body and then call these non-evident states the causes of evident
states.
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opponents are the skeptics. Since philosophers disagree about good and
evil, the Academics and Pyrrhonists consider it rash to assent to any opinion
about them.^^ Galen's answer is that disagreement arises because not only
physicians but even good philosophers who have not been trained in
apodeictic method are misled by false arguments that closely resemble true
ones. The remedy is daily practice in logic and avoidance of rash
statements. With the proper method one may arrive at true knowledge of
good and evil.^^'^
A comparison of Galen's account of the attack on endeixis with Sextus'
lengthy discussions in PH 2. 99-129 and AM 8. 143-298 reveals many
differences but some similarities. The indicative sign, Sextus says, ek Tf|(;
ibiac, (pvaecoq Kal Kaxa(5KZ\)T\<^ OT||j.aivei to oi) eoxi armeiov.^^* Galen's
formula, e^ a-uxfjq xr\c, xot) n{>a.y\iaxoc, cp-uoEox; (see above, 293), does not
include KataoKevTi, but endeixis rests on KaxaoKEvri in such passages as
De instr. odor. 3. 8 {CMG Suppl. V, p. 42. 16): dno xfi<; KaxaoKEvfiq
xfiv ev5ei^iv xou ^Tixo-u^iEvo-u Xa^pdvovxaq and PHP 7. 3. 30 (p. 446.
11): xovxo XE ox>\f at)x6 xfiq KaxaoKEu-nq xcov ^lopicov £v6£i4aM-£VTi(; and
many others. ^^'
Both Galen and Sextus see endeixis as a relation of logical consequence
between sign and thing signified. ^''•^ Sextus formulates this relation as a
conditional, the conclusion following on the condition. ^''^ Galen does not
ordinarily explain endeixis as a conditional, but presumably it could always
be so formulated. Many of the conditionals that appear from time to time
in his works could be considered instances of endeixis, for example, "If the
offspring resemble each of their parents, they resemble them by virtue of a
cause common to both."^^^ j^ ^^ ^am^. content. 10. 6, where Galen places
two endeixeis in sequence, they are, according to the Latin text, si hec sunt
signa, hee sunt cause, and si hee sunt cause, hec est cura}'^'^
In his explanation of the relation of indicator to what is indicated Galen
uses the terms £)i(paai(; and EjxcpaCvEaGai: xt]v ydp olov £|i(paaiv ir\c,
(XKoXo-uGiaq e'vSei^iv lzyo\iVJ. The empiricist, he says, also discovers x6
^^De peccat. dignot. 1. 6 {CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 42. 15^3. 2).
^^''ibid. 2. 2-7 (pp. 43. 17-44. 20); cf. 3. 14 (p. 49. 17-21). That disagreement is a
sign of ignorance and lack of training in logic is a point made by Galen in In Hipp. De
Vict. acut. comm. 1. 14 {CMG V 9.1. p. 127. 23-24) and Adv. lul. 5. 9 (CMG V 10.3. p.
50. 11-12).
'<* Sextus. PH 2. 101: cf. AM 8. 154. 276.
1^ See for example PHP 9. 8. 12 (p. 594. 3); De usu part. 17. 1 (4. 360 K. = 2. 447. 19-
20 Helmreich); Defoet.form. 6 (4. 687. 13-14 K.).
''O For Galen, see In Hipp. Progn. comm. 3. 44 {CMG V 9.2. p. 373. 8): ti 8" e^
aKoX,o\)9iaq XoyiKfi<;. onep eoxiv ev8ei^i<;.
^'1 See Sextus. AM 8. 272. 276.
^'^ Gal. De semine 2. 1 (4. 609. 7-9 K.).
^'^ De caus. content. 10. 6 {CMG Suppl. Or. U, p. 141. 26-27). In Lyons' translation
of the Arabic, however (ibid. p. 73. 5-6). the introductory word is "when."
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dcKoXovGov, but not as ep.<paiv6p,evov x© TiyouiiEvcp.i'''* Sextus' term,
taken from the Stoic definition of sign, is EKKaXvTixiKov.i'^^ g^ j^ p^j 2
112 Sextus says that some dogmatists, using eVcpaaic; as a criterion, say
that a conditional is true in which the consequent is contained potentially
(6\)vd^Ei) in the antecedent. This could conceivably be intended as an
interpretation of Galen's emphasis. If endeixis is from effect to cause, as it
often is in Galen, Sextus' explanation of emphasis would mean that the
cause is somehow contained in the effect. This is in fact the case in Galen's
explanation of quahtative change. The four active qualities (hot, cold, dry,
wet) change an object by making it like themselves.^^^ When they generate
humors in the body by acting on nutriment, their powers are passed on to
the humors that they produce. They are in the body potentially, not
actually: 6\)vdnei jiev ydp eotiv ev xoTq aw^iaaiv, evepyeCoc 6e otJk
Eoxiv.'^'^ Whether Galen would have considered an inference from the
humors to the qualities that cause them an example of emphasis must
remain uncertain; but in any case we must recognize the possibility that
Galen was one of the rational physicians that Sextus included among the
proponents of indicative signs. ^^^
The charge that there are disputes among dogmatists that cannot be
resolved by any test appears to have been the argument that Galen considered
the most serious. ^^' Galen's answer is that there are tests. In more recent
times, he says, physicians have neglected to watch accurately what happens
to the sick and to seek out their conditions and the causes from which the
cure is discovered, the cure itself being judged also by TiEvpa.'^^ Those who
have mastered apodeictic method should test by nEipa whether they have
really solved a problem, as a geometer who has found a method for dividing
a line into equal parts has the result as witness.'*' The person who designs
a sundial follows a logical method that indicates to him where to draw the
lines, and he then checks the lines for accuracy against other sundials and
^''* MM 2.1 (10. 126. 10-12 K.).
*'^ The word etcKaA-wnxiKov is in the definition of indicative sign in Sextus, PH 2. 101,
a passage bracketed by Mau. It has, however, a prominent place in Sextus' attack on the
indicative sign. It is in the Stoic definition of sign (PH 2. 104), and is discussed in PH 2.
116-20. See also Sextus, AM S. 245, 251-53, 256, 257, 273. In AM 8. 165
eKKaXvnTiKov is paired with (itivwtikov. In AM 8. 154 Sextus says that the indicative
sign all but announces what it indicates.
''^ See PHP 6. 6. 28 (p. 400. 22-23, with the note on p. 668).
*''' PHP 8. 4. 21 (p. 502. 19-25).
'^* Sextus, AM 8. 156. Another rather close parallel between Galen and Sextus is
mentioned below, note 197.
''' For the empiricists see Gal. De sectis 5 (1. 78 K. = SM 3. 11. 20-22); for the
skeptics see Gal. De diebus decret. 1. 3 (9. 778. 7-18 K.) and Sextus, PH 2. 116, AM 8.
257, 288.
1*° Gal. In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 3. 30 {CMG V 10.2.2, p. 167. 21-25).
^*l De peccat. dignot. 3. 1-7 {CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 46. 1-47. 21).
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against an even flow of water. '^^ jq disagree when a test is available is as
ridiculous as the dispute of the two philosophers, one of whom argued at
length on theoretical grounds that wood is heavier than water, the other that
water is heavier than wood, as if it were impossible to settle the matter by
observation.^*^
There are of course disputes concerning matters about which no
apodeictic proof is possible and no test is available, for example, whether
the cosmos had a beginning, or whether the whole is finite or infinite.^*'*
On such matters one should suspend judgment. The question of the
substance of the divine craftsman is also unanswerable. We know from his
works that he exists, but we do not know his ovoia.^^^ Galen even admits
to a Cameadean doubt whether noxious animals were divinely created,'*^ but
he rejects the argument that what looks like the work of an artisan may in
fact be a matter of chance.'*^ Closer to medicine, Julianus had argued that
we should not use the word "nature," since we do not know what nature is.
Galen concedes that it is difficult or impossible to know the oiioia of nature
or soul. We say that every plant is governed by nature, and every animal by
nature and soul, when we do not know the oxxsia of either. But, he adds, it
is difficult also to know the ovoia of sense-perception, thought, memory,
or reasoning. That is hardly surprising, when we do not even know the
ovoia of the sun, which we see most clearly.'**
In those matters, then, where our logical method does not help us and
no test is available, we must acknowledge our ignorance.'*^ But even where
a logical inference can be made and can be confirmed by a test, the test
182 Ibid. 5. 1-4 (pp. 54. 20-55. 27).
1" Ibid. 7. 2-3 (p. 66. 1-9); cf. 7. 7 (p. 67. 1-^). See also De caus. procat. 16 (CMG
Suppl. n, p. 4. 24-26): dissonancie que in rationibus experientia est maximum
iudicatorium.
1** De peccat. dignot. 3. 4 (CMG V 4.1.1, p. 46. 23-25); cf. 7. 8-11 (pp. 67. 6-68. 4).
See also In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm. 1. 12 {CMC V 9.1. p. 125. 9-16).
185 pijp 9 9 2_3 (p. 598. 2-11). On the wisdom and power of the divine craftsman see
above, 298-99 and note 136.
186 Z)£ foet. form. 6 (4. 701. 1-5 K.); cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 120, De nat. dear. 3. fr. 7 (pp.
1230-32 in Pease's edition, with Pease's note ad loc.).
187 pfjp 9 g 4_9 (pp 590. 22-92. 21). For Cameades, see Cic. De div. 1. 23.
188 Adv. lul. 5. 1-5 (CMC V 10.3, pp. 47. 17^9. 5). The theme that we do not know
the owaia of the soul is commonplace in Galen's writings. Some references are collected
in PHP p. 675, note to p. 444. 4-8. According to De foet. form. 6 (4. 687. 10-12 K.), we
all speak of nature as the cause of birth, but we do not know its ouoia; cf. also PHP 9. 8.
27 (p. 596. 22-29). As for the ov>o{a of the sun (Adv. lul. p. 49. 2-5), Galen had chided
the latter-day Academics for saying that the sun is not Kaxa\r]nz6c,: De opt. doctr. 1 (1. 40
K. = 179. 6-8 Barigazzi). The difference, I suppose, between Galen and the Academics is
that for Galen there is some real object, whatever it is, that makes the regular movements
apparent to us, whereas the Academics stop with the appearances.
18' It should be noted that Galen recognizes the possibility that a question to which
only a likely answer can now be given may receive a "truer" (dXtiGeoxepa) answer in the
future: De semine 2. 6 (4. 649. 15-17 K.).
Phillip De Lacy 305
comes after the inference. The endeixis itself is made ave\) xfjq neipac,}^^
How then do we establish the necessary relation between the evident and the
non-evident that makes the inference valid? The answer lies in those truths
that are clear to the mind. Inferences from effect to cause are governed by
such clear and generally accepted truths as that nothing happens without a
cause,^'' that which is undergoing change arrives at a form similar to that
which is changing it,^'^ peculiarities of substance have their own
peculiarities of powers. '^^ Galen has many such truths which he invokes as
he needs them.^''* They are starting-points for reasoning (X^oyiKal dpxai),
for they are accepted without proof.^'^ When therefore the skeptics and
empiricists doubt that we can know the ovoia of the power of drugs, and the
dogmatists who say that it is knowable advance conflicting theories, Galen
can explain the power not only of drugs but of all else in terms of the
qualities of the thing that causes the change. ^'^
This explanation, however, depends on Galen's theory of the elements
and their mixture in bodies, whether animate or inanimate, and for that
Galen refers the reader to his works On the elements according to
Hippocrates and On mixtures. In the former he presents his proofs that
there is more than one element, that the elements undergo qualitative
change, that there are only four qualities that can change an object through
and through, that these four qualities cannot exist apart from matter, that the
four combinations of quality with matter produce four elements, that in the
world as we know it these four elements are not found in their pure form but
only in combination.^^'' In the work On mixtures he points out that in any
1''° See above. 297 and note 125. •
I'l See PHP 4. 4. 36 (p. 258. 13. with p. 646, note to p. 258. 13-14). Galen was aware
of. and participated in. controversies about causes; see Bardong's introduction to his
edition of De caus. procatarc, CMG Suppl EI, pp. xii-xxxiii.
^'^ Eiq ojioiav i6eav t^ jietaPaXXovxi x6 fiexaPaXXonevov dcpiicveixai, PHP 6. 8.
13 (p. 410. 13-14); cf. ibid. 6. 6. 28 (p. 400. 21-23); De semine 1. 11. 12 (4. 553. 4-5.
556. 16-17 K.); De usu part. 4. 12. 14. 10 (3. 298, 4. 185 K. = 1. 219. 6-8, 2. 317. 11-
14 Helmreich).
mpffp-j 5 14 (p. 456. 11-12).
^''* See for example MM 1. 4 (10. 36. 15-37. 3 K.) and the passages coUected in PHP
pp. 698-99. note to p. 544. 17-19.
^'5 MM 1.4 (10. 37. 6-7 K.); cf. PHP 9. 8. 1 (p. 590. 12) and Thrasybulus 24 (5. 847
K. = SM 3. 62. 9-10).
^'<*D« simp. med. 1. 1 (11. 380. 18-81. 12 K.). Diocles (cf. De alim.fac. 1. 1. 4-6
[CMG V 4.2. pp. 202. 25-03. 24]) and Quintus (fn Hipp. Epid. I comm. 2. 7 [CMG V 10.1.
p. 52. 26-29]) were among those who rejected a theoretical approach to the action of
drugs.
''"' See especiaUy De elem. 1. 2, 5. 7. 8. In De elem. 1. 9 (1. 489 K. = 56. 2-7
Helmreich) Galen raises but leaves unanswered the question whether mixtures are of
qualities only or of corporeal substances. He alludes to this same problem also in De nat.
fac. 1. 2 and 2. 4 (2. 5. 92 K. = SM 3. 104. 11-15. 168. 11-14); MM 1. 2 (10. 16. 12-15
K.); In Hipp. De nat. horn. comm. 1. 3 (CMG V 9.1, p. 19. 4-7); and De prop. plac. 4.
762. 9-16 K. Sextus {PH 3. 57-62) uses the problem whether mixtures are of qualities or
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combination of the four elements there may be an even balance of qualities,
or one or two qualities may dominate.^'* When one thing causes a change
in another, therefore, the change can be traced back to the dominant quality
of the cause.^^
Inference from structure also depends on universal truths, for example,
larger things are sources of smaller things,^^^ the governing part of the soul
is the source of sense-perception and voluntary motion.^oi what is rightly
made in all its parts is assigned to art.^^ When Galen makes an inference
by endeixis without slating the universal truth, whether needing no proof or
proved earlier, we must assume that if asked he would supply it.
The answer to those who would question the possibility of proof is
now clear,2^3 Proof (dnoSei^K;) follows ev5ei^i<; as the final step in
Galen's scientific method.^^ It confirms endeixis by supplying the
universal truth that validates it. There is no infinite regress, since there are
starting-points, the universal truths that are accepted without proof, and clear
sense-perceptions that require no criterion.^^^ Even the philosophers who
contentiously question all demonstration understand, even if they do not say
so, that if the XoyiKal dpxai are not trusted, nothing can be proved.^^ So
we end up where we began, with truths clear to the senses and clear to the
mind. On them the whole of Galen's medical theory is based, and without
them it would collapse.-^^
Barnegat Light, NJ
substances or both in his argument against the dogmatists' theory of the mixture of the
elements.
1'* On the nine kinds of erases see De temp. 1. 8 (1. 554-59 K. = 29. 3-32. 4
Helmreich).
^" A corollary of this theory is that when a cold drug causes heat in the body the drug is
said to be potentially hot. See De temp. 3. 1 (1. 649-51 K. = 87. 25-89. 14 Helmreich).
200 PHP 6. 3. 20. 32 (pp. 378. 6, 380. 25-28).
201 PHP 8. 1. 1 (p. 480. 8-9).
202p//P9. 8. 9 (p. 592. 19-20).
20^ Galen mentions the empiricists' rejection of proof in De sectis 5 (1. 77 K. = SM 3.
11. 1-2 = 105. 30-32 Deichgr.). He wrote a treatise, now lost, on Clitomachus' attack on
proof: De libr. prop. 11 (19. 44 K. = SM 2. 120. 3-4).
20* Cf. De peccat. dignot. 3. 20-21 (CMC V 4.1.1, p. 51. 6-15), where, in spite of the
difficult text, it is clear that Galen differentiates three levels, x6 Ttptorcoq xe Kai e^ avxovi
nioTov. 6 Xofoc, ji6vTi<; evSei^ecoq Seojievoq. and dn68ei^i(;.
205 See for example De alim. fac. 1. 1. 3 {CMG V 4.2. p. 202. 14-16). Of course the
conclusion of one proof (to npoa7to6e5ei7M.evov) may be used as the premise of another;
cf. De temp. 2. 2 (1. 587 K. = 50. 1^ Helmreich). There is a sequence of such proofs in De
semine 2. 1 (4. 609-10 K.). where one step, missing from the Greek, is supplied by the
Arabic. (I am indebted to Dr. Strohmaier for this information.)
206 See above. 287 and note 35.
20^
I am indebted to R. J. Durling for help in finding Galen's references to skepticism.
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The Fragments of Alexander of Cotiaeumi
ANDREW R. DYCK
I. Introduction
Thanks to the survival of the twelfth speech (really a letter of consolation to
the people of Cotiaeum) of Aelius Aristides, the life of Alexander of
Cotiaeum is better attested than that of any other scholar of Greek antiquity;
for no other do we possess such extensive contemporary documentation.
That is not to say that we know everything we would like to know about
the man; for Aristides too often contents himself with vague encomiastic
generalities where we would prefer specific information. Nevertheless we
must be grateful to know as much as we do. In contrast, however, to the
amount of biographical information, the work itself is pathetically
undCTdocumaited
Having died around the middle of the second century A.D.^ at a ripe old
age (§§ 35-36), Alexander will have been bom ca. A.D. 70-80.^ We are
not told who his own teachers were, the panegyrist being content to oote
merely that Alexander had surpassed them (§ 6); nor does Aristides identify
any students of Alexander besides (unnamed) members of the imperial
family and himself—Aristides has never been accused of a lack of interest in
self-promotion (cf. also § 40: Alexander's judgment on Aristides' speeches)
—though we are assured that they are legion (§ 10).
' On the spelling, cf. Keil ad Ael. Aristid. 2. 217. 9; H. Erbse. Beitrdge zur
Uberlieferung der IliasschoUen (Munich 1960) 36 n. 2 (I have not, however, regularized
the spelling in the documents that foUow). I cite the speech hereafter in the text by
paragraph number in Keil's edition.
^ Cf. C. A. Behr, Aelius Aristides and the Sacred Tales (Amsterdam 1968) 51.
^ M. Aurelius to Fronto Ep. 3. 9. 2. van den Hout probably should not be used to date
the future emperor's tuition from Alexander later than 139, pace P. Aelius Aristides, The
Complete Works, tr. C. A. Behr, U (Leiden 1981) 395 n. 14. The author indicates that, at
the date of the letter (139 in view of the allusion to the "Caesaris oratio," probably a
speech of thanks to Pius for the granting of the title of "caesar"), what he has learned about
Greek composition is abandoning him, not that he had never learned the subject at all:
nuhi vero nunc potissimum Graece scribendum est. 'quamobrem?' rogas. volo periculum
facere, an id, quod non didici, facilius obsecundet mihi, quoniam quidem id, quod didici,
deserU.
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While eschewing the problematical name of "sophist" (§ 8)
—
perhaps
in deference to the Socrates of his beloved Plato (§ 25)—Alexander did not
spurn payment for his art (§ 16). An interesting aspect of his teaching is
the fact that slaves would attend along with their young masters and that
manumission of the slaves would often ensue either as a spontaneous result
of their admiration for their slaves' learning or on request from Alexander
himself (§ IS).^
Aristides offers a pleasing portrait of Alexander's good relations with
his colleagues (§ 11), tolerance of the non-professional (ibid., an
observation confirmed by Marcus Aurelius: test. 2) and generosity (§§ 15-
17, including benefactions to Cotiaeum). When Aristides fell ill in Rome
in spring of 144, Alexander enabled him to return home safely (§ 39). He
died leaving a widow and a small son (§§ 37-38).
Besides a work on Aesop (no doubt inspired by local patriotism in view
of the fact that Cotiaeum was sometimes given as that author's provenance:
cf. §§ 26-27), the only other work which Aristides mentions is the
Homeric a\)Yypa(pT|, assumed to have been identical with the 'E^riyriTiKd
in at least two books cited by Porphyry (test. 6 = fr. 2). Only three
fragments are assigned to a specific work, one to the 'E^-nyriTiKd (fr. 2),
two to the riavxoSaTid (frr. 4 and 5). Fr. 2 makes it clear that, as the title
suggests, the 'E^TiyriTiKd concerned the exegesis of specific Homeric
passages. On this basis, I have assigned to the 'E^riyrixiKd two other
fragments which likewise deal with the exegesis of Homeric passages, rather
than, e.g., the philological treatment of voces Homericae, which, inter alia,
was dealt with in the navTo5a7id (fr. 5).^ On the other hand, one cannot
exclude that comments on the spelling or etymology of voces Homericae
appeared in the 'E^TjyrjxiKd, if only as obiter dicta. Hence there remains a
large category of glosses of uncertain provenance, which I have arranged
alphabetically by word discussed (indicated in bold type). I have not
ordinarily burdened the critical apparatus with itacistic errors or confusions
of e and av, or indicated variants in the apparatus testimoniorum.^
* Similarly, slaves who were professional grammarians or philologists had very good
chances of receiving iheir freedom; cf. J. Christes, Sklaven und Freigelassene als
Grammaliker und Philologen im antiken Rom, Forschungen zur antiken Sklaverei 10
(Wiesbaden 1979) 181 ff.
^ One might wish to contemplate, with M. W. Haslam, the possibility that the
'EEtiYTiTiKd formed part of the flavToSand.
Et. Gen. is cited from my collation of photographs.—Note that the Alexander cited at
sch. AT (ex.) ad A 109fe is in all probability Alexander of Myndus, as M. Wellhausen,
"Alexander von Myndos." Hermes 26 (1891) 565 n. 2, showed (= FGrHist 25 F 6; Jacoby
also prints it, however, among the dubious fragments of Alexander Polyhistor at 273 F
143). The following works are referred to by abbreviated tide:
AO Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriplis bibliothecarum
Oxoniensium, ed. J. A. Cramer, 4 vols. (Oxford 1835-37)
An. Orth. Anekdola zur griechischen Orthographie, ed. A. Ludwich (ind. lect.
Konigsberg 1905-12)
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Ap. Dysc. Apollonii Dyscoli quae supersunt, ed. R. Schneider-G. Uhlig, 3
vols. (Leipzig 1878-1910)
Ap. S. Apollonii Sophistae Lexicon Homericum, ed. I. Bekker (Berlin
1833)
Aristox. fr. Die Schule des Aristoteles, hrsg. v. F. Wehrli, 11: Aristoxenos (2.
Aufl., Basel and Stuttgart 1967)
Choer. Orth. Choerobosci Orthographia, ed. in: AO 11 167-281
Choer. Th. Theodosii Alexandrini Canones, Georgii Choerobosci Scholia,
Sophronii Palriarchae Alexandrini Excerpta, ed. A. Hilgard, 2
vols. (Leipzig 1889-94)
EM Etymologicum Magnum, ed. Th. Gaisford (Oxford 1848)
Epaphr. Epaphroditi grammatici quae supersunt, ed. E. Luenzer (diss. Bonn
1866)
Ep. ad A Epimerismi Homerici I, ed. A. R. Dyck, SGLG 5/1 (Berlin and New
York 1983)
El. Gud. . . . Etymologicum Gudianum quod vocatur, ed. A. De Stefani, 2 fasc.
Stef. (Leipzig 1909-20)
Et. Orion. G cod. Paris. 2653, s. XVL ed. in: Orionis Thebani Etymologicum,
ed. F. G. Sturz (Leipzig 1820)
Et.Orion.H cod. Darmstad. 2773, s. XIV, ed. in: Etymologicum Graecae
linguae Gudianum, ed. F. G. Sturz (Leipzig 1818) 610 ff.
Eust. Eustathii archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis Commentarii ad Homeri
Iliadem, ed. M. van der Valk, 4 vols. (Leiden 1971-88); Eust.
Commentarii in Odysseam, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1825-26)
Greg. Cor. Gregorii Corinthii et aliorum grammaticorum libri de dialectis
linguae Graecae, ed. G. H. Schaefer (Leipzig 1811)
Hda Herodiani Technici Reliquiae, ed. A. Lenlz, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1867-
70)
Hsch. Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon, ed. K. Latte, 2 vols. [A-0]
(Copenhagen 1953-66); rest in: Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon,
ed. M. Schmidt, IH-IV (Jena 1861-62)
Moer. Harpocration et Moeris, ed. I. Bekker (Berlin 1833)
Porph. Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum reliquias collegit, disposuit,
edidit H. Schrader. 2 vols. (Leipzig 1880-90)
Porph. . . . Sod. Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum Liber I, lesto critico a cura di
A. R. Sodano (Naples 1970)
sch. Ap. Rh. Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium Vetera, ed. C. Wendel (Berlin
1935)
sch. D mil. Scholia Didymi quae vocantur in Iliadem; ed. princ: J. Lascaris
(Rome 1517); here cited from: 'Ojiripou 'IXiaq Kai eiq a-UTf)v
axoXia yevSeniYpacpa Ai6v(io\), ek 6e(XTpo-u ev '0^ov{a
(1675)
sch. D in Od. Didymi antiquissimi auctoris interpretatio in Odysseam (Venice
1528)
sch. D.T. Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem grammaticam, ed. A. Hilgard
(Leipzig 1901)
sch. Eur. Scholia in Euripidem, ed. E. Schwartz, 2 vols. (Berlin 1887-91)
sch. //. Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem {scholia vetera), ed. H. Erbse, 7
vols. (Berlin 1969-88)
sch. Lye. Lycophronis Alexandra, ed. E. Scheer, 11: Scholia (Berlin 1908)
sch. Od. Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam, ed. G. Dindorf, 2 vols.
(Oxford 1855)
SGLG Sammlung griechischer und lateinischer Grammatiker
310 IlUnois Classical Studies. XVI
II. Testimonia
a. Devita
1. Ael. Arist. oraL XII lota
2. M. Aurel. Ant. Ad se ipsum 1, 10: napa 'AXe^dv5po-u xov
Ypafi^ttTiKox) to dveniTiXTiKxov Kal to \iT\ 6vei5iaTiK{0(;
eniXa^pdveoGai twv pdpPapov t\ ooXoikov ti r\ octitixe*;
7tpoeveYKap,evtov, aXX' inite^ioic, avxb ^lovov EKeivo, o E6ei
[5] eipfiaSai, npocpepeoOai ev xpono) dnoKpioetoq r\
a\)ve7iifj.apT\)pTjoeco(;
"n
avvSiaXrivj/ecLx; nepl a-uxot) tou
npdY|j.ato<;, ou/l nepl xot) pTi|iaxoq, r\ 6i' exepac; xivbq xo\.a\ixr\c^
i\m£Xo\)<; napx>no\ivr\oeG>c,.
3.SHA IV lul. Cap. M. Ant. phil. 2. 3: usus praeterea
grammaticis Graeco Alexandro Cotiaensi (cotidianis: corr. Uhlig),
Latinis Trosio Apro et Pol<l>ione et Eutychio Proculo Siccensi.
b. De scriptis
4. Ael. Arist. 12. 36 = 2. 223. 17 Keil: Kaixoi x6 xr[<; '0\n\piKr\q
ovTYpacpfiq dnoxpSv Kal xavxT] K6a)j.0(; eivai noXXaxxi.
5. Steph. Byz. 379. 3: Koxideiov . . . ev0a rjv 'AA.e^av5po<; 6
'AoKXTi7tid6ot» Ypa|i|j.axiK6(; noXx>\iaQEoxaxoq xP'HM-ot^^C^v. o<;
Tiepl 7tavxo6a7rfi<; \)XT\q k6' Eypa\\ie ^i^Xovq.
6. 7, 8 = frr. 2, 4 et 5 infra laud.
III. Fragmenta
a. 'E^TiyrixiKd
1. Sch. A ad N 358-59: xol 5' epi5o(; Kpaxepfi(; <Kal o^iouou
7rxoXe|ioio / Tceipap inaXXdl^avxEC, in' d^(poxEpoiai
xdvvoaav>: 6 Xoyoc;- o'l 6£ x6 Tiepaq xo\> 7coX,e^o\) Kal xfi<;
Su. Suidae Lexicon, ed. A. Adler, 5 vols. (Leipzig 1928-38)
Tyrann. Die Fragmente der Grammatiker Tyrannion und Diokles, ed. W.
Haas. SGLG 3 (Berlin and New York 1977) 79-184
Tz. Ex. Draconis Slratonicensis liber De metris poeticis, loannis Tzetzae
Exegesis in Homeri Iliadem, ed. G. Hermann (Leipzig 1812)
Zon. lohannis Zonarae Lexicon, ed. L A. H. Titlmann, 2 vols. (Leipzig
1808)
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£pi5o<; oDvayavTeq eTiexeivav d^wpoxEpoK;, oiov dfi<potepco0ev.
[5] ^lETEVTlVEKtai |J,EV OVV (XTtO TOJV SeO^ICOV. TW 6£
inaXXd^ai etcI xov auvdyai xP^^^^t^ '^"''- "^^^ TiE^oXoycov
Tiveq, TtXEovd^Ei 6£ 'ApiaT6^£vo<; 6 ^ovaiKoq inr[XXay\ii\a
Aiycov (fr. 137 We.) id a'uvT||i)i£va. oiSxox; 6 KoxiaEtx;.
1-3 le. suppl. Erbse
Cf. sch. A (Did. I Ariston.) ad N 359a: Tceipap inaXXa^avzec, <en'
d^<poxepoiai xdvuaoav> (suppl. Villoison): Sixo)^ 'Apiaxapxoc;,
KOI "eTi' dXA,T|X,oiaiv." ev 5e 6i' d|i(poxep(ov x6 Xeyoiievov otv 6
IloaeiSwv Ktti 6 Zzvc, xov noXe^ov xfi epi5i ovveSriaav, x6 nipac,
xr\q epiSoq koi naXiv x6 xot> jioX,e|xo\) Xa^ovxec, Kal
ejiaX.X,d^avx£(; en' ducpoxepoK;, MOJiep o'l xd a^^axa noiotivxEQ,
x65e EJil x65e. ovxcaq 'Apioxapxoq. I fi 5irtA,Ti, oxi napaXA-Tiyopei,
5vo Tcepaxa \)rtoxi6ejiEvoi;, exepov ^ev EpiSoq, exepov 5e tcoX-e^ou,
e^ajtxoneva Kax' diicpoxepcov xoov oxpaxeuiidxcov; sch. D ad N 358-
60: 6 5e Zevc, koI 6 FloaeiScov xd Tcepaxa zr\q n6Lxr\c, Kai xov
noXi\io\) xetvavxeq vaxd dppoxepcov x&v oxpaxcav, eSriaav
ioxvpo) 5£0)iM, oq {5eap.6(;) (ut gl. seclusi) TcoA-Xoiq aixioq
aiKoXtiaq eyevexo. 3 x6 nipac] cf. sch. D ad N 359: neipap:
nipaq, xiXoq. 5 x© 6e inaXXa^ai—] cf. sch. D ad N 359:
enaXXa^avzeq: ininXi^avxcc, xdq xfipac; xai oiovei 6r|aavx£(;;
Ap. S. 70. 26: enaXXa^avxeq: tninXi^avxzq, e^amiaxioavxe^, cui
sim. Hsch. (Cyrill.) e 4131: in aXXa^avxec,: £<pa|i.|iaxiaavx£q,
E7ti7tA.£^avx£(; . . . ; Porph. 1. 184. 14: 6\)vax(6x£pa Kal
xoX.)i.Tip6x£pa djio x&v Eiq jiepaxa oxoivia avuPaXXovxcov Kal eiq
5eo^6v £jcaX,Xaxx6vxcov xd jtEpaxa, EJtEixa xeivovxojv
p.EXEvf|voxEv, Epi6oq Xiyoiv Kal noXEfioD xd JiEpaxa
eva^Xd^avxEc; Kal bi\oavxec, Exdvvaav in' 6LXXr\Xovc„ ovxcoq
iox'upa)^ XTiv Epiv xtd noXiyi(o o\)v5r|aavxE(; ax; xov 5£0|i.6v xovxov
"dppTiKxov" (360) HEV Eivai Kal "dX-oxov" (360) a\)xoi(;, "noXX5>v"
be. "yovvax' 'eXxtae" (360); Eust. 937. 5: fi Se ^£xa<popd yiyovev eiq
xr[v M^dxTjv dno xwv ev xoi(; oxoivioiq n xoic; i)idai 6eop^(ov, d
StjoavxEc; xivEq e^ aKpoov, sixa 6vaoxdvxE(; xav-oovaiv, dx; dv 6
Sfio^oq Ji-uKvcaOElq Kal CT<piyx0£l<; dacpaXiaGfi. naXaioq 6e xiq
(priaiv ovxco- "jcEipap EnaXXd^avxEi; dvxl xoti p-dxiiv
JiapaxEivavxEq, dno xajv £7ii7rX,£KO|i.£V(ov oxoiviwv Kaxd xd
jiEpaxa"; Eust. 937. 23.
I assume that this entire scholium, not just the final portion (xw 5£
inaXXd^ai—), derives from Alexander.'' It is all of one piece; the
sentence beginning xm be znaXXd^ai gives grounds for the interpretation
inaXXd^ai = a\)vd\|/ai of the paraphrase. Alexander follows Aristarchus
in interpreting jiEipap as = TtEpac; ("end") and inaXXd^ai as "join"
(o-uvdxi/ai Alexander; coonEp xd d)ip.axa 7ioiot)vx£<; and E^aTixojiEva
Kax' d)i(pox£p(ov xcibv oxpax£\)p.dxtov respectively in the Didymean and
' Subscriptions can be deceptive, however, see on fr. 3 below.
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Aristonicean portions of sch. A ad N 359a; tninXi^avxEc, Ap. S. 70. 26);
the D-schoIia, too, present a similar doctrine. Alexander may have been the
first to spell out that the underlying metaphor is from ropes, but this was
certainly impUcit in Aristarchus' position.*
Of greater interest for the student of Alexander are the following words
(xQ 5e inaXXa^ai—). "Certain prose authors" are cited—let us leave
open the question whether citation of specific names and passages has been
lost in the course of transmission—to establish an identity of meaning of
ETiaXXa^ai and ovvdvifai. Possibly Alexander will have in mind the use
of inaXXdoGEWf in the sense "overlap" or "become confused or
intermixed," for which LSJ cites various Aristotelian passages (s.v.
inaXXdoooi II.2.a-b). The following citation of Aristoxenus has been
misunderstood: it is not, as F. Wehrli supposed (ad Aristoxen. fr. 137), that
Aristoxenus is alleging that Homer is guilty of redundancy, but rather that
Alexander is accusing Aristoxenus of redundancy (cf. LSJ ^.v. tiXeovoc^o)
III.6) in calUng xa ovvrimieva enr{XXay\ieva. Though both terms occur
in the Elements of Harmony,^ the passage Alexander refers to does not.
Besides the continuing influence of Aristarchus, this fragment discloses that
Alexander read his prose authors with Homer in mind, in the hope that their
usage would shed light on the poet's.
Lehrs suspected that this notice reached the A-scholia via Porphyry,
Quaestiones Homericae, where a similar doctrine is found. ^° The fact that
Porphyry elsewhere cites Alexander's 'E^tiynTiKd (fr. 2) is a point in favor
of this hypothesis. Note, however, that Porphyry's notice diverges from
our scholium in content and phraseology. Furthermore the other citations
of Alexander in the A-scholia (frr. 5 and 8) have no corresponding material
in Porphyry and are not typical of his interests. I suspect that all three
fragments derive from an exegetical commentary the author of which, like
Porphyry, had access to the 'E^TiyrixiKd.
^ M. van der Valk, Researches on the Text and Scholia of the Iliad, 2 vols. (Leiden
1963-64), at 11 97-99, regards the interpretation of Tieipap as "end" rather than "rope"
(cf. LSJ S.V., n.2) as Aristarchus' fatal mistake in this passage. He sees this as the
replacement of "a concrete notion by an abstract idea" (p. 97); but note that nipaq as used
here by the ancient interpreters has the concrete sense of "the end of a rope." Furthermore
fastening of a rope over two parties would not require two ropes to be joined "crosswise
over one another" (pace van der Valk 98-99). If any part of Aristarchus' interpretation
fails to satisfy, it is his gloss of enaXXd^avxeq, which faUs to make clear "daB die
Tatigkeit der Gotter ihre verderbliche Wirkung auf beide Parteien gleichermaBen ausiibt"
(A. Heubeck, "Homerica," Gymnasium 56 [1949] 251 = Kleine Schriften zur griechischen
Sprache und Literatur [Erlangen 1984] 124). For the interpretation of this passage, cf. also
R. Janko, The Iliad. A Commentary IV: Books 13-16 (Cambridge, forthcoming) ad loc.
' Aristoxeni Elementa Harmonica, ed. R. da Rios (Rome 1954) Index verborum s.vv.
'° K. Lehrs, Quaestiones epicae (Konigsberg 1 837) 11 n. 2; similarly Erbse (above,
note 1) 96; in his edition of the scholia, however, Erbse adds a question mark after
Porphyry's name.
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2. Porph. 1. 227. 22 = 27. 29 Sod. = Erbse ad sch. I 509-33: ev
T© SevxEpo) Twv 'E^TiyriTiKfov 'AXe^avSpoq 6 Kox-uaev(;- 5tSo
oxpaxol JiEpiEKaGrivto tt^v noXiv jioXi^iioi, r{ nopGeiv d^iovvxeq
auTTiv r[ xa TijiiaTi Xa^6\/xcq (XTiievai- ol 5' ev5ov ovteq o\)k
[5] E6exovTO tTiv TtpoKXiiaiv. ol ot)v 7toXi)iioi, (p-naiv, EV£5pav
TlVCt ETlOlTjOaVTO TWV TlOl^VltOV Kttl TWV Po'UKoA.COV, tt flV
KXTm-axa Twv ev xf[ noXei. elxa d^ioi to ^.ev "ol 6' o\S Ttto
7tE{6ovxo" (513) dK0t)Eiv JiEpl T©v EV xr[ jioXei, to Se "Xox©
"UKEGcOpTiaaOVTO" (513) TlEpl TMV TtoXEfiCcOV, Kttl TO "ol 5' lottv"
[10] (516) TiEpl tSv Eiq TTiv £VE5pav dniovTcov noX£|i{(ov, ol
6£ OKOTlol TWV TtoXE^ltOV ElOl. TO Se "ol 6' (Oq 0\>V ETlliGoVTO
TIO^VV KE^aSoV TlEpl Po-UOlv" (530) ETll TWV EV TTl KoXzi
dcKOVEl- £Ka0£^OVTO ydp EV EKKA,T|o{a Po-oXeVOIJ-EVOI, TOC TEl^Tl
<ppo\)p£tv 7tapa56vT£(; xr[ dnoXe\i(o fiA^iKCot- to ydp "ipdcov
[15] TipoTidpoiGE KaGrmEvoi" (531) OTi|a.aiv£i twv EKKXriaiwv,
EV ai<; Eipo-uoi Kal dyopE-uovoiv. ote 5' aiixoiq e^tivuGti Td
KttTa xa 7ioi|i,via, inixpixovox. Kal e^eXGovtec; ov^i^aXXoxxsi
Hdx-qv.
subsidia: magna ex parte codicem V (= Vat. gr. 305, anno 1314)
secutus sum; ex recensione x laudo *B, h.e. codicis Venet. gr. 821
manum recentiorem (s. XXI/XIII) 1-2 — kox. *B: dXe^avSpoq jiev
6 KOX. ovTCO (p-rjoiv V 2 post kox. hab. B oxi 3 nepveKaGrivTo]
Tiap- *B 6 xwv Jtoifivicov Kal xcbv PoukoXcov V: xoi(; tioiuviok; kuI
xoiq povKoXioii; *B 10 post Tcepi hab. *B xoiv TioXxjiitov I xtiv] om.
V I jtoXejiicov V: hoc loco om. *B 12 nepl V: Jiapd *B 13
eKKXrioia *B: eKKXTioiaic; V 14 ipdcov] eip- propter etym. *
scribendum monuit Haslam 15 xwv] om. *B 16 dyopevo-ooiv] ek-
KXtioid^ovoiv *B
14-16 ipdcov— dyopevovoiv] cf. sch. D ad I 531: ipd(ov: Ttpo xcov
OYopcov, 6 Eoxiv eKKXriaicov, anb xov el'peiv ev avxaiq Kal Xiyeiv,
oGev 6 'Ipoc;; Ap. S. 92. 22; Hsch. i 873; sch. A (Ariston.) et bT (ex.)
ad I 531a-6; Et Orion. G 59. 1; Et. Gud. 427. 23 (d^); EM 475. 11;
Eust. 1160. 34.
Alexander's interpretation of the famous scene of siege and battle from
the Shield of Achilles (I 509 ff.) is among three interpretations quoted by
Porphyry, who (rightly) rejects both this one and the view that the two
armies are divided, one friendly to the besieged, the other hostile.^ ^
Alexander's reading entails a number of difficulties, most notably, as
Porphyry pointed out (1. 228. 27 = 29. 7 Sod.), the fact that he must
assume a change of subject within v. 513 (ol 6* oiS tico 7ie{Govxo, X6x(o 5'
{)7tEGtopT|aaovxo), since he thinks the ambush was conducted by the
besiegers, not the besieged; as Porphyry rightly says of this interpretation,
" Cf. Erbse (above, note 1) 36 and 54.
314 Illinois Classical Studies, XVI
eoTi e^EYXOvxtov tov tioitittiv jxt] 6'uvd|j.evov (ppd^Eiv dxapdxax; (1.
228. 15-16 = 29. 24-25 Sod.). Moreover, how is it that the besiegers have
not already possessed themselves of the townsmen's herds of cattle and
flocks of sheep, which Alexander supposes to be the goal of the ambush?
Would the besieged risk leaving their walls in charge of women, children
and aged men merely for a council? Porphyry's question is also pertinent:
If the ambush was mounted only by a portion of the besiegers, how could
the townsmen climb on their horses and ride to the scene openly and
without opposiUon (1. 228. 16 = 29. 24 Sod.)?
Alexander remains isolated in this interpretation, accepted neither by
Porphyry nor the author of the exegetical scholia (T and b ad S 513c^~^).
Only Eustathius, perplexed by the repeated use of o'l 8e to shift the subject
(vv. 513, 516, 525), accuses the poet of dod(peia and leaves Alexander's
interpretation on an equal footing with the other two cited by Porphyry
(1159. 33 ff.). Porphyry himself, like modem commentators, prefers the
interpretation whereby the besieged undertake the ambush, the women,
children and old men guard the walls because the warriors have left for that
purpose, the scouts are sent out by the townsmen, not the besiegers, and it
is the besiegers whose council is interrupted by the commotion which
follows upon the ambush (1. 228. 19 ff. = 29. 29 ff. Sod.). In one detail
Alexander was in good company, however, namely his interpretation of
ipdtov (v. 531), where he followed a well-established tradition. ^^
3a. Porph. 1. 234. 10 = 112. 7 Sod. = Erbse ad sch. T 79-80a:
'AXe^avSpoq 6e 6 KcTiaeuq 91101 Xeyov KaXax; e'xEi to
eoxSnoq lov br\\n\yopov\/xo<; dKovEiv Kal \ir[ -uTioKpovEiv a\)t6v
Kttl £|j.7io6i^£iv (tovxo yctp ormaivEi to "uPpdA.XEiv" [T 80])-
[5] xa^e^ov ydp Kal xw Tcdvv 6£iva> ev tapaxfi eItieiv. to
ydp "xaXETibv EnioTdp-Evov TiEp EovTa" (ibid.) KaTa 'Attiktiv
ovvTiGEiav n^Eovdl^Ei to "EovTa"- ekeivok; ydp jy^ ovvtjGec;
Xeyeiv "p.Ti 7tpo5o\)(; T])ia<; yevt]" dvTl xo\> p.Ti npoSox;, Kal
"naiC,ei<; e'xcov" dvTl Tot) 5ia7ia{^Ei<;, Kal ivxavQa "xaXETiov
[10] ydp EKiaTdjiEvov TiEp EovTa" (ibid.) dvTl tov tov
ETHOTd^iEvov 0op-up£ia0ai xa^E^ov, ax; Kal tov EniaTtmovoq
pTiTOpoq EV Bop-uPo) xaXenGx; 6TmTiyopot)VTO(;. I ejioI Se 6ok£i
3b. Sch. A ad T 79-80a: EOTaoToq ^iev KaXov aKouEiv <—
[15] £6vTa>: KaXfix; e'xev tov koxioxoc, Kal StmriyopovvTOi;
dKOVEiv Kal iix] vTioKpovEiv |j.Ti6' EiiTiodi^Eiv ' TovTo ydp 6tiXoT
TO "{)P<P>dXX£iv" (T 80)- xaX£.nb\ ydp Kal x& ndvv Seivw
EV Tapaxfi EinEiv. tovto dyvoTjoac; 'A.pioxapxoq Kal oiT|0El<;
^^ Probably ihe interpretation of Aristarchus (cf. sch. A [Ariston.] ad Z 531a), it
entered the scholastic tradition (cf. D).
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napaiTTiaiv xiva ek xo\> 'Aya\ii\ivo\oq yiweaQai jiapeveSiiKe
[20] TO "ax)x69i E^ e5pT|^" (T 77). np&xov ^.ev ovv t( av
Ka0E^oiTO Tov dyKcova XExpcoiJ.Evoq; ETiEixa ouxcoc; Eppcoxai
©axE oXiyov iSaxEpov (cf. T 252-66) Kdnpov dcTtoocpaxxEiv.
oiSxax; 6 KoxiaEvq.
recensionem % ut pleniorem hie magna ex parte secutus sum
2 Xeyov %: om. V I e'xet %: om. V 4 ormaivei] aviiPaivei V I
•uPPdXXeiv] {)PdX,Xeiv *B: •oPPdX.eiv V 5 x© . . . 8eiv© X- "^^
(corr. x(b) . . . 5eiv6v V I to] x© Haslam, fort, recte 5-12 x6 ydp
XctXtnov—] om. V 10 ydp Villoison: Tiep *B 17 "bpdXXeiv A:
suppl. Villoison
3-4 \ir[ i)jioKpou£iv—\)PPdX,X£iv] cf. sch. D ad T 80: uPPdX.Xeiv:
uTtoKpoveiv, £H7to5i^£iv xov Xeyovxa . .
.
; Ap. S. 156. 27 et 33:
... ol 5e jrepl xov Zi5(6viov eoxcoxa |xev Xiyovoi xov
'Aya\ii\ivova napa zr\ Ka0e5pa, o\)5' ev ^.eooiq eoxfflxa. ... ol
5e Tiepi xov IiScoviov ek xov uPPdX.Xeiv x6 -unoKpoveiv
dKOvouoiv; Hsch. i) 567: •bnopdXA.Ei: •ujioKpoioEi; sch. bT ad T 80^;:
•uPPdXX,Eiv: -ujioKpouEoGai GopiiPq) xov Xiyovxa; Eust. 1172. 34:
ol Ktti avxoi (sc. ol dKpipEoxEpoi) ojioPdXXEiv <paai x6 kcoX-ueiv
Kttl -onoKpouEiv 5id Kpauyfiq Kai noiEiv SopuPov . . . 8-9 Kal
"nai^Eiq EX^ov" dvxi xov Sianai^EK;] cf. Moer. 212. 8 ((pX-vapEiq
e'xcov); Greg. Cor. 146-47.
At issue is a passage from the Assembly scene in T (74-80) where
Achilles announces his return to battle; the immediate reaction is as
follows:
&C, £<pa6', ol 5* Exdprioav £iiKVT|ni5E(; 'Axaiol
|i.fiviv dnEiJiovxoq \ityaQx)^io\) FItiXeicovo^.
xoioi 51 Kttl p,£X££iJiEv cxva^ dv6pa)v 'AyajiEnvoav
a-oxoGfiv £^ £6pTi(;, ovS' ev fXEoooioiv dvaoxd(;-
"(6 tpiXoi TipooEq Aavaoi, GEpdicovxEq "Aprioq,
Eoxaoxoq |j.Ev KaXov okoveiv, o\)6e eoikev
'uPpdA.^iv xaXe^ov ydp £7iioxa|i£v(p JtEp eovxi ..."
In light of sch. A ad T 79-80a (= fr. 3b) Alexander has been thought guilty
of the grave error of supposing that Aristarchus interpolated (7iap£V£0TiK£)
V, 77, on the assumption that avxoGEv e^ e5pt|(; means that Agamemnon
spoke from his seat because of a wound; ^^ yet Agamemnon's wound was at
the elbow (A 252). Now T 77 was already read by Aristophanes of
Byzantium (and therefore could not have been interpolated by Aristarchus),
'^ This, by the way, was the interpretation of Epaphroditus fr. 43 L = sch. bT ad T 71b
and Eust. 1172.21.
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as we know from sch. AT (Did.) ad T 76-77. Therefore Ludwich thought
that Alexander must be burdened with a surprising piece of negligence.^"*
Alexander has, however, been sufficiently exculpated on this score by
Erbse, who makes it very likely that the compiler of the A-scholia
combined at sch. T 79-80a two passages from Porphyry (1. 233. 3 ff. =
1 10. 3 Sod. + the first part of our fr. 3a) and carelessly added to the
conglomerate the subscription ovxax; 6 KoTiaeijq, which applied only to the
first part (—ev xapaxf] eitieiv ~ first part of fr. 3a). Moreover, the A-
compiler evidently misunderstood Porphyry's words (1. 233. 5 = 110. 7
So.) Ktti <pT|ai (sc. 6 'Apioxapxoc;) 5ia lovxo Eve0T|Ke (sc. 6 "OfiTipoq) x6
"avxoGev e^ E5pT|<; ot)8' ev \iiaaoiai dvaaxdq" to mean that Aristarchus
interpolated (TtapEveOriKe) the verse in question. Finally, the words
ax)x69ev e^ e6pt\c, can merely mean that Agamemnon spoke from where he
was, i.e., did not go to the usual speaker's position in the middle of the
assembly, but did stand up (as is implied by v. 79: eaxaoxoq ^lev Ka^ov
(XKo-ueiv).^^
If, then, Alexander can be cleared of responsibility for the misinforma-
tion laid to his charge in fr. 3b, what was his contribution to the understand-
ing of T 80? Like others, he passed on the interpretation of v^^aXkeiv as
equivalent to "UTioKpovEiv, e|j.7to5{^Eiv, doubtless known to him from the
scholastic tradition (cf. sch. D ad loc.). Whether he did more than that
depends upon the status of the latter part of fr. 3a (x6 ydp "xaXznbv
E7iiaxd|iEv6v TtEp Eovxa" Kaxd 'Axxiktiv a\)VTi6Eiav—). E. Kammer,
following Barnes, athetized this material, which is absent from V;^^ Sodano
agrees that it does not belong to Alexander but believes it to have been added
by the redactor of the x-recension. In putting forward this view Sodano cites
sch. A ad T 79-80a (= our fr. 3b), Ap. S. ^.v. -oppdUEiv and Eust. 1172.
20; but none of these passages excludes the possibility that Alexander
explained eovxi of T 80 as a pleonasm according to Attic usage.
Now Alexander was interested in matters of dialect (cf. frr. 5 and 13);
and one sentence which he cites, ")i^ 7ipo6oi)(; rwxaq yevti," is not a bad
parallel. He should not, however, have mixed this up with such expressions
as naiC,ziq e'xcov and tried to subsume both types under the rubric
"pleonastic participle;" also the phenomenon is, of course, by no means
^* A. Ludwich. Arislarchs homerische Textkritik, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1884-85) at I 74-75
(the error posited would be especially surprising since fr. 7 below shows Alexander
familiar with, and influenced by, Didymus' work).
^^ Erbse (above, note 1) 54-57; for the last point he compares Demetrius Sidonius apud
Ap. S. 156. 27 (quoted above; cf. also Eust. 1172. 30); he is likewise able to show that
Schader's assumption that a citation of Demetrius has fallen out at 1. 233. 3 of his edition
of Porphyry is unfounded and therefore that the Apollonius cited at 1. 233. 11 was the
teacher of Porphyry, not of Demetrius.
^^ Scholia Homerica emendatiora praefatione de scholiis Porphyrianis praemissa, ed. E.
Kammer (diss. Konigsberg 1863); Joshua Barnes published Porphyry among other works
of Homeric exegesis in the introduction to his edition of Homer (Cambridge 1711); both of
these works, cited by Sodano, are inaccessible to me.
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confined to Attic;^^ possibly Alexander was here influenced by Aristarchus'
view that Homer was an Athenian.^*
It is worth remembering that in Alexander's day the study of syntax was
in its infancy, his contemporary, Apollonius Dyscolus, being the author of
the first book on the subject, a book, however, which was not the kind of
systematic exposition of Greek syntax a modern reader would expect but
rather a paradigmatic discussion of select problems^' and which offers no
guidance on the problem at hand. Perhaps, then, Alexander's attempt to
grapple with the conjoined participles of T 80 should not be judged too
harshly.
b. navTo5a7ta
4. Et. Gen. (A) s.v. 5{Kpov Kal 5iKpoov, unde EM 276. 26 =
Hdn. 2. 385. 21: 'AXi^avbpoc, 6e 6 xov 'AoKA.T|7tid5o\) ev x(o i'
Tcov navTo5a7ia)v napa to Kopoq, o ariiiaivei tov KA,d5ov
(evGev Ktti Kopoi0aXi<; t; 6d(pvTi Xeyexai) Kal Kopeiv, x6 xoi(;
[5] KXd5oiq oapovv. I iyca 5e vojii^co jiaXXov napd to Kepa^
5 oapovv] oapp- A
Ex Et. Gen. etiam Zon. 1238: KopiGaXiq (sic): r\ Sdcpvri, koi Kopoq,
6 KXd5o(;, KOI xopeiv, x6 zoic, KX,d5oiq aapovv. 3 Kopoq =
KXdSoq] cf. Hsch. k 3655: Kopoq: f^XfiGoq dvGpcojttov (7cXTia|i.ovT|
dubitanter Haslam). Kal td vea pXaoTrmaxa. Kal nexpov.
The adjective 6iKpoo(; or, later by hyphaeresis, 5iKpo<; (= "cl6ven,
bifurcated") is attested as early as the Little Iliad (fr. 5 Bemabe and Davies:
6i[i<pi 5e TiopKTiq / xpvoEoq doTpdjiTEi Kal in avxia 6iKpoo<; ai%^T| = sch.
T ad n 1426 = sch. Pi. N. 6. S5b) and continued in use by poets (Ar. Pax
637: ttjvSe ^.ev 5iKpoiq eco0o\)v tt^v Geov KEKpdyixaaiv; Call. fr. 177. 2
Pf.: 5iKpov (piTpov d£ipafi£VT|; conjectured by Hermann at Aesch. fr. 152
R.); it also proved useful to medical and scientific authors (see LSJ, Thes.
Ling. Gr., s.v.). If Lentz has correctly assigned our passage to Herodian,
whose work on pathology often served as a source for the etymologica,^'' it
'' Cf. examples cited at R. Kiihner and B. Gerth, Ausfiihrliche Grammalik der
griechischen Sprache I (4. Aufl., Hannover 1955) 39 (§ 353.4, Anm. 3).
^* Cf. sch. A (Arislon.) ad N 197; Vila V (p. 247. 8 Allen = Vitae Homeri et Hesiodi, ed.
Wilamowiiz [Berlin 1916; rp. 1929] 29. 9); R. Pfeiffer, A History of Classical Scholarship
from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age (Oxford 1968) 228. Herodian, too,
regarded the Homeric dialect as equivalent to Old Attic: cf. J. Wackemagel, Kleine
Schriften (Gottingen n.d.) 11 1107.
^'Cf. Cohn, RE D.l (1895) *.v. ApoUonios no. 81, 139. 16; D. L. Blank, Ancient
Philosophy and Grammar: The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus (Chico, CA 1982).
^ On the reconstruction of this work, cf. R. Reitzenstein, Inedita poetarum Graecorum
fragmenta EI (ind. lect. Rostock 1891) 18 ff.
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is he, rather than Alexander, who has the honor of being the first to propose
the etymology currently favored (< Kcpaq; the stem ending in -p will
account for the original SiKpoov).^'
Alexander's mistake was perhaps to attempt to build a word-family on,
at best, a very tenuous foundation, the only other independent testimony for
Kopoq = KXaSoq being Hsch. k 3655; hence, for instance, LSJ does not
recognize Kopoq in this sense. The word for laurel (usually spelled
KopvGaXiq) is surely related to the cult titles of Apollo (KopvGoc;) and
Artemis {KopvQaX{X)ia), rather than a generic word for branch.
Alexander's connection of Kopeiv and Kopoq with the same root^^ might
seem prima facie more promising in light of (piXeiv/cpiXcx;. However, if the
basic noun stands to the verb's direct object in the relation of an instrument
with which it is treated, one expects a formation in -o\Jv, not -eiv.^^
Together with fr. 9 and test. 5, our fragment preserves what I take to be
the name of Alexander's father, Asclepiades;^ and, like fr. 5, it tells us that
Alexander wrote a Miscellany in at least ten books (cf. test. 5). If the
contents were alphabetically arranged, this might account for SiKpoov and
biiaxoizq being treated in Uie same book, but without further evidence we
cannot be sure.
5. Sch. A ad E 241c: enioxoiEq: tw en(axoi|ii dKoXovSov
eoTi TO inioxoic,, tw 5e ETiiaxoiTiv to eniaxoiriq- Kal I'aax; e5ei
ovTcoq e'xeiv, napecpGapri 5e vnb x&v iieTaxapaKTTjpiadvTcov
TO) 5e xapaKTfjpi yevoiievov o|j.oiov tw "ioitiv" Kal "ocYaYoiiiv'
[5] Tiapd laKcpoi (frr. 169 et 182 Voigt) Kal tw "TieTiayoiTiv'
Tiap' E\)7i6Xi5i (fr. 472 K.-A.) eiKOTCog ePap"OTovT|0T| to
ETiiaxoiTig yev6\ievov eniaxoiec;, ox; AioXikov. ovtco Kal
'AXe^avSpoc; 6 KoTiaevc; ev tw i' tSv navTo5ana)v.
2 ETCioxoiTiv TO eTiioxoiTiq Cobct: inioxoiT\c, to eniaxoiTiv A 5 xw
Bekker: to A
1-2 x^ ETiiaxoifii—ejiiaxoiTiq] cf. Ap. Dysc. et Hdn. apud Choer. Th.
2. 260. 19-20, unde EM 664. 26 (s.v. nepinaxoiiiv) et Eust. 983. 1:
CK xov oxoifii 5e x6 axoir]v 'AxxiKcbQ, 6|ioicoc x© JiepiJiaxoi^i
7i£pv7iaxoiT|v Ktti zoiq b\ioioiq; sch. A ad H 241!? . {xw key) (seel.
Erbse) tniaxoitq: ovxco^ xfiv Ypa(pfiv TcapaxiGexai 6 'HpcoSvavoc;
EV xm i^' xfi; KaGoXou (Hdn. 1. 469. 14; cf. 2. 230. 20) Kal Xiyzi
anb xov ejcioxok; TcX£ovaa^.6v Eivai xov e
-n
ovaxoX-qv xov
^^ Cf. H. Frisk, Griechisches Etymologisches Worterbuch, 3 vols. (Heidelberg 1960-
72) at I 394. s.v. hixpooc,.
^ M. W. Haslam queries whether Kopoi; = KXdSoi; might have been inferred from
Kopeiv.
^ Cf. A. Debrunner, Griechische Wortbildungslehre (Heidelberg 1917) 93 f. and 99 f.
^ Rather than of his teacher, as A. Meineke (Analecta Alexandrina [Berlin 1843] 16)
supposed.
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enicxoiTiq; sch. A*"^ ad E 2416^: ovx(oi; 'Hp(o5iav6(; iniax^^c,
(debuit en{oxoie(;, ut vidit Erbse).
In the Ai6<; dTidxTj Hera offers "Ynsfoq the prospect of fine gifts in
return for collaboration in putting Zeus to sleep (E 238^1):
5wpa 6e xoi Scooco xaXov 6p6vov, a<p9ixov aiei,
Xpvoeov "H<paioxo(; 6e k' e|i.6(; naiq, a.[i(f\yx)r\zic,
xev^Ei acKTjaa^, xtnb be Gpfivuv noalv rioei,
X9 KEv EJiiaxoie^ X,i7iapo\)(; 7i66aq eiXanivd^cov.
At issue in our fragment is the word inicxoiec;, attested here as early as the
third century B.C. (n^' = Pap. Ryl. 49) and assumed by Alexander and
Herodian to be the transmitted text.
Alexander notes that one would expect iniaxoic, (to E7tiaxoi|ii) or etii-
axoir[C, (to eniaxoiriv). He therefore cautiously (iaco<;) moots the possibility
that Eniaxoir\<; ought to have been the reading (enioxoK;, of course, being
metrically excluded) but that it was corrupted in the process of transcription
from Old Attic script, which failed to differentiate between e and t].'^
The modern editor must also face the additional query: Is the reading
ETiiaxoiTi^ plausibly Homeric in light of what we know about the history of
Greek? Now axoi<; is original, oxoiriq an innovation; but how early an
innovation? In the Odyssey we meet cpiXoCri (6 692) and cpopoCri (i 320),
which have been explained as Attic; the Iliad has oxairioav (transmitted
without a variant) at P 733.'^ Wackemagel has argued, however, that, since
the Iliad otherwise has the -it)- formation only for verbs in -[ii, the true
reading at 5 241 is inioxoiaq.^''
Admittedly the evidence is less extensive than one would like.
However, editors including Ludwich, Allen and Mazon are probably rigTit in
preferring Alexander's in\axoir\c,. Note that it is not a "conjecture of the
second century A.D.," as Wackernagel states,^* but an alternative
interpretation of the oldest 7iapd5oai<; and that the parchment reading that
he prefers is attested only in the sixth century A.D. (a fact which he does
not mention).29 Furthermore if eniaxoiTiq strains credibility in spite of
oxairiaav, (piXoiTi and (popoiri, how much less likely is Homer to have
^ This mode of explanation is likely to have been used already by Aristarchus: cf. sch.
A (Ariston.) ad A 104a\ with testimonies adduced by Erbse. I assume, however, that
Alexander learned only the principle, not its application to this passage, from his great
predecessor (via Didymus?).
^ Cf. E. Schwyzer. Griechische Grammalik I (Munich 1953) 794 ff.; P. Chantraine,
Grammaire homerique I (Paris 1958) 463 ff.
^^ J. Wackemagel, Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu Homer (Gottingen 1916) 14; and
Kleine Schriften (above, note 18) I 806-07.
^ Previous note.
^' Cod. Brit. mus. add. 17210: iniaxoiat;.
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known an miaxoioic, formed on the analogy of the third plural weak aorist
optative -eiav (cf., e.g., Tirmriveiav [r 299], dKovoeiov [B 98, 282])?30
The provenance of our scholium is a difficult problem. Erbse would
assign it, together with the other A-scholia which mention Alexander, to
Porphyry's Quaestiones Homericae; he points to the fact that in his eighth
quaestio Porphyry deals with a problem of textual criticism, just as our
scholium does (cf. fr. 15 below, which displays an interest in the processes
by which the true reading is corrupted similar to that of our fragment) .^^
Van der Valk, however, objects that (a) we have no evidence that Porphyry
dealt with E 241; (b) Porphyry's interest in a textual problem in the eighth
quaestio is an exception; (c) our fragment deals specifically with a
grammatical point, and we know that Porphyry despised grammar and
grammarians; and (d) the citation by work and book number is more precise
than Porphyry is wont to be (but cf. fr. 2)}'^
H. Schrader, on the other hand, assigned this scholium to Herodian.^^
However, if, as I am inclined to believe, at Hdn. 1. 468. 4 Lentz's
reconstruction (based on Ep. alph. [AO 2. 334. 20] and EM 495. 1) is
correct, the prosodical portion of our scholium conflicts with Herodian's
doctrine that the strong aorist optative only of verbs with participles ending
in -(; retains the accent of the primitive; hence, on Herodian's view, one
would in any case expect ETiCaxoieq, not the form £7iiaxo'ie<; implied by
Alexander, so that the supposition of Aeolic barytonesis would be
redundant. If this note had passed through Herodian's hands, one would thus
have expected it to include a corrective along these lines.
In view of the deficiencies of the hypotheses of Porphyrian or
Herodianic provenance, might we be best advised to assign this scholium to
the exegetical commentary which seems the likely source of two other
citations of Alexander in the A-scholia (sc. frr. 1 and 8)?^"*
c. Ex opere incerto
6. EM 77. 7 (s.v. a^idna^-o^^^): eaxiv o\)v d^ineX.o'u xi Yevo<;.
01 6e TTiv EOTtepiov axacp-oXriv- 'AXe^av6po(; tt]v tdPoiSpaaxov
A,eYEi.
2 TTiv dPovpaaxov] zr\\i dpovfiaaxov PT: xt^v anJieXov
PovPaoxov vel Poupdoxeiov Sturz
^° Cf. R. Janko (above, note 8) ad loc., who arrives at a similar conclusion.
3* Cf. Erbse (above, note 1) 97-98.
" Van der Valk (above, note 8) I 113-14.
^^ H. Schrader, Porphyrii Quaeslionum Homericarum ad fliadem perlinentium reliquiae
(Leipzig 1880) 379.
This is the alternate possibility mooted (with a query) in Erbse's edition. The
citation of Eupolis, ill adapted to the argument, may be a later addition (so M. W. Haslam).
" On the accent, cf. Hdn. 2. 762. 6 = Choer. 7/i. 1. 331. 4.
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Cf. Hsch. a 3425: a^d^a^vq: a|a.JieXoq, f\ yivoc, <5xa<f>vXr\q- eiprixai
6e Kttl ejci x^^^o^ tivo(;, 6-6o PaKiripiaiq -ujio tdq p.aaxdXaq
ep£v5o^.€vov Kttl eKKpe^.d^.evov exovxo<; xov 7c65a dx; potpvv.
The compiler of the EM adds our fragment immediately after a
Methodian gloss (s.v. a\id]xa^-oq) which he copied from the Et. Gen.^ Our
material has been thought likely to derive from Diogenianus in view of the
similar definitions presented by Hesychius and the EM;^"^ if that is so,
Diogenianus, who was his contemporary,^^ is the earliest author to cite
Alexander. The word was used by Sappho (fr. 173 Voigt) and Epicharmus
(Fa Kttl QaXcLooa, fr. 24 Kaibel) and in a comic scene described at Hsch.
a 3425; in addition, \)/et)5a|xd^a^'u<; appears at Ar. Vesp. 326 (cf. sch. ad
loc.). What was meant by those who called the d|id|ia4'oq tj eG7iepio<;
oioLipvX-f] is obscure enough;^' but Alexander's remark is corrupt
(dpovPaoTov being vox nihili), with no remedy in sight (the connection
with Bot)j3aaTi(;, the Egyptian equivalent of Artemis [cf. Hdt. 2. 137. 5]
implied by Sturz's conjectures is far from clear).
7. Et. Gen. (A), unde EM 145. 38 (s/v. ap^idTEiov \izKo(^
[Eur. Or. 1384]): . . . dA,Xoi 6e oxi 6 rixoq xot) dp|iatO(; o^ix;
Kttl Xznxoc, YivExai- xov o\>\ o^^v Kal Xenxov (pGoyYov
dp^dxeiov EK TO-UTOX) 6 E'upi7i{5Ti<; eKaA^eae- Kal z\)\o\)xo\
[5] eiodyei Xeyovxa- xoiamai 5e xcov euvo-oxcov a'l 9(Dvai.
ovxco Ai6'U)iO(; (p. 245 Schm.) Kal 'A^e^avSpoq. I r\ napa xov
dp|i6v, o ormalvei xov n6Xe\iov zr[ xcov Op-uycov SiaXeKxo)
(pTjal naXap.T|6Ti<;. I laxopei 6 x-qv kco|iiktiv Ai^iv axJvaYaywv
M£665io<;.
Cf. sch. TB Eur. Or. 1384 (1. 220. 21 Schwartz): 'AnoXXoboipoq 6
K'upTivaiO(; (fr. IDyck) TtapeniypacpTiv Xiyzi Eivai to fctpHoSiov w
"lX.iovt. el 5e r\v TtapejiiypacpTi, ana^ ctv enEypdcpexo {x6 "IXiov
dncoXexo}. e'vioi 5e xov EK7ce7iTi5T|K6xa ^puya et)vot»x6v <paaiv
eivai, xovi; 6£ e\)vo'6xo'*^<; CTtieiKcbq o^ucpcovo'oc; oTcdpxevv. x6 oov
o^^xovov dp|i.dx£iov a\)x6v <pdvai 5id x6 xov -ujia^oviov xSv
dpiidxcov Tixov dvaxexanevov xe Kal o^vv eivai. oxi 61
evvo^xoi; tJv, (prjai- "oiSxe <ydp> yuvq ni<p\)Kac„ ovx' ev
dv6pdoiv o\) y' el" (1528)- Kal naXiv "o^h ydp Pofi<; oKovoav
"Apyoq e^eyelpexai" (1530). eiol 5e Kal aX/iai aixiai ac,
EKxiBexai 6 -unonvTmaxiadp-evoq.
^^ Ed. at R. Reitzenstein, Geschichte der griechischen Etymologika (Leipzig 1897) 13.
20.
" Cf. Erbse (above, note 1) 97.
^* 5m. 8 1140: . . . yeyovox; . . . knx *A6piavo\) PaaiXeox;; cf. Cohn, RE V.l
(1903) 778. 10 ff.
'' Cf. L. Dindorf. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae 1.2 (Paris 1831-56) 20d.
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Our fragment has reached the etymologica via the fifth-century
lexicographer Methodius,'*" who is expressly cited. Methodius is likely to
have used an Atticist source, which, in turn, found the comment in the
riavtoSand (the 'E^TiyriTiKd not being known to have dealt with authors
other than Homer). Sch. Eur. Or. 1384 preserves (via Didymus, who is
expressly cited: to dp^idxeiov )i.eXoq 6 Ai6^))i6<; (pTjoiv cbvojidoGai . , .
,
1. 220. 9 Schwartz) a more detailed version of the same doctrine (though the
scholium's last sentence shows that it, too, is curtailed). Alexander has
simply taken over from Didymus an interpretation of the use of dpudteiov
at Or. 1384; Didymus' own work is largely of value as a collection of the
views of his predecessors; we have no way of gauging his originality in this
matter, however.'*^ Furthermore, Alexander shows no awareness of the
possibility that Apollodorus of Cyrene had raised, namely that Or. 1384
might be a stage direction that crept from the margin into the text.'*^
8. Sch. A"" ad A li: <*kx\Xr\o<^:> 6 KoTia£\)(; '"AxvXfioq," 6id
to ^lETpov Ev X. Ypdcpev Kai ydp to Kd|iav6po<; dvtl tot>
lKd)iav5po(; -^pai^zxai.
1 le. add. Erbse 2 yap Erbse: //// A 3 Yp(d<pExai) Erbse, Beitr. 96:
Yp(d<peo9ai) Erbse in ed.
1-2 *AxiXtio(;
—
Ypd<p£i] cf. sch. DAT ad A \h: nTiX,Tiid5e(o
'kX\kr\oz,: ovxax; dvaYvcooxeov 5i' £v6q \ 5ia x6 nexpov xai 5ia
x6 axoq (6 eaxi Xvjitiv) eneveyKeiv xoi(; 'IXievaiv. oi 6e napa x6
lATi OiYE^v xei^oi xpoipfji; (debuit x^^^^ vel X^^^is' o ^^"^^ ^po<pTi(;, ut
vidit Erbse)- oXdiC, yap o\> fiexeaxe "iCLkaKioo;, Ep. ad A IE (cum
test.); Tz. Ex. 61. 3: 'kxxX^oc,: ev X, o\> 6ia x6 ^£xpov, KaGd
xivEi; (pdaKo-oaiv, dXXa 5id xe x6 dxoq e^noieiv 'IXieiioi koi 5id
x6 X'^Xfi^ a|j.oipov eivai . . . ; sim. Tz. laudatus sch. Lye. 797; Eust.
14. 8: oxi ©ojiep 'OS-uaoevi; noxe ^£v 5id Svo oo napa x^
TioiTixfi, TioxE 5e 5i' kvoq, wq ^£xd xat»xa <pavT|0£xai, oiSxco xai
'AxiXXevc;, evxav>0a hev ev x© "nriX,-nid6£a) 'AxiXfio(;" Kal
dXXaxov 51 5i' kvbc, EKcpcovEixai X, ev jiXeiooi be. xojiok; 5vo X<X>
(corr. Haslam) exei- EJcoYcovi^ovxai be. aXXoi jiev xfi xo\) kvoq,
EXEpoi be. xfi x©v bio X Ypacpfi, xct )j.£v 5-uo xiGevxei; f[ anb xou
dxoq idXXEiv -hyovv X-utctjv £|j.pdXXEiv, . . . t^ Kaxd 7iX£ovaop.6v
xo\) exepo-o X 6id x6 eixptovoxepov, . . . xw 8£ evl X
O'0vnYopoiivxE(; Ttpcoxov ^.ev ek xfi!; dvaXoYia<;, wa fi 0|iovov xa»
'OiXevq, ^aaiXe-oq- elxa e^ £xv^oXoYia<;, (oq anb xov dxo(; zoic,
^Cf. C. Wendel. RE XV.2 (1932) 1380. 22 ff., esp. 1381. 20 ff.
*^ Cf. Pfeiffer (above, note 18) 274 ff.; on the Euripidean commenuries in particular, p.
277.
*^ For Apollodorus' date (prior to the first-century A.D. lexicographer Pamphilus, who
quotes him), cf. A. Dyck. "On ApoUodorus of Cyrene." //SCP 85 (1981) 106; E. Hoffmann-
Aleith. RE XVm.3 (1949) 336. 44 (Pamphilos no. 25). The problem is still debated: cf.
Euripides, Orestes, ed. C. W. Willink (Oxford 1986) ad loc., with literature there cited.
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'iXievoiv . . . yeveoGai- f\ anb xo\> a oxepT|TiKOv Kal tov x^^^'i
. . .
2-3 x6 KajiavSpoc;
— YP«<P£^«'^1 cf. sch. h ad O 223 (laud.
Erbse ad loc); sch. D.T. 351. 8: "nSiq ovv," endyo'uai, "ndXiv to ok
Koivfiv elpyaoaTo, dx; ev x© 'o\)6e EKOtjiavSpoq tkriyev' (O 305)
KOI TO C, binXovv 6v ev tw 'oi xe ZdKi)v9ov evaiov' (B 634);"
npbc, o\>c, <panev, £nei6-n dvayKTi riv ndvxax; xct 6v6|iaxa
EvxeGfivai XTi noiriaei, a ndvxcoc; evxiSe^^eva x^^ov eipyd^exo
xov oxixov Kal 5id x6 xpei'^Sec; jiexpoi) Kaxeppovnaev 6
noiiixrii;; ibid. 506. 4; Eust. 255. 29 (cum Valkii adn.): on|J-eifi>aai Se
6x1 6 lKd|iav5po(; Svoxepwi; £v ^.expo) e'xcov Tiapeicpeeiv npcoiK©
eKaivoxojiT|0Ti e^ dvdyKTi^ napd xov jioitixov.
This fragment represents a stage in the efforts of ancient grammarians
to bring the spelling and prosody of Homeric proper names under a common
denominator. It is surprising that Alexander is singled out for the spelling
'AxiXfjoc; in A 1, which is that both of the vulgate and the scholastic
tradition (cf. sch. D ad loc.).'*-' In any case, others (like sch. D, Tzetzes,
Eustathius and others) sought an etymological, rather than a metrical,
justification.
The name of the river Scamander could not have been used in hexameter
verse if the initial gk- caused a preceding short syllable to lengthen.
Accordingly, in all twelve passages in which it occurs in the the Iliad the a
fails to make position and a variant spelling with k- is attested."*** The
reading with ok- is attested at P. Heid. 1262a (= n^^, 3rd century B.C.) at O
305. '^^ Alexander provides a terminus ante quern for the spelling
Kdp.ocvSpoc; in Homer.
The rule formulated at sch. h ad O 223 whereby only verbs beginning
with OK- or C,-, but not nouns, lengthen the previous syllabic is
inadequate: it introduces an alien element (part of speech) into metrical
calculations;'*^ and what about 0Ke5dvv\)m/Ke5dw\)^i?'*^ More promising
is the approach of K. Strunk, who argues that the prosody § ok- takes
advantage of a reminiscence of a dialect in which ok had been assimilated to
^' On the spelling itself, cf. M. W. Haslam, "Homeric Words and Homeric Metre: Two
Doublets Examined (XeCpWeiPo), yaia/aia)," Glotta 54 (1976) 206 n. 12.
^ E 36. 77. 774, H 329. A 499. M 21. 9 74. <& 124. 223. 305. 603. X 148; the same
is true of the name iKandvSpioq derived from it (Z 402); M. W. Haslam compares the
treatment of the form OKcnapvov at e 237 and i 39 1 . where the a likewise fails to make
position.
*^ Cf. S. West. The Ptolemaic Papyri of Homer, Papyrologica Coloniensia 3 (Cologne
and Opladen 1967) 138.
*^ M. W. Haslam raises the interesting possibility that h's rule may have arisen from a
misunderstanding of xct ovonaxa at sch. D.T. 351. 8 (cited above).—For a similarly
misguided introduction of part of speech into ancient prosodical doctrine, cf. J.
Wackemagel (above, note 18) 11 1105.
*' Erbse (above, note 1) 96 n. 2. therefore rightly assumes this note to be a late
invention.
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K and cites corresponding short forms and papyrus evidence for a personal
name K(X}x(^)ocv6po<;.'**
Erbse assigned our scholium to Porphyry's Quaestiones Homericae,^^
more perhaps because of fr. 3b above than the nature of our fragment itself
(it has no correspondence in Porphyry's extant work; nor is it clear what
kind of ^T|TTma could have accommodated it). It is argued above (ad frr. 1
and 5) that we should in any case assume that some of the citations of
Alexander in the A-scholia derive from an exegetical commentary, a
hypothesis which would also suit this fragment well.
9.Et. Gen. (AB) s.v. axvTi,unde Et. Gud. d2 251. 18 Stef. et
EM 181. 55: ... 'AXe^avSpoq Se 6 xot) *AaKX,Ti7iid6o'u Xeyei
auTTiv Ttapa tov di^co \)iiXko\xa eivai, ax; xe-uxco texvri, Kal
(XTIoPoXt] TOt) I.
2 6 TOV ctaKX. A: om. B 2-3 "kiyzx a-uxTjv post \i.iX'kavia. hab. B 3
texvTi B: xevxiiv Kal A I xai A: om. B 4 i A: -o B
3 Tiapct TOV di^co] cf. Et. Orion. G (23. 12). I te^xco texvri] cf. Et.
Orion. H (616. 44); EM 755. 56, cui sim. Zon. 1720; Eust. 178. 5,
421. 36, 575. 33.
If, as LSJ contends, the basic meaning of dxvTi is "anything that comes
off the surface," then Alexander's etymology from the verb meaning "shoot,
dart" has at least some semantic plausibility. However, the supporting
analogy is inadequate; for, as M. W. Haslam observes, xexv-q is not formed
from TEt)4o>, nor does di^co have a present *dixco. Not surprisingly, then,
Alexander's etymology failed to find favor either in Byzantine or modem
times.
The Byzantines preferred the etymology from e'xco ( . . . dexTivn xiq
ovoa, f) \ir\ 5\)vap.ev'n exeoOoti Kal KpaxEioGai 6id to XenTOfiepec; Kal
dto^iov: Et. Gen.; cf. test, cited by Erbse ad sch. bT ad A 307c). Modem
etymologists allow a connection either with dx^pov, "chaff," or with the
root in Latin agna ("ear of grain") and Gothic ahana ("chaff) plus the -snd
sufrix.50
Probably this fragment, like Alexander's other etymologies (frr. 4, 11,
12), belongs to the navxo6and (fr. 4 above being expressly attested for
that work). In Et. Orion, the gloss s.v. dxvri occurs within a group of
glosses interpolated into the section from Philoxenus. I suspect that
Orion's gloss on dxvTj may derive from Herodian, as seems likely in the
case of fr. 4. The Et. Gen. will have drawn on a more detailed Orion gloss
** K. Slrunk, "Sprachliches und Prosodisches zur mykenischen Orthographie," IF 66
(1961) 164 f.
*' Erbse (above, note 1) 96, and, with a question mark, ad sch. A \i.
^°Cf. H. Frisk (above, note 21) s.v. axvti; P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire elymologique
de la langue grecque: Histoire des mots, 4 vols. (Paris 1968-80) s.v. axvti-
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than is now extant Note that the mention of Alexander's father's name also
binds fragments 4 and 9 together.
10a. Choer. Th. 2. 108. 31: '0 5e 'AAi^avSpoq 6 KoTvaex)^
Gau^aaiox; avxb ax'n|xat{^Ei- Xeyei yap oti noXka prmaxa
anb xox) \iiXXovioc, jiapdyovxai Eiq xov iveoxSixa, Kal
xpinovGi TO a Eiq to x ^1 ei<; xo k, oiov o^itb G^irpoi ofXTixo) (e^ ov
[5] TO o|XT|^to), 6X6) oXego) oXekco- outcck; ovv ek toO Seioco
^.£XXoVTO<; EYEVETO 6 EVEOTOX; 5eiK(0 KttTa TpOTl-qV TOt) a £l<;
TO K, Kal EK XO\> 5eIKC0 XoiTlOV (XKoXovGcoq 6 jIEOOq
7iapaKEi|a.Evo<; 5e5oiKa, cooTtEp Xeitcco XiXoina, XeiPco
XiXoi^a, 71E10CO 7i£7ioi6a.
10b, Et. Gen. (AB), unde EM 253. 9: 6£6oiKa: eoti 5£i6co, oiov
[11] "6e{5o) |J.Ti Ti TidGco"- To-uTov 6 |i£ao<; napaKEijiEvoq
6£5oi5a Kal 5id ttiv inaXXr[Xiav twv 5 ETpditTi to EoxotTOv
5 e'lq K Kal yEyovE SfiSoiKa. I 6 6£ 'AXi^avSpoc, 6 KoT-ua£\)(;
Qav\iaoi(oc, dnoXoYEuai Xiyiov oti TtoXXa pTjiiaTd eioiv djio
[15] IXeXXoVTCOV Eiq EVEOTQTac; IJ-ETttYO^EVa Kal TpETtOVTa TO
T[ eic, xb xr[ eiq to k, oiov ojiw aiiTjoco o\Jir\xGi ojiri^co, oXGi
oXeoco oXekcd- oliTcoq o\)v Kal EK xov bEiavi h-eA-Xovtoc;
EYEVETO 6 EVEOTOX; SeiKCO Kal EK TOVTOU 6 \lioOC,
7iapaKEi|iEvo<; 6£8oiKa. I 6id ti ydp Seikco eyeveto Kal o-u
[20] Seixco; ETiEiS-q oiL)6£7ioT£ Ttt eIc; %(£> pTi^aTa GeXo-uoi T-fi El
5i(p06YY<i> TiapaXriYEoOai, nXr\\/ xox) oteixco Xeixo). oIStcoc;
ZrivoPioq.
1 KOfoavevq O 6 eyevexo] eYivexo C 11 jidGco] fort. JcdGriai ut A
470 (cf. anon, ad EM 253. 11) 12 5e5oi5a B: 5e6oiKa a'i twv B:
xo\) A 13 ante k hab. A x6 I yeyove A: y^vexai B 15 )xeX,A,6vx(ov]
lieXXovxc^ A I ^ExaY6^£va] napa- B 16 prior r[ cm. B 19 xi A:
xovxo B I post SeiK© hab. A pfi|ia
Cf. ad Ep. ad A 555.
At issue is the form 6£5oiKa. For the first question about it, viz. its
classification as to tense and voice, Choeroboscus has found an answer to
his satisfaction in Apollonius: It is perfect middle, changed from 5£6oi5a
because of the juxtaposition of the three d sounds (Choer. Th. 2. 108. 20 =
Ap. Dysc. 3. 107. 42). Choeroboscus then goes on to explain that the third
5 was changed because, owing to the nature of the perfect reduplication, a
change of either of the first two deltas would have entailed change of the
other and thereby a total change in the appearance and sound of the word.
He then goes on to cite the "remarkable" analysis of Alexander, who sees
5£5oiKa as a regular perfect middle to 6£ikco, formed on future 6Eiaco, like
oXGi oAiato oXeko). By the way, the 7idGo<; by which a present form was
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derived from the future was not uncommonly used by the ancients; cf., e.g.,
Ep. ad A 490.
1 have focussed on Choeroboscus' presentation, since it gives a clearer
notion of the grammatical context in which Alexander's remark was quoted
than does the excerpt in the Et. Gen. Both Choeroboscus and Et. Gen. s.v.
5e5oiKa are likely, however, to derive from the same source, namely
Zenobius' commentary on Apollonius' 'PTm.atiK6v.5i Choeroboscus'
dependence on Zenobius was made likely by Reitzenstein, who compared
Choeroboscus' discussion of lp,doaco {Th. 2. 154. 17) with Et. Gen. s.vv.
ivdoato and i^idaacD.^^ I suspect that Alexander's "remarkable" opinion
was already cited (and rejected) by his contemporary, Apollonius Dyscolus;
it seems much less likely to have been dredged up by Zenobius centuries
later."
11. Et. Gen. (AB), unde EM 277. 8: 6ivcoToiaiv (F 391):
dnb xov 6iva) tot) a'uoxpe(pto. xopvE-uxoiq r\ OTpoyyuA,oi(; anb xr\q
Twv KX,ivo7t65tov 7t£pi(pepEia(;. 'AAi^av5po<; 6 Kofuae-oq.
2 alt. Tov Erbse: x6 AB 3 aXi^avbpoq — A: om. B
Cf. sch. D ad r391: Sivcotovcti: fixoi tietcoikiX^evok; ti koxoc
ovoxpocpfiv xExopve-uiievoK;; Ap. S. 59. 5: 5ivcoxoioi Xexeeaoi:
oxpoYY-uXoii;, ctno xfi(; xwv kX,ivoji65(ov TiEpwpepEiaq; Et. Orion. G
(44. 1; in sede scholiorum Horn.): SivcoxTJ (6ivaxri G: corr. Larcher):
nEpi<pEpri(;, EoiKvia 6iv(p (dSivco G, corr. Larcher), o eoxi xopvco.
bivoc, Se 6 xopvoq napct x6 5ivEia9ai koI KVKXovaGai (SovEioSai
Kai KoXovaGai G, corr. Larcher); sch. bT ad N 407a; ad Ep. Horn. 6
48 (= AO I. 114. 10) eius editionis quam praeparo.
The form 6ivcoxoiai occurs in the Homeric poems only at this place
(but cf. 5iva)xf|v at N 407 and t 56), where Aphrodite seeks to lure Helen
back to Paris' chamber in spite of his debacle in the p.ovoji,ax{a with
Menelaus (F 390 ff.):
"5evp' lO'- 'AiXi^avbpoq oe kqXei oikovSe veeoGoi.
^1 H. Duentzer, De Zenodoti studiis Homericis (Gottingen 1848) 14-16, had the merit
of observing that, apart from four passages dealing with voces Homericae where Zenodotus
was clearly meant, the t,V[ compendium in the EM should be resolved as ZrivoPioq. The
fragments of this work were assembled by G. Schoemann, De Zenobii commentario
Rhematici Apolloniani (progr. Danzig 1881); our fragment is no. 12 at pp. 11-12.
"Reitzenstein (above, note 36) 361-62.
^^On Apollonius' date, cf. Cohn, RE U.l (1895) 136. 32 ff. Unlike the younger
grammarian Choeroboscus, our Zenobius does not enjoy his own RE article; H. Garmer, RE
X A (1972) 12. 10 ff., suggests that our Zenobius may be the author of iAP 9. 7 1 1 in honor
of a ihetorician named Victor, if Sulpicius Victor (4th century) is the honoree in question;
note, however, that, as Reitzenstein (above, note 36) 362 showed by reference to Et. Gen.
s.v. ovStic, = EM 639. 16, Zenobius was contemporary with or younger than John
Philoponus (6th century), whom he criticized.
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Keivo(; o Y* ev Qa}ua\i(o koI 5ivcoxoioi "Kixtaai,
KaXXei xe oxiX,P(ov koi eiVotoiv ..."
Alexander's interpretation of 6ivq>t6<; as a verbal adjective to 6iva) is
implicit in the D-scholium to F 391; and the agreement in wording of Alex-
ander's explanation with that of Apollonius Sophista is striking. As
terminus ante quem for the latter we have only the fact that he is cited by
Herodian.^"* However, it is more likely that Alexander has copied from
Apollonius (whose Lexicon survives in a shortened version only) than vice
versa, since, although Apollonius names a good many sources,^^ Alex-ander
is not among them, Apion being the latest source that Apollonius does cite.
Apollonius will have been influenced here, as elsewhere, by the D-scholia
(or rather their ancient predecessor, the scholia minora).^^
It is tempting to believe, with Erbse,^'' that Alexander's comment was
taken from the 'E^TiyriTiKd, but since the IlavToSaTid, too, dealt with a
Homeric ana^ XEyo^evov (cf. fr. 5), certainty is unobtainable. Nor is it
possible to determine the source from which the Et. Gen. gleaned this
information.^^
12. EM 294. 7 (s.v. Scdxwti [I 155, 297, i 268]): 'AXi^avbpoc,
5e cruv0etov eivai Tqv Xe^iv Tiapd to x-qv 56oiv tCveiv, iv' fi ti
dOTOxivop.£VT| Soou;.
2 56aiv] -iq D
Cf. sch. D ad I 155: Soatlvrioi: Scopeaiq.
We may assume that Alexander was familiar with the explanation of
5(oxivT| given in the D-scholium to I 155. His etymology both accounts
for the -xiv- element and at the same time adds the idea of "paying what
one owes"^' appropriate to the earliest occurrence of the word in the passage
where Agamemnon promises Achilles his choice of one of his three
daughters in marriage and seven fortified towns (nxoXieQpa) as a dowry if
he will return to batUe (1 154-56 ~ 296-98):
ev 5' av5pe(; vaiovai noXvpprivef;, noX'uPovxai,
oi KE e ScoxivTiai Geov c6<; xiixTjoo-oai
Kai ol vnb OKTjicxpq) X,inapa(; xeXiovoi Sejiiaxaq.
^ Cf. Cohn. RE n.l (1895) 135. 60 ff.
^* Fifteen to be exact; cf. the detailed discussion by H. Schenck, Die Quellen des
Homerlexikons des Apollonios Sophistes (Hamburg 1961) 13 ff.
^^ Cf. H. Gattiker, Das Verhdltnis des Homerlexikons des Apollonios Sophistes zu den
Homerscholien (diss. Zurich 1945) 50-65; K. Steinicke, Apollonii Sophistae Lexicon
Homericum (diss. Gottingen 1957) xvii-xxi; Schenck (previous note) 146 ff. gives a
paradigmatic source-analysis of glosses on ten pages of Bekker's edition.
5^ Erbse (above, note 1) 98 n. 1.
* Erbse ad sch. P 391a mentions Orus with a question mark (because of fr. 14?).
^' Cf. LSJ s.v. x{va> I, s.v. otno D.4, s.v. dnoTivaj 1.1-2.
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These 5ciyxivai are clearly, as Leumann remarks, "am Grundstiick haftende
Abgaben."^ In the Odyssey 6an{vTi twice appears as a gift to be given by
host to guest (i 268, X 352).
This etymology, like Alexander's derivation for 6iKpo(o)v (fr. 4), has
found favor in neither medieval nor modem times. More influential in
Byzantium were the two alternative etymologies recorded at Choer. Orth.
(191. 12): (a) 5tbao), 6toaivTi, 6coTivn; (b) SESoxai, Soxoq, 6ot{vt|,
5cmivn, both repeated (without mention of Alexander's hypothesis) at Et.
Gen. (AB) s.v. 6onivTi (~ Zon. 588) and Et. Gud. 387. 18 Slef.;^! the EM
has sandwiched Alexander's view between these two. One wonders whether
it might have been, again, Herodian who saved the doctrine of his elder
contemporary for posterity; Herodian himself was, after all, not averse to
bold compounds.^^
Modem comparative Unguists see 5anivri as an old formation from the
word for gift, 5tb<; or *6tbT-(;, and the suffix (x)iv-, possibly a
backformation from a genitive *5caxivo(;.^3
13.Eust. 859. 50: ioxeov 6e Kal oxi xov irjxfipa ol p.E0*
"Oji-npov iTjxpov xe Xiyovai Kal iaxpov, Kal oxi o\i p.6vov Kaxa
yevoq dppeviKov laxpoq, aXka Kal 0tiA.\)k65<;. (prial yovv Ai'Xwx;
Aiovvoioq (i 1) iaxpov yuvaiKa, "AXe^ic, 5e (fr. 318 K.)
[5] idxpiav. f| 8e iaxpCvTi o\)x 'EXXtivikov, (prioi. Tiapd 5e
xoiq TexviKoiq Keixai Kal oxi 6 |iev "^Qpoq (p. 42 Ritschl) ovx
'EXh\v\.Kr[v Xe^w x^v iaxpivTjv Eiva{ (pTjaiv, 'AXit^ctybpoc, Se 6
KoxxvaEvq, npbc, ocKpipEiav XaX&v, \iT\ 'Axxiktiv Eivai avx-qv
Xiyei.
Cf. Choer. Orth. (170. 33 ~ Hdn. 2. 456. 26): 'ASpriaxivTi. Ainxivn:
. . . x6 XI I- xa yap 5ia xo\> ivrj ^ovoYevfl, \it[ yevo^eva dno
CTtiGexcov Kvpia, dnooxpe(povTai xtiv 8id it[<; ei 5i(p96yyoD
ypa9Tiv, oiov 'QKeavivri, Evtivivt), laxpivri Kal xd ofioia; An.
Orth. 163. 23-24: xd 5e [sc. 6id xov tivt]] hntp y' ovXXaPdq 5ia
xov I- AirixivTi, 'A5pTiaxivTi, 'QKeavivT], Evtivivti, K-opriKivTi,
iaxpivTi . . .
This fragment is unique in dealing, not with a textual problem,
definition or etymology but exclusively with a question of usage. Here, as
elsewhere, Eustathius displays familiarity with the Atticist lexicon of
^° M. Leumann, Homerische Worter (Basel 1950) 280; he goes on to suggest that
SciKiva as "rent in kind" at IG IV 841. 18, 21 (Calauria, 3rd cent. B.C.) may be a semantic
development from this passage.
^^ Cf. also Eust. 743. 44, who merely notes the lengthening of the first vowel of
ScoxivTi.
•'^Cf., e.g.. P. Egenolff, "Zu Lentz* Herodian m." Philol. 62 (1903) 57-59; Dyck.
Glotta 55 (1977) 225-27 CitpQiJioq < i<pi + e\)ji6(;).
" Cf. H. Frisk (above, note 21) s.v. 6{8(oni; E. Schwyzer (above, note 26) I 465 n. 5.
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Alexander's contemporary, Aelius Dionysius,^ who made the point that
iaxpoq can be common to both genders,^ cited Alexis for the form idxpia
but denied that iaxpivri was Greek. Eustathius also used, however, another
source which quoted Orus and Alexander and which, it is agreed, he refers to
by the periphrasis o'l TexviKoi. While Reitzenstein argued that Eustathius
thus refers to an otherwise unknown collection of Atticist excerpts,^ it is
generally agreed today that napa xoig TexviKoiq is rather an allusion to
Choeroboscus, who (among others) is elsewhere so referred to^'' and is the
source of Eustathius' other two citations of Orus.^^ Presumably the remark
will have stood in a more nearly complete version of Choeroboscus'
Orthography than is now extant Qrus, in turn, will have cited Alexander,^^
as in fr. 14.
Atticism was certainly in the air in Alexander's lifetime, as the activity
of Aelius Dionysius and Herodian^^ attests; it therefore seems likely that his
remark on iaxpivri was prompted by Atticist interests (a reply to Aelius
Dionysius?).^^ We do not know whether he cited evidence in support of his
position, though he certainly could have (cf. LSJ s.v. iaxpCvTj).
14. Et. Gen. (AB), unde EM 664. 39: JiepippiiSTi^: oiov
"7cepippT|5-n(; 6e xpane^p" (x 84). AB Tiepippayeic;, nepipp-ueiq.
ouxcoc; 'AXe^avSpoq 6 Koxiaetx;. Ilio*; 5e (fr. 14 Hiller)
TtEpicpepriq, 7iEpippv)T|(;. ''i^pcx; (om. Ritschl). A EM
4 (bpoq EM: om. A
Cf. sch. D ad x 84: TcepippriSriq: nepiKXaaGelq r\ 7t£pippaY£{(;- ti
jiepippe6p.£vo(; ti jiepipp-oeiq r\ Jiepicpepriq; Ap. S. 130. 7;
TcepippiiSri^: Ttcpipprjao^evo^, 7cepiKeKXao|ievo(;. pe^xiov Se
^ Cf. H. Erbse, Untersuchungen zu den attizistischen Lexika, Abh. der Deutschen
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Philos.-hist. Kl., Jg. 1949. 2 (BerUn 1950) 1 ff.
^^ For iaxpoc, as feminine, cf. Plut. mor. 143d, Ath. 636a.
" Reitzenstein (above, note 36) 389.
^^ Cf. K. Alpers, Das altizistische Lexikon des Oros: Untersuchung und kritische
Ausgabe der Fragmente, SGLG 4 (Berlin and New York 1981) 82-83, who finds that in aU
other passages which refer to oi TexviKo{ Reitzenstein 's interpretation is excluded.
^ Namely 837. 44 (^fjTpeiov) from Choer. Orth. 215. 27 (possibly via Et. Gen. [AB]
s.v. ^ritpeiov) and 857. 42 (Xecov) from Choer. Orth. 235. 32; cf. L. Cohn. De
Aristophane Byzantio et Suetonio Tranquillo Eustathi auctoribus, Jahrbb. f. cl. Philol., ed.
A. Fleckeisen, 12. Supplbd. (Leipzig 1881) 295 n. 23, and RE VI.l (1907) 1474. 2 ff.;
Alpers (previous note) 81 n. 12. Cf. in general also Erbse (above, note 1) 97 n. 2, and van
der Valk ad Eust. 859. 52.
^' Kaxa OpuvCxou, Kata oxoixeiov has been seen as the work of Orus in question:
cf. F. Ritschl, De Oro et Orione commentatio (Bratislava 1834) 42; R. Reitzenstein, Der
Anfang des Lexikons des Photios (Leipzig and Berlin 1907) xlix; C. Wendel, RE XVm.l
(1942) 1178. 49 ff.; perhaps, however, this should be modified slightly to Orus* Atticist
work later used by himself in his Orthography, cf. Alpers (above, note 67) 80-83.
^°Cf. Reitzenstein (above, note 36) 371 ff.
'I Cf. L. Cohn. "Der Atticist Philemon." Philol. 57 (1898) 365.
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nexa<popiKco(; 7r£plppe6^cvoq• pdXXexai yap Kai to noxripiov
Kpaxwv, ojq ajia xr[ Ttooei JtepippeioGai neoovxa. 6 5e
'Apioxapxoq oxpoPriBelq 7t£pi<pepTiq e'jiece xfi xpaTie^ri, mq
nepiKXaoGnvai Jiepi avxrjv "TcepippTiSriq 5e xpane^ri /
Kdjineoev" (x 84-85); sch. Ap. Rh. 1. 431a: JcepippTi5Ti(;
Kep(deaavv): tn\ jipoaonov neG' bp^ir\c, Kaxev£x8ei(;, ETcippayel^
elq to{)^Jlpoo9ev, r\ enevexOeic; <ti> (suppl. Haslam) dvxi xov
7l£pl<pcp6^evo(;, ©q koi napd xw nonixfi- "jiepippriSfi^ Se xpane^ri
/ KdnrcEoev" (x 84-85). 'Avxtjiaxoc; 5£ (fr. 190 Wyss) x6 Kaxd
kvkXov iieoEiv ovxo) Xeyei. vvv 5e dvxl xo\> E7C€vex0ei(; eiq x6
enJipooGev; Eust. 1920. 30: negippiiSTiq 8e 6 ippavxia\iivoq
ai'naxi, ojq djio xov pd^co, nepi o{) npoEiprixai (sc. 912. 22, 1469.
3), ov 5£\)XEpO(; d6pioxo(; Eppa5ov, o6ev 6 nEpippTiStji;.
The first question that this fragment raises is that of the relation of the
two grammarians cited, Alexander and Pius. Now Hiller dates Pius to the
end of the second or beginning of the third century, with the terminus post
quem derived from the fact that Pius is not cited by Herodian.'^^ j^ order for
that argument to have force, however, it would have to be shown that Pius
offered material relevant to Herodian's interests. But, in fact, none of Pius'
fragments bears upon prosody, which was the focus of Herodian's preserved
work on the Homeric text.'^^ More telling perhaps is the fact that Pius'
work was not cited by Nicanor, who lived under Hadrian and might well
have been interested in Pius' punctuation of ^ 55 (fr. 6 Hiller).'''*
Furthermore Hiller's terminus ante quem is given by Orus' citation; but
Orus is nowadays dated to the fifth, not to the first half of the third,
century.''^
It is worth considering whether the grammarian's name may provide a
clue to his date. Like, for instance, the Thucydidean biographer
Marcellinus, Pius bears, in Greek fashion, a single name, even though the
name itself is Roman. I suspect that the grammarian takes his name from
the emperor Antoninus Pius, who adopted the agnomen upon ascending the
throne in 138.''^ Pius' case is evidently not parallel with that of Aelius
''^
E. Hiller, "Der Grammatiker Pius und die dnoXoyCai npoq xdq aQev(\a£ic;
•Apiaxdpxov," P/ii/o/. 28 (1869) 93-94; the question of Pius' date is left open by D.
Strout and R. French. RE XX.2 (1950) 1891. 26 ff.. s.v. Pius no. 2.
^' Namely the 'IXiaioi and '05\)ooeiaKTi npooa)5{ai, preserved in extensive excerpts
in the scholia on the respective poems; some of the content of these works was doubtless
repeated—and not merely in Lentz's reconstruction—in the Ka9oXiKTi npooa)6{a. The
one doctrine of Pius that might have interested Herodian is that preserved in fr. 1 Hiller (=
sch. T ad E 63Sd^), since Herodian, too, dealt with the problem of aXK' oiov (sch. A ad E
638c = Hdn. 2. 52. 9 Lentz; cf. also Haas ad Tyrann. fr. 18); however. Pius' view (i.e.. that
the words ^oav oiix oioc; cni need to be understood) is so eccentric that Herodian may well
have thought it unworthy of serious attention.
'^ A point already made by Hiller (above, note 72) 93 and n. 11; for Nicanor's date. cf.
C. Wendel, REXWJl.l (1936) 274. 50-52.
'^Cf. C. Wendel. RE XVm.l (1942) 1178. 34 ff.. with literature.
''<' Cf. P. V. Rohden. RE n.2 (1896) 2497. 60 ff. and 2498. 24 ff.
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Herodian and others who, upon receiving Roman citizenship, adopted the
gentile name of the emperor responsible,^^ since then we would have
expected him also to adopt Aelius (the nomen gentile of Imp, Caes. T.
Aelius Hadrianus Antoninus Aug. Pius) and to have retained his original
Greek name. He is likely rather to have been named after the emperor, who
was often simply called Pius to distinguish him from the later Antonini.^*
One would expect a child so named to have been bom after the death of
Antoninus Pius on March 7, 161, and within ca. one generation of that date,
while the memory of the emperor was still potent. We thus arrive by a
different route at a date not dissimilar to Killer's.
It would have been welcome for Alexander to have been contemporary
with, or later than, Pius, so that we could assume the same chain of
transmission for both frr. 13 and 14 (viz. Alexander > Orus). However, our
fragment may have come from Alexander's 'E^TiyrjTiKd, fr. 13 from the
IlavtoSand. Orus is not otherwise known to have used Pius; possibly he
found both scholars cited in a commentary of later imperial date. One
wishes the citation of Orus were by both name and title. Possibly it derives
from the Avoek; npoxdaEcov twv 'Hpco6iavo\), which dealt with
controverted voces HomericaeJ^
Hiller's comment on our fragment, that Alexander derived 7iepippT|5T|(;
from nepipp-nyvuiii, whereas Pius saw nepippeiv as its etymon, and his
suggestion that nepippveiq should be deleted, is an attempt to construct a
dichotomy at the expense of the transmitted text. Both scholars are, in any
case, dependent on the D-scholia or their ancient forerunners.
Modem etymologies of TiEpippTiSriq have not made much progress
because of the uncertainty about its meaning. It is evidently formed (rom
jtEpi- and a stem *pTi5o<;, possibly related to pa6iv6<; "slender."*^
IS.Porph. 1. 286. 19 Schr. = 35. 9 Sod.: 'Ev xoi^ oaT^ovoq
I\)^^iKTOi(; TTEpl 'Hpo6oT£io'u 6iop0a)|a.aTO(; 6 Ypa)j.)iaxiK6(;
6ia?lEY6)iEvo(; TiEipaxai Kal '0|j,Tipucd xiva aacprivi^Eiv, o{)5£v
5£ XE^pov Kal Tov 'Hp65otov (piXot>vt{ ooi xfiv Tictaav xou
[5] dv5p6<; dva7pd\|/tt) ^T|XT|aiv, (pTjol yctp oxi ev xfj TiptoxT]
'Hp65oxo(; xwv 'laxopiwv nEpi Kpoiaov xox> A\)5o£) noXkd xe
aXXa 5iE{XEKxai Kal ^V oxi ... dv£0TiKE Se xiva (sc.
dvaGrmaxa) Kal "ev BpaYxiSpoi tt\oi MiXtjoicov" (1. 92. 2).
Kal YEYpaTixai
-qSTi Kaxd Jidvxa a.nXG>q xd dvxiYpacpa x6
the case of a Spartan named Eurycles who, upon receiving citizenship from Augustus, was
called C. lulius Eurycles (/'//? IV 208. no. 301); cf. B. Doer. Die romische Namengebung
(Stungart 1937) 126. On Aelius Herodian. cf. E. HUler. Quaestiones Herodianeae (diss.
Bonn 1866) 3, and Lentz. Hdn. I xi.
'"^ Cf. V. Rohden (above, note 76) 2498. 63 ff.
" Cf. Wendel (above, note 75) 1 179. 1 ff.
*°Cf. Frisk (above, note 21) and Chantraine (above, note 50) s.v. nepippT)5f|(;.
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[10] "ir\c," apQpov cruv xw i ujo5\)va^ovv xw "xaiq," ov)5eva ye
^.T^v 'EXXr\woiw {jTio^eivai GtiX-ukox; "xaq Bpayx^Sa^" av
eineiv, 'Hp65oxov 6e \iaXXjov av exepcov (pvXa^aaGai, aKpipfj
xe ovxa nepl xot 6v6|j.axa Kal Tidvo etiieikwc; (ppovxiaxiKov.
xot»xo 6r\ GepaTie-ucov xiq (sc. Alexander Cot.; cf. quae sq.) ovx
[15] 'Hpo56xo-u (pT|olv a)idpxTma yeyovevai, ^laXXov 6e xov
{o\)Y)Ypcc(pea <pT|ai Sia^apxeiv Tiape^PaXovxa x6 (a}i,
noXXa 6e (pepeoGai n-expi vvv d^apxtijiaxa Kaxd it\v
'Hpo66xo\) o'UYYpacpfiv Kal exi xt^v 6o\)icu6i5o'u Kal <I)iA.iaxo\)
Kal x(ov aXX(ov d^ioXoycov oDyvpacpecov. x{ 6* cuxl Kal xd
[20] Ttoirmaxa axeSov dvd7tX,eco Tidvxa xvyxavei
d^apxrmdxcov yP^V'-'^'^^ '^"'- '^^^ dXXcov Tiapa-
6iopGco|idxcov 7tdv\) dypoiKcov; . . . eKavdycofiev 6£ enX xov
'Hp66oxov Kal xov 5iopGtoxT]v xov Kox-uaea 'AXe^av5pov.
Ti^io-u ydp 6 dvTip ypd(peiv "xfiai Mi^riaicov" x<^P^ '^o^ *• "'^^<i
[25] MiXriaicov," vTioKEi^EVTiq e^coGev X(iipT\c, r\ yfiq. "Kal Eyo)
6£," (pTioiv (sc. Philemon), "etieiGo^tiv o^Sxcoq Exew xd xti(;
ypacpfjq, xov Se dv5pa xfjq dKpiPo\)<; av)VEOEC0<; EXEGa-ujidKEiv.
Evxvxojv <6£> xoiq 'HpoSoxEioiq aiJXOi<; etieoi Kal yEvo^Evo^
ETil xeXei xf|9 AiyuTixiaKTiq pCp^o-u, tixk; eoxI 6E\)X£pa xp
[30] xd^Ei, E-upioKco ndXiv Kaxd xtjv alxiaxiKT^v Tixtbaiv
Einovxa xov 'Hp65oxov 'dvsGi^^KEv zic, Bpayxi6a<; xdq
MiXtjoicov' (2. 159. 3). ovkexi o\)v w}j.t|v dudpxti^a Eivav
ypacpiKov, 'IcoviKov 5£ ^laXXov iSvco^ia. noXXa ydp oi)xoi x(bv
ovofidxcov xa^po'^oi GtjXvkcck; EKCpEpovxEq, olov XTjv XE ^iGov
[35] Kal x-qv Kiova Kal exi xt^v MapaGcova- Kpaxivoq (fr. 506
K.-A.) 'Et)i7i7ioxdxT| MapaGcov,' NiKav6poq (fr. Ill Schneider)
'Et)Kxi|iEVT|v MapaGwva.' xama jiev ot)v d r\\ieic, EoSpo^iEv
Kal EKpwa^EV -uyiEa." xoiavxa 6ti xot» <I)iA,ti|iovo(; XEyovxoq,
d ^Ev npbq 'AXtt,avbpov mpi xov 'Hpo5oxEio-o 6iopGa)}iaxo(;
[40] £ipT|KEV, Ot)K OIKEIOV KpCvtO XTl napOX)OT\ "UTIoGEaEV
E^Exd^ElV.
subsidia: cod. V tantum
5 dvaypdvco Schrader: -\)/ai V 8 ppayx^Srioi ut Hdt. Schrader:
Ppayxiai V 16 oDYypacpea V: corr. Schrader I oi V: corr. Rosen 28
6e suppl. Schrader 38 vyiia Sodano: vymq V
This, the most detailed of all discussions of Alexander's doctrines, came
to Porphyry via Philemon, rightly identified by L. Cohn with the Atticist
lexicographer who lived ca. A.D. 2(X).*'
«» Cf. L. Cohn (above, note 71) 363-66; C. Wendel. RE XIX.2 (1938) 2152. 15 f. and
2151. 37.
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Proper names form a difficult transmissional problem,*^ especially
when, as in the case of BpayxiSai, they are anarthrous unless coupled with
attributes. Here, as in fr. 13, the fundamental problem is that of
determining the 'EXXTivia^6(; of a certain form, though in this case the
decision on usage has textual consequences. While in fr. 13 Alexander
admitted taxpivri as a Greek (albeit not Attic) form, here he denies that
BpayxiSai as a feminine is Greek (lines 10-12: o\)6eva ye |itiv
'EXXtivcdv {)7to|i£ivai 0t|X\)K(O(; "xac, BpayxiSaq" ccv eiTieiv). Note that,
unlike Zoilus of Amphipolis and others, his reaction is not to blame the
author, but the napaboGic;.^^ Hence he proposes to emend to ev
Bpayxi6r[ai xr\<; MiXtjoicov with (Ionic) XcopTiq oryfjc; understood.^"* The
formulation itself is perhaps a bit awkward; one might rather have expected
ev Bpa7xi5pai xfjc; Mi^Tioiriq (cf. Paus. 7. 5. 4). But the fatal objection is
the one raised by Philemon, that i<; Bpayx{6a<; xaq Mi>,T|aia)v is, in fact,
read at Hdt. 2. 159. 3. Alexander thus stands convicted of carelessness
(diough the lack of modem aids should be taken into account).
By the way, Philemon's defense of the napaSooic, on grounds that the
lonians had a predilection for feminine forms is also wide of the mark.
MapaGcov appears as feminine at Pi. O. 13. 110; and, as Kassel and Austin
truly remark ad Cratin. fr, 506, it is odd to see him cited for an allegedly
Ionic feature. Presumably Alexander's error lay rather in confusing the
ethnic o'l Bpayx^Sai (cf. Hdt. 1. 158. 1: iq xohq BpaYXv5a(;) with the
(feminine) toponym.^^
IV. Alexander's Legacy
For Aristides, Alexander's writings were but a pale reflection (^iiKpa atxa
el'ScoXa) of his lectures (§ 26). No doubt, in turn, the surviving fragments
are but a pale reflection of the writings. It is thus doubly difficult for the
modem student to do justice to the man who, in his time, held so high a
reputation.
The surviving fragments indicate that Alexander was read largely by his
contemporaries (Diogenianus [fr. 6], Apollonius Dyscolus [10], Herodian
[4, 9, 12]) or those who wrote within about a generation of his death
(Philemon [15]).^^ Within the same interval his views will have entered the
^^Cf., e.g., Haas ad Tyrann. fr. 29 and CP 77 (1982) 273 (problems of accentuation of
pr(M)er names in the Homeric text).
" Cf. Erbse (above, note 1) 98.
^ The proposed emendation is therefore not xfiq (pace Herodoti Hisloriae, ed. H. B.
Rosen. I [Leipzig 1987] app. crit. ad 1. 92. 2).
*^ Cf. H. B. Rosen, Eine Laut- und Formenlehre der herodotischen Sprachform
(Heidelberg 1962) 99 n. 104.
*^ L. Cohn's idea (above, note 71) 366 that Philemon's politeness in disagreement
with Alexander (fr. 15) is an indication that he was a younger contemporary personally
acquainted with him is an attractive possibility (though not the only possible
explanation).
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exegetical commentaries from which most of the Homeric fragments derive
(1, 5, 8 and possibly 11 and 14). On one occasion Porphyry's citation of
Alexander is demonstrably at second hand (fr. 15) and, in all likelihood, in
other cases as well, in spite of citation by book number (fr. 2). In the fifth
century Methodius (fr. 7) and Orus (frr. 13 and 14 and possibly 11) probably
knew his views via intermediary (Atticist?) works.
It is a pity that so large a percentage of the surviving fragments deals
with Homeric problems,*^ since the possibility of reaping a new and true
insight from that well-ploughed field was much reduced in Alexander's day.
Thus his Homeric criticism makes, on the whole, a much less original
impression than that of, say, Apion,** since Alexander so often follows the
scholastic interpretation (preserved in the D-scholia: cf. frr. 1 and 14 and
part of 3) or ApoUonius Sophista (fr. 11). In some cases when he does
venture out on his own, as in his interpretation of the siege depicted on the
Shield of Achilles (fr. 2) or his explanation of the syntax of eTiiaxa^evcp
EovTi (fr. 3), the results are unfortunate. It was perhaps premature,
however, for G. Wentzel to deny Alexander any "wissenschaftliche
Bedeutung."^' For fr. 5 preserves an (evidently original) interpretation of
the napd6oai<; at 5 241 and an explanation of the corruption which have
prevailed to this day.
Aristides praises Alexander for the sheer range of his interests (§ 24),
but this is a merit that our fragments are least able to do justice to. We
would not know, for instance, that Alexander had devoted attention to
emending the text of Herodotus but for the fact that Porphyry, exceptionally
in the Quaestiones Homericae, quoted Philemon on the subject because he
thought the comments on textual corruption of more general interest and
because his dedicatee, Anatolius, happened to be interested in Herodotus (fr.
15). The only other author whose exegesis is represented in the fragments
is Euripides (fr. 7). Only en passant in the Homeric fragments do we find
examples of Alexander's wide reading: the citations of Aristoxenus (fr. 1),
Sappho and Eupolis (fr. 5), though the latter may have been added later (see
above, note 34).
It would be easy to measure Alexander against the standard of modem
philology and find him wanting. Though his etymologies (cf. frr. 4, 9, 11,
12) have not found favor, taken as a whole, they are by no means the worst
surviving from antiquity, an age when the etymologist's art, like rhetoric,
took persuasiveness, rather than truth, as its goal.'^ If on occasion he
'"'Tof 15(1.2.3,5.8. 11. 14).
" Cf. S. Neitzel (ed.), Apions rXS>aaai 'O^TipiKai, SGLG 3 (Berlin and New York
1977) 204 ff.
89 Wentzel. RE 1.2 (1894) 1456. 30.
'°Cf. the definition at El. Gen. (A'B) s.v. izxyjioXoyia: eoti Xe^etoq AvdnTV^iq
ovjiqxovtov Tffiv aimaivo|ieva)v ccpno^ovoa x^ (pcovp npbc, xr\v xo\> vnoKt\.\iivov
npay\i.axo<; niGavoTtita . . . (known also in simplified fom from sch. D.T. 14. 23.
169. 20, 303. 17 and 390. 12. as weU as from Eustaihius' paraphrase [1408. 13]); C.
Andrew R. Dyck 335
seems less careful than he should have been, the difficulty of working
without modem aids needs to be borne in mind (cf. ad fr. 15). It is a pity
that more of his Atticist work has not survived, since the one fragment that
we have (fr. 13) makes it clear that in this field he was an authority more
accurate than some who made a name for themselves by writing on such
questions.
Such is our picture of Alexander of Cotiaeum: a great teacher, a great
personality, but as a scholar largely a routinier, though with an occasional
flash of insight.^^
V. Indices
a. Passages Discussed by
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Parental Gifts: Father-Son Dedications and
Dialogues in Roman Didactic Literature
FANNIE J. LEMOINE
Introduction
Literary dedications are designed either to acknowledge a bond between the
author and the dedicatee or to attempt to establish such a bond. In the Latin
didactic tradition authors frequently present themselves as fathers giving
their educational treatises to their sons or composing fictive dialogues in
which they act as the teacher and the son as the pupil. The dedications and
dialogues reflected historical practice and reinforced patterns of paternal and
filial behavior through literary example.
Father-son dedications and dialogues also serve formal literary ends.
They help the author speak in a more intimate, yet authoritative voice and
create a sense of reciprocal obligation between composer and reader. The
dedication or the dialogue establishes the context within which the author
presents his literary gift.
The five aims of this study are: (1) to trace a brief history of father-son
dedications and dialogues in Latin didactic literature, (2) to examine the
formative contributions made by Cato and Cicero, (3) to argue for a
distinctly Roman character to the tradition, (4) to illustrate the conventional
presentations of authorial personality and subject matter found in later
introductory prefaces, and (5) to show how the conventions dealing with
persons and subject matter are subverted by two late Latin paternal authors,
Augustine and Martianus Capella. The article concludes with a brief
discussion of the influence of this pattern of familial instruction upon
didactic texts in the Middle Ages.
Ancient rhetorical theory advocated finding the material for
introductions either from the personalities involved (ex personis) or from the
subject matter itself {ex rebus). Close examination of two types of Latin
usage in these prefaces, occurrences of the word munus and metaphors for
eating, will both demonstrate conventional presentations of personality and
subject matter and suggest how those conventions are overturned.
The Latin word munus is a term regularly used to describe the literary
work itself, the service the father has performed for his child, and the
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relationship which fulfilling such an obligation, usually responding to a
child's request, acknowledges. The word is prominent in Cicero's writings,
where it serves as a significant trait in the presentation of the author as
responsible and benevolent.
Winning the goodwill of the audience through favorable presentation of
the personality of the speaker is a cardinal rhetorical rule for exordia. The ex
personis approach to a beginning is one Cicero himself frequently uses and
which he discusses and recommends in the rhetorical handbook he prepared
for his son. Acceptance of the munus implies accepting a role for father and
son which would ordinarily be seen as good and virtuous. The term and this
sort of presentation of the paternal author appears in other works of later
periods. Yet at least one of our fathers, Augustine, emphatically rejects the
role and the implications associated with it.
Metaphors for food or eating, the second type of Latin usage examined
in this paper, are regularly employed in this didactic tradition to describe the
subject matter or the manner of its preparation, the part of the introduction
drawn ex rebus. The metaphors become especially prominent in the fatherly
gifts of two late Latin authors, Macrobius and Martianus Capella.
Macrobius expands on the conventional metaphors; Martianus Capella calls
them into question. In both cases, the metaphoric usage indicates attitudes
toward education which conffast sharply with present-day views.
This study is suggestive, not exhaustive in its treatment of the topic.
The article underscores the importance of the family in the history of
Western education and contributes to greater understanding of tradition and
originality in Latin didactic literature. The choice of topic is an
acknowledgment of the respect I have for the author to whom this volume
of essays has been dedicated.
Fathers and Sons in Roman Didactic Literature
Many years ago Rudolf Hirzel^ noted how unusual father-son dialogues are
among the Greeks and how common they are among the Romans. Among
the Latin paternal authors, he cites Cato, Cicero, Livy, Seneca, Asconius,
Quintilian, the Jurist Paulus, Martianus Capella, Macrobius, and Tiberius
Claudius Donatus. On the other hand, he mentions that among the many
dialogues of Socrates only one is held with a family member, a dialogue
between Socrates and his oldest son Lamprocles. More recent scholars, such
as Tore Janson and Robert Kaster,^ have also noted how popular the practice
^ R. Hirzel. Der Dialog (Leipzig 1895) 429-30 and 429 n. 4.
^ For example, see T. Janson, "Latin Prose Prefaces: Studies in Literary Conventions,"
Acta Universitatis Slockholmiensis 13 (1964) 117; R. A. Kaster, Guardians ofLanguage:
The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity (Berkeley 1988) 66-68; B. A. Marshall, A
Historical Commentary on Asconius (Columbia, MO 1985) 37-38.
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of dedicating textbooks to sons was throughout antiquity and have discussed
some of the characteristic features of such dedications.
Many later Greek examples could also be cited. The work Stobaeus
prepared for his son Septimius comes immediately to mind as a fifth-century
Greek parallel.^ Yet in Latin letters the dominance of this form of
introduction or composition for didactic treatises is clear and deserves study
precisely because of its frequent occurrence. Although it shares similarities
with traditions of parental advice on morals or conduct, whether Greek,
Latin, or vernacular, the Latin works examined here focus more exclusively
upon certain technical or encylopaedic aspects of learning. Philosophical
and rehgious currents also strongly influence some of the later Latin works
and establish the supporting framework within which more technical
material is set. For example, in the De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii
Martianus Capella combines elements of Platonic dialogues, the priestly
colloquies of die Corpus Hermeticum, and the Latin didactic conventions of
a paternal author."*
Hirzel^ speculated that the difference between Latin and Greek authors
might be attributed to the greater power and responsibility the Roman father
was expected to exercise over his son. He would have found some support
for his argument in other literary comparisons. The Aeneid, Roman
comedies, and some other Latin works which borrow from Greek models
seem to give greater prominence to the relationship between father and son
than did the Greek originals.
Responding to another's request for a work is a common device Latin
authors use in order to accomplish the difficult task of making a beginning.
Tore Janson^ has gathered a series of Roman authors who claim to write at
the urging of relatives, friends, or publishers and has outlined the words and
phrases conventionally used to describe the requests and their fulfillment.
Sons are prominent among such claimants.
Although the sons may, in fact, have been unwilling recipients of such
fatherly attention, the claims in the dedications should not be dismissed as
mere adherence to literary convention. They reveal what kind of relations
were considered appropriate between father and son and what kind of attitudes
^ An earlier Greek medical parallel would be Oribasius's dedication of medical writings
to his son Eustathius, who was himself archiatrus in the East in 373-74. A still earlier
philosophical parallel is provided by Gentilianus Amelius, who recorded Plolinus's
lectures for his adoptive son Hostilianus Hesychius. The Alexandrian astrological writer
Paulus offers a late fourth-century example of a surviving astronomical work dedicated to
his son Cronamon. Artemidorus's dedication of Books 4 and 5 of the Onirocriticon and
Basil's dedication of his essay on Greek literature to his nephews provide additional
examples of familial dedications of Greek writings which are somewhat analogous to the
didactic textbooks of the Latin tradition.
See D. Shanzer, A Philosophical and Literary Commentary on Martianus Capella's De
Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Book I (Berkeley 1986) 51.
^ Hirzel (above, note 1) 429 n. 4.
^Janson (above, note 2) 27-32 and 116-20.
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family members voiced about giving the gift of learning to the next
generation. They demonstrate as well the special responsibility Roman
fathers were expected to adopt toward their children's education and the
perceived value of the educational undertaking itself.
The value placed on learning can be seen in explicit statements and in
metaphors found in some of the dedicatory prefaces or the exchanges which
form the opening or conclusion of a dialogue. Quintilian, for example, in
the preface to the sixth book of the Institutiones oratoriae, calls his work
the best part of the inheritance he had planned to leave his child:
Respiciens tamen illam curam meae voluptatis, quod filio, cuius
eminens ingenium sollicitam quoque parentis diligentiam merebatur,
hanc optimam partem relicturus hereditatis videbar ut, si me, quod
aequum et optabile fuit, fata intercepissent, praeceptore tamen patre
uteretur. (6 pr. 1)
The principles of grammar, rhetoric, or medicine the father preserved for
his child constituted a major inheritance and an indispensable entry into a
powerful and privileged elite. In antiquity the number of people who
participated in such an elite, and the specific rewards participation was likely
to bring, varied from age to age and from place to place. Yet, overall, few
can doubt William Harris's conclusion in his work on ancient literacy:
The written culture of antiquity was in the main restricted to a
privileged minority—though in some places it was quite a large
minority—and it coexisted with elements of an oral culture. This
written culture certainly helped to widen class differences, as well as
having the overwhelmingly important effect of enabling empires to be
built. Access to the privileged world of writing was automatic for some
and variously difficult for others. . . If fortune set the individual among
the literate, that was a golden gift.^
By giving such a gift to their sons, fathers transformed the bonds of
authority into ties of affection, not simply because of the instrumental value
of the gift as an entree into a privileged world. Certain intrinsic
characteristics of the educational gift were likely to reinforce an attitude of
reverential respect. These texts affirm the value of the personal bond
between teacher and pupil and underscore the widely held ancient opinion
that good learning and proper moral behavior are inextricably linked.
The prefaces and the father-son dialogues provide literary models of the
proper caring and respectful exchanges expected to characterize relationships
between fathers and sons. They also highlight the ethical qualities which
ancients found far more essential to the definition of a well-educated man
than the modem attributes of intellectual talent, critical inquiry, or technical
'' W. V. Harris. Ancient Literacy (Cambridge. MA 1989) 337.
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skill.* A well-educated man was expected to conform to established values
and to fonn his own identity by responding to accepted familial and social
obligations.
The didactic material also tends to be bounded by set texts, excerpts of
which were inserted directly into the author's work. For example, fixed
textual structures—such as a set of Ciceronian speeches or works of Virgil,
or fragmentary recollections of literary precedents, or distillation of earlier
technical handbooks—literally determine the horizon within which inquiry
occurs and necessarily limit education to interpretation and reproduction of
received opinion. Good education was seen as a combination of these
"quiddities" and personal behavioral attributes. In different ways and, no
doubt, for different reasons, Augustine in the De Magistro and Martianus
Capella in the De nuptiis challenge that normative picture. They sketch
different relationships between father and son and arrange their didactic
material within literary frameworks which undermine wholehearted
acceptance of paternal instructional authority. Yet, the tradition as a whole
conveys a certain attitude toward education and prescribes roles for author
and reader which had a strong influence on education throughout the Middle
Ages and into the modem world.
Imagines apud maiores
In the Natural History^ Pliny describes the wax facial masks of family
ancestors which were kept in the atria of Roman houses and carried in a
clan's funeral processions. These family images and family trees served to
remind members of their past and reinforce allegiance to the clan for the
future.
The following chart of Latin fathers (page 343) illustrates a somewhat
analogous literary relationship. It provides a partial list of Latin authors
who either dedicated a didactic work to a child or wrote an educational
treatise in the form of a dialogue between father and son. Literary
borrowings, echoes of influence, and direct quotations show that many of
these works are closely connected. For example, the influence of the Nodes
Atticae of Aulus Gellius upon the Saturnalia of Macrobius is salient and
easily discernible upon first reading of the prefaces to the two works. The
African peripatetic Nonius Marcellus quotes Cato and Apuleius and
obviously used Gellius in his own De compendiosa doctrina. Flavius
Sosipater Charisius, in the five books of his Ars grammatica, includes a
number of quotations from Cato's speeches.
For an insightful discussion of these educational assumptions and the implications
they had for ancient students, fatherly teachers, and professional grammarians, see Kaster
(above, note 2) 50-70.
' Pliny, NH 35. 6.
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This list is not definitive nor does it make any claim for any sort of
direct traceable lineage through the entire series of works. It does, however,
illustrate the prevalence of this form of dedication or composition in Roman
educational handbooks and suggest how widespread this practice was in
antiquity. History, philosophy, or verse might be written for friends or
distinguished patrons; but, the field of more humble didactic letters is
dominated by handbooks which are prefaced as fathers' gifts to offspring or
by hterary dialogues between a younger and an older interlocutor, usually a
father and a son related by blood or marriage. Although the hterary forms
are different, the relationship presupposed between author and reader is
similar. In both, the reader is expected to assume the role of the son, the
respectful junior partner who is frequently pictured as initiator, consumer,
and custodian of the literary effort.
The chart shows that fathers addressed educational treatises to their sons
on a wide range of topics, from early examples of practical and moral advice
to discussions in late antiquity of grammar, rhetoric, hterary and historical
commentary, medicine, geography, arithmetic, orthography, philosophy,
music, and liberal education. The catalogue would be considerably longer if
published letters of advice and moral exhortation addressed by fathers to their
sons had been included.^^ Such letters are related in form and intent to the
dedicatory epistles that preface educational and moral treatises. The list also
includes only treatises with explicit references to the son as the recipient and
some indication of the reason for the request beyond a conventional
formulaic greeting. A few names of paternal authors are included whose
works do not survive or survive only in fragments. The prominence of an
author such as Livy and the importance of Cato in initiating and fostering
the tradition account for their inclusion.
For example, our limited knowledge of Livy's epistolary essay for his
son is drawn mainly from a quotation Quintilian includes in the tenth book
of the Institutiones oratoriae.^^ In the passage cited Livy advises his son to
read Demosthenes, Cicero, and other orators who most closely resemble
those masters. Livy's essay was probably written to assist the son in his
rhetorical studies and may have contained comments on Sallust and the
rhetorician Miltiades. Seneca the Elder^^ in the rhetorical work he prepared
for his own three sons attributes such comments to Livy. Since Livy's son
became a writer and was cited as an authority by PUny the Elder in the fifth
and sixth books of the Natural History, Livy's instruction seems to have
borne good fruit.
^° Sid. Ap. Ep. 3. 13 is an excellent example of this sort of moral advice in open
epistolary form.
" Quint. 10. 1. 39.
12 Sen. Controv. 9. 1. 14 and 2. 26.
Si
o ^
Si
o
1
3H
s ?
^' s
'5
^
^g^Se
3^ <
as
2 .§«
11m
(u 5 S2 ""
^^.
.5 a
t: (u <« <M 3) j^ ^
'13
O
.S.3
o S
2 ^ ^ g
1^
2 ? §
CO U-, >
3 w
<!S
O <U
s •
•2 '^ I
^g
:ss
a ^ tt "i ti
344 Illinois Classical Studies, XVI
Cato and Cicero: Imago patris et munera
The chart reveals how frequently father-son instruction appears in Roman
didactic letters. The following discussion argues for its distinctively Roman
quality and for the particular relationship such father-son dedications tended
to portray and to foster in real life. In order to make that argument, greater
attention must be given to the two fathers at the head of the tradition, Cato
and Cicero. The two contribute quite different features to its subsequent
development.
Both in substance and literary form Cicero is a major contributor. His
works to his son Marcus have been studied and imitated by countless
epigones. On the other hand, Cato's actual literary contributions are much
more difficult to assess. Only fragments of his work to his son survive, and
the historical and cultural circumstances surrounding its composition are not
completely clear. However, his influence as a model, an ideal type of
Roman father, was assured by his own actions and by the example later
authors made of his life. Therefore, any examination of father-son
dedications in Roman educational literature must begin with Marcus Porcius
Cato's Adfilium or, as it was commonly known, Ad Marcum filium.
Cato prepared this collection of practical precepts on various topics for
his elder son, Marcus Porcius Cato Licinianus, bom to Cato and Licinia in
190 B.C. Cato probably undertook his didactic work during the 170s, when
his son would have been old enough to benefit from his instruction. The
nature of this collection and the extent of its learning has been the subject of
some debate. Alan Astin in his 1978 work Cato the Censor^^ has argued
against labelling Cato's work a comprehensive encyclopaedia made up of
separate books on topics such as rhetoric or medicine. Rather he sees the
work as a miscellaneous collection of precepts on agriculture, military
affairs, religious law, with little extensive treatment of rhetoric or medicine.
The collection Cato prepared for his son probably had the same terse
and elliptical character as his extant work on agriculture. Harris^'* suggests
that the rough style and poor organization found in the De agri cultura may
be the result of oral composition or dictation to a secretary. Since Cato
learned Latin letters—i.e., the more formal study of Latin language and
literature—only later in life,^^ oral exposition or dictation may have been
his preferred method of composing, even though he apparently kept careful
written records of his speeches.
Fronto's well-known description of Cato preparing his speech De
sumptu 5MC»^^ provides us with evidence for Cato's use of both oral and
written compositional techniques. The orator incorporated written material
'3 A. E. Astin. Cato the Censor (Oxford 1978) 182-83. 332-40.
^* Harris (above, note 7) 173.
i^Val. Max. 8.7. 1.
i<* Pronto. Ad A. Imp. 1.2.9.
Fannie J. LeMoine 345
from an earlier speech but relied heavily upon the assistance of a scribe in
preparing the new written text. The passage describes Cato listening to his
previous words and then dictating word-for-word insertions and deletions.
Dictation was a usual manner of composition in antiquity and would
certainly not be remarkable in and of itself. Yet in this period of the Roman
Republic other signs, such as the growing number of inscriptions, mark a
noticeable transition from a predominately oral to an increasingly literate
society.^'' Thus, Fronto's description lends evidence for Cato's role in a key
transitional period in the development of Latin literacy as well as in the
development of Roman literature. His model of careful notetaking and
dictation may well have served as an exemplar for the preparation of texts in
the later tradition.
Whatever the case, the disjointed quality of his pronouncements and
their archaic diction probably added to the authority which later authors
attributed to his work. His precepts were delivered in a style which Pliny,
Seneca the Elder, and Columella describe as oracular. Seneca the Elder, in
the dedicatory preface to the Controversial gives special weight to the
words and the moral authority which the figure of Cato had come to
embody:
Erratis, optimi iuvenes, nisi illam vocem non M. Catonis sed oraculi
creditis. Quid enim est oraculum? nempe voluntas divina hominis ore
enuntiata; et quern tandem antistitem sanctiorem sibi invenire divinitas
potuit quam M. Catonem, per quern humane generi non praeciperet sed
convicium faceret? Ille ergo vir quid ait? "Orator est, Marce fill, vir
bonus dicendi peritus."^*
The elder Seneca includes this observation as a part of his denunciation
of decadent trends he found so detrimental to the growth of eloquence in his
own day. Although Seneca assumed a far more intimate and urbane style in
addressing his own sons, Cato's ethical and stylistic model—especially the
link between character and learning, between what the words said and Cato's
moral authority—influenced the later author and served as prelude and
counterpoint for the paternal advice and rhetorical memories he preserved for
his children.
Cato did much to foster the image of himself as a moral authority.
From the swimming lessons in the Tiber to the practical precepts for
successful public life in the forum and private life on the farm, Cato not
only established himself but also advertised himself as a model for an
education he saw as both family-centered and father-dominated. The reasons
for this are many and various, but certainly both assimilation and rejection
of Hellenic educational patterns play some role.
^^ For a discussion of Cato's use of notes and prepared texts, see Astin (above, note 13)
134-36. Astin's careful treatment of Cato does not consider some of the broader
implications of oral and literate practices in Roman society of the period.
^* Sen. Controv. 1 pr. 9.
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Cato's consciously adopted lifestyle and his carefully publicized
educational program seem to have been carried out at least in part as a
reaction to the type of Hellenic influence in education to which Cato
objected and which he also appropriated in developing his own educational
plan. It was noted earlier that Cato received little formal education early in
his life. Later on—although he owned a slave, a grammatistes with some
instructional ability—he chose not to subject his son to a slave's discipline
but to teach his child himself, following an unusual parental course that
involved great expenditure of time and effort.'^ In addition to the collection
of precepts, he even prepared a Roman history in large letters in order to
teach him to read, and later had continued correspondence with him, a part of
which came into circulation and was cited by Cicero and Plutarch. In other
words, our earliest well-documented example of a fatherly educator is, to a
certain extent, a conscious creation in reaction to the Hellenic patterns of the
gymnasia, professional experts, and a diminished educational role for both
parents.
The Roman pattern may be compared to the Jewish reaction that led to
the more violent Maccabean revolt. In both cases contact with Hellenic
culture shaped the conscious identity of the other people and gave birth to a
more widespread recognition of the distinctive characteristics of Jewish or
Roman society. That statement by no means implies a one-dimensional
portrait of an anti-Hellenic Cato, fathering a simphstic, reactionary literary
tradition. Cato's "Romanitas" is far more complex than such a picture
would suggest, and his contributions to the educational tradition must be
seen as part of the reaction, adaptation, and adjustment to Hellenic culture
which caused a ferment in the Roman upper classes throughout the last two
centuries of the Republic.
In sum, Cato's writings for his son, the Roman history, the oracular
precepts, and the letters, start literary traditions which serve a number of
propagandistic functions. The dedication to the son, the ongoing "public"
concern for the son's development, give concrete expression to the father's
role as the most important teacher and identify both the literary model and
the historical personages who conform to the literary model as virtuous and
"Roman."
Later paternal authors cite Cato prominently and account in great part
for the fragments of his work which are now extant. Cicero, Livy, Seneca,
and Quintilian provide some references, but a vast storehouse of quotations
comes from sources like Aulus Gellius, Charisius, Nonius, and Macrobius.
Although Festus, Priscian, Servius, and many others add more to the
corpus, citations by paternal authors are sizeable and, in some instances,
seem to have special significance for the quoting author.
For example, Macrobius, at the end of the preface to the Saturnalia,
mentions that he may need his readers' indulgence because he was "bom
" Plut. Cat. mai. 20. 5.
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under an alien sky and his words might lack the polish of the native Roman
tongue,"20 He then ends his preface by suggesting that he might merit the
neat rebuke Cato gave to Aulus Albinus who had composed a History of
Rome in Greek and then begged pardon for faults of arrangement and style
because he was a Roman, born in Latium, and the Greek language was
completely foreign to him. Cato rebukes Aulus for apologizing for an error
rather than avoiding a mistake which was neither done unwittingly or under
compulsion. The quotation from Cato aptly fits the occasion and at the
same time demonstrates that Macrobius the foreigner is in firm command of
his Roman literary predecessors.^^
Cato's work can be seen as not only the first but also the exemplar
which later tradition would redesign to fit its own needs. Conservative Cato
can be credited with fathering a literary tradition which gains adherents, in
part, because of its claim to be an old family custom. Much of the Greek
learning which passed into the Latin didactic tradition came through this
"Old Roman" route.
In fact, other evidence would suggest that in many ways Italy of the
second century B.C. was backward in its educational practices and that
fathers were not notable for their care in educating their children. Cicero
mentions that Polybius accuses the Romans of negligence in educating their
offspring and himself concedes that the Romans had no firmly established
and commonly accepted educational standard.^^ At the same time the great
increase in the number of inscriptions during the second century B.C. and
the influx of Greek teachers suggest a rise in literacy and a growing
recognition that formal education was going to play a more important role
in the lives of the prominent. The figure of Cato, the father-educator, arises
in that time, but only acquires its distinctive character and influence through
the colors Cicero, Seneca Rhetor, Plutarch, and other authors add to the
portrait.
^'^ Sat. 1, pr. 11: ... sed omnia quibus sit ingenium luum vegetius, memoria
adminiculatior, oratio sollertior, sermo incorruptior, nisi sicubi nos, sub alio ortos caelo,
Latinae linguae vena non adiuvet. The entire passage about Cato runs from 12 to 16.
^' A similar but less compelling argument could be made for Flavius Sosipater
Charisius. Charisius dedicated a work on grammar in five volumes to his son, probably
some time during the middle of the fourth century, and included a number of quotations from
Cato's speeches. Since in the introduction he urges his son to perfect by industry the
eloquent Latin he could not obtain through birthplace, it seems likely that Charisius was
not Italian. Yet, he believed that, by practice and good example, his son could become as
eloquent as the native bom.
" Cic. De rep. 4. 3: disciplinam puerilem ingenuis,de qua Graeci multum frustra
laborarunt, et in qua una Polybius noster hospes nostrorum instilutorum neglegentiam
accusat, nullam certain aut destinatam legibus aut publice expositam aut unam omnium esse
voluerunt.
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Munera Ciceronis
More modem readers are forced to view Cato and earlier Roman educational
tradition through Cicero's eyes and to understand the Latin dedicatory
tradition as it has been shaped by Cicero's words. Cicero's example as
father-educator was a major influence upon Asconius, Quintihan, Ambrose,
Macrobius, Augustine, and many lesser lights, and the picture Cicero
sketches of himself as teacher and chief architect of his son's academic and
moral advancement becomes the model from which later parental portraits
are drawn.
Of the two works Cicero addressed to his son Marcus, the Partitiones
and the De ojficiis, the Partitiones is the more technical and schematic. It
draws heavily upon the rhetorical precepts of the Middle Academy and was
in turn quoted frequently by Quintilian and later rhetoricians. It is presented
in a simple question and answer format with Cicero pater acting as the
respondent to the questions posed by his son Marcus. As his son indicates
in the beginning of the work, this is a reversal of their usual roles and a
change of their usual language, for Cicero customarily drilled his son on
rhetorical matters by asking him questions in Greek.
The date of composition is uncertain. The most likely possibilities are
53 or 46 B.C. In a letter to his brother in 54 B.C.,^^ Cicero comments
upon his nephew's fine progress in rhetorical studies and mentions his desire
to give him additional instruction when they are in the country and at
leisure. The type of systematic handbook Cicero produced in the Partitiones
might well be the concrete fulfillment of that wish undertaken for his own
son who would then be just beginning his elementary training in rhetoric.
Later, in 46 B.C., Marcus ////m^ would have been nineteen and ready to leave
for Athens to finish his studies. At that time Cicero would have had
enough leisure to write such a work, and the letters of the period and the
subsequent composition of the De ojficiis in 44 B.C. show how concerned
Cicero then was about his son's academic and moral development. Cicero
does not specify any setting for the dialogue, but the intimate tone and
references to leisure suggest a scene of retirement and relative tranquillity in
his Tusculan villa.
In constructing the dialogue's opening exchange Cicero follows
precepts for exordia he gives in the Partitiones. Introductory passages, as he
says in 28. 3, are derived ex personis aut ex rebus ipsis, and they are used
for three purposes: to win a friendly, intelligent, and attentive hearing. He
recommends capturing the goodwill of the audience by presenting the
speaker's personality in the most virtuous and favorable light and gaining
the audience's understanding and attention through a clear exposition of the
planned treatment of the subject and an indication of its importance.
^ Ad Q.frat. 3. 34.
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As might be expected, the opening exchange between father and son is
in a pleasant, relaxed style; but, it sums up in an unambiguous way the
importance of a father's attention to his son's education. It begins with a
request from the son:
Cicero filius: Studeo, mi pater, Latine ex te audire ea quae mihi tu
de ratione dicendi Graece tradidisti—si modo tibi est otium, et si vis.
Cicero pater: An est, mi Cicero, quod ego malim quam te quam
doctissimum esse? Otium autem primum est summum, quoniam
aliquando Roma exeundi potestas data est; deinde ista tua studia vel
maximis occupationibus meis anteferrem libenter. {Part. 1)
Janson, in his examination of the preface of the Orator,^'^ discusses the
many bilateral connections which formed the basic social fabric of ancient
Rome. These relations could link an inferior and a superior, as patronus and
cliens, or equals in bonds of friendship or mutual self-interest, as amici.
The maintenance of such relations rested upon the ingrained expectation that
an honorable person would feel the obligation to repay any services received
and would, when needed or requested, show gratitude by direct action. Thus,
the topos of responding to a request, which is such a frequent device in these
Latin prefaces, stands within an intricate network of relationships that
defined individuals and their roles in society. The topoi also served to
further types of behavior and educational expectations which are consonant
with the combination of learning and ethical values discussed above. In
short, the literary framework used to pass on the doctrina supported and
strengthened the mores, the ethical qualities which formed a fundamental
part of the education itself.
Cicero's use of the device, however, has some noteworthy feattires.
The father who inhabits the world of this dialogue is ready and willing to
put all his other business aside in order to educate his son. In fact, Cicero
turns to services he can perform for his son when his opportunity for public
service has been limited. When his role in the state has been circumscribed,
he is still able and eager to fulfill responsibilities which, he asserts, are
more important than civic duties. His awareness of his own personal
situation and tlie implications he draws from it can be seen in an
examination of his use of the word munus, especially in his discussion of
Scipio in Book 3 of the De officiis.
Before examining that passage and others in which he mentions munera
in this connection, another important feature of the introduction of the
Partitiones needs to be reviewed. The son's request immediately introduces
the reader into a bilingual and bicultural world of learning, the special
domain of an international elite, who are equally comfortable speaking either
language and familiar with the pressures of major public and private
business.
^ Janson (above, note 2) 43-44.
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Most of the paternal authors who form part of the later didactic tradition
can be identified as learned members of a fairly high social class. Although
some came from the aristocratic elite, others probably originated from the
middle to upper-middle class and based their careers and livelihood on
enterprises other than education. Robert Kasler, in his discussion of the
development of professional grammarians, argues that no known
professional grammarian in late antiquity dedicated a work to his own son
and that such familial dedications are the characteristic mark of amateur
litterateurs.^ His basic point is sound, although it is possible to quibble
slightly with his claim, for the paternal author Augustine was certainly a
professional teacher of grammar and rhetoric early in his career at Thagaste.
The fathers who form part of this tradition are men like Nonius
Marcellus, Mallius Theodorus, or the Marcellus of medical fame. Nonius
Marcellus is either related to or identical with the Nonius Marcellus
Herculius of CIL VIII 4878, who in 324 restored destroyed buildings and
repaired streets in Thubursicum Numidarum. The honor such an inscription
records gives some indication of the wealth and status of the family to
which Nonius is assumed to belong. Mallius Theodorus wrote a treatise on
metrics, De metris, for his son Theodorus. He was the consul of 399 and
was celebrated by Claudian in his panegyric. Augustine praised him in both
the De beata vita and the De ordine, and regrets having praised him too
much in Retractationes 1. 2. Marcellus, a Gallic Christian, served as
magister officiorum under Theodosius. De medicamentis , the work he
prepared for his sons, contains over 2,500 entries of various remedies and
concoctions, and is prefaced by a series of letters on medicine, the first of
which is also a letter addressed to his sons by a certain Largius
Designatianus. Although many of these paternal authors have left few
prosopographical traces and one is so unknown that the authenticity of his
name has been questioned,^ those who can be identified either come from a
social class which had the means and leisure necessary for reading and study
or could aspire to membership in such a class.
The importance Cicero ascribes to educating his son finds parallels in a
number of the later texts.^^ Calling attention to the use of both Greek and
Latin material is also a common feature of the later tradition and underlines
the badge of culture and the "Romanitas" of the Latin speaker. References
" Kasler (above, note 2) 68.
^^ It has been suggested that Vibius Sequester, the author of the De fluminibus,
fonlibus,lacubus, nemoribus, paludibus.montibus, gentibus per litleras libellus, is a
ficlive construct from Cicero, Pro Cluentio 8. 25. See Schanz-Hosius IV.2 121 for a
discussion of the "actuality" of the author.
^' For example, Aulus Gellius, in his introduction to the Attic Nights, gives a clear
statement of his priorities in managing his business, educating his children, and
completing the volumes of commentaries for their entertainment and edification: Quantum
autem vitae mihi deinceps deum voluntate erit quantumque a tuenda re familiari
procurandoque cultu liberorum meorum dabitur otium, ea omnia subsiciva et subsecundaria
tempora ad colligendas huiuscemodi memoriarum deleclatiunculas conferam (pr. 23).
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to Greek material or sources inevitably make a reader aware of what is non-
Greek in the work at hand. The Roman father's selection and interpretation
of both Greek and Latin material is regularly mentioned in the later tradition
and provides a distinctive cast to the father's role in the presentation of the
material.
The education Cicero gives Marcus in the Partitiones might be aptly
characterized as a translation exercise and summary review. Schematic and
reductive, it shows many similarities to the announced objectives and types
of material presented by later authors. Other works in the paternal didactic
tradition also draw upon Greek material and make explicit references to
translating aspects of Hellenic learning into a Roman family gift. The
father-teacher frequently assumes the role of translator or interpreter of one
text or of an entire body of learning and describes his subject matter and his
approach to that subject matter in terms of assimilation, selection, and
transmission. In a very basic sense, he "familiarizes" the material taken
from a different language, culture, or historical period as an inheritance for
his child.
The De qfficiis provides a grander and more comprehensive example of
Cicero's role as interpreter of and contributor to Greek learning. The three
books of this work Cicero wrote in 44 B.C. and directed to his son Marcus
who was then studying in Athens. He begins the first book of the De
qfficiis with an appeal to Marcus to combine Latin and Greek philosophical
and rhetorical studies. To support that appeal, he cites his own work and
underscores the service he has provided others, both those fellow
countrymen who know and those who do not know Greek letters. But he is
careful to point out that he is not simply a translator but that he draws from
his sources according to his own judgment and decision:
Sequimur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum
Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio
arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. (1. 2. 6)
In sum, at the beginning of both the Partitiones and the De officiis,
Cicero calls special attention to his indebtedness to Greek sources, places
that philosophical or rhetorical debt within a personal and familial context,
and indicates how his own educational values and judgment have shaped the
work. By citing the Hellenic debt, Cicero subtly asserts his own
independence and illustrates how his Roman ways depart from the Greek.
Similarly, many Roman authors in the later tradition call attention to
their careful perusal and selection of Greek sources for incorporation within
a Latin work and a Roman family setting. Serving as a Latin translator and
interpreter of Greek material was no doubt both fashionable and useful in
Cicero's day and later. And later authors continue to cite their reliance upon
both Greek and Latin material and to describe their service for their sons in
terms of translation, selection, and interpretation. Notable reference to
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Greek material occurs both where it would be obviously expected and where
it seems to serve other ends than mere necessity.
For example, the Platonist Apuleius, when writing about Plato and
addressing his son Faustinus on the chief end of moral philosophy, would
be expected to begin with interpretations of Platonic thought. His brief
introductory reference to Plato is, however, far from the elaborate listing of
Greek and Latin works found in authors like Aulus Gellius or Macrobius.^*
In introducing the Attic Nights, Aulus Gellius provides a long list of Latin
and Greek sources, reiterates the time and effort he expended in their perusal,
and stresses that his notetaking and excerpting were far more selective than
the voluminous and tedious commentary characteristic of some of the
Greeks.2^ Macrobius's introduction to the Saturnalia shows a noticeable
dependence on the introduction to the Attic Nights and a clear desire to
separate his product and manner of composition from that of his predecessor,
but he employs many of the same commonplaces, including explicit
reference to perusal and judicious selection from diverse works written in
Greek and Latin (Sat. pr. 2). Less well-known paternal authors, such as the
Gallic magister officiorum Marcellus and the African physician Cassius
Felix, medical writers of the fifth century, stress their own careful attention
to Greek sources and their own roles as translators, at least partly in order to
warn of the serious errors negligence can produce.^^
Although Cassius Fehx himself admits that his collection of treatments
for 82 illnesses is largely excerpted from Greek practitioners, especially
Galen's 0epa7ie\)xiKa jcpoq r^ia-uKcova, he often cites Roman practice
with approval and knows Punic names for medicinal herbs. His
identification with Roman culture is especially interesting in view of his
apparent knowledge of Punic and the linguistic peculiarities of his Latin
style.
To be sure, there is a world of literary and cultural difference and almost
five centuries of time between Cicero and Marcellus and Cassius Felix. The
^ Apuleius, De Platone 2 init.: Moralis philosophiae caput est, FausUne fill, ul scias,
quit>us ad beatam vUam perveniri rationibus possit. verum f a/i beatitudinem bonorum fine
ante alia conlingeret ut ostendam, quae de hoc Plato senserit.
^' Aulus Gellius, Noc. Alt. pr. 3-14.
^° Marcellus, De medicamentis , episl. ad filios 5: Nam licet attentissime species et
mensuras specierum remediis quibusque adscripsero et ipsarum mensurarum notas vel
ponderum qualitates secundum Graecam traditionem et medicorum veterum consuetudinem
seorsum libello huic inseruero et nan solum Romana, sed etiam Grata expositione
digessero, tamen ex re est, ut haec eadem cum peritioribus conferantur ac saepius
relractentur et quae confecta fuerint vel parata medicamina sub signaculis semper habeantur,
ne aut casus incidat aut malignitas alicuius obrepat, quae benivole et sincere parata
corrumpat, sitque de remedio venenum et de salubritate pernicies culpeturque medicina, cum
peccarit incuria.
Cassius Felix, De medicina, init.: cum diuturno tempore sedulus mecum volvendo,
carissime fili, de medicina Iractassem, omnipotentis dei nutu monito placuit mihi ut ex
Graecis logicae sectae auctoribus omnium causarum dogmata in breviloquio Latino sermone
conscriberem.
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latter are translating technical works for readers somewhat removed from the
liberally educated, sophisticated audience Cicero could expect. The son of
Cassius Felix no doubt needed a translation of the Greek and may also have
needed his father's admonition that he neither add nor subtract anything from
the given text. Yet almost all of these paternal authors assume the role of
cultural and historical intermediary and limit their own original contribution
to the setting, selection, and arrangment of previous texts.
At the conclusion of the Partitiones Cicero again sets his schematic
outline of rhetorical theory in a context which identifies transmission of
learning with performing a service, a personal obligation which arises out of
affection and is reinforced by family tradition. The conclusion of the
dialogue follows rhetorical precepts in that it contains both recapitulation
and amplification. Cicero places the dry and bare presentation of rhetoric in
the wider framework of moral philosophy and ends with an exhortation to
follow what the dialogue has presented as a guide for more important
matters. The dialogue ends with the son's acknowledgment of the service
Cicero has rendered: Ego vero ac magno quidem studio, mi pater,
multisque ex tuis praeclarissimis muneribus nullum maius exspecto (Part.
140).
The word munus which Cicero uses here to characterize his service also
appears at the end of the De ojficiis and at other key points within that text.
Cicero employs the term frequently to describe literary services and to
highhght special relationships established by this type of gift-giving. The
important connotations of the word can be most easily seen in an
examination of its use in the De ojficiis. In the conclusion of that work,
Cicero employs the term but in a far more artful and moving address to his
son: Habes a patre munus, Marcefili, mea quidem sententia magnum', sed
perinde erit, ut acceperis {De ojficiis 3. 33. 121).
Cicero then continues his conclusion with personification of his
instruction as three books who are to be received as fellow-guests and who
are to speak in his own voice as he would speak with Marcus were he able
and as he hopes soon to do—a wish of course never fulfilled for Cicero—but
his son fortunately escaped the proscription because he was in Athens. The
personification shows how the father's gift becomes the substitute for the
father himself and reveals how intensely personal, almost physical, the
educational bond could be which surrounded the selected didactic material
contained in the gift.^'
Munus, the Latin word which Cicero uses regularly to describe what he
has done for a recipient, is usually translated by the more general English
^^ De officiis 3. 33. 121: Quamquam hi libi Ires libri inter Cratippi commenlarios
tamquam hospiles erunt recipiendi; sed, ut, si ipse venissem Athenas (quod quidem esset
factum, nisi me e medio cursu clara voce patria revocasset), aliquando me quoque audires
,
sic, quoniam his voluminibus ad te profecta vox est mea, tribues its temporis quantum
poteris, poteris autem, quantum voles. Cum vero intellexero te hoc scientiae genere
gaudere, tum et praesens tecum propediem, ut spero, et, dwn aberis, absens loquar.
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terms "service," "duty," "obligation," "tribute," "gift," or by the more
concrete "work" or "book." It is of course the proper term for the last office
for the dead and, especially, the gift of funeral games or pubHc monuments
to celebrate the memory of a family member, such as Augustus's gift of the
Theater of Marcellus and Octavia's gift of the Ubrary in memory of her son.
The frequency with which this term is used in dedications and the eagerness
with which the multiple connotations are explored by some Latin authors
suggest that the term, at least from Cicero onward, held special meaning and
should not be dismissed as a banal convention of hterary dedications.
The public, personal, reciprocal nature characteristic of the literary
service that Cicero describes as munus is as evident in the conclusions of
the Partitiones and De officiis as it is in Cicero's much more playful use of
the term in his letter to Varro of July 1 1 or 12, 45 B.C. The letter was sent
as a reminder that the treatise which Varro had promised to dedicate to
Cicero (probably the De lingua Latino) was, like many scholarly works both
now and then, some four years overdue. The letter begins with a pun upon
munus as both a gladiatorial show and a literary gift. Cicero then refers to
his dedication to Varro of the four books of the Acadermca posteriora, four
immodest reminders of the literary obligation Varro owes him. In his
subsequent word-plays upon munus and remunerari Cicero stresses the
reciprocity of the bond of affection and study that is given formal, public
expression through such gifts:
Etsi munus flagitare, quamvis quis ostenderit, ne populus quidem solet,
nisi concitatus, tamen ego exspectatione promissi tui moveor, ut
admoneam te, non ut flagitem. Misi autem ad te quattuor admonitores
non nimis verecundos. Nosti enim profecto os adulescentioris
Academiae. Ex ea igitur media excitalos misi, qui metuo ne te forte
flagitent; ego autem mandavi, ut rogarent. Exspectabam omnino
iamdiu, meque sustinebam, ne ad te prius ipse quid scriberem, quam
aliquid accepissem, ut possem te remunerari quam simillimo munere.
{Adfam.9.S. 1)
Cicero uses the word frequently in other dedications or prefaces, as, for
example, in the dedication of the Paradoxa Stoicorum to Brutus, or in the
famous proemium to Book 3 of the De ojficiis on the leisure and solitude of
Scipio Africanus. There he employs the term in both the narrow meaning
of "literary work" as well as in its broader sense:
Sed nee hoc otium cum Africani otio nee haec solitudo cum ilia
comparanda est. Ille enim requiescens a rei publicae pulcherrimis
muneribus otium sibi sumebat aliquando et e coetu hominum
frequentiaque interdum tamquam in portum se in solitudinem recipiebat,
nostrum autem otium negotii inopia, non requiescendi studio
constitutum est. Exstincto enim senatu deletisque iudiciis quid est quod
dignum nobis aut in curia aut in foro agere possimus? . . . Quamquam
Africanus maiorem laudem meo iudicio assequebatur. Nulla enim eius
ingenii monumenta mandata litteris, nullum opus otii, nullum
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solitudinis munus exstat; ex quo intellegi debet ilium mentis agitatione
investigationeque earum rerum, quas cogitando consequebatur, nee
otiosum nee solum umquam fuisse; nos autem, qui non tantum roboris
habemus, ut cogitatione tacita a solitudine abstrahamur, ad hanc
scribendi operam omne studium curamque convertimus. (JDe officiis 3.
1. 2^)
In this passage Cicero draws an explicit comparison between himself
and Scipio. Scipio, known for his outstanding gifts {rei publicae
pulcherrimis muneribus) to the state, had no need to erect literary
monuments or perform a service of solitude {nullum solitudinis munus).
Cicero does not have such strength of mind nor ability to sustain himself
when alone. Instead, as he himself admits, he devotes himself to
performing this service for his son and to other literary efforts.
Hidden in that explicit comparison is the tacit admission that Cicero
can only sustain his isolation and affirm his self-worth by fulfilling services
which will win him the respect and gratitude of his son or of others for
whom his writings are destined. The senate is dead, the courts are effaced,
no worthy service is possible there, because there is no worthy recipient of
such service. But Cicero, in writing the De officiis for his son, creates a
memorial, a public gift commemorating himself and calling for
acknowledgment of his role as paternal benefactor by his son Marcus and by
all subsequent readers.
The literary work becomes the concrete fulfillment of an obligation,
whether of family or friendship, not dissimilar from the recognition for
services rendered to the gods or the state. As such, the dedication or the
dialogic frame becomes a way of asserting and affirming the author's own
identity and worth as a valuable member of the state or the family
community. The work itself preserves and commemorates the author and
affirms his and his son's identity by incorporating historical, literary, or
scientific monuments from the past into a literary family portrait. Cicero
does this subtly with his portrait of Scipio and his service to his son.
Many of the authors on the list handle their gifts with far less finesse.
Still, works in this tradition can be called munera, in more than one sense
of the word. They are literary monuments which incorporate old and new
material in a celebratory structure. They might be compared to visual
monuments, like the Arch of Constantine, where the dehberate inclusion of
past material signals an attempt to foster an identity and establish a bond
between the best of the past and the present.
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The Use oi Munus by Later Paternal Authors:
Seneca, Boethius, and Augustine
Later authors in the didactic tradition use munus or similar words for gift-
giving as a regular part of the introduction. Just as Cicero draws the
comparison between a gladiatorial show and his munus for Varro, so Seneca
the Elder in the preface to Book 4 of the Controversiae draws the same
playful comparison between his own activity and the stage managers of
gladiatorial shows and indirectly reinforces the connection between his
literary munus and a show in commemoration for the dead.^^ Although
Seneca's reference is playful, his usage seems apt, especially since so much
of his work is devoted to celebrating and preserving in memory the
accomplishments of rhetors and orators long departed.
One of the most elaborate examples of the repetition of munus is found
in the dedicatory preface to the Arithmetic of Boethius. There the role-
reversal of son-in-law dedicating a munusculum to his father-in-law adds an
extra degree of point to the theme of giving and receiving service. The
submissive tone of the preface comes in part from the role-reversal of
dedicator and dedicatee, but it also conforms to the practice more common in
late antiquity of stressing the humility of the author and the exaltation of
the recipient of the gift.^^ Boethius's preface repeats and amplifies a number
of the loci communes expected in late Latin dedicatory prefaces, such as the
responsibility of the dedicatee to examine, improve, and approve of the work
before it is submitted to others, the transmittal of Greek riches into a Latin
treasury, the questionable competence of the author, the amount of labor
expended in preparing the work, the diminutive and unfinished results
{munusculum, novi operis rudimenta), as well as a long excursus on the
plastic arts and the appearance of attenuated food-metaphors throughout.^
Munus appears four times in this relatively short dedicatory letter. It
opens the address {in dandis accipiendisque muneribus), it appears in the
playful description of the work as a munusculum, intensified by the
Sen. Controv. 4 pr. 1: Quod munerarii solent facere, qui ad expeclationem populi
detinendam nova paria per omnes dies dispensant, ut sit quod populum el delectet et
revocel, hoc ego facio: nan semel omnes produco; aliquid novi semper habeat libellus, ut
non tantum sententiarum vos sed etiam auctorum novitate sollicilet.
See Janson (above, note 2) 120.
^ Boethius, Arithm., pr. 3. 1-16 Friedlein: In dandis accipiendisque muneribus ita rede
officia inter eos praecipue, qui sese magnifaciunt, aestimantur, si liquido constabit, nee ab
hoc aliud, quod liberalius afferet, inventum, nee ab illo unquam, quod iucundius
benevolentia conplecteretur, acceptum. Haec ipse considerans attuli non ignava opum
pondera, quibus adfacinus nihil instructius, cum habendi silis incanduit, ad meritum nihil
villus, cum ea sibi victor animus calcata subiecit, sed ea, quae ex Graecarum opulentia
litterarum in Romanae orationis thesaurum sumpta conveximus. Ita enim mei quoque mihi
operis ratio constabit, si, quae ex sapientiae doctrinis elicui, sapientissimi iudicio
conprobentur. Vides igitur, ut tam magni laboris effectus tuum tantum spectet examen, nee
in aures prodire publieas, nisi doetae sententiae adstipulatione nitatur.
Fannie J. LeMoine 357
fortifying pun, sed huic munusculo non eadem quae ceteris imminent artibus
munimenta constituo,^^ and it is repeated in two instances near the end of
the dedication which stress Symmachus's role as the worthy recipient of the
gift because of his learning and his ability to correct the faults of the
author.3^ The repetition hnks the son-in-law with the fatherly reader in a
tight bond of personal obligation and almost seems to compel the reader's
service and partnership in producing the learned work. The bonds of
personal service and relationships affirmed in the Boethian dedicatory letter
stand in stark contrast to Augustine's use of the word munus in his
discussion of the De magistro, one of the two dialogues in which he and his
son Adeodatus appear.
In recalling the De magistro in Book 9 of the Confessions, Augustine
uses the word munus so prominently and with such insistence that the
passage clearly reads as a profound rejection of the traditional didactic
relationships celebrated in father-son dialogues and a concomitant rejection
of the munera by which fathers and sons established their identities and
affirmed their worth in the Roman world. The nominal subject of that
chapter is Augustine's baptism at Milan with Alypius and Adeodatus, his
fellow catechumens who were receiving baptism at the same time. Yet
what the reader may notice immediately is how little of the chapter is
concerned with the rebirth of the three coaevi, Alypius, Augustine, and
Adeodatus, and how much of the chapter is concerned with Augustine's
reflection on his own lifegiving, parental role:
Adiunximus etiam nobis puerum Adeodatum ex me natum camaliter de
peccato meo. Tu bene feceras eum. Annorum erat fere quindecim et
ingenio praeveniebat multos graves et doctos viros. Munera tua tib^
confiteor, domine deus meus, creator omnium et multum potens
reformare nostra deformia: nam ego in illo puero praeter delictum nihil
habebam. Quod enim enutriebatur a nobis in disciplina tua, tu
inspiraveras nobis, nullus alius: munera tua tibi confiteor.
Est liber noster, qui inscribitur "de Magistro." Ipse ibi mecum
loquitur. Tu scis illius esse sensa omnia, quae inseruntur ibi ex persona
conlocutoris mei, cum esset in annis sedecim. Multa eius alia
mirabiliora exp>ertus sum. Horrori mihi erat illud ingenium: et quis
praeter te talium miraculorum opifex? (Conf. 9. 6. 14)
Running through this passage is the refrain munera tua tibi confiteor,
domine deus meus. It is apparent that Augustine repeats the refrain almost
as a ritualistic acknowledgment of thanksgiving for God's gifts. It is
equally apparent that at the same time he is rejecting the conventional role
^^Pr. 3. 20-21 Friedlein.
^^ Pr. 5. 7-10 Friedlein: . . . tu lantum dignus eo munere videbare, eoque magis
inerrato opus esse intellegebam; 5. 21-23 Friedlein: Tu tantwn palerna gratia nostrum
provehas munus. Ita et laboris mei primitias doctissimo iudicio consecrabis et non maiore
censebitur auctor merito quam probator.
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of the Roman father as instructor, educator, nourisher, and bestower of gifts.
God is the father; Christ, the teacher. Men like Augustine may assist, but
the gift of life and true learning is divine. Augustine makes the same point
on the divine origin of wisdom and the inner, personal nature of learning in
the De magistro, and he repeats the same admonition elsewhere, notably, for
example, in Letter 266. The Bishop of Hippo wrote this letter to his
spiritual daughter Florentina, a girl of serious, studious inclinations.
Rorentina's mother had introduced the girl to Augustine and had requested
the Bishop's instruction for her. Augustine replied to the request wiUingly
enough, but he concludes his letter with this caveat:
. . . admonendam te his litteris credidi secundum supra dictas
optiones, ut quaeras, quod vis, ne sim superfluus, si conatus fuero
docere, quod scis, dum tamen firmissime teneas, quod, etsi aliquid
salubriter per me scire potueris, ille te docebit, qui est interioris
hominis magister interior, qui in corde tuo tibi ostendit verum esse,
quod dicitur, quia neque qui plantat, est aliquid, neque qui rigat, sed qui
incrementum dat deus. {Ep. 266. 4 = CSEL LVH 650. 13-20)
The quotation from 1 Cor. 3. 7 picks up on the theme of instruction from
the Apostle Paul developed earlier in the letter and underscores the limited
role a human being can play in providing nourishment or instruction if the
human lacks divine help and guidance.
Augustine's rejection of the traditionally understood and accepted role of
teacher is reaffirmed in Retractationes 1.11, where he again discusses the De
magistro and stresses that the one teacher is Christ.^'' That he chose the
dialogue between father and son as the literary vehicle for this discussion of
teaching and that he refers to that work and his son so prominently in the
baptism chapter of the Confessions are two signs of the radical departure
Augustine takes from the traditional patterns and claims of paternal
authorship sketched earlier in this article. Augustine rejects the paternal role
considered normative in this educational tradition and, in its place,
substitutes a much more profound dependence upon the inner man's relation
to God. Augustine's comments in the Confessions and the position on
teaching he outlines in the De magistro question the very basis of a father's
educational authority. For Augustine, legitimate instructional authority
stands on religious and theological grounds which differ profoundly from the
familial model espoused by Cato, Cicero, and other Roman paternal
teachers.
^' Retract. 1.11: Per idem tempus scripsi librum, cuius est lilulus "de Magistro ," in quo
disputatur et quaeritur et invenitur magistrum non esse, qui docet hominem scientiam, nisi
deum secundum illud etiam, quod in evangelio scriplum est: "Vnus est magister vester
Chrislus."
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Digesta etindigesta
Metaphors for food and digestion are often used in these prefaces to
characterize the discovery, ordering, or presentation of the subject matter.
Since the father-son didactic tradition shares some features wiUi symposia
and literary feasts, it is not surprising to find occasional metaphors
comparing intellectual sustenance to food, but in the De nuptiis of
Martianus Capella, these metaphors overturn rather than support the role of
the paternal author as a competent provider.
Many authors use digerere or digesta to describe the process of
arrangement and interpretation they have used in preparing their works.
When the term is used without metaphoric elaboration, it does not call up
strong associations between food and subject matter or between intellectual
activity and eating. For example, Vibius Sequester uses the word twice in
the opening seven lines of the De fluminibus, fontibus, lacubus,
nemoribus, paludibus, montibus, gentibus per litteras libellus?^ Charisius
describes the Ars grammatica he is giving his son as a gift a me digestam in
libris quinque?'^ Marcellus in the introductory letter to his sons repeats the
digestion-metaphor at two points when he describes what he has included
from Latin and Greek sources and what he has appended to the De
medicamentis^^
On the other hand, in the preface to the Attic Nights, the comparisons
are somewhat more apparent. Aulus Gellius ascribes to his finished work
the same disparity of subject matter he had included in his first short and
undigested notes.'*^ He also characterizes his work as the first fruits or
appetizers of the liberal arts, sed primitias quasdam et quasi libam^nta
ingenuarum artium^'^ When Macrobius writes his introduction to the
Saturnalia, he echoes the words and phrasing of the preface to the Attic
Nights, but he sharply distinguishes his practice from that of his
unacknowledged predecessor. In describing his method and its intended
result, he places far greater emphasis upon the comparisons between
intellectual and physical digestion. For example, he asserts that he has
^* Quanta ingenio ac studio, fill carissime,apud plerosque poetas fluminum mentio
habita est, tanto labore sum secutus eorum et regiones et vocabula et qualitates in litteram
digerens. . . . fontium etiam et lacuum, paludumque et montium, nemorumque et
gentium, . . . huic libello in litteram digesta nomina subieci.
Amore Latini sermonis obligare te cupiens, fili karissime, artem grammaticam
sollertia doctissimorum virorum politam et a me digestam in libris quinque dono tibi misi.
*° See note 30 for quotation of Marcellus's first usage.
*^ Pr. 3: Facta igitur est in his quoque commentariis eadem rerum disparilitas quaefuit in
illis annotationibus pristinis, quas breviter et indigeste et incondite ex auditionibus
lectionibusque variis feceramus.
*^ Pr. 13. At the end of dedicatory preface of the De arithmetica Boethius uses the same
analogy (faboris mei primitias).
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brought material from diverse authors and disparate times together into a
coherent whole:
nee indigeste tamquam in acervum congessimus digna memoratu: sed
uariarum rerum disparilitas auctoribus diversa, confusa temporibus, ita
in quoddam digesta corpus est, ut quae indistincte atque promiscue ad
subsidium memoriae adnotaveramus in ordinem instar membrorum
cohaerentia convenirent. {Sat. pr. 3)
He then develops five comparisons to describe his method of composition
and the resulting form of the work. His composition imitates the bees'
production of honey, nature's transformation of food into blood and bodily
strength, the combination of single numbers into a finished product, the
blending of scents to make a single perfume, and the blending of voices to
form a choir.'*^
Macrobius borrowed this section of his preface from the eighty-fourth
letter of Seneca. In that letter Seneca endorses the usefulness of extensive
reading and argues for excerpting material from others and transforming it
into one's own possession. With only minor revisions, Macrobius lifts the
five comparisons given in sections 3-10 of Seneca's letter and juxtaposes
the Senecan excerpts with the echoes from Aulus Gellius cited above. In
other words, the text in which Macrobius describes his method of
composition is an example of the appropriation method he claims for his
text. He advocates seamless synthesis as an author's major task and
endorses verbal regurgitation both by precept and in practice.
Martianus Capelia uses eating- and regurgitation-metaphors as major
elements in the literary frame in which he sets the De nuptiis and in the
narrative of the second book of the myth. By calling attention to the
literary functions these metaphors fulfill, Martianus subverts his persona'
s
narrative authority and raises questions about the principles of seamless
synthesis and verbal regurgitation which Macrobius so effectively
demonstrates.
The De nuptiis is written as a Menippean Satura, a classical genre
which has no well-defined literary canon, but is usually thought to include a
*^ Sat. 1, pr. 5-10. The first two comparisons run as follows: Apes enim quodam modo
debemus imitari, quae vagantur et /lores carpunt, deinde, quidquid atlulere, disponunt ac per
favos dividunt et sucum varium in unum saporem mixtura quadam et proprietate spiritus sui
mutant, nos quoque, quidquid diversa lectione quaesivimus , committemus stilo, ut in
ordinem eodem digerente coalescat. nam et in animo melius distincta servantur et ipsa
distinctio non sine quodam fermento, quo conditur universitas, in unius saporis usum varia
libamenta confundit, ut , etiam siquid apparuerit unde sumptum sit , aliud tamen esse quam
unde sumptum noscetur appareat: quod in corpore nostro videmus sine ulla opera nostra
facere naturam: alimenta quae accipimus, quam diu in sua qualitate perseverant et solida
innatant, male stomacho oneri sunt: at cum ex eo quod erant mutata sunt, tum demum in
vires et sanguinem transeunt. idem in his, quibus aluntur ingenia, praestemus, ut
quaecumque hausimus non patiamur Integra esse, ne aliena sint, sed in quandam digeriem
concoquantur: alioquin in menwriam ire possunt, non in ingenium.
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mixture of prose and verse, journeys to the underworld or the heavens, and a
questioning of the authority of the narrator and the decorum of literary
conventions. The work contains nine books, the first two devoted to the
myth of the marriage between the god Mercury and the human maiden
Philology, and the last seven devoted to presentations by the personified
Liberal Arts: Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Geometry, Arithmetic,
Astronomy, and Music. The entire work is surrounded by a Uterary frame in
which Martianus, the white-haired father, retells for his son Martianus the
story Satura had told him.
In the opening prose section, Martianus attributes the entire work to the
personification of the genre, Satura, and includes her as an important figure
in the subsequent development of the literary frame. She interrupts
Martianus at the beginning of the eighth book and at the end of the work in
order to protest angrily about his authorial incompetence. The word satura
was thought to derive from a type of stuffing,"*"* and Martianus seems to
play upon that derivation in his final poem describing the work. In the
poem Martianus describes the fable Satura told him as an indigestible
mixture of contrasting ingredients (997-98):
habes senilem, Martiane, fabulam
miscilla lusit quam lucemis flamine
Satura, Pelasgos dum docere nititur
artes cathedris vix arnicas Atticis,
sic in novena decidit volumina.
haec quippe loquax docta indoctis aggerans
fandis tacenda farcinat, immiscuit
Musas deosque, disciplinas cyclicas
garrire agresti cruda finxit plasmate. *
At this point Satura can no longer contain her rage at the hash the
author has made of her tale. Swelling with rage and bile (999 turgensque
felle ac bill), she interrupts and attacks him viciously, and concludes her
remarks to the son or reader with these words (1000):
ab hoc creatum Pegaseum gurgitem
decente quando possem haurire poculo?
The narrator uses similar language in the interchange with Satura at the
beginning of the eighth book on astronomy. At that point in the wedding
some of the guests have lost interest in the presentations given by the
Liberal Arts and have turned their attention elsewhere. Silenus has fallen
into a drunken sleep, and Cupid rudely awakens him. Satura cannot
^ Varro's derivation is recorded by Diomedes in the third book of his Ars Grammatica
as follows (Keil, Gramm. Lat. I 485 ff.): sive a quodam genere farciminis quod multis rebus
refertum saturam dicit Varro vocitatum. est autem hoc positum in secundo libra
Plaulinarum quaestionum "satura est uva passa et polenta et nuclei pini ex mulso
consparsi."
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stomach such levity (807 nondum stomacho senescente), she attempts to
call the narrator back to his senses with a poem on a loftier plane, but the
narrator responds with a spirited defense of his efforts which include a series
of playful questions and a final piece of advice which reinforces the
connection between tasting and being wise: ride, si sapis, o puella, ride.^^
The concluding poem and the interchange at the beginning of Book 8
contain a strong admixture of farce (incidentally, another literary term which
derives from stuffing). These episodes portray the process of composition
as awkward and interrupted, and they stress that the finished product is not a
sweet and pleasant blend, like the honey to which Macrobius alludes, but an
indigestible collation, impossible to sip or even to be contained in a fitting
cup. When describing his own work or the disposition of Satura, Martianus
frequently uses words which imply breaking apart or breaking through
barriers of constraint. This language, the disparate subject matter, and the
variation from lofty religious speculation to low farce give the entire work a
degree of ambiguity not found in most of these didactic texts, and reveal
doubts about the competence of the cook and the quality of the educational
feast.
Such doubts may have arisen from the religious or spiritual beliefs to
which Martianus"*^ gives dramatic enactment in Book 2 of the De nuptiis.
Before the human maiden Philology can make her ascent to the stars, she is
forced to vomit up a large number of heavy texts lodged in her breast.
These books the Muses hasten to gather up and preserve for earthly use."*^
*^ 809: Talia adhuc canente Satura, velitus ille ac durissime casligatus denuo me risus
invasil. "euge" inquam, "Satura mea, an te poetriam fecit cholera? coepistine Permesiaci
gurgilis silire fontes? iamne fulgores praevides et vultus deoruml ubi illud repente
discessit, quod irrisoria semper lepidaque versulia inter insana [semper] deridebas vatum
tumores, dicabulis cavillantibus saleque contenta nee minus [poetarum] rhetorum cothurno
inter lymphatica derelicto, et quod rabido fervebas cerebrosa motu, ac me Sileni somnum
ridentem censorio clangore superciliosior increpabasl ergone figmenta dimoveam, et
nihil leporis iocique permixti taedium auscultantium recreabitl Paeligni de cetera iuvenis
versiculo resipisce, et ni tragicum corrugaris, ride, si sapis, o puella, ride."
*^ The extensive religious speculation in the De nuptiis would suggest that the author
was a well-educated and devout pagan.
^' 134-38: et "heus" inquit "virgo, praecepit deorum pater hoc regali lectica in caeli
palatia subveharis, quam quidem nullifas attrectare terrigenae , sed ne tibi quidem, si ante
nostrum poculum, licet." et cum dicto leniter dextra cordis eius pulsum pectusque
pertraclat, ac nescioqua intima plenitudine distentam magno cum turgore respiciens, "ni
haec," inquit "quibus plenum pectus geris, coactissima egestione vomueris forasque
dijfuderis, immortalitatis sedem nullatenus obtinebis." at ilia omni nisu magnaque vi
quicquid intra pectus persenserat evomebat. tunc vero ilia nausea ac vomitio laborata in
omnigenum copias convertitur litterarum. cernere erat
,
qui libri quantaque volumina
,
quot
linguarum opera ex ore virginis diffluebant. alia ex papyro, quae cedro perlita fuerat,
videbantur, alii carbasinis voluminibus impHcati libri, ex ovillis multi quoque tergoribus
,
rari vero in philyrae cortice subnotati; erantque quidam sacra nigredine colorati
,
quorum
litterae animantum credebantur effigies, quasque librorum notas Athanasia conspiciens
quibusdam eminentibus saxis iussit ascribi atque intra specum per Aegyptiorum adyta
collocari, eademque saxa stelas appellans deorum stemmata praecipit continere. sed dum
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Martianus dwells upon the outer, physical characteristics of the books
Philology disgorges and provides a catalogue of works of differing languages
written on various materials and with quite differing outer forms. The scene
is an unforgetable presentation of a mystical insight. It simultaneously
stresses the value of human learning and the necessity for its ultimate
rejection if the human hopes to gain a vision of the divine.
Both Apuleius and Macrobius act as interpreters of philosophical and
religious matters for their sons. Apuleius 's De Platone et eius dogmate and
theZ)e mundo and Macrobius 's Saturnalia and Somnium Scipionis contain
revelation and reUgious speculation which the father explains and clarifies
for his child. Those paternal authors do not overtly question either the
nature of their work or their competence to undertake it. Their role is to
translate difficult philosophical concepts into understandable form.
Martianus follows a different course. He creates a myth, sets didactic
discourses within unfamiliar surroundings, and subverts his paternal
authority by open abuse of his authorial persona. He uses comparisons
between his literary effort and food, but his comparisons stress
indigestibility and ejection. Throughout his work Martianus stresses the
underlying unity of opposites and his own inability to achieve it.
Augustine challenges the tradition by rejecting the basis for paternal
educational authority. Martianus undermines it by suggesting that all the
disparate elements of knowledge cannot be brought together into one
smooth mixture humans can swallow.
In general, the digestion-metaphors in ancient didactic texts present a
somewhat unappetizing vision of the subject matter either as disordered
tidbits or already processed pap. While such a vision may be offensive to a
modem reader, the repetition of the metaphor in the ancient authors suggests
that they held a different view. They saw themselves as processors and
preservers of intellectual nourishment which could be used to sustain the
next generation.
Roman Models and Medieval Textbooks
The influence of father-son dialogues and dedications extends far beyond the
ancient world. Two brief examples from Cato and Cicero will illustrate
how the tradition continued into medieval textbooks. Cato influences the
development of the tradition, not so much through the survival of his words
as through the exemplary portrait later authors made of his life. Cicero
shapes and develops the father-son didactic tradition through the direct
lalia virgo undanler evomeret, puellae quamplures
,
quorum Aries aliae, allerae diclae sunt
Disciplinae, subinde, quae ex ore virgo effuderat , colligebanl in suum unaquaeque illarum
necessarium usum facullalemque corripiens . ipsae etiam Musae, praeserlim Vranie
Calliopeque, innumera gremio congessere volumina.
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influence of his writings and the indirect influence which derived from his
reputation.
Thus, it is not the actual, historical Cato, but the Cato of romance, the
typical wise old Roman father who is the voice of the popular
Disticha Catonis. These two-line hexameter maxims were purportedly
directed by Cato to his son Marcus. The kernel of the collection of moral
aphorisms originated well before the third century A.D., although the
collection continued to grow and change in the course of its later use as a
primary text. As one of the basic texts for the elementary study of Latin
during the medieval period, the Disticha spread the influence of Cato and the
father-son educational model widely. To be sure, the Disticha were not
without rivals in the medieval classroom and were supplanted to some
degree by the Monosticha of Eugenius and, later especially, by the study of
the Psalter. Still, the number of extant manuscripts and the references to
maxims from other sources attest to their currency from the fourth century
onward. The very attribution of the collection to Cato and its subsequent
popularity not only furthered the literary convention but also fostered a
memory of an educational practice which was centered upon the father
teaching his son.
Cicero's two works for his son provide models for imitation throughout
the later tradition. Of the many followers and imitators, Ambrose deserves
special mention because his work marks a turning point in the tradition's
development. In his three books De officiis ministrorum Ambrose uses the
Ciceronian literary model in order to address the young clerics of the diocese
for whom he is the spiritual father. His work exemplifies the transition
between the dedication of moral instruction to children of the flesh and the
deliverance of moral precepts to children of the spirit.
Three observations may be gleaned from a quick retrospective of the
catalogue of authors: (1) the prominence of the father-son dedication in
authors of the late fourth and fifth centuries; (2) the large number of Latin
paternal authors who were not born under Italian skies and, in some
instances, call attention to their foreign origins (Seneca, Aulus Gellius,
Apuleius, Nonius Marcellus, Charisius, Macrobius, Augustine, Martianus
Capella, Marcellus, Cassius Felix, and Martyrius could be included in such
a group); and (3) the number of important educational texts of the early and
later Middle Ages which are prefaced by father-son dedications or are
constructed as a father-son dialogue. By manuscript count alone, the
Disticha Catonis, the De nuptiis, and the De arithmetica would rank among
the most widely distributed texts. Others on the list are not far behind in
count, although a few are preserved in a unique manuscript or only in
fragments.
Ancient education depended very much upon the possession,
preservation, and transmission of actual texts. Such education can be
characterized as highly literary and almost slavish in its adherence to earlier
textual authorities as an abstract generahzation. It was also bounded by the
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scrolls and books, the concrete physical signs and the means by which
learning was passed from one generation to the next. Modems live in a
world of multiple copies, easy duplication, and quick obsolescence; and
modem education must teach the ability to search and synthesize. Not even
the wealthiest readers in antiquity faced comparable problems of textual
proliferation and intellectual plenty. Owning and displaying the scrolls and
books themselves were signs of the owner's participation in the cultural
tradition.
School texts in the late Middle Ages, for example, show a number of
signs of the pride of ownership."*^ Paul Gehl has discussed examples of
Tuscan production of small books for children. These texts gave the child
simultaneously a set of moral goals, instruction in Latin, and a tangible,
attractively decorated artifact of book culture. In a similar way, the earlier
Latin texts in this tradition represented an actual physical gift, a scroll or
codex which the father intended as a more permanent, outward expression of
the learning he hoped to transmit. The father's role in educating his child
then becomes not so much an act of discovery for the future but a
monument to past learning, digested and assembled into a conventional
literary stmcture which celebrated family relations and accomplishments.
The literary convention of father-son dedication so prevalent in the
Roman encyclopaedic tradition may thus be linked with a conscious
identification in the author's mind between the type of learned work and
virtuous attributes. The prevalence of this form of dedication in late
antiquity should not be seen as meaningless repetition of an outmoded
convention but rather as a badge, a consciously assumed marker of
participation within Roman culture. The subject matter taught (the ethical
and practical precepts of agriculture, rhetoric, religion, and politics) also
served similar aims and was, like the conventional dedications, both
descriptive and prescriptive.
To be sure, the major subject matter of the educational treatise, the
basic text of the handbook, usually proceeds without frequent references to
the reader, whether addressed as son or not. Yet the frame which the
dedication or dialogue provides sets up a fictive educational model and
pattern of identification which subsequent readers are forced to recall or even,
to a limited extent, to assume. In short, the texts themselves contain
reminders of the primary role of the parent in educating his offspring.
Although Bishop Eucherius's dedication of religious writings to his sons
Salonius and Veranius, and Boethius's dedication of the De sancta trinitate
to his father-in-law indicate how subject matter and catechetical expectations
were changing in the later period, the instructional patterns and the familial
format remain remarkably constant. The ancient model for teaching and
leaming accompanies the subject matter taught and retains some influence in
** See P. F. Gehl, "Latin Readers in Fourteenth-Century Florence: Schoolkids and their
Books," ScrUtura e Civilia 13 (1989) 396-98. 410.
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the later period, if only as the fictive, textbook setting for instruction or the
imagined context by which the author establishes a bond with his reader.
It is misleading to read these ancient dedications and dialogues as if the
literary forms served the same functions as modern dedications. Such a
reading fails to acknowledge the source of the author's authority and the
relationships which define the work's purpose and execution. Modem
didactic authors, relying on their membership in a professional class, use
their works to demonstrate their authority in the field. Dedication to a
husband or child is a brief recognition of other aspects of the author's life.
Ancient authors draw their didactic authority from the family relation and
construct their works as celebratory monuments of that relationship. The
works confirm the family's identification with a cultured class in Roman
society and stand as visible, public testimony of personal commitment to
virtue and learning.
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The Text of Prodromus' Novel
MIROSLAV MARCOVICH
Theodorus Prodromus (ca. 1100-1158) was a prolific author.' Doubtless
the masterpiece of his poetic skill is the romantic novel in verses (4,614 of
them) Ta Katdc 'Po5dv0Tiv Kal AoaiKA.Ea, divided into nine books. The
romance is preserved in four manuscripts, clearly falling into two classes:
HV vs. UL.2
The older class is represented by H (= Heidelbergensis Palatinus gr. 43,
saec. XIV, ff. 39^-830- H is by far the best codex, but it has been heavily
damaged by moisture and time; hence it is difficult to read. The other MS
of this class is V (= Vaticanus gr. 121, saec. XIII, ff. 22^-29^). V is copied
in four columns per page, with 61-71 lines per column. No dodecasyllabic
line is longer than 4 cm. Consequently, V is difficult to read because of its
extremely small letters.
The younger class is represented by U (= Vaticanus Urbinas gr. 134,
saec. XV medii, ff. 78''-1190, copied by the scribe Francopulos, and by L
(= Laurentianus Acquisti e Doni 341, saec. XVI ineuntis, ff. P-500. .
In addition, between 1328 and 1336 Michael Macarius Chrysocephalus
copied moral sentences (yvwiJ-ai) from Prodromus' novel (total: 99 verses)
and included them in his Anthology 'Po6covia{, "Rose Garden."
Chrysocephalus' autograph is preserved in cod. M (= Marcianus gr. 452
[Collocazione 796], ff. 245^-246^). On the other hand, cod. Musei
Britannici Sloane 2003, saec. XVII (fol. 174), is of no value for the
establishment of the text, since it copied Prodromus' loci communes from
the first printed edition of the novel.^
This editio princeps appeared in 1625 in Paris, as prepared by Gilbert
Gaulmin (1587-1667), along with a Latin metrical version and copious
' Compare W. Horandner, Theodoras Prodromos: Historische Gedichie, Wiener
Byzantinislische Studien 11 (Vienna 1974) 37-67 (Werke).
So correctly M. T. Coltone, "La iradizione manoscritta del romanzo di Teodoro
Prodrome," Universild di Padova, Istituto di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici, Miscellanea 2
(1979) 9-34.
' Contra R. Beaton, The Medieval Greek Romance, Cambridge Studies in Medieval
Literature 4 (Cambridge 1989) 67: "Prodromos' romance . . . was excerpted in a further
two [manuscripts], the second from as late as the seventeenth century. . . . This evidence
for a continuing readership . . ."
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notes by Gaulmin."* The edition is based on H alone, which Claude de
Saumaise (Claudius Salmasius, 1588-1653) had copied for Gaulmin with an
infinite number of misreadings and omissions (e.g., Saumaise skipped ff.
55''-56' of H, comprising 4. 89-191 of the novel). Now, since H has a
major lacuna after f. IT (comprising 8. 398^97), its text was supplied for
Gaulmin by John Barclay (1582-1621) from V. Incidentally, in the copy of
Gaulmin 's editio princeps in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris (Y^ 6072)
there are marginal emendations by Pierre Daniel Huet (1630-1721), which I
have used.
Prodromus' novel was edited for the second (and last) time by Rudolf
Hercher (1821-1878), in 1859, in his Erotici Scriptores Graecir' Hercher
did not collate the MSS, but rather relied on Gaulmin (read: Saumaise), in
addition to the work of Philippe Le Has (1794-1860). The consequence is
that Hercher's edition is full of false readings and mistakes. The merit of
the edition, however, is in the fact that Hercher, a learned scholar, was able
to emend many a scribal error.
While preparing a first critical edition of Prodromus' novel,^ I have
twice collated all the manuscripts in their originals. It is my impression
that the archetype contained supralinear variae lectiones. In addition,
Prodromus' own okoteivti eK(ppaai(; was not always correctly understood
by the scribes; hence an abundance of undetected scribal errors in the extant
manuscripts. It is instructive to point out the degree of deterioration of the
original text of the novel during one single century of its transmission:
1 150-1250 (the age of V).
On this occasion, I am presenting a selection of emendations suggested
by me, along with a few remarks on Prodromus' probable sources of poetic
inspiration."^
* Theodori Prodromi philosophi Rhodanlhes el Dosiclis amorum libri IX. Graece el
Latine. Interprete Gilb[erto] Gaulmino Molinensi. Parisiis, apud Tussanum du Bray, sub
via lacobaea, sub spicis maturis. M.DC.XXV. Cum privilegio Regis. 592 p. (Greek text
with a facing Latin version, pp. 1-423; Gaulmin's notes, pp. 471-574.)
^
'EptoTiKcov X-oycov avyypaipelc,, recognovit Rudolphus Hercher. Tomus alter, Upsiae
1859, pp. 287-434 and xU-lviii.
^Forthcoming (1992) in the Bibliotheca Teubneriana.
^ Compare also O. Hager, De Theodori Prodromi in fabula erotica 'Po6dv8Ti xal
ho(s\.Kkr\!:,fontibus (diss. Gottingen 1908); H. Hunger, "Antiker und byzantinischer
Roman," SB Akademie Heidelberg, Philos.-hist. Klasse 1980, Abh. 3 (Heidelberg 1980)
1-34; idem, "Die byzantinische Lileratur der Komnenenzeit. Versuch einer
Neubewertung," Anzeiger der Akademie Wien, Philos.-hist. Klasse 105 (1968) 59-76;
idem. Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzanliner, Byzantinisches Handbuch,
V.2 (Munich 1978) 128-33; A. D. Aleksidze. Vizaniijskij roman XII veka (TbUisi 1965);
S. V. Poljakova, /z istorii vizantijskogo romana (Moscow 1979) 89-124; R. Beaton
(above, note 3) 67-73 and 220 (with literature).
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(1) The pirates of Mistylus conquer Rhodes and take many captives,
among them the young couple Rhodanthe and Dosicles. 1. 33-38 Hercher
reads:
"AXXo-oc, Se SeajiriaavxEq ek xa>v avxevcov
kXoioi(; ai6ripoi^ ta<f)\)pr\Xaxr\\iivoiq
Kal xe^P«<; eKSrioavxeq e^ojciaGiovq, 35
5o\)Xo-U(; TipofiYov dSXiox; zovc, dOXioix;-
|i.e6* d)v AoaiKX.fiq Kai 'Po5dv0ri napGevoq
Xeipi ovveSeGrioav (bjioti PapPdpo-u.
In 38, Gaulmin and Hercher follow the reading of HV, ^vveSeGriaav, but it
does not scan. Isidor Hilberg suggested ^-oveaxeGTiaav instead.* Hilberg
was right, but the fact is that the reading ^-oveoxeOTioav already exists in
the class UL. Prodromus employs avvexco in the same sense at 1. 94 and
4. 56. The probable reason for the reading 4vve6e0T|aav in HV was the
presence in the scribe's memory of 33 6ea^riaavTe(; and 35 eKbr\aa\/xEc,.
(2) Within the traditional ecphrasis of a beautiful bride,' in our case
Rhodanthe (1. 39-60), we read (1. 46-^7):
'Ocppv^ <P'oaiK(b(; EX) Y£W)i.eTpo'u)i.EVT|
Evq Etxpva ^l^^olv TmiK-oKXiov.
V has ev)<p\)o\)<;, and this is the correct reading; compare 5. 113 Kal Kt)KA.ov
cooTiep e\)(pt)a |ii|j.o\)^ev(ov.
(3) In prison, the young hero Dosicles is seriously worried abou^ his
own and Rhodanthe's future (1. 97-98):
"Kal xavxa jiiKpd, tcov 5' Eq avpiov xdpiv
Xiav KaxaoJia xf^v k\i.T[v vjf'ux'nv (p6Po<; . . ."
ACav is Saumaise's mistake; all MSS have tioXx>c,. Compare 7. 470 eiq
lieyi-aTov eutieocov (p6pov. Cottone 15 is correct.
(4) "Barbarians are by nature passionately fond of women," states
Dosicles (cf. 3. 154) echoing Chariton 5. 2. 6 (cp-uoEi 6e eaxi x6 pdpPapov
yvvai^aveq), and if they do not get what they want they are ready to
commit murder (1. 110-11):
"9eph6v ydp Eaxiv zxc, Epov x6 pdpPapov,
Kttv \ir[ xuxT], Jipoxeipov Eig 90vo'upY(av."
^ Epistula crilica ad loannem Vahlenum (Vienna 1877) 14.
'Compare Constantine Manasses, Itinerary 1. 166-99; idem. Chronicle 1157-67;
Nicelas Choniates, Hist. p. 151 Bekker (= p. 116. 61-66 van Dieten); Eustath.
Macrembolita 3. 6. 1-4; Achill. Tat. 1. 4; Xenoph. Ephes. 1. 2. 6; Musaeus 55-66 et
alibi.
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Kav jiTi Tuxn is an emendation by Le Bas and Hercher of Kal |j.t| tuxt| of
the class UL. But the older class HV, seconded by Chrysocephalus'
autograph M, have Kal ^ti xvxov, and this is the correct reading. Maybe
the scribe of the source for UL was influenced by 106 kcxv ^ev tuxh ^"d
109 ei 5' ot) Toxw-
(5) The noble Rhodanthe is of delicate nature, says Dosicles, not
accustomed to the hardships of Ufe, and sensitive to the lightest illness (1.
118-21):
".
. . aXK' i] 'Po5dv9Ti nSx; •unoiaei xov tiovov,
yvvfi 0aAxx|j.(p xai tpvcpaiq Ei6iO|i.£vn,
oap^ djiaX.fl, npoxevpoq tic, ndaav voaov, 120
zi Kal ^iKpd yovv alKia nape^Tceooi;"
AikCoc is Hercher's emendation for the transmitted aixia (actually, H has
|i.iKpa and al'xia). Read: ei Kal jxiKpa yoiiv aixia 7iapE)j.7ieoT| ( =
MSS), "should even a slightest occasion for illness occur," and compare 2.
465 Kal ^Ti6ev -uiiiv ejitcoScov TtapEfineaoi.
(6) But in the same prison there is a friend in need, to cheer up
Dosicles, Cratander from Cyprus, who addresses his fellow-prisoner as
follows (1. 137-43):
"Ka-uGrixi" (pTioi "xcbv oxevayiimv, (b ^eve-
EJiiaxeq 6\|/£ xdq podq tcov SaKpvcov,
dno^EvcoBElq xfi^ £VEyKovaTi(; <p£pE-
e'xek; ydp fmd(; o\)vaji£^£V(i>|i£vo\)<;. 140
Arioxmv dnrivcbv dpnayfi KaxEOXESilc; •
navxEc, KaxEax£0Tm£v ojiXoiq Pappdpcov.
OiK£i<; (puXaKTiv o'0|J.n£(p\)XaK{a|i.E9a . . ."
In 139, d7to^£vco0El<; is Saumaise's mistake; all MSS have d7ie^Evtb9Ti(;,
which corresponds to 141 KaxEOXEOriq and 143 oiKeiq (p\)XaKT|v. Thus
read line 139: dTtE^EvcbGriq xfiq EveyKo-uoTiq- (pipe.
(7) Cratander tells Dosicles his own tragic story—the accidental death
of his beloved girl Chrysochroe. He was just paying a secret visit to the
girl's premises, just as Clitophon in Achilles Tatius 2. 23. 4 did, (1. 176-
77):
"jipopdq be Jipoq xov^jcpoaBev fiavx<a 7to5l
£C7t£-o6ov eXGew dfi<pi x-qv XpuaoxpoTiv."
no5l is a rare metrical irregularity. (Every Byzantine dodecasyllable should
end with a paroxytone.). The meter is restored by reading r[avxov n65a.
The construction is common enough: Theognis 283; Aristoph. Eccl. 161;
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Eur. Bacch. 647, Or. 136, Med. 217; E. Forberg, Abhandlung iiber noba
Paivca und dhnliche Strukturen im Griechischen (Coburg 1850).
(8) In his dirge for the dead daughter, Chrysochroe's father Androcles
likens his daughter to a beautiful tree cut before its time (1. 224-25):
"to 6ev5pov evxpo-ov, e\)Jipene^, naXKxiq i^eya,
Kevttx; -ojiavGovv, d)paia|J.£vov p.dxTiv"
K(xXXo(; is Saumaise's mistake; all MSS have KaXov. Thus read the line:
© 5£v5pov e-uxpot)v, evTipejiec;, Kokov, fieya.
(9) Androcles continues his dirge (1. 247-48):
"IIou CTov TO KoXXoc; xo\> TtpoacoTtov, JtapGeve;
'H (lev Ke<paX.fi t© X-vG© oivexpiPTi . . ."
First, the MSS have ooi, not oov. Second, owetpiPri is the reading of the
younger class UL; the older one, HV, has o-uveGpiSpTi, and this is the correct
reading: Compare 6. 449 teGvyikev ti naic, (i.e., Chrysochroe)
a'uv0p\)PeTaa TT]v Kocpav.
(10) In his turn, the misfortunate groom of Chrysochroe, Cratander,
opens his own dirge (1. 277-78):
""fll)xov" Xeyoav "ctyaXjia ctetixov TcapGevo-o,
w KdXX,0(;, oiov xai Geovq e<peX,KvoEv ..."
All MSS have napGeve. Thus read: ayaXfj-a oetitov, 7iapGeve,.and
compare 1. 39-40, 'Hv cov to koXKoc, xfiq K6pri<; xpfjiia ^evov,/ aYaX,)ia
OEKTov, EiKovoq Geiuc; TVTioq . . .
(11) Cratander continues (1.301-02):
"IxEpyoin.' av a-uxoq xov <p6vov xov ek A,{Gcov,
EJiEi A,{Gq) xeGvtikev r\ XpvooxpoT] •"
'Ek XiGcov is Gaulmin's emendation for the transmitted ev A^CGoiq. Hercher
adopts the emendation (p. xliv), since the instrumental ev is employed with
a noun ((povoq), not with a verb ("to kill"). I think this distinction is
irrelevant, and the MSS' ev XCGok; should be retained. Compare 1. 266 fi
Tcix; Kpivovtaq a-oiiTiaxd^EK; ev XiGco; NT Hebrews 11. 37 ev (povw
|j.axa(pri<; djiEGavov.
(12) Androcles preferred a quiet, private life (1. 323-26):
"koXov (j.£v t|v |ioi, vav KaXov koi ouiKpEpov
Pvovv KaG' avxov t\.c, xov anavxa xpovov
x6 yap awondv Kal oxEyEiv i\x.ac, xv)xa^ 325
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SimiiYopiKOJv \)7cep£Kpivov X-oycov •"
In 325, oTeyeiv is Hcrcher's conjecture for the transmitted pXeneiv. The
change is, however, unwarranted, since Prodromus elsewhere employs
pXeTieiv in a metaphorical sense ("to mind, pay attention to"). Compare 9.
94 Geoq 6e xtiv Po\)A,t]v ^Xznov, 5. 81,6. 334. Cottone 15 is correct.
(13) Androcles explains his case to the judges (1. 337-40):
"'Hv ^loi Qvya.xr\p to'uvona Xp-oaoxpori,
KaXfj n.£v eiSoq, vai KaA.fi koI napGevoq,
ti6ti bk npbc, 6dX,a|j,ov fitoi|j.ao|i.evri
Kal npbq yd^ov kolX C^vybv Ti\)xp£7iia)AevTi." 340
HV omit line 340, and UL have Kal npbq ya^iKov C,x)yb\f, which is
correct: compare 7taoTd6e<; ya^vKai at 1. 216-17, yaixiKTi aXvo\.c, at 6.
157.
(14) In his defense, Cratander's father Craton asks the judges, "Who
has ever accused my son of any crime?" (1. 360-63):
".
. . ziq axpv Kal vvv z.vyEvr[ CJ\aa(; piov, 360
<p6vcov KaGapov Kal a\>Xr[\ia.x(ov ^evov
Kal navxbq alaxpot» Kal pSeXuKtox) xoic; vo^oii;-
r\ xic, KaxTiYopTiaev a-uxwv xoidSe;"
In 363, Hercher adopts Gaulmin's reading, at)X(ov. HV, however, have
a-uToic;, while UL have a-uxot), which is the correct reading: a\)To\) refers to
Cratander.
(15) After submitting to a iudicium Dei through fire,^° Cratander is
found innocent. The crowd that is present cheers Cratander and Craton, and
boos the false accuser Androcles (1. 401-04):
Ilpoc; xavxa Kpd^a^ oumiiYTl (pcovqv |j.vav
6 ovuTcapeoxcbq oxXoc; dn.<pl xf^v Kpiaiv
TOY o'UK09dvxTiv 'Av5poKA,fiv KaxTiY6po\)v,
fijidi; JiEpiKpoxovvxEi; etxprinoK; ^.oyok;.
Gaulmin and Hercher follow V in reading 403 KaTTi76po\)v. But HUL have
KaKTiyopovv, and this is the correct reading: The crowd employs only
verbal abuse against Androcles, without accusing him of anything.
(16) Again Cratander comforts Dosicles in prison (1. 506-07):
1° Compare Soph. Antig. 264-65; HeUod. Aethiop. 8. 9. 10. 8-9; Strab. 5. 2. 9. 12.
2. 7; Pliny. N// 7. 19; Verg. Aen. 11. 787-88; Raymond, Hist. Francorum, pp. 120-22 ed.
Hill; Georg. Acropol. Chron. 50 (pp. 96-98 Heisenberg); Georg. Pachym. Mich. Pal. p.
92 ed. Bonn.; loann. Cantac. Hist. 3. 27 (pp. 172 f. ed. Bonn.); C. Cupane, Rivista di
studi bizantini e neoellenici, N.S. 10-11 (1974) 147-68.
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"Twv ^ev Ka9' i\\ia.c, toiq Seoii; (ppovxioxeov •
vai ydp, AooikX-ek;, xoTq 0eoi(; Tcdvtcoq jieXoi-"
Gaulmin and Hercher read Tidvxox; ^eXoi, But HV have jkxvtcov [liXov,
and this is the correct reading (against ndvxcov \iiXzi L, and Tiavxcoq
^E^ei U).
(17) To Cratander's request to tell his own story, Dosicles replies with
a Vergilian Infandum, regina, tubes renovare dolorem (1. 510-1 1):
"KXxx\)9|i.oi)(; |i£v, oi5a, Kal podq xwv SoKp-ucov
i\\ia.q anaixziq, o-ovvecoKope ^eve."
But neither of the youths is a vecoKopoc;. Read instead: a-uvvEcoxepe. This
a-uvvEcbxepe means the same as a-uvriXiKitoxa; compare loann. Malal.
Chron. 7 (= p. 181. 17 DindorO-
(18) The harbor of Rhodes is quiet and safe (2. 9-10 and 15-16):
"Td nEv ydp evSov docpaXf] xo\> XijiEvoq-
o\) K-u|j.dx(ov Gpovq, ov Xocpoi Kal xdop-axa ... 10
o-u5' dvxeyEpoii; nv£'u|i,dx(ov dvxiGpocov 15
5iv£'i x6 pEiGpov Ktti kdkXoi xdq oXxdSaq-"
First, in 15 Hercher follows V by reading dvxiGpocov. But it was induced
by 10 Gpo\j(;. HUL have dvxmvocov, and this is the correct reading.
Compare 2. 317 xapa%0El(; . . . Tivoaic; dvxijtvooic;. Second, in 16
Hercher follows UL by reading k\)kXoi. But kvkcl of HV is a lectio
difficilior and is to be preferred.
(19) Dosicles depicts a rich banquet given by Giaucon at Rhodes (2.
105-10):
"Ouxco |iEv Eixe xfi(; KaGsSpaq ti Geok;- 105
Kai navTEC, Elaxioivxo XaiJ-Ttpoiq oixioiq,
•uno IxpaxoK>,£i Xiyupaiq K£Kpay6x£<;,
a)5fi(; dyaGfi<; i\i\itX5iq TiyoDji-Evco.
E\)Gi)q 5* dvaoxdq zo\> noxo-o Na-ooiKpdxrji;
opxTioiv cbpxTiooi'^o va-oxiKcoxEpav." 110
There is a lacuna after line 106 properly describing the banquet and the
transition to a drinking-party, for Stratocles is not likely to have been
singing during the dinner. This is confirmed by 109 xov tioxod, which
cannot refer to the dinner, but only to the ensuing symposium.
(20) The host's young (and drunk) son Dryas makes advances to
Rhodanthe, while imitating Achilles Tatius 2. 9. 2-3 (2. 141-46):
"'AA.X,' 6 Jipocrivfiq HEipaKioKOi; 6 Apva(;
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dAoix; epcoTi zt[c, '?od6.\fQr\q dSiKco
PdtKxov jipoJiTjSa KOI Kpaxfipa A.ajipdvei,
Xapov 5e Kipva xoiq ^evok; tiieiv 7t6|i.a.
Ei(; yo^v 'Po5dv0Tiv emiavcbc; dcpiynevoq 145
5l5oi 7CpO7Cl0)V TOV Kpaxfiptt tf[ KOpTl-"
Read in 143 PaKxcov, and compare 145 emxavox; d(piY|ievo(; and Aesch.
Septem 498.
(21) Finally Dosicles tells his story. Imitating Hero's father (Musaeus
187-92), Rhodanthe's stem father Straton was keeping his daughter shut up
in an ivory lower, in order that she escape men's lusty eyes (2. 175-79):
"Tamriv 5e'^ naxr\p 6 7tpoA.£x0ei<; 6 Ixpdxcov 175
eacoGev eyKEKXeiKe jxiKpou Jivpyio'o,
&>c, dv SvooTttoi; dpoevQv x'^P^ M^evTl.
ov6* ZKxbc, tXQtiv xT\q (pvXJaicfii; tj^iov."
Already Cottone 15 f. has pointed out that all MSS have KopaK; (177), not
Xcoplq, and that this reading is confirmed by line 182 ax; av epaaxou
X,{xvov ocpSa^^iov (p-uyri. Let me add to this that people; is one of
Saumaise's many blunders, shared by Gaulmin and Hercher, and that Nicetas
Eugenianus, in his own love-novel Drosilla and Charicles, imitates
Prodromus' lines as follows (2. 60-62):
"X-uveyyvx; tiv ^oi napGevoc; KaXA-vYovT],
XTIV dpp£V(OV )J.EV OyiV E\)^PoV|J.£VTl,
ix-uxaudxcp 6e 9aXd|i.cp (ppovpoviiEvq."
(22) But Dosicles was able to have a look at Rhodanthe on her way to
a pubUc bath (2. 186-89):
".
. . eI5ov 'PoSdvO-qv npoc, x6 XoDxpov TiY^£vr|v
vnb npono\inoic„ vn' onaSoiq jiupioiq.
'I5a)v jipoofiXBov Ktti 7:po<o>EA.9a)v TjpojiTiv
xd^ dKoXovGovc; 'x{<;, xivcov ti napQivoc,;'"
In 186, HVL have i5o\) 'Po6dv0Ti npbq xb ^cuxpov Tiyjievri, and this is the
correct reading. Following U (i6o\) 'Po5dv9T|v npbq xb Xoxixpbv tiyixevtiv)
Hercher changed i6o\) into ei5ov. But 188 iSwv is not a sufficient reason
for such a change.
(23) Dosicles depicts himself as a handsome young man, a match for
Rhodanthe's beauty (2. 251-54 and 259-60):
"'AXX' o\)6' £|ioi Tipoaconov tjoPo^coiievov,
o\)5£ ^EVTi xvc; Kai 5vo£vxE-uKxo(; jtXdoK;-
'' Ae scripsi: 6 codd.
Miroslav Marcovich 375
aXXco(; xe KdXXoq ctvSpiKov oxaBripOTTiq,
d^Kri Kpaxaid, npbc, jidxa<; evavbpia . .
.
254
Ei yovv Kax* av6pa xiq xct loxt KoXh^vc, xpivei,
©paiov txv jidBoi jie xtiv Oecapiav." 260
Obviously lines 259-60, describing Dosicles' physical beauty, belong
immediately after lines 251-52 and before the next point, 253 ^'AXkax; xe,
as already Huet had pointed out in the margin of Gaulmin's edition (p. 70).
(24) Dosicles is love-stricken and cannot sleep (2. 319-21):
"... xoioioSe noXKolq dvxinaXaiaaq XoyoK;
q)5d(; e^ avxdq 5e-ux£pa<; dA,eKx6pcov 320
eXxxSov 6\j/e Kai npoq vnvov expdnriv."
Read -nA-vOov for eXaOov, and compare 1. 429-30: "tjtwo) to )iaKp6v
KO\)(pio\)|j.ev xcijv Tcovcov 7 EO|iev yap wbac, eic, xpitaq d^eKxopcov."
(25) Anxiety obfuscates man's mind (2. 322-27):
'"H yop JtepixxTi cfuppori xmv <ppovxi6cov
OKOxov Kaxappaivovaa xwv dvco xojicov
Kttv axuyvov dvco Simio-upyovaa yv6<pov
KOI vvKxa TtoXXfiv Kal PaGvoKiov ^6<pov 325
Kal xov Xoyio|j.ot) ouvGoXxj^ioa xdi; K6pa(;
(piXei xd noXXa Kal xov vjivov eiacpepew . . ."
In 324, avco is an echo of the avco in the preceding line. M has o>.ov,
which I would take to be a corruption of the correct oiov. Compare Georg.
Pisida, Exp. Pers. 2. 289-91.
(26) How the craftsman Night creates dreams (2. 329-33):
"Twv jtpayjidxoiv ydp koi Xoycov x©v ev <pdei
EiScoXa noXXd Kal <pdoei(; vuKXixpoovx; 330
fi v\)^ dvajrXdxxovaa koI OKidq \i6vac,
7iX,acxoypa(pot>oa SaKxvXco OKiaypdcpo)
<pepei x6 <pda|j.a xt) KaG' vTivouq £)a.cpdoei-"
In 330, v\)KTixp6o\)<; is nonsensical and influenced by 331 t] vtj^. Read
liiKToxpoovq, "party-colored," instead, and compare Archimed. Probl.
bovinum 13 and 21.
(27) How Eros wounds (2. 424-26):
"yeXcov 5£ ni\intx xcov PeXcbv xaq evxdaei^-
xo^ov ydp eaxiv etxp'uax; e^timievov • 425
\iii<sr[q Kax' avxTJi; evxjxoxei xt\q, KapSiaq."
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In 425, first, read with HM, e^rm^evoq (sc. "Epox;), not with V zfywuihov
(UL omit lines 329-433). Second, read e<;Tiv' for eotiv.
(28) Dosicles elopes with Rhodanthe and embarks on a ship in the
harbor of Abydus. His friends bid them farewell (2. 458-61):
"Ev)9\)(; 5e navizc, ol aDvepyoi xal cpiXoi
navxtc, npbq a\)x6v" tjv 8' eyo) "xov X,i|ieva,
'aco^oioOe' <paal 'koi (piXavGpconoiq x\)xo.ic, 460
UTio jipoTiojiTioiq dvvouE fqv xpiPov'."
In 459, navxzq is a repetition of 7tdvTe<; in the preceding line. Read
pdvxE<; instead.
(29) After the banquet, the guest Nausicrates falls asleep while drunk
(3. 43^6):
"OuTCO \izv cbvetpconev o-btoq xov noxov
eyo) 5' opitfiLC, Se^mv tfi napGevco
Kal o'uX.XaPoov e^eim xov 5co|j.aTio\), 45
dcpelq EKEi 6eiKvoi)VT;a xov NavaiKpotxriv."
In 46, Nausicrates cannot dine while sleeping (43). The obvious
emendation, 6' vTcvovvxa, was seen already by Gaulmin (p. 491). I prefer,
however, y' vns/ovvxa.
(30) There was an ithyphallic statue of Hermes in Abydus (as the
sculptors used to represent this god). Well, he once appeared to Rhodanthe
in a dream, telling her that by the providence of the gods worshiped in
Abydus she will be married to Dosicles in that city (compare Achilles
Tatius4. 1.4), 3. 69-75:
"'Ep\iT[c, ydp a\)x6<;, ov aocpoq XiGo^ooq
X,i0o^oTiaa<;, iaq b xcx'^ix^c, v6|ao<;, 70
eoxTiaev eiq "Ap-u5ov ev jipoavXioiq,
voKxcop £:Jiioxd<; xfi Ka9' iSrtvovc; encpdaei
'6 XT[<; 'Po5dv0Tiq kqI AoaiKXioc, yd^Oi;*
e'Ax^ev 'eiq "Ap\)5ov £kA,£io0ti ^eaTjv,
Gemv npovoia xmv ekev KEKXeioiievcov'." 75
First, in 70 read: XiQo^or{oac, coq 6 xexviTaic; vojioq. Second, in 75 read
KEK^rmevtov, "of the gods invoked in Abydus." KeKA^eio^evcov is an
echo of 74 eKA.eia9T|.
(31) Horace's idea (Odes 1. 35. 26-27), diffugiunt cadis I cumfaece
siccatis armci, is expressed in these terms (3. 141-47):
'YnoSpdnoi ydp o-uk dvEvXoyoi; <p6Po(;
|j.T| Tcov <piXoi Yiyvoivxo xov Jioxoi) tcXeov
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Kai TTiv Tpi)<pT]v oxepyoiev o\)x'i '^ov cpiXov
ol Tov 7t66ov yeiaovvxEi; ev ^£aalq yLzQaic,
oa0poi(; 9£^.e9X,oi(; ev)6iaoTpo(p(0Tepoi(; 145
KOI Twv ev a|i|i(p Jiai6iK6c)v ctSupp-axcov
oxeyao^ia nioxevovxeq dydjiTiQ \iiya.
In 145^6, a scribe had misread the abbreviations for -oov and -oiq. Read
instead:
KOI XTiv xp-u(pTiv axepyovev, ovxi xov <ptXov,
oi xov TtoGov yeiaovvxEQ ev ^.eaaii; \i.iQaic„
aaQpSiv GeneGXcov ev>5iaaxpocpa)xepai(;,^^ 145
Kol xoiq ev a|j.|j.(p 7cai5iKoi(; d9\)p|xa<ji^^
<jx£yaa|ia niaxevovxeq dydjiriq ^eya.
(32) The king Mistylus had dedicated Rhodanthe and Dosicles to the
gods as vEcoKopoi. The satrap Gobryas asks Mistylus to give him
Rhodanthe in marriage instead. The king categorically refuses while stating
(3. 252) -unEOXOiiTiv yap xoiq Geovq xtiv napGevov. But the closing of
Mistylus' argument is corrupt (probably because of Prodromus' okoxeivti
eK(ppaaiq), 3. 258-63:
"I,x> (sc. Gobryas) 5' a.Xk' eoiKaq Kal XaPd>v xtjv napGevov
Kttl Tfupoov a.\\iac, vu|j,(piKfi(; 5a5oux^"';
Kttl Jiaoxd5(ov eocoGev eyxaGiSpiJoaq 260
x6 \ir\ napaox£iv eyvaXeiv xm Miax\)X(p,
e<p' qjnep ePpd6'uvev f| 0^01)0(0 •
Kaixoi SeScoKe npo(;>Q6.aaq 6 Miaxt)Xo(;,
Kttl FcoPpuaq eiXricpe x-qv ep(0)j.evT|v."
^
First, lines 260 and 259 should be transposed, since during a wedding first
comes 7\ naoxdc; and then ti dadovxia; compare 1. 216-18 and 6. 381-83.
Second, in 263 read Geoic; for the senseless Kaixoi. And finally, in 264 read
TipvTi|i£VT|v for £pco)i£VT|v. Thc scnsc of Unes 261-64 is: "It seems to me,
Gobryas, that you blame Mistylus for not granting the very reason for the
delay of your marital union, which is simply: Mistylus had already given
the girl to the gods, and Gobryas had taken her in spite of her being denied
to him."
(33) Gobryas tries to persuade Rhodanthe in the prison to sleep with
him. Failing in his attempt he withdraws to his palace fearing Mistylus (3.
322-25):
. . . oiywv fiexfiXGev eiq xov oikciov 56|iov,
oi|i.ai JixoTiGelq \it\ <pavev xcp Mioxv^q)
^^ Compare Xen. De re equestri 1. 2.
'3 Compare Iliad 15. 362-64; Eurip. fr. 272; Clem. Protrept. 17. 2. 109. 3; Iambi, ap.
Stob. Ed. 2. 1. 16; Georg. Pisida Hexaem. 568-69 et alibi.
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noivTiXatTiSTi xfi npooTiKO-uoTi Kpiaei
d>q £|i.Ttapoiva)v Toiq Gecov veojKopOK;. 325
In 323, read (pavelq for (pavev, which is confirmed by 325 e^inapoivcov.
(34) Imitating Heliodorus (Aethiop. 1. 22 and 1. 25; 7. 13 and 7. 26),
Gobryas takes Dosicles for Rhodanthe's brother and promises him Mistylus'
daughter Calippe in marriage if Dosicles could persuade Rhodanthe to marry
Gobryas. Dosicles politely declines the offer (3. 376-84):
"KaX(0(; nev rmcov eoTOxaoco, FcoPpva,
Ktti xfiv d5eXxpT]v £\)(pu(b(; Eyvox; <piooiv
eK xfiq d6eX.(pfi(; twv xapaKtripcov Qiac,.
'Eycb 6' £|ia\)TOt) ovvvoco ^ev ttiv tuxtiv,
o\)K dyvoo) Se 5ox»Xo(; cov zov MioxuXo-o, 380
dvd^ioq 5e
-cfi Ka'k\.nnr[ vv^c^ioc,-
aio0dvon.ai bk Kai napoiKcov ev ^evti.
'AvTip ydp aix^dX-coToq eiq vyoq xoaov
oiL)K dv Jiox' dpSfi Kai ^exanxfj xtiv x\)xtiv . . ."
Line 382 has been misplaced. Read the passage as follows:
ex xfi{; dSeXcpfic; xcov xapaKxrjpcov Qiaq-
iyu) 5' t\ia\)xo\) cuvvocc) jiev xf^v x^xtiv, 379
aio6dvonai 6e xal jiapoiKcbv ev ^evri, 382
o\)K dyvoo) xe SovXoq cov xov MioxuXov, 380
dvd^iO(; ^ xfi KaX,i7iJiTi v'0|j.<piO(;. 381
(35) "It would have been better for you," says Dosicles to Rhodanthe,
"had Gobryas killed you when taking Rhodes, than to become his wife" (3.
437^3):
"(Ei9e) . . . 5iexpiloaxo Kai ae Fcoppvaq,
oxav KaxeaKuX£-u£ xf^v 6hr\v 'P65ov
Ktti xajv KaxoiKcov zaKvXzvE x6 nXiov,
Ktti \ir\ Kttxaox^v ^(boav e^coypTiaE ae, 440
oco^cov Eauxm xal jipoii.EUvqaxE'ujiEvo^
XT^v o^x Ea-uxo^i, xov |i6vo\) AooikXeoc;,
ocoxTip jiovTipoq, dOXiav acoxripiav."
In 440, read |xf|<v> for the senseless ^iti (already Gaulmin wrote jxev), and in
442 THV |j.6vo-u AoaiKXeoq.
(36) Rhodanthe reassures Dosicles about her faithfulness to him (3.
519-22):
"'Eyd) ^£v" dvxE^e^Ev e-uGuq r[ Koptj
"(Oeol 5£ Jidvxox; dKpocbvxai xwv Xdyfov) 520
r\ aoi (pMXaxQS) xapxepox; XTipo-o|ievTi
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r\ T^ ^i<pEi yovv, o\) yap av xat roaPpva."
First, in an oath one badly needs either an optative or an imperative ("so
help me God"). Consequently, read in 520 (XKpoSvTo, and compare 8. 518
Geol 6£ ^lapx-upovvTov xS Xoyo). Second, in 521 Kapxepox; is
Saumaise's misreading; all MSS have KaGapox;, which is the correct
reading.
(37) King Bryaxes sends an ultimatum in writing to the king Mistylus
(4. 47-52):
"'Ey© ^ev oiSxco xov 7i68ov tppovpeiv GeX-co,
KOI Geafioq)vXa^ eif.u ooi xfiq 6.ya.nT[c,-
a\) 5' ctXXa xauxTiv ei(; x6 nav otvaxpeneK;.
"Opoix; naXaioiyq, wq opw, nepixpencov 50
X-ueK; xot Geofxa Kai xa Seajia xo\) noGo-u
Ktti npbc, (a.axTiOM.6v coyKaXeiq cxKovxd ne."
In 49, Hercher follows U by reading dvaxpeTieiq, But HUV have
dnoxpeJiTi instead, and this is the correct reading for "turning away from
something." Incidentally, in 50 it seems preferable to read TiapaxpeTicov,
"altering, perverting, revoking, falsifying," for HUL TiepixpeTtcov, V
fj.exaxpeno)v.
(38) "Return to me my city Rhamnon at once, or else . . ." Thus
Bryaxes finishes his letter (4. 58-68):
"Kaixoi x6 'Pdjivov caq i\ir\ navxoic, noXic,
Ktti |j.oi Tipoofiye xox)q (popo-uq exrioiox; •
Kttl xov Bp-ud^Tiv eixe Seojioxtiv jiovov, 60
o-UK dyvoeiv <paiTi)j.£v av ae, MiaxvXe.
"H yovv npbq thiok; dvx{ne^\|/ov xfjv JioXiv
Kttl xovq dX,6vxaq Xt)aov 6\i/e 6ea)iio-oq,
Kal TtdXiv Tincbv dpxexco xd xov JtoGov,
f\ yovv Bp-ud^Tiv Kttxd gov kivwv ^dQe- 65
TtdvxcoQ 5e ndvxcoq coc, x6 *Pd|ivov xt^v ji6A,iv
Kal xohq dXovxaq oxpaxicoxaq puoonai,
XDxov 5e Kal odq a\)V'U(papndo(o tioX-ek;."
In 59, all MSS have hT\oiov<;, which is confirmed both by Nicetas
Eugenianus 5. 296 \)7iTipexot»aiv eiq EXTjoiotx; (popovc, and by, e.g., IG 7.
2227. (The inversion suggested by Ph. Le Bas, ixT\ciovc, cpopoxx;, is not
necessary.) In 65, read kweTv for kivcov, and in 66 Kal for co^.
(39) When Mistylus had read Bryaxes' letter, he became prey to two
different feelings at the same time
—
shame from his own satraps vs. fear
from the mighty Bryaxes. This conflict of opposing emotional impulses is
depicted in these terms (4. 85-99):
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KaGfiato yovv avat)8oq ei<; noX'uv xpovov 85
Xpoiaiq nepixxaiq x-qv 6eav Tj^-Xaynevoq,
Ktti xaiq eatoGev yvxivaiq KivT|oeai
xa\ XT\ Jtepixxfj xeijv TiaGcov jiexaKXioei
^op<pou^ev6<; n(oq Kai a-ove^TiXXaynevoq,
Ktti 6£iYna xT^c; eocoGev ei<; yox^iv C«^i1<; 90
XTiv ixxbc, £i<; jtpooconov eiicpaivcov ^dX-qv.
Ai5o\)|j.£vo(; ^ev xovq eauxov oaxpdnai;,
cpoPovnevoc; 6e xov Bp^d^ov x6 xpdxoq
xTiv oyiv eoxvyva^e, xov xpo^v (oxpia
xounnaXiv evxoq o\)oxoX.r|v nenovGoxa- 95
XoXo'U|i£vo(;^'* 5e Ktti Guiiffl n£(pA,£Y|iEvoq
oXoq fifiXaq tiv EjiJiaGfi \izhxviav
a'l ydp xo^^ttov xai G-o|i6(pX,£Kxoi (pX6Y£(;
XTIV ai[i.axT|pdv oiov e^cotixcov cpvaiv.
First, in 87 read ox; (causal, "since") for Kal. Second, in 91 read aA.Tiv for
^d^Tiv, which is an echo of C,aXr\q in the preceding line. This a^ii,
"wandering of mind, distraction," may be paralleled by Eur. Med. 1285;
Plat. Crat. 421b3; Nicander, Alexipharm. 84 and 124; Suda, s.v. Third, in
95 neither nenovQoxa ofHV nor nenovQoxoc, of UL is satisfactory. Read
the line instead, xw naXiv evxbc, o'uotoA.tiv rceTiovGevai, and compare 4.
81 xfi 6eiX(a 6e o\)atoX.Tiv Tidaxcov ndXiv. Fourth, in 97 read eiinaGev
lie^aviot. Finally, since in our passage aiSox; and xoXoc, are opposed to
(popoq, lines 93-95 are out of place and should be transposed after line 99.
Consequently, lines 92-99 should read as follows:
Al5ovjj.£vo(; )j.£v xoi)q Ea-oxov aaxpdjia(;, 92
XoXov^Evoq XE Kal Gvp-tt) 7ce<pXey^£vo(;, 96
okoc^ HE^aq Tiv E^JiaGEi \JizKav'm
(al yap x°'Xa%xo\ Kal GdhocpXekxoi (pXoyEq
XTIV aijiaxTipdv oiov E^corexcov <pt)aiv) • 99
popoviiEvoq hz xov Bpvd^o'o x6 Kpdxoq, 93
x-qv 6v/iv Eoxvyva^E, xov xP^^^v coxpia, 94
xa> jidXiv Evxoq o-ooxoXtiv KETCovGEvai. 95
The conflict between opyri and cpoPoq is mentioned at 4, 76-81. But the best
example of the conflict between aiSox; and (p6po<; seems to be the novel of
Constantine Manasses, fr. 148 Mazal:^^
"Oxi oi ai5oi Kal <p6P(p ev xauxw Xti9G£vxe<; (eI'xe e^ Epcoxoq, eixe
xivoq aX,X,o-u TcdGovq) dvd H£po(; vvv ^£v coxpoi, vvv 6' EpvGpol
noXkaxxc, cpaivovxai, xov ai'iiaxoq xfi<; ^ev ai5ot><; EJtiKpaxovoTiq
ETil x6 EKxoc; 5iaxEo^£vo\) 5£p^.a, tiv 5' 6 (poPoi; EitiKpaxp, etiI x6
^*
'OxXovfievoq codd.: corr. Hercher.
^^ O. Mazal, Der Roman des Konslantinos Manasses, Wiener Byzanlinistische Sludien
4 (Vienna 1967) 201.
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PdGoq x'^PO^v'^o<3 ^^^^ o^ov vEKpotv tfiv iKzbq KaxaXi|j.ndvovxo(;
eTiicpdveiav.
(40) Mistylus gives orders to his satrap Gobryas, "Today entertain
Bryaxes' messenger Artaxanes with a banquet. Tomorrow he shall return to
his master with my answer" (4. 107-10):
"... <pvXo<pp6vriaov^^ Kal |a.aKpo\) ^oxOo-u Pdpoq
Xvcsov xpaniC,r\ Kal KaxaoxpcboEi kXivtic;-
eiq aupiov 5e cfuXXaPiv avxiypdcpoxx;
Xxxpdjv ^lExeXBoi npbq xov ai)xo\i 6ea7i6xTiv." 110
In 109, Hercher changed auX^aPwv of UL to ox>XXa^Gi\, epistolae (p. 1).
But HV have o-u^iXaPaq, and this is the correct reading; ot)A.A,aPai
dvTiYpa(poi is an "answering letter" (compare lemma to line 4. 423,
'EjiiotoXti Miotv)Xo\) 7tp6<; Bptxx^Tiv ocvxiypacpoc;, MSS).
(41) During the banquet, sparrows fly out of the belly of a roasted
lamb, witnessing to the presence of Petronius {Satyricon 40. 5) in
Byzantium (4. 144-47):
"Ti 5'; Ox)xl 6a\»)ia Kai x6 K\)p (pepei \i.iya,
oitox; xov dpvov dvGpaxcoaav, dx; ^"kintxc,, 145
eaojGev iXGeiv evXapox; -uneaxdXTi,
^T| Jiou X\)nav9fi x6 Tixepov xoiq oxpovGioK;;"
In 145, Le Bas and Hercher follow the reading of VUL, oncoq. But the
reading of H, onep {sc. to 7it»p), is to be preferred.
(42) The ecphrasis of a precious cup with the representation of
Dionysus, Satyrs and Bacchants opens thus (4. 331):
"YA,Ti nev -ujieoxpcoxo odre(peipO(; XiGoq . .
.
Both Gaulmin and Hercher read '-oXv^, with the latter's remark (p. 1), "\3X.ti
corruptum est." I think the MSS' \iX-\\ could be retained in the sense, "the
basic material of the cup." Compare Prodromus' probable source of
inspiration, Achilles Tatius 2. 3. 2, 'Yd^o-u ^ev xh uav epyov
opcopvYM-evTiq, "The material of the cup was wrought rock-crystal," where to
Tiav Epyov seems to correspond to our \)Xr\.
(43) The main theme on the wine-cup is, of course, vintage. While
one group of workers presses the grapes in the wine-vat, and another one
pours the wine in large wine-jars, a third group engages in dancing (just as
Homer's grape-gatherers do, Iliad 18. 569-72), 4. 355-64:
^^ Sc. Artaxanes. Compare 9. 378; Theophan. Chronogr. p. 106. 12 de Boor.
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"AXXoi GX-iPovteq tok; pdYa<; xtov Poxpvcov 355
Tov ovvov e^iK|j.a^ov ei<; X,tiv6v ^eoTlv•
TtXe^d^ievoi bk xovq, eavxcbv SaKxvXov^
Xopov ^-uvioxcov, X,i9ivoi xopooT^ot'toti-
"E<pTi(; av aiL)xo-b(; evxpaveaxepov pXencov
a6eiv dXTi6(0(; exxp-od xpaymSiav, 360
Kat noM ^-oveXfieiv koi ^uven.nXi^ai x^pa
Kai ^oyxopc^oE'-v ecTxe<; otv a(po5p6v noGov.
"AXXoi XOV OIVOV £V oji.iKpov^ K£pa|J.lOl(;
PdXXovxei; dvxePaXXov eii; veovq niGovq.
This text is both dislocated and lacunose. First, lines 363-64 belong
immediately after line 356: "AXkoi . . . "AXkoi. Next, a third "AaXoi is
missing: There is a lacuna after line 364, indicating the dancing group
(already L had marked a lacuna after line 357). Finally, in 364 read
Xa^ovxzc, for ^aXXovxec,. The scribal error XaPcov: PaA,cov is proverbial
(and present in our novel as well: 3. 110 npooXa^cov for 7ipoaPa?i(bv, 6.
49 Axipoi HV for pd^T]). Consequently, read the passage as follows:
"AXXoi GXiPovxeq xdi; pdyat; xcov Poxpvcov 355
XOV ovvov £^{K)i.a^ov ei(; Xtivov iieotiv, 356
aXkoi XOV olvov Ev oiiixpoic; Kepa^lvol(; 363
Tux^ovieq dvxePaXXov tic, vioMC, niGov^. 364***********
7iXe^dp.evoi 5e xoix; eavxcov Sokx-uXov^ 357
xopov ^uviaxcov, XiGivoi xapooxdxai.^^
(44) The Bacchants are doing everything to induce Dionysus to join
them in dancing. The first one grabs him by his tunic (4, 401-06):
'H \iiv xiq e5e6paKXO xov xixcovioi),
XOV ovyxopevxTiv evGev £KKaXx)•u^£VTl •
dX,X,T| )iaXaKcb(; xfjc; nvy^c, EiXTmnEvn
XOV ^£vpaKtoKov dvxEovpEV Tip£|xa-
aXkt] 5£ (piXrmaxi )iaXaKcoxEp(p 405
v<p£iX,K£v a\)x6v eI^ h-eoov xopo^ ax6|ia.
Line 401 does not scan. Hilberg suggested a\) 6e8paKTo for e5E5paKTo,
but av does not go well with jiev. Read e<v>5e5paKTo, and compare Pap.
mag. Paris. I 2137 ev5e5paY|xevo(;.
(45) "You are to blame for the present enmity between us," replies
Mistylus to Bryaxes (4. 432-42):
'^ Compare 4. 397-99 (representations on the same cup):
Al 5' apa Bdicxav xouq eawxaiv 6aKTiiXo-U(;
nX,e^dfievai kvkXcoGi Kal xopoaxd8Tiv,
ewKCoav KdXXioxov e^aSeiv \i.ekoq . . .
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"Iv 5', dx; eoiKE, xtiv cxecriv koi tov noGov
Tov>x(p Tiepaxoi^ koi JiepiypoKpeiv QiXeiq,
tffl Tctq \)9' rmaq E^ajioondoai tcoXck;
Kol ooi TiapaaxEvv dveX-evSepcoxaxa 435
Kai o^iKpvvai |j.Ev XTiv e^^v e^ovolav,
x6 oov 5e jiaX,Xov avxenav^fioai Kpdxoq-
ojiep poPou (paivoixo ornxeiov nXeov,
aXX' ov) xpavov ylyvoixo a^jj-PoXov ji69o\),
V^XH"; <5'> dyevvovq, o\) <piXovaT|(; KapSiaq, 440
yvcoiiTiq xajievvfic;, ctveXeDOepo-o xpoitov,
Ti6ov(; aacpnc; evSei^eic; evTiOeoxdxou."
In 435, the meter is restored by reading dv£Xe'u0EpcoTdTa<(;>. In 440,
Hercher's addition 6' will not do the job, since 442 oa(pT[c, evSei^k; must
come first. Thus read:
"dXA." OV) xpavov yiyvoixo ovuPoXov noOo-u- 439
nGovi; oa(pfi(; evSei^iq evtiGeoxdxo'u, 442
\fvxric, dyevvouc;, ov) 9iXx)voti(; Kap5ia<;, 440
yvcc)|j.Ti(; xa7i£ivfi(;, dveXe-uGepo-u xpono-o." 441
(46) Mistylus continues his letter to Bryaxes (4. 475-77):
"... elbzc, (povevGev xoxi oxpaxoii gov x6 nXiov, 475
eixa x6 'Pd|j.vov ii-upioK; oook; novoiq
£n£KpdxTiaa(; avxoq'* doq ava^ oXcov ..."
Hercher follows UL b^ reading in 476 eixa, which is nonsensical, while
Gaulmin follows HV zlSeq, which is an echo of the Eibzc, in the preceding
line. Huet had seen the truth while jotting dXec, in the margin of p. 181 of
Gaulmin's edition. Compare 4. 470, jidxriv avvfj^ac;, ax; to 'Pdjivov
ouXXdpTiq. A comma should come after 476 tiovok;.
(47) "You, Artaxanes, are more gullible than a small child," says the
king Bryaxes while referring to Mistylus' trick with the sparrows flying out
of the belly of a roasted lamb (cf. no. 41), 5. 73-80:
Tot)xa)v dKO-uoaq 6 Bp-ud^riq xmv Xoycov
"aXk' fiyvooDv" eX,e^Ev, "dpxvaaxpdna,
ouxco Tievixpoix; nopjioX.'UKeicov xvkoix; 75
unoxpeiiovxa Kai oKidq 'Apxa^dvriv
KOI 6eiX.ia)vxa Jiaiyvicov xj/e-oSe^ nXaacic,,
a |j.T|5' ctv ax)xa)v xoiv ppe(poov Kaxiox^ooi,
o\)X,(o^evov 6e xd(; (ppevaq Kai vovv oXov
yeA^ooxoTioimv xai nayeipov dndxaii;." 80
In 77, nXda£i<; is Gaulmin's convincing emendation of the MSS' (ppaozic,.
Cottone (16) objects, "(ppdaeiq e la lezione da accettare." However, when
Aiixoq eneKpaxTiaaq codd.: transposuit Le Bas.
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dealing with a "magic trick" (not a "magic spell"), nXdoeic, (not (ppdoeic,)
is the right word; compare 4. 165, said of Mistylus, nXaxxcov, jiapioxcov
xfi xEpaaxCcp tiXocoei. Furthermore, in 79 Hercher follows UL by reading
a-uXcojO-Evov, but o-u^toji-Evwv of HV is to be preferred {sc. Kaxicxvoox.)
.
And all MSS have Kal, not xdc,. Thus read: at)Xa)|x£vcov 6£ Kal (ppEvaq
Kttl vot)v oXov.
(48) Before attacking the army of Mistylus, the king Bryaxes delivers a
300-line speech to his own army and navy (5. 115-414). The speaker is
standing on a shield, held on the shoulders of his soldiers,^' in the middle of
the navy (5. 112-14):
. . . eXe^e zavza, xcov vewv Tl0polo^evcl)v
Kal kil)kA,ov (oamp eiixpvd |j.i|io\)^.£vcov,
e^ oia KEvxpov xot> Kpaxouvxoi; Tipjievoi).
In 114, Hercher writes tip^evov, "being lifted, elevated." But HV have
TjpY^Evov and UL tipy^evcov. Consequently, read xipyiiEvo-u. The ruler
begins his speech as it were from the center of an imaginary circle, formed
by the ships of the expedition. Compare 5. 500: Kal Se-uxepcov vvv
ap%o|j.ai |j.Tivu|xdx(ov, writes Bryaxes to Mistylus.
(49) "If you defeat a weaker enemy, small indeed will be your glory,"
states Bryaxes (5. 175-77):
"Ti yap \i-iyo. xponaiov r\ tioiov yipctc, 175
HiKpoq, Ttevixpoq, E\)ap{9|iTixo(; oxoX-oq^^
liExaxpoTccoOelq £k xooo-oxcov vaviidxcov;"
All MSS have Kaxaxpo7ito0Elq for ^Exaxpo7ico0El<;, which is confirmed
by 5.193, ^T| Tio-o Xd9oi|iEv Kaxax£xpo7ico}i£voi . .
.
(50) "The sword of the goddess of Justice^^ will punish Mistylus for
sending to death so many brave defenders of the city of Rhamnon," says
Bryaxes (5. 233-35):
"... ov(; 8' EK ^axaipaq XtiaxpiKrii; xot^KOoxoiiox)
Eiq Eoxotxov xdpxapov, Evq PaGi) OKOxoq
piyavxa jiiKpox; Kal KaKoxporecp xpoTcco." 235
^' Compare Tacit. Hist. 4. 15. 2 impositusque scuto more gent is et sustinentium umeris
vibratus; Ammian. Marc. 20. 4. 17 (lulianus) impositusque scuto pedestri; Liban. Orat. 13.
34.
^ While Mistylus' army is e-uap(0nTiTO(; (compare Nic. Eugen. 4. 21; Georg. Pisida,
Exp. Pars. 3. 207), Bryaxes' own army is 6\)oapi0nTiToq (5. 183. 202, 225).
Incidentally, in 4. 499 for jifJKoq . . . tx>ntpiy(>anxov, read nfJKOt; . . . aTtepiypajixov,
"unlimited, infinite." Compare 7. 367 (HL) dxa^ia for the correct cura^ia (U).
^' 5. 228 ti ndxaipa xr\q ^iia\q. Compare Aesch. Choeph. 647.
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Hercher follows UL by reading in 234 xapxapov, but the older class HV
have nixavpov instead, which is to be preferred as deriving from VT
(Proverbs 9. 18 in\ TiexaDpov "Ai6ov), as Gaulmin (510) had pointed out.
Compare Suda, s.v. nixavpov.
(51) Imitating Theodosius Diaconus (Expugn. Cretae 1. 1?>-16),
Bryaxes calls the soldiers his own sons and heirs (5. 243-51):
"IlaiSe^ Bpvd^ov xal <piXoi koI Q\>\i\iaxo\
(KaXcb yap m'\.ox>z, kov (piXovc; koi civ\i\ia.xo\>c;,
SeiKvi)^ tot 5£0|J.a tfiq eq \>\ia.q a-^amxt^, 245
OLM 6 Bp-od^Tic; eixev vnaq niaSio^x;,
av SeoTtoTTiq Tiv, akXb. ht] (p-uxooTcopoi;,
o-oK av ETceoJteiJoaTe xov jiiaGoiJ xdpiv,
^dx•^v jiapapxt)ovxe(; e^ evavx{a(;,
Kaxa5pa|i£iv jiev 6\)a|iEV(ov ndvxa(; xoiioix;, 250
Ttapacicdoai 5e Kai XaPeiv oXaq noXeiq ..."
First, there is an obvious lacuna after line 242 (as pointed out by Hercher,
p. Hi), since the paragraph 236-42 lacks a finite verb. But a new paragraph
would not have opened with 243, flaiSeq Bp-od^ov, but with such a phrase
as, "Av6pE<; axpaxdpxai, Gpeii^axa axpaxTjYiaq (compare 5. 115, 163,
223, 236, 272). Second, in 245 all MSS have 0ea|xa, not 5eo^d, and
Tipoc;, not eg. Compare Bryaxes' own words: 4. 33 xoc 0ea|j.a xr\c, Ttpoq
amov dyaKTiq, 4. 48 Kal Geofi-otp-u^a^ Ei|J.i aoi xr\c, dydTiTiq, 4. 51 A.tjek;
xd 0eo|j.d Kal xd Seo^d xo\> noGov. Finally, lines 249 and 248 should
change places.
(52) Borrowing the Homeric simile about the irrational leopard Qliad
21. 573-78), only substituting boar for leopard, Bryaxes says (5.305-12):
"... Kttl xaGdrcep avq ek Spviio^i nriScbv iieyaq 305
Kal Gripaypevxaiq 6e^ioiq evxuyxdvcov,
dXXox) 7iapennT|^avxo<; cxKpov x6 ^i(pO(;,
Eoco 6ico8ei Kal Kaxd onXdyxvcov heocov,
a\)x6q ^aviKcbq dvxi(3aivcov xm ^i(p£i,
Kal TiiKpdv a-ux(p xt^v acpayfiv reapapxvEi, 310
Gpaovq laaxTjXTiq Eiq xov oikeTov <p6vov,
oiSxtt) KaG' a\)X(ov dKovwvxEi;^^ xtiv oJidGriv;"
With 305 a new sentence begins (300 "H tiox; av ox> ndaxoixe ixaviKov
TidGoq is understood). Consequently, read in 305: "H KaGdnep . . .
Moreover, lines 309 and 308 should change places, as is witnessed by Iliad
21. 576-78 (the subject is the leopard):
El TCEp ydp <pGd|AEv6(; jiiv r\ o\>xaor\ i\t pdX.Tiaiv,
aXKa. XE Kal nEpl 5o\)pl TiEJiapiiEvq ovk djtoX,TiyEi
^^
'AKOVovvteq codd.: corr. Hercher conl. 4. 217.
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dX-KTiq, jipiv y' Tje ^l}^pX,1l^eval tie Sanf^vai.
(53) Bryaxes continues his speech (5. 334-37):
""Iv' ouv e<p* "ojia*; [ir\ ti xcov Seivwv pinoi,
^fl npbc, Xa<pt)p(ov apnayfiv |j.Ti5ei(; pinoi- 335
eiq dpjiayriv ydp avtoq TiaxoXTi|j.evo(;
Xtopav Tiapdaxoi xov (p-uyeiv xw MioxvXtp ..."
In 335, penoi is an echo of the penoi in the preceding line. The original
reading was pXenoi. Incidentally, dpnaYTiv in 335 is the reading of U
alone; HVL have apnayac,, which is the correct reading, just as in 5. 316
liTl npbc, Xacp-upcov dpTiaydq (codd.: a.pnayi\v Gaulmin, Hercher)
oopixTjKoxeq . .
.
, as Cottone 16 already had pointed out.
(54) "Fear will surely kill us before the enemy does,"^^ continues
Bryaxes (5. 385-88):
"'H Kai Tcepixxov xovxo xoiq evavxioiq- 385
(poPoq yctp TiM-O"; Kot'i^ Jipo MioxvA,o\) <pQa.aac,
GavTiv Tipo Gavf]^ xal npo xo\» ^icpoxx; <p6vov
6oiTi, (jJcaGi^cov wanepei xai(; eXnioiv."
This text is nonsensical. Read instead:
"<p6pO(; ydp imlv, xal npo Miox'oX.ov (pGdaac;,
GavTiv Ttpo Gavfi<; xai npb zov ^icpovc, <p6vov
SoiT] anaGi^cov, maJiepel xaiq enTiiaiv ."
The proverbial gnats are mentioned at 5. 187-89: "dp^aiKoq ydp Kal
nahxixEpoc, Xoyoq / Kpoxeiv Tiapaivei xtiv |J.dxTiv xalc, e|j.7iiaiv / ox; oia
idic, Xiovoi Toiq TiocvaXKeai."^'*
(55) "Cowardice is an unforgivable affliction," says Bryaxes to his
soldiers (5. 389-97):
'"'Iv' ovv d7toxp£;ioixe xavxa jxaKpoGev,
\ii\ npbq <^vyr[\f pev|/oixE Svayevei xponw. 390
Ei |i.ev yotp e^TJv x-qv Gavriv Ttecpevyevai
Kai xTiv xeXe-uxTiv ei^ x6 ndv dreoSpdvai
dX-TiKxov aSonep et)xvxr|aavxa(;^^ piov,
KdvxavGa (pavXov x-qv )J.dxT|v £K<p\>yydveiv •
xiq ydp TtxoTiGfi xtiv xeX-evxTJv, eine |ioi, 395
C^(or\v dXriKxov eiL)x-uxT|aa(; ek xvxriq;
^ This is a recurrent idea in Prodromus; compare 1. 28, 3. 123, 7. 346, 519.
^ Compare Aesop. Fab. 267 Hausrath; AchiU. Tat. 2. 22; Nicit. Choniat. Hisl. p. 650.
20 Bekker.
^ EiixvxTiaavxe^ codd.: corr. Le Bas.
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"O^co^ yevoix' txv zov naQovc, a\>yyv(oozioc,."^^
I think that Gaulmin and Hercher have not understood the sense of this
passage. Read r\v for ttiv in 394, m:oT\Qe\q for 7ixoT|9fi in 395, add a 5' in
396, and include line 397 in the same sentence. Thanks to Prodromus'
redundancy, lines 395-97 say much the same as lines 391-94. Thus read:
"... KotvxauGa <pat»Xov tjv )a.axTiv eKcpvyyaveiv
Tiq Y«P ^xorjGel^ ttiv xeXxvxriv, eijie ^ol, 395
^(OTiv <5'> aXriKxov evx-uxriaaq ek Tvxm
6[i(oc, yevoix' civ xou naQovq ovyyvcooxeo^;"
To 7id0o<; in 397 refers to "cowardice," implied by 390 (pvynv and SuayEVEi
tpOTCQ), 394 EKcpvYYOcvEiv and 395 7iTOTi0Elq.
(56) Finally, Bryaxes gives his navy the order to attack (5. 434^0):
Tooaijxd <f>r\ai, xoi<; ye \ii\v Kco7criX.dxai(;
Kiveiv KeXevei xdq xpiripeiq eaq xd^oq, 435
ooq ctv Tcap' auxriv xtiv noXiv lov MiaxvXov
<p0daai£v dnpooTixa |ir|5' eyvcoaiiEvoi
atXnzov £|j,n£ooi£v Eiq ^ieoov vi^ioc,
Kal vt)Kxa 5oi£v xoiq £vavxio-u|j.evoi(;
Ktti ocpcov KaxEpydaaivxo li-upiov (povov. 440
In 434, read te for ye; in 437, (pGdaavxEc; for cpGdaaiEv; and in 438, ax;
for elq (eic, \iioow HV: jieoov ox; UL): The attacking army is likened to a
dense black cloud (Iliad 4. 274, 16. 66; Herodot. 8. 109. 2).
(57) The description of Mistylus' navy (5. 469-75): •
TaiixTiv ^i£v eixov al xpiripEi^ xtiv Geoiv-
k-ukX-o) 5e xov o^nTiavxa Miox-uXo-u oxoXov 470
7iX,TiG\)q ^£ylox(ov EoxEcpdvo-u <popxi5cov
vnoaxEvov 6£ napavoi^aoai cx6)i.a
Xcopav TtapEixov £^65o-o xoi^ va.\>\i6.xoic,-
x6 5' eKx6<; avxwv koi :cp6<; axxaiq x^^P^ov
noXvq 7iap£ioxr|K£ioav ka^bq Itcjiecov. 475
Since all MSS have in 472 7iapavo{^aaa, and in 473 napEi^Ev (sc. 471
TiXriGix; , . . (popxiScov), read 471-75 as follows:
7iXtiG\)(; fi-Eyiaxcov eoxEcpdvov <popxi5(ov
(vnooxEvov ydp napavoi^aoa axofia
xcopav jiapEixEv £^65o\) xoiq va-undxoiq),
x6 5' EKXoq a\)xa)v Kal npbc, OKxaii; x^^piov
noX'uq 7cap£iaxT|K£ioav ea\ibc, InnEcov. 475
ZuyyvoxTxeoq HV: -xeov UL.
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(58) The naval battle between Bryaxes and Mistylus begins. At first,
Mistylus has the upper hand (6. 25-31):
Ta Tiptota ^ev 6fi xai kot' apxaq xfiq jidxil^ 25
to KpeixTOv eixev 6 cxoXot; xov MioxvA-ov
xpeiq yap xpiripEK; o\)X.XxxPd)v 6 Fcoppvaq
£K xfi<; eKeiGev 5\)a}i£vov(; vaujiaxiaq
ojiXov hex' a-uxmv Kai ovv avioiq vavjidxoK;
jiiKpou y' otv expojio\)xo xo\)(; evavxio-uq 30
Kai Jipoq cpvyriv ckXivev av)xo\)(; oiGpoav.
Read in 28 va-uapxiaq , "from the enemy fleet" (cf. Lycophron, Alex.
733), not "sea-fight" (va^)^axicx<;). The scribe was influenced by the
\ax)\idxoic, at the end of the following line. The same scribal error recurs at
5. 442, va\)apx{av HUL: va-u^a^iav V.
(59) Eventually Bryaxes wins the sea-battle thanks to his clever
frogmen, and conquers Mistylus' city. The description of the ransacking and
looting of the captured city is filled with horror-stories. One of them reads
(6. 134-39):
A'l TiXo-Goiai y-ovavKEq (co jiiKpdq x^xiiq)
XEvpaq ovvEXEXjiTivTO xoi(; 5aKxvX{oi(;
•
135
fi SvaJtpayouoa nXouxov ri-unopEi ^Evov,
x6 a(op,a KEpSaivovoa- kov o\)k tic, ziXoc,
oiL)K T|v A.a0Evv o\) 5oi)Xov o\)5£ bzan6zr\\f •
KoivTi x^xri xct Ttdvxa kqI koivoq vojioq.
First, Une 135 does not scan. Hilberg's suggestion, ax»ve<K>TeT|j,TivTO, is
warmly recommended by 6. 204 o\)vejcx£|ioi(;. Second, in 137 read o\)v for
OVK.
(60) Rhodanthe and Dosicles are taken prisoners, put on two different
ships as slaves and sent away (6. 192-94):
'AtcejiXeov |i.£v r\ C,vya.c, xwv oXkoScov,
VEKpctv (pEpovoai XTiv C^vydba xoiv vecov,
fi ^lev 'PoSdvGriv, r\ be. xov AoaiKXia.
Hercher follows HV by reading in 192 dninXeov, then he writes (pepovoai
in the next line. It seems preferable to follow L (U) by reading in 192
dninXEEv, and then in 193 (ptpovaa with all MSS.
(61) Rhodanthe and Dosicles are two halves of the same body. If one
splits an animal in two parts neither part will live (6. 200-04):
Ol) ydp KoGdjiEp £K <p-uxo\) x|i.T|6£i(; KX«5oq 200
zic, avGiq ekxeBtiXe Kai VDxnv e'xev.
oiSxcoq e'xoiev al kox' aioGtiaiv (pvaEiq-
dXX' El XE^oi^ Pouv ciq \xioac, xo^dc, 5vo,
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^eoTiv dv avxwv atJxiKa avveKxenoK;.
An Aristotelian vegetative soul is out of place here. Read in 201 ^coV for
V'ux'nv, and compare 204 ^cotiv.
(62) A severe sea-storm surprises the ships (6. 209-13):
Nv^ 5e\)X£pa |j.EifiX6e, koi Gpaavq Noxoq
5pi|i.i)(; npoeX-Soiv eK \iior\q n£CTTi)j.ppia(; 210
K-upxoi nev £iL)6\)(; zt[c, SaXdooiiQ x-qv pdxiv,
•byoi 6e xavxTjc; K-oiidxcov noXXoix; X,6<po\)q,
Kai x«o^a 'to^ koixcoGe liexpi n\)0|J.evo(;.
Line 213 does not make sense. Unless there is a lacuna after line 212, I
would suggest reading Kal xaaiidxcov for the transmitted Kal xda|i.a xo\).
Compare 2. 10-14:
oii KUjidxcov 9po\j(;, ov XxScpoi Kal xdofiaxa 10
(XOUXOOV EKElVOiq dvX£rt£^TlY£p}i.eVCOV
TivKYTi xapaxfi Kal ovxvfi |j.£xaKXia£i,
Kal xwv Xocpcov )j.£v dvxixao^iaxovnEvcov,
xcov xao^dxcov Se xo-unaXiv Xo90\)H£V(ov).
(63) The storm causes the shipwreck of Rhodanthe's vessel, but she is
saved while safely riding on a plank from the wreckage (compare Achill.
Tat. 5. 9. 1). Some sea-merchants take Rhodanthe in their ship and sell her
as a slave on Cyprus (6. 239-44):
. . . Evx-uyxdvEi |i.£v (sc. Rhodanthe) £|i.7copiKai(; oXKaai
xTiv d^<pl K-ujipov zvQi nov cxEiX,an£vai(;, 24Q
Kal XTiv Ea-oxfii; XiJiapEi ocoxripiav
£K xcov £v auxa^ eiijiXeovxcov E^Ttopcov.
'AXk' o'i 8\)a(onTi9£vx£(; auxov xov Xoyov
dvEXKVovoiv EKXoq avxTiv a\)xiKa . . .
Read lines 243-44 instead:
'AXX' 01, 5-uacojtTi9£vx£q avxiiq xov Xoyov,
dvEA,KVODOiv Evxoc; {sc. xr\q 6XKd5o^) avx-qv avxtKa . .
.
(64) Dosicles takes Rhodanthe for dead at sea and engages in a 250-line
dirge, in which he says (6. 281-85):
"KaxEoxov r\\ia.c, XrioxpiKal X£^p£<5 ^luo,
£X0p6^ Bp\)d^T|(;, aXXcq ExBpoq MiaxiiXoc;-
dXX' kXnic, -ortESpa^Ev, 6.XK' zQaXy^i |j.e
eXevGePOV (pCOq 6\|>£ YOt)V 6E6opK£vav
xov SovXiKou xeGevxo^ £K7to5mv vEtpovq-" 285
What Dosicles loathes is not "the cloud" but "the darkness of slavery." He
has in mind the darkness of a prisoner's dungeon: 7. 250 Kal 6eo^6(; ti|j,iv
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Kttl (pvXaKTi Kttl oKoxoc, (cotTipare 3. 119, 244, 7. 20, 9. 282).
Accordingly read in 285 <iove(poA)(; for vecpo-uq.
(65) Dosicles continues his dirge (6. 296-302):
"Hoi) aoi xa xpiva tmv KaXibv piXTijidTcov,
not) adi^azoq xa n^pxa, oapKoq ti z^H.
x6 xcbv pX£<pdp(ov dvGoq; "Q^ol, napGeve,
liapaivexai x6 jifiXov.^^ -q poid <p6ivei,
(p-uXX-oppoei xct 6ev6pa, Jiijixei xd Kpiva- 300
ciq ynv 6 KapTcoq, fi x«P^ napzpp<ir\,^^
xou |iexo7i(opov npo<p6doavxo(; xov xpovov."
In 297, all MSS have xov for not), which is the correct reading, and in 302,
Hilberg's suggestion, (pOivoTicopo-u for iiExoTicbpot), restores the meter.
Again, the archetype of HV UL was more corrupt than hitherto assumed by
scholars.
(66) Dosicles vividly depicts Rhodanthe's plight at sea (6. 323-28):
"... Ga^d ovveiXkov xai(; ponai(; xdjv K-ujidxcov,
xwv dve^cov 5£ xai<; nvoaiq dvxeJiveov,
eiq \>\\fo<; aiGepiov dvao7i(0|i.evT|, 325
KaxTiYjievTi 5e [lixpic, avxot> ji'uG^£vo(;
d)(; dv x6 nvE^)|Ia Kai x6 Kvna ov^cpepT],
EKEiGev evGev paSicoq oxp<o<pco|i£VTi."
In 324, for dvx£7iveo\) read avenviov, "you were revived by the blowing
winds," and read lines 326-28 as follows:
"... JcvG)i.evoq, 326
EKEiGev evGev paSioo^ cxpaxpconEvn, 328
dx; dv x6 nvEvjia Kai x6 KV|i.a av^cpEpT]." 327
(67) Dosicles continues his dirge (6. 373-76):
"Tfiv ydp GdXaxxav eoxei; dvxi naaxaboq,
XQv K-uiidxcov xov p6|i.pov dvxl xv)i.ndv(ov,
XMv doxpanajv x6 (piyyoq dvxl A,a|i.nd5(ov, 375
xov xcbv VYpcbv KOipavov dvxl vu)i(pio\)."^'
In 373, all MSS have 7iaoTd5cov, which goes well with the rhyming
plurals in 374 and 375. UaoxdSec,, pluralis pro singulari, is employed at
1. 216, 2. 63, 3. 260, 9. 43.
^ Compare Achill. Tat. 1. 8. 9; Nicet. Eugen. 6. 74.
^ Compare Archil, fr. 196A. 18 West; Theocrit. 7. 121; loann. Geometra, Carm. 2. 56;
Prodromus, Catomyomachia 279.
'^^ Compare A.G.d.lQ.l.
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(68) Following the rules of a dirge, Dosicles addresses Rhodanthe's
parents (6. 379-84):
"KaXoic, a.nri'kavGaxe xo\> Gvyaxpiov,
lifiTep 'Po5dv9ri<; Kal ndxep, Opuvri, Zxpaxov 380
KaXT]v owenTJ^aaSe y«HO'*> «aoxd5a,
KaXov c\)V£jiXi^aa6e xfi Kopri oxe<po(;,
Xannpctv ujte^T|\|/ax£ xt^v 5a5o\)xiav •
xoiouxojv otTccovaaGe xojv pvXaY^dxcov."
While in 384 Hilberg was convincing when restoring the meter by reading
ToiovTov for xoio\Stcov (another sign of how precarious Hercher's edition is),
he was less fortunate in line 381, where he suggested owEnXe^aoQe for
the unmetrical ODveTiTj^aoGe. For G\)ve7iX,£^aG0E is discarded by the same
word in the next line. The correct reading is o\)VE<K>7iTi4aa0£ . .
.
TiaatdSa. Compare a few lines earlier (6. 369) eTitioao^ev . . .
TiaoxdSa, 7. 172 Kai v\)|i(piK(ov evvoia TiaoxoTiTiYicov; Nicetas
Eugenianus 6. 552; Constantine Manasses, Aristander and Callithea fr. 100.
1 Mazal TiaaxdScov TiriyvujiEvcov ydp Kal ydjicov t£^ov|I£vcov . . .
Finally, it seems preferable to take the entire passage 6. 379-92 as a set
of rhetorical questions (with an expected answer, "No way!"). Accordingly,
question marks are needed after lines 380, 384, 386, 389 and 391. These
five rhetorical questions are answered by Dosicles himself in 392-93:
""ii <ppov5a Tcdvxa Kai k£v6(; iiovoq Xoyoc,-
XOLvidv b Tiovxoq eKpo<pa xd(; eXTc{5a(;."
(69) Cratander tries to dissuade Dosicles from committing suicide; a
traditional mourning for Rhodanthe will do (6. 436-45):
"Ei 6' apa Kai xeGviixev r\ ar\ napQivoq
(keioGo) yap oiSxco Kal 5i56oG(o xw Xoyo)),
XI 5t\ nap' av)x6 xtiv xeXevxriv dandoTi;
"EKKoyov ctKpov zf[ GavovoT] xtiv koiitiv,
aneioov niKpov^^ SdKpvov ck pX,£(pap{5(ov, 440
pfi^ov x6 xixcoviov, oi|i(o^ov jieya,
piyov oeauxov Kaxd ynq kni axo^a,
Qhq tic; Kopucpriv, fiv Sokt] aoi, Kal koviv
dv5p6<; ydp o\)5e xauxa, nXr[v <popTixea
V^X^<9 dX,ovoTi(; £^ epcoxoX,Ti\|i{a(;." 445
In 444, read o\) 5ti for ovSk, since xavxa refers to the suicide (438 xt]v
T£>^\)XTiv), not to the mourning (439-43).
(70) Dosicles is disconsolate and engages in yet another dirge while
addressing Rhodanthe (6. 487-91):
^^ riiKpov Le Bas: jiiKpov codd.
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"'IX^^'S 5ieiA.ov Ktti 6ieartaaavT6 oe,
Kol Tai<; -ocpaXoK; xcbv jietpwv ripa^P^ oe;
OveEi^ ti jiiKpov Ktti JiapaanaipEK; EXi, 490
T\ Kfjxoq dvxivTiKxov epp6<pTiae oe;"
In 491, dvTivTiKtov is Hercher's conjecture for the transmitted
dvTiTtviKTov. Read dpxiTiviKxov, "(you), just drowned," instead, and
compare, e.g., 8. 479 dpxiaoxx;, "just healed."
(71) While Dosicles remains enslaved and imprisoned in Pissa,
Rhodathe is serving as a slave of Craton on Cyprus (7. 5-1 1):
Ti 5' fi 'Po6dv0r|; Kav eyvco 5o\)A,tiv xvx^v, 5
Kcxv eiSe xov Kpdxcova 5eoTt6xT|v veov,
OX) xov Tipiv T| YvoT|oe SeoTcoxTiv "Epov
Kctv CK T\)XTiq 5eo7toivav eyvg) x-qv IxdXTjv,
OX) XTiv TtaXaidv 'AcppoSixTjv Tiyvoei -
Kav 7tX,eioxov ea|i6v e\)pe ovvSo-GA-cov vecov, 10
o-uvSo-uA-ov TiTtioxaxo xov AooiK^ea-
In 6, read oi6e for Ei6e.
(72) Rhodanthe matches Dosicles' dirge with one of her own (7. 57-
68):
".
. . Ktti GOV xvxov 0av6vxo<; (aSjioi vDjicpie)
e|4.ov 'PoSdvOriq xfiq xaXavncopox) x^piv,
eycb pXenco (pwq kqi nveco xov depa
^Ti (pwq epuSpicooa, \ir[ xov depa, 60
ov Ttveiv d9fiKaq, ov pXeneiv Ti)i.cov xdp'^v;
'Opffl 6e Tiovxov, Tiovxov ovK ai6ov|ievT|,
ov Eaxe<; (alai) Kai xdcpov xai naoxdSa;
Ilaxcb 5e yfiq xt^v pdxw ekxoc; aiox'ovTiq,
r\v ov Tcaxeiq av ((pet» Geot) xivoq X^piv; 65
'E)io\) xdpvv- Kai ^moav ov 7ii|i7ipdxe |J.e;
Aixfi XiJiovxoq xov (Jiov AooiKX,eo(;
Pioi 'Po5dv9-n Kai Piovoa XavBdvei;"
In 61, read (with UL) o (sc. (pcoq) ^XinEiv. And in 67, read ACkti for
Hercher's Aixfi; all MSS have 6ikti. According to Rhodanthe, Dosicles
justly and dutifully dies for her while fulfilling his marital pledge of eternal
union; compare 7. 56 oavxbv TcpoaneTwi^aq a-oToq avToxeip.
(73) Everybody is asking Rhodanthe about Cratander. She tells them
what she knows (7. 275-77 and 280-85):
'^
•E^eGpvve V^, Gaulmin: e^e0pev|/e HV^: e^eGpaye
'^
"Hpa^e Hercher: fippa^e HUL: eppa^e V.
UL.
Miroslav Marcovich 393
"Tavvv ojioi yevoiTO Kai tivoc; ptov" 275
e<pT| 'Po5dv9Ti 'VilSe n-uvOdveaSe ^o\) . . .
MwjTvX,o(; avTov eixev eyKZKXeia^ivov 280
ppovpa OKOxeivfi Kai ^o<p(o6ei x^P^fp-
MiKpoq JiapfiXfie val ^iKp6(; ixeaov xpovoc;,
Kttl tk; Bpvd^Ti<; dvxipdi; i^ Mioxv^cp
fidxTiv covEKpotTioev e^ evavxiaq
Kttl ndv Kateoxpevaxo tovtov to xpdxoc;." 285
In 275, read with H Nvv ovv for Hercher's improvisation, TavOv. And in
282, read with HUL Kai ppa/ix; for Kai ^iiKpog (Gaulmin), val ^iKpoc; (Le
Bas, Hercher), and compare 4. 82, 8. 3 and 8. 284.
(74) Rhodanthe ends her information, and Craton leaves for Pissa at
once (7. 304-05 and 310-12):
To'uxo\)(; 'Po5dv9r| avjinepaivei zovq "Koyovq-
b 5' apa Kpdxcov "xaipe noi, xekvov" (ppdaa(; . .
.
305
eiq riiooav e^cop^rjae zov naibbq x^P'-^- 310
~Q. cnXayxva naipoq, cb xekovxoq Kap5ia,
caq Kpeuxov ouSev naxpl zr\c, e-ooxopyiac;.
In 304, xo-bxoxx; and xoxx; Xoyovc, are Hercher's emendations (with reference
to 2. 52). But HUL have to-utok; (sc. xoiq oteoi) and xov A^oyov, and this
is the correct reading. In 312, Gaulmin and Hercher have Tiaxpl x^q , but
the reading of HUL naxpiKr\c, is to be preferred (Prodromus employs
naxpiKoc, at 1. 237, 5. 258, 6. 274).
(75) The king Bryaxes argues with Dosicles for human sacrifice, "Gods
expect the most precious sacrifice from men" (7. 423-25):
"Ti 5*; "Av jiupiov evx^xcov xP'^^oo^ P^cpoi;
eneixa |j.evxoi OKe\)o<; ooxpdKov (pepco,
dp'" eiTiev "dYdoaivxo xal 5e^aivx6 ^e (sc. 6eol);" 425
Read with HUL evxvxcdv for evtv^wv (Gaulmin, Hercher).
(76) Cratander refutes Bryaxes (7. 493-501):
"El 6' ovv 6 KaX6(;, PaoiXev, xfiv iSeav
a^i6(; eaxi xfiq Qiaq Gaveiv x^piv
Kttl 6'oaiao8ei(; xoiq 0£oi(; xoipiv (pepei, 495
XI 5t| Tcoxe jipofjA-Gev elq yfiv, eiTie (loi;
'Qq dv GdvTi Kttl <xo'u<;> Geo'ix; eaxidari;
Ti 5' ol Geoi Tiapfi^av av)x6v ev p{(p;
'Qc, dv xvGelq xpdne^av auxovq dpxuoTi;
Ti 6' d5iKovvx£(; ol xaXol xfiv iSeav 500
Geoiq £xoi^.d^oioi XTiv etxoxvav;"
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First, in 495 read with H (pepeiv for (pepei UL, Gaulmin, Hercher. Second,
in 497, GdvTi Kal <to-u(;> is the reading of Le Bas, adopted by Hercher.
Since HUL have Gavfixai Kal instead, read the line, 'Qq av Gaveixai Kal
Qeovc; EOTida-n. Finally, read 500-01 as follows:
"T( 5'; 'A5iK0\)vx£<; ol xaXoi ttiv I5eav
Geoiq etoi|4.dao'ooi ttiv eucoxiav;"
(77) Craton arrives in Pissa, learns about the human sacrifices, and
starts entreating Bryaxes to free Cratander (8. 5-12):
. . . ctX-aA-ayfi Gpiivovvtoq avbpbq ev |i.£ocp 5
Kal Tcdvtaq k^inXr]^z tm Kaivqj <j)6pq).
'O 5' r|v 6 Kpdxcov dx; ydp eiq Illaaav <p6daa(;
xfiq vr\6c, EK^ac, dvaPaivei ttiv noXiv
KOI ^vvT^xcbv yepovTi tivI PapPdpco
(epoiTO ydp yepovTa Bp-od^ov nipi) 10
Ktti xoLC, Qvaiaq EK^aGdjv Kal xovi; (povouq
TipooEiovv £iL)G\)(; T9 ve© Kpdxcov ^.Eya . .
.
First, in 6 read val for Kal. Second, in 7 read To 6' tJv (HUL) for '0 6' tJv
(Gaulmin, Hercher), and oc, for ooq. Finally, read 9-10 as follows:
Kal ^Dvx\)xft)v yEpovTi tivi PapPdpw
epoixo xov (HUL) yEpovxa Bpvd^ov JiEpi.
(78) Craton implores Bryaxes (8. 26-30):
"MdxTiv ydp dvooain-i xov tiXovv xov xoaov.
El K-unpov a.<f>t\c, ev KEvoiq ojSe Spd^co,
jidxTiv 5e xa»v ocov lEpoov 7to6a)v Giyoj.
Ov ^(ov x6 xEKvov 6\|/onai jiaxT^p yEpcov;
Mti xot>xo, Geie paaiA-Ev, ^t] Tcpoq GeSv." 30
Read lines 28-29 instead:
^dxT^v Se xoav oSv Upoov jio5mv Giyco,
Mt; ^mv x6 xekvov 6\|/o|iai nax-qp yEpcov.
(79) Craton continues (8. 38-42):
"Aoxco TcaxTip SeiXoio^ dvG' v\.o\> 5iKaq-
yEpovxa G-ooia^E, jiTi KaXov veov
yEpovxi |i.£v ydp xov ^icpovq p-iKpoq Xdyo^, 40
dx; niKpov r[bTi koI ^(90-o(; X'^pl'j GdvTi-
VEO) 6e xoxj ^fjv Ti xdpi<; "po<; "^oiq npooco."
In 41, Hercher follows Chrysocephalus (M) in reading ox;. But oq of HVU
(oi L) is to be preferred. Thus read: 09 . . . Kal ^icpovx; xcopXc, Gdvoi.
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(80) Craton quotes the prophet Hosea (6. 6 eXeoc, GeXco Kai ox)
GDOiav), 8. 50-55:
"Abe, Toi(; Seoi^ xov oikxov dvxi 9\)Oia(;- 50
KaX,Ti 0eoi<; xpotTce^a (piXavOpconia,
KaA-oq KpaxTip av6pco7to(; EKcpvyajv <p6vov.
Ovxco 0£oi Seiicvovai xtiv ocoxripiav,
ovxco Geojv apiaxoq t] koivti x«P<*.
aXX' oi) Kpea(; ppoxeiov, ov noXvc, <p6voi; ..." 55
In 54, 1 think Prodromus wrote apioxov, not apiaxoq (to avoid ambiguity),
and certainly xdpic, for the unmetrical x«pot- H koivti xapiq, "the gratitude
of all," is common enough.^^
(81) Employing the image of God as a potter (Jeremiah 18. 6, Romans
9. 21 et saepius), Craton says (8. 74-81):
xovq xEKxovdi; ^o^), xouq enovq Kepajieac;, 75
xe9p\))i.)i.ev(ov n.dX,ioxa xojv K£pa|iicov;
OiSxo) yctp av lax'oov eivai xexvixai
Ktti xcti; d9op^dq Xa^pdvoiev xoxt Piov,
aX,X,ov GpvPevxoq aXXo JiA,dxxovxEq veov;
'kXX' o\) 'itXSioi,^^ ndv ye ^.tiv xo\)vavx{ov. 80
0eoi 6' £(p' 0) x£p<p8eTEv dvOpcojcov pov©;"
Read lines 75-79 instead:
xovc, x£Kxovd(; \x.o\), xo'vx; ejaovc; KEpaji£a(;
;
75
]Y
Quxco yap av laxiJOv Eivai XEXvixai
XE6p-u)i.H£V(ov ^idXioxa xwv KEpajo-icov;
Kai xd(; d<pop)j.d(; XafiPdvoiEv xov Pioi), 78
dXXo-o GpvPEVxoq ixXXo TC^dxxovxEi; veov;
(82) While Dosicles and Cratander are standing on the pyre to be
sacrificed to the gods, suddenly a miraculous shower extinguishes the pyre
and saves their lives. (The same miraculous shower saved lives in
Xenophon, Ephes. 4. 2. 8-10; Parthenius, Narrat. amat. 6, p. 52. 2-5
Martini; Acta Pauli et Theclae 11). Then the king Bryaxes sets the youths
free (8. 130-35):
'O Se Bp'V)d4Ti(; ^•^vuoa(; oiynv E(piT 130
"Ico^ovoGe, XEKva, Ktti nvoTiv EX-E-oGEpav
TivEoixE Ktti pXinoiXE Xannpdv Ti|j.£pav.
"ExEiq xov -ulov £K Geojv, jtdxEp yipov
e'xev*;. AoovkXek;, ek Geosv hev xov ptov,
^' Compare, e.g., Lycurg. In Leocrat. 139 Blass.
^
'POOC o\> yeXoKji hints at 8. 71, owk av xapfj xfjv Gpwyiv oxtbz Kayxaooi {sc.
KEpajieuq).
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CK 5e Bpixi^o-o xnv eXevGepav t^xtiv." 135
In 134, Hcrcher follows U in reading ek Gecov. But HVL have ek Aioq
instead, and this is the correct reading: ek Gecov is an echo of the ek Gewv
in the preceding line. It is Zeus who sends showers.
(83) How all the maidens of Cyprus became love-stricken as soon as
they approached Dosicles (8. 191-94 and 200-04):
Ouxax; ekewcov xdjv vecov ti|j.(onEV(ov
enai^ev ojq eicoSev 6 Spijiuq "Epcoq,
jioXXoix; oicxovx; xoiq veoiq Kai xaic; viaic,
EK xov ji\)p(65oi)(; xavGcov xo^apiov ... 194
'H |iev yap (sc. napGevo^) ai6oiJ^ ektioScov xeGeiixevriq 200
•fiYYvoev, dvxePXeyev dnXriaxoK; Kopaiq,
(oc, £77t)Gev pXinovaa xaGapoJc; ^Xinoi-
ccXXti npoafiXGe, xov x'^'^'^voc; (sc. AoaiKXeoc;) iivj^axo
KoiK xr\c, ctcpTiq eXaPe 6£'ux£pov PeXo(; . . .
In 192, read with all MSS ETiai^Ev. And in 202, read (p^E-yoi for the
senseless ^Xinoi. ^Xiyoi (intransitive) is confirmed by 204 £A,aPE
6etStepov ^iXoc;.
(84) "I cannot believe that Dosicles is unable to recognize me. He
who . . . ," says Rhodanthe (8. 352-57):
".
. . oq ^a)Ypa9£iv oS^ivoxo xfiv £^t]v Gmv
|i£Ocp npbq ax>xu> KapSiaq nivaKio),''^
6i' ov TcapoiKW KvTcpov £v 5ovXti X\)XT1'
Tiv aiL)x6q oi5£v cKXinovcav naxpi5a, 355
11V oiKiav, ov o^Pov, oijq <pvxoan6pox>c,,
Kav vvv GEtopobv dyvoEiv nXxixxoixo |i.E."
In 355, Gaulmin and Hercher follow U^ in reading £KA.i7iot)aav. But
HVU^L offer the correct reading, EKA.i7iot)aa. Accordingly, punctuate as
follows:
5l' ov TtapOlKCO KvTipOV EV 5o{)A,Tl XX>XX[<
r[v, a\ixbc, o15ev, EKXinovoa naxpi5a, . .
.
(85) After the happy reunion of Rhodanthe and Dosicles, the host
Cratander proposes (8. 403-06):
"MfixEp, TipoKEioGco 6E'ux£pa jiavSaiala-
Tiavfiy-upiv oxT|a(on£v EVKA-EEOXEpav,
XopconEv, E\)(ppavGcbji£v fiSovTiv v£av 405
xd Tipcoxa Kaxd xoiq veoi^
-otcekp^Pti."
^^ Compare 2 Cor. 3. 3, Prov. 3. 3, 7. 3.
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Cratander is not inviting people to dance, but to rejoice. Thus in 405 read
with VUL xapw^ev for xopa>|xev of Gaulmin and Hercher (H omits 8.
398-497), and compare line 412: Upbq xama tioiov yr[Qoc„ fi6ovTi tcooti.
(86) Cratander' s sister Myrilla, a contender for Dosicles' heart, puts
poison in Rhodanthe's wine causing a total paralysis of her rival's body.
The poet is shocked and exclaims (8. 448-52):
"Q. C^r\Xox\>nov Kap6ia(; Kal PaoKavo-u-
e<p' Q) t-oxew epcoTOc;, evtvxeiv ydficp,
dbv o\) tvxeiv eiieXkev evSiKco Kpiaei, 450
£9* 0) avveXfieiv xm AooikXei wmpi©,
5e5a)Ke oapK6(; ndpeaiv xt[ jiapGevo).
Reverse the order of lines 450 and 45 1
.
(87) The poet continues, "And where is the Goddess of Justice?" (8.
460-63):
'H ^.ev MvpiXXa xavta PaoKotvcp xpon©- 460
XI 5' r[ Oeojv xe'vp koi xct 9ea)J.d xi\c, AiKTiq;
CK)K £t)6v(; dvxeoxpajtxo xfi Jiovripia;
Mevxoi- |j.iaei ydp xfiv KOKoxponov (p^aiv.
In 461, Hercher (p. Ivii) follows U^ by reading Geajxa, which can be
paralleled by 7. 389 voiio-og Tipoxijico Kal xa Geajioc xr\i^ Aiicriq. But VU^L
have 6ea)j.a instead. "The shackles of Dike" is to be preferred to "Dike's
laws" in view of 5. 228 t\ tcov Gewv x^vp, t\ fidxaipa zric, Adcrjc;.
(88) While hunting in a forest, Dosicles and Cratander see a partially
paralyzed bear finding the healing herb (8. 466-70 and 476-79):
. . . dpKxov voaovoav evpov fininXri^iav,
xoiq 5e^ioiq h.ev veKpdv, ov Kivov^ievriv,
e\)cov6|ioiq 6e npo(5toMp\iivr\v [lovoiq.
'Q.C, 5e TipofiABev eii; noT]<p6pov xojiov,
dveanaKuia Jioiav EiJJipeneCTxdxriv . . . 470
xavxTiv nepixpiyaoa x© vexpo) \iiXti 476
fi (p-ooiKTi xexvixiq (dpKXoq, 'r\v £.(f>r\v),
x6 vEKpov e^Mcocev djiav capKiov
Kal (pvydi; dpxiotoiioi; mx^'^o 5p6|Aq).
First, in 468 read 7ipoa<a>eo'up^evriv. Second, in 470 Tioiav
E-uTtpeTieotdxTiv is Hercher's reading for et)7tpe7ieaxdTT|v Tioav VUL. But
the form noa recurs in lines 475, 484, 503, 517 and 521. Consequently,
read the line instead dveaTtaKma <y'> (dveoTiaKuiav V: dveoTiaKvia
UL) zx>npzneax6ixr\v noav. Finally, in 479 dpxiaco|io<; is senseless. Read
apxiacooq, "just healed," instead.
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(89) "Who could expect such an irrational act from Myrilla?" asks
Dosicles (9. 75-80):
"Kai nov yap av r\Xn\<5xo tw AooiKXei 75
ovTco Mt)piX,X«v T(bv <ppeva)v oKpeatdvai,^^
ioc, 7rpoo5oicfioai tov AooikXtiv E^KVoai,
el xfi 'PoSdvBri napeGeiari TipoaPXenoi,
0(; XTivixavxa Kai ondGiiv eanaaiievoq
Heocov Kax' avxmv eyKotxcov tny\lja\ij\y/;" 80
Dosicles was ready to kill himself, but he did not. Thus read in 79
XTiviKavt* av for TTiviKa\)Tav (L: TiiviKavxa HVU).
(90) Rhodanthe advises Dosicles that both of them should flee from
Cyprus. But he is afraid of greater perils than Myrilla (8. 104-11):
""Ejceixa kcxv <pvYoi)iev eiq a^Xriv koXiv,
xiq eyyoaxai KOi Oeovq onvuoi |ioi 105
^Ti X£^P<* ^noxov ^T|X£ pdpPapov oxoXov
^r|5e Bp-ud^Tiv 6\)a^evf) PaaiXea
eXJOovxa 0^6x1001 ^.e 6eanoiq dX'uxoK;-'^
Kttl 5ovX,ov EKJienvai |i£ npbc, xfiv naxpi5a;
Kctv Buoid^eiv xiQ ^E xoiiq 6£oi(; GeXri, 110
xi(; xou n-upoQ piuaaixo Semepoq Kpdxcov;"
In 106, read with all MSS M.ri6e for \iT\iz. In 110, Kav QvoiaC,ziv xiq [it
is the reading of Gaulmin and Hercher for MSS' kcxv Kai Gvaid^eiv p.e.
Read instead: Kav tiod Gi^aid^eiv )xe. The subject is, of course, Bryaxes
(line 107). Kav tio-u in this position recurs at 6. 87, 7. 151 and 177.
(91) Rhodanthe tells her story—how she survived the shipwreck and
was saved from the sea (9. 149-59):
"... xd 5' £v5ov ov)5ev f[ <l)G6vo(; KaKd tiXekcov
KOI x^lp Gewv Xvovoa xdq TiXoKajiiSaq. 150
'H vavq ydp, tiv eiafiXGov, evGvq eppdyn,
6 <p6pxo(; dnaq x© pvGw npooeppitpii,
eyw 6e x© kX-u6(ovi a•o^^eGelXK6nTlv,
)iiKp6c) 7tapi^f|aaaa npooPdSriv ^vX,(p,
e(p' u xp6|j.cp )i.£v, ujiepenX.eov 5' 6^(0(; ..." 155
"0Ecbv Xeyeiq npovoiav, oaq eacp^e at"
x£|i.(bv AoaiK^fiq xt^v 6iT|yTiaiv Xiyci
"-onep KOp'u(pfi(; dcpavox; 'i7ixa)j.evT|
KOI xw ^vX(o bibovaa xeipaycoylav."
3* Compare Soph. Philocl. 865; Eur. Or. 1021, Bacchae 944; Prodromus 2. 218.
497. 4. 426. 5. 79, 8. 442.
3' Compare Odyssey 8. 274-75; Aesch. Prom. 155.
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In 149, read with UL evGev, "what followed," for evSov HV. And in 158,
read ao<paXSiq, "safely," for the insipid d<pavc5<;.
(92) Finally, Lysippus and Straton, the fathers of Dosicles and
Rhodanthe, arrive in Delphi to consult Pythia about the destiny of their
children. She produces nine cryptic hexameters beginning with Titcte (just
as the oracle in Xenophon's Ephesiaca 1. 6, 2 did),^^ which in Hercher's
ediUonread(9. 196-204):
"Tinxe, bxxa yevexa, TtoX.VTipdxoio it \i6<sxov
jiopxio^ 6' bLiiakr\c, cxoKxac, 6i^ea8e KeXevSovq;^'
Xepoffl -up' bXxKKxiOXf^,^^ ^(poTp6<pov'*^ noxi vaoov,
11V Xxixe Kt)npoY£V£ia, rioBoi) yevexeip', *A(ppo5vxT|
(tie 7capaoxop.evTi x65e oiSvona, tie XaPouaa), 200
5epk6|I£voi piocovxaq eXevoexe- dXX,' EJti ndxpriq
oxEyaB"*^ vno oxEcpdvoiai xponaio<p6po\) K'u9£pEiTi(;-
xouq ydp "Epcoq xe IloGoi; xe Kai 'AcppoyEVEia K'u9t|pt|'*^
6)i.T|oaxo 6£io5£xoio dX,-UKX07t£5Tiov aiSdpov.'"*"*
Versus claudicant, but the poet is to blame (since a, i, u remain 6{5cpova in
his hexameter as well). In lines 196-97, "the young bull and heifer" are, of
course, Dosicles and Rhodanthe. In 200, read with Gaulmin (p. 550)
<T>o\)vo^a. And in 201, read Xetjoete, "you will see them alive," for
eXeuoete V and Huet: eXevooete HUL: e Xetjooete conjectured Gaulmin
(p. 551), and compare Lysippus' interpretation of the oracle (9. 220), wq
apa Kttl Piov)VTa(; laxoijiEv P^etieiv . . .
(93) Finally, Dosicles and Rhodanthe obtain pardon from Lysippus and
Straton for their elopement (9. 301-1 1):
Ouxco AooikXtic; kqi XEycov xal SaKpvcov
E^iX,£o\)v eotievSe ioxx^ (puxooTtopo-uc;-
•ujiocpGdoaq 6£ xov AooikXtiv 6 Ixpdxcov
Kttl xTiv 'Po5dv9Tiv x©v no5(ov'*^ dvaondaa^,
"cb Seuxe" <^r\ci\ "xEKva, npoanxv^aoOE ^lE, 305
(i) 6EVXE, Jipoarc^KTixE xw <p\)xoan6p(p
Kai XE^pot<; £i<; ipo.yx\kov dpxT|aax£ \io\> •
(b XEKvov, (i) 9-uyaxEp, dondaaio |ie.
^* Compare also Heliod. 2. 26 and 2. 35.
^' Compare Dionys. Perieg. 62 OKoA-idq evenoixe KeXevBovq; Pindar, Pyth. 2. 85;
Nicander, Ther. 267, 478.
*° Compare Soph. Ajax 1219; A.G. 9. 657. 2.
*^ Z(poxp6(pov Hercher: ^(utixpocpov HV: ^wrivopov UL.
*^ZTev|/a6' Hercher: ax£(pa0' HUL: oxe(pr)0' V: oxecpGeG* Gaulmin.
*^ KvGripTi Gaulmin (p. 551), Hercher: icoGepcb H^ (cu corr. ex e): loiSepco V: KaGapa
UL
"^ Compare Hesiod, Theog. 521; Apoll. Rhod. 2. 1249; A. G. 5. 229. 6.
*^ T(ov no5(ov codd.: xoiv no6oiv Gaulmin, Hercher.
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"ii 5et>po, vv^<pTi, Sevpo, Xa\inpl v-un(pie-
(oc, euxvxTiq 6 YdfiO(; vndjv, xeicvia, 310
xoiq dGavdiOK; £\)T-uxa)v vvjKpooxoXoK;."
It is only natural that Rhodanthe's father Straton will embrace his daughter
first. Accordingly, transpose line 308 to follow line 304:
Kai iTiv 'Po5dv6Tiv xcbv 7to5(bv dvaondoai;, 304
"(0 TEKvov, w S^yaxep, dojcdoaio ^e• 308
w 6evte" (p-qoi "xeicva, npoonxu^aaGe ^e . . .
" 305
As for the postponement of 91101, it can be paralleled by 9. 432-35, where it
is postponed three lines. Furthermore, in line 311 Gaulmin and Hercher
followed HV in reading ev)T\)X(ov, and then Hercher (p. Iviii) conjectured the
change of the datives into accusatives. But UL have evx-ux^v, and this is
the correct reading. Maybe e\)Tuxcbv was written under the influence of the
Evvoxr[<; in the preceding line.
(94) Dosicles calls his hosts to introduce them to the newcomers
Lysippus and Straton (9. 357-59):
""Q xal ^evioxai xal ^evov xai 5ean6xav,
Kpdxcov, (plXe Kpdxav5p£, nayxd'kr] IxdX.Ti,
(0 SevxE, 5e\)xe, coveopxd^one noi."
Both Gaulmin and Hercher have ^evoi. But Craton and Stale are not
Dosicles' guests but hosts. All MSS have (piXoi instead, and this is the
correct reading.
(95) During the banquet, seeing his happy guests Lysippus and Straton
eating nothing, the host Craton says, "People overwhelmed with joy need
no food" (9. 389-94):
'Ejiei 5e ^Tl8ev \it\ Avainnoc,, \ir\ Ixpdxcov
eaGoiEv, fi6\) npoayeXaaac, 6 Kpdxcov, 390
"eneiJiep" eluev "(dyvoco 5e xov xponov)
o\)5£v (payeiv GeXovxe xojv 7ipoKei|iev(ov,
eyo) YeXoio'U(; ev ixeoco TtpoOeiq Xoyovi;
Kctv Yovv 61' avxoJv eaxidato xo\)(; cplXoix;."
Evidently, Craton is well acquainted with such behavior (391 xov xpoTiov),
for he can explain it (9. 418-22):
"... dXX', ojq EOiKE, xr[q x«P«<; H nXr\p6xr\<;
SE^afiEvfiv etiXtioe Jiavx6<; EvxEpov,
ox; \ii\bk. ulav iox^eiv AixpEiv \(/ixa 420
t\ XI KpEOx; fiopiov, fi iiiKpov H£0\),
fi XI 7cXaKO\»vxo(; f\ oioa|iot>vxo(; iiEpoq."
Consequently, dyvoco in 391 is corrupt. Read instead lines 391-92:
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"intinep" eiJi' (<o'uk> dYvoco<v> br\ xov xpojiov),
"ovSev 9aYeiv SeXoite xwv jcpoKei^ievojv ..."
(96) The explanation of the phenomenon, oXtjv 6 /aipcov axpotpei xfiv
•fmepav (9. 407), is actually due to an old nurse of Craton's; he then
exclaims (9. 423-24):
"Nal'*^ X"^PE' x{x9ti, Ypav^ (piXooopojxdxTi,
ax; (pvoiKooq eX.'uoa^ tdj-iv xov Xoyov."
^iXooo(p(i>xaxT\ is unmetrical, and Hilberg (p. 15) was quick to suggest
<pi>,T|, ao(poyxdTTi instead. However, line 2. 434, d7ip6a{pcopo<; ydp apxi
<piXoao(pia, reminds one of the necessity of living with metrical
irregularities when dealing with "heavy words."
Appendix:
A Godsent Remedy for Paralysis
Myrilla, the rival for the heart of Dosicles, puts a poison in Rhodanthe's
cup of wine and causes a total paralysis of her body (8. 437-47). But
Dosicles, while hunting in the forest, finds a miraculous healing plant,'*''
applies it to Rhodanthe's body as an ointment (8. 504 7i£pi%p{oa<;) and
cures her of the paralysis (8. 504-09).
The question is now: What is the source of this anecdote? Rohde"** and
Krumbacher^' assumed popular and oriental origin ("Einzelne fruher nicht
vorkommende Motive gehen vielleicht auf die populare Uberlieferung
orientalischer Marchen zuruck"). 1 would like to suggest Greek learned
sources instead—the physicians Dioscurides of Cilicia and Paul of Aegina.
In his practical Handbook of Medicine, Paul states that bodily paralysis
could be cured by applying the plant crowfoot. Ranunculus (Greek
Batrachion, "frog-plant") to the body as a plaster (3. 18. 3, p. 163. 15
Heiberg). And Paul is our only source for such a cure. In his turn,
Dioscurides describes a kind of Ranunculus as having a white root and red
flower (2. 175 Wellmann = Pliny NH 25. 172-74). Now, this description
^ Nal Hercher: Kal codd.
'*^ In this endeavor, our hero is assisted by a semiparalyzed bear (8. 466-79). Wild
animals often provide humans with magic cures in international folklore; compare Stith
Thompson, Motif-Index of Folk Literature, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN 1958) B512. Also
V. Pecoraro, "La nascita del romanzo modemo nell' Europa del Xn° secolo. Le sue origini
orienlali e la mediazione di Bizancio all' Occidente," Jahrbuch der Osterreichischen
Byzantinistik 32 (1982) 307-19.
** E. Rohde, Der griechische Roman und seine Vorldufer (Leipzig 1876; 2nd ed. 1900;
3rd ed. 1914; 4lh ed. Hildesheim 1960) 126 n. 2 (= 134 n. 2) and 529 n. 2 (= 546 n. 2).
^' K. Krumbacher, Geschichle der byzanlinischen Lileratur von Justinian bis zum Ende
des ostromischen Reiches (527-1453), 2nd ed. (Munich 1897) 751.
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of crowfoot coincides with Prodromus' description of the miraculous plant
healing the paralysis—white root, green leaves and red flower (8. 471-75).
Both handbooks of medicine, by Paul of Aegina and by Dioscurides,
were well known in Byzantium. There can be little doubt then that
Prodromus used them as his source for the wonderful plant healing the
paralysis. Of course, a partially paralyzed bear in the forest was needed to
demonstrate the treatment with the crowfoot. The anecdote attests to the
erudition of our poeta doctus.
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